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LELAND·STANFORD·JVNIOR·VNIVERSITY

CORRESPONDENCE,

DESPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS,

OF

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

SECOND MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

EDITED BY

HIS BROTHER,

CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY,

G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., ETC.

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LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

LORD CASTLEREAGH.

OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

1808-9 *(continued)*.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Stuart.

Draft. London, November 1, 1808.

Dear Sir—As I consider the instructions sent to you on the 13th go as far to direct an application of your disposable force to Spain as can be done with propriety from hence, I have only further to add to my letters, public and private, of that date, that every day's intelligence makes me additionally desirous of hearing that a British force has shown itself on the side of Catalonia, where its services would be of the utmost importance.

I hope the Court of Palermo will feel that, even to their ultimate views in Italy, the completion of the great work in Spain is of more consequence than an imperfect attempt in Italy, which, without the co-operation of some important military power, can hardly expect permanently to deliver itself, assisted only by a small British corps, with very limited means of furnishing either arms or military stores for arming the people.

You will, of course, take the necessary steps, through the King's Minister, for obtaining their concurrence to your moving with the corps which you have rendered disposable, which, I believe, under the late treaty, by which we are bound to keep a given amount of force in Sicily, is necessary, in order to enable you to carry with you, on service, an adequate proportion of your army.

It may also be necessary that, during your absence, some additional vigilance should be exerted with respect to the local force within the island. You will also suggest to Lord Collingwood the importance of keeping up the naval defences, as far as the relative situation of the enemy may appear to him to require it.

Since I last wrote, Sir John Moore's army has been put in motion towards Spain; they move by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Sir David Baird, with his corps, has landed at Corunna, after a favourable passage of four days from Falmouth, and is advancing towards Valladolid, where the whole will assemble, consisting of 35,000 infantry and nine regiments of cavalry. The enemy, between 40 and 50,000 strong, are concentrated in Biscay and Navarre, expecting reinforcements: they are encircled from Saragossa by Milapo, Lagrono, Frias, and Bilbao, by the various provincial armies, which exceed in number 100,000 men, and I have reason to believe they meditate an attack before the French reinforcements are actually on the line of operations.

I conclude you will bring your small corps of cavalry with you. I shall endeavour to repair the losses sustained by the detachment of the 20th in Portugal, so that it may be in a state to join you in the south of Spain. It was my intention to have sent it on to Sicily; but, as it has been roughly handled in the action of the 21st, I deem it more advisable to leave it at Lisbon till I know more of your movements.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Stuart.

Draft. Downing Street, November 4, 1808.

Dear Sir—I think it right to apprise you that it appears, by the return of our messenger from Paris, that Buonaparte had left that capital for Bayonne. As his reinforcements were expected to have reached the frontier about this time, his object no doubt is to put himself at the head of his army, and attempt the conquest of Spain.

The division of the French army nearest Erfurth has, it is said, been put in motion towards Catalonia. I trust your corps may embarrass their advance. If you find them in great force on your arrival, you will regulate your movements accordingly. I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum on Rank between the Spanish and English Officers in Spain.

November 8, 1808.

Some decision must be come to upon the subject of rank, as the British and Spanish officers must be expected, on various occasions, to serve together upon the same outposts or line of duty; and it must be exactly defined in what manner the command is to be respectively assumed. There does not appear to me any alternative but that the officers of each army must roll together, according to the dates of their respective commissions, without reference to the powers from whom such commissions are derived, whether regal or provincial, provided such commissions are acknowledged by the Supreme Government.

The British being an auxiliary force, it must necessarily be under the command of the Spanish Commander-in-Chief, if a Generalissimo is appointed. The British General must be therefore liable, in that case, to receive orders from the staff of the Spanish General, as emanating directly from himself; but no orders can be given to the British Army but through its own General.

It must be clearly understood that the British force is

intended as a field army, and it is not to be separated into detachments, nor is any detachment to be made from it but with the entire concurrence and by the express orders of its own General.

The British force is not to be employed in the garrisoning of any place or places, whereby a material diminution would be made of its effective strength, nor is it to be occupied in sieges without the particular consent of its General; but it is to be kept together, as far as the circumstances of the war will permit, for the express purpose of opposing the enemy *en pleine campagne.*

Whenever the British General shall have occasion to make any proposition to or hold any communication with the Spanish Government, he shall correspond with it through the medium of the British Minister at Madrid, and all communications from the Spanish Government shall be made through the same channel: but it must be explicitly defined that the British General cannot be placed in any manner under the control of the British Minister, or receive any orders from him, though he must be in constant and intimate correspondence with him, as it cannot be supposed that he cannot have a competent knowledge of military affairs, to give a decisive opinion upon any such matters that the Spanish Government or officers may refer to him. No proposition, therefore, either from the Spanish Government, or the British Minister, as emanating either from himself or from the Supreme Junta, shall be considered as in any manner binding on the British General; he taking care to make a full answer to any such proposition, and making known his reasons for dissenting therefrom.

In the event of any difference of opinion upon important subjects between the British and Spanish Generals-in-Chief, the British General shall take care to represent the same, in the most full and proper manner, to the British Minister, to be by him made known to the Supreme Government, or to his own Court, as the case may be; but nothing is herein intended to

prevent the British General from the most full and confidential communication with his own Government, which he is expected to do by every opportunity.

It is not deemed necessary to give any special instruction relative to the payment of the troops, or providing them with clothing, forage, &c., the whole of which is to be paid by the British Government in like manner as if the troops were acting independently of the Spanish nation. J. H. G.

General Kellermann to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Ryde, 8 Novembre, 1808.

Général—Les Ministres de Sa Majesté ont enfin consenti à lever mon arrêt et je viens de recevoir l'avis que j'allais être transporté en France sur un cartel; quoique ce n'était qu'un acte de justice que j'étais en droit d'exiger, je crois cependant qu'on n'aurait pas tenu grand compte de mes reclamations, si elles n'avoient été appuyées, et je me regarde comme particulièrement obligé envers vous.

Les communications pacifiques, qui viennent d'avoir lieu entre les deux pays m'ont fait naître quelques idées que j'ai jetté sur le papier, et que je vous envoye:[1] si vous ne les trouvez pas déraisonnables, vous pourriez les communiquer à vos amis dans le ministère. Je vous observe que ce n'est que de particulier à particulier que je parle, et que cela ne part uniquement que de moi.

Je vous renouvelle, Général, l'assurance de ma haute consideration, et vous prie de me donner vos ordres pour France.

J'ai l'honneur d'être votre très humble Serviteur,

KELLERMANN.

PS. On m'annonce à l'instant que mon cartel ne sera prêt que dans 5 à 6 jours: actuellement qu'on admet les parlemen-

[1] I conclude that the paper which follows this letter contains the *Ideas* here referred to by Kellermann, though it was found entirely detached, and there is no indication whatever about it pointing to the author.

taires à Calais, ne pourrait on consentir à me laisser prendre cette route ? Je partirais à 5 heures du soir, sans même entrer dans Portsmouth, en marchant toute la nuit ; je serais le lendemain matin à Dover, mais j'aurais obtenu l'avantage d'arriver avec certitude dans 24 heures, et je ne puis vous exprimer quelle obligation je vous aurai de ce service.

Idées d'un Français sur les Moyens de Rapprochement des Puissances belligerentes, dans la supposition que de part et d'autre on fut dans l'intention de faire la Paix.

La réunion de la Russie, de la France, et du Dannemarc contre l'Angleterre, la neutralité sincère ou forcée de l'Autriche, ne laisse aucun espoir à l'Angleterre de susciter dans le Nord une diversion favorable à l'Espagne.

La cooperation des forces réunies de la France, de la confédération du Rhin, de la Hollande, de la Suisse, et de l'Italie, commandées par l'Empereur en personne, contre l'Espagne, defendue seulement par les restes de son armée de ligne et un ramas de paysans, dangereux sans doute par leur exaltation et leur fanatisme, mais non encore dressés à la guerre, ne peut laisser beaucoup de doute sur l'issue de cette grande lutte.

L'accession d'une armée Anglaise de 50 à 60 mille hommes est sans doute d'un poids important dans la balance, mais d'un autre côté est très propre à populariser la guerre dans la nation, et les troupes, impatientes de pouvoir enfin atteindre dans son armée l'Angleterre, jusqu' alors inaccessible à leur coups, l'Espagne, malgré tout son fanatisme, son exasperation, peut-être fondée, ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître la grandeur du danger qui la menace, la profondeur de l'abyme où elle va se précipiter inévitablement, et ce sentiment irrécusable de son impuissance à conjurer l'orage doit déjà lui ôter l'espoir du succès, principal mobile de ses efforts, amener le découragement, et la livrer à moitié vaincue à un maître irrité.

L'Empereur et la masse imposante qu'il entraine avec lui ne peuvent reculer, nul arrangement possible, il faut périr ou se soumettre: le moindre relâchement de la part de la France annoncerait de la faiblesse, et produirait pour elle de conséquences fatales. Cette guerre est donc devenue juste pour elle, parcequ'elle est devenue nécessaire: cette terrible verité sentie, le rétablissement de la dinastie des Bourbons sur le trône d'Espagne devenu impossible, puis qu'ils sont retenus en France et qu'une armée si formidable s'y oppose, c'est à Ferdinand à se dévouer lui-même pour son peuple, à délier les Anglais de leurs engagements, les Espagnols de leurs serments, à leur faire sentir l'inutilité de leurs efforts *pour lui*, quand même s'ils étaient couronnés par le succès, à les engager à se soumettre volontairement, à prévenir, leur déstruction totale, à subir la loi de la nécessité, et accepter un Roi dont les mœurs douces, le caractère affable, leur promet un Gouvernement modéré, du moment qu'il pourra se reposer sur leur foi. Il peut alors demander pour lui l'Empire de l'Amerique, et la faculté de s'y retirer avec les Espagnols qui lui sont attachés et qui voudraient le suivre. Il avait formé ce projet dans un tems plus reculé: peut-être aujourd'hui l'Empereur ne serait-il pas éloigné d'adopter un pareil arrangement: si le sacrifice était sincère, et si l'Espagne y accédait de son côté, cette idée pourrait être murie et développée plus amplement; et on l'offre pour base d'un rapprochement, qui, d'après les liasons actuelles de l'Espagne et de la Grande Bretagne, ne parait pas pouvoir être effectué autrement.

Quant aux autres intérêts à démêler entre la France et l'Angleterre, c'est aux Gouvernemens à s'en entendre. Il ne sera pas difficile d'y parvenir, si l'un et l'autre veulent sincèrement rendre à l'Europe un repos dont elle a tout besoin, et après lequel elle soupire depuis si long-temps, et si inutilement.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. R. Ryder, Judge Advocate General.

St. James's Square, Thursday night, November 10, 1808.

My dear Ryder—I enclose for your consideration a draft to Sir David Dundas, written upon the supposition that a previous demand from the Court, which I still continue to consider as an important preliminary, will impose a duty so difficult and important upon me, as to justify what, if voluntarily performed, might well be deemed no venial offence.

Among the endless perplexities and conflicting duties and difficulties of this delectable little military adventure of mine, which, I conclude, belong to the Bed of Roses, on which I was supposed to compliment our predecessors as reclining, I really cannot discover a less thorny escape. If your judgment approves, I shall, without hesitation, expose my old limbs to be scratched and torn in this path, without searching for a better one in the forest.

I enclose also for your perusal my private letter to Dalrymple, of which, at my desire, he has enclosed me a copy.

I shall hope to see you at one to-morrow, at the Office: pray ask Gordon, *en chemin*, if Sir David has his materials to work upon. Yours sincerely, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir David Dundas.

Draft. Downing Street, November, 1808.

Sir—In compliance with the desire signified to me in your letter of [blank], I have obtained his Majesty's gracious permission to lay the accompanying instructions and correspondence before the Board of General Officers assembled in pursuance of his Majesty's Warrant of the [blank].

Sir Hew Dalrymple, in his letter of [blank], has signified to me that he should deem it essential to the explanation of his conduct with respect to the Convention of Cintra, to enter into an extended view of circumstances collaterally bearing upon

that transaction. I do not feel that I can in justice to him undertake to select such parts only of the papers in question as might otherwise appear to me the material and proper documents to be produced. Under these impressions, I have thought it my duty humbly to solicit his Majesty's gracious permission to lay the whole of the instructions and correspondence connected with the late expedition to Portugal before the Board, leaving it to their wisdom and discretion to make such use of them as the nature of the case and the ends of justice may appear to them to require.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Draft. Coombe Wood, November 6, 1808.

Sir—However desirous I may feel to pay attention to applications proceeding from you, and which have for their object the elucidation of the subject which the Court of Inquiry has been directed to investigate, yet I trust you will permit me to protest as well against the propriety of founding official inquiries upon the anonymous and unauthorized paragraphs which daily appear in the public prints, as against the supposition that his Majesty's Ministers possess an influence over any newspaper, which can justify any individual in attributing to them either a knowledge or approbation of the sentiments which may be found therein.

Had any letters been addressed to me explanatory of the Convention of Cintra, which appeared to me proper to be communicated to you, I should have felt it my personal duty (as in a recent instance) to have put you in possession of them, without solicitation on your part.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.

Draft. St. James's Square, November 11, 1808.

My dear Lord—I send, for your consideration, two drafts to Sir John Moore, together with a memorandum of the Duke

of York's, on the subject of Military Command, which, you will observe, has been adopted as the basis of these instructions.

Being unwilling to ask you to come up to town if it can be avoided, I have communicated these drafts to such of our colleagues as are in London, reserving a final decision upon them till Tuesday, if you should have any suggestions to propose. As far as they have been considered, they have met with their approbation.

We have not had any intelligence from our army later than the 18th of last month, which, I believe, you saw. There is a letter from General Leith of the 31st, which has been productive of numerous reports of battles, but contains, in truth, nothing but the advance of Blake's army to Zarnosa, being a few leagues in front of Bilbao, towards Durango.

If the temper of the Court of Vienna is to be estimated by the selection of intelligence given in the Court Gazette, the conferences at Erfurt do not appear to have rendered it more accommodating to France. In one received to-day, they have, for the first time, given the account of Dupont's surrender, and the victory of Vimeira, in detail. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.

Draft. Downing Street, November 11, 1808.

My dear Lord—In order that Sir John Moore and Sir John Cradock may be the better enabled to judge what requisitions it may be necessary for them to make for carrying on the public service in Spain and Portugal, I should be much obliged to you to let me have a detailed specification of all the advance supplies, including men, guns, ammunition, &c., similar to a paper I received from you with respect to the Copenhagen equipment, which have been furnished by the advance for the service of the British army sent to Portugal, and subsequently for the force sent to Corunna.

I should not have troubled you with this application, had

the information in this Office enabled me to supply it at all in a satisfactory manner; but, although the whole has originated in letters from this Office, the orders are formed in such general terms as to give but an imperfect view of the subject, at least, for my object.

I should rather wish to see the whole of the means furnished in Portugal brought into one point of view, that I might confer with you upon the explanations which it may be advantageous to have brought into view before the Court of Inquiry, as far as it can with propriety be done, to repel any suggestion of deficiency of equipment; although the conduct of Government cannot be considered as matter of inquiry before the Court, yet, as in the mode of their receiving the information which they will have a right to call for, for the immediate duty with which they are charged, injurious impressions may be guarded against, I am anxious that this object should not be neglected, as well for the sake of the Government in general as of myself individually; specially responsible, as I must consider myself, for the detailed sufficiency and execution of the expedition.

From what I can learn, I do not apprehend that any of the parties will rest the explanation of their conduct on the inadequacy of the means with which they were furnished by Government; but it is better to be prepared for such a case, should it arise.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

London, November 12, 1808.

My dear Lord—I enclose a letter which I have received from General Brenier, the object of which is (to save you the trouble of reading it) to claim for the officers who are taken in Portugal the advantage of the 19th Article of the Convention, under which he supposes that they have a claim to be set at liberty. As for himself, he says that, notwithstanding the

claim, he is willing to be considered as exchanged for General Abercromby; but, as he says that the French Government must, by this time, have received the offer of the exchange, and have not taken advantage of the means afforded by the frequent communication by messengers to decline it, he begs you now to consider it as accepted, and not oblige him to wait during the ten weeks during which it was first settled that he should wait for their answer.

I imagine there is no ground for the claim of release, under the 19th Article of the Convention; and, as for the exchange, I conclude that, if you was to allow Brenier to go before the ten weeks would elapse, the French Government would inform you that the exchange could not be allowed; that Abercromby would still be considered a prisoner by them, and that you must keep Brenier. He also wishes to go by Calais when he does go. Let me know what answer I shall give him upon these points.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

London, November 14, 1808.

My dear Lord—After I saw you on Saturday, I spoke to Colonel Gordon, and he agreed entirely in opinion with me that it was expedient to recommend General Spencer to the King at an early period for some mark of his Majesty's favour; but he promised to speak to the Duke of York upon the subject.

I have always been of opinion that I should not be able to convince the public of the goodness of my motives for signing the Armistice; and the late discussions in Middlesex and elsewhere, and the paragraphs in the newspapers, which, after all, rule every thing in this country, tend to convince me that it is determined that I shall not have the benefit of an acquittal, and that the news-writers and the orators of the day

are determined to listen to nothing in my justification. I am, therefore, quite certain that the Government will not be able to recommend for any mark of the King's favour, to which they might otherwise think me entitled.

If this turns out to be true, the Ministers will be obliged to recommend that a mark of the King's favour should be conferred on General Spencer, and not on me, although both were employed on the same service; and this, after an inquiry will have been held, in which my conduct will have been investigated. They will be obliged to adopt this line, notwithstanding that I hope they will be convinced of the propriety of my conduct and the goodness of my motives in every instance: or they must determine not to confer on General Spencer those marks of the King's favour which his services undoubtedly merit.

I have no doubt of the alternative which the Ministers will be inclined to adopt; I am convinced that Spencer himself will urge them not to think of him, if the King's favour cannot be extended to me; and thus he will lose what he so well deserves. I am convinced that this will be the result of any further delay.

I wish, therefore, that you would immediately recommend Spencer for what you think he ought to have. There can be no doubt of his merit on every ground, and nobody can with reason complain that an injustice is done to me, because even my most sanguine friend cannot think that I am in a situation to receive any mark of his Majesty's favour. I wish that you would turn this subject over in your mind, and you will discover that great difficulties will be avoided by adopting immediately the measure which I most earnestly recommend.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

It is said that Spencer would not like to accept any mark of the King's favour at present; but I am convinced that I shall be able to prevail with him.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir John Cradock.

Draft. Stanmore, November 19, 1808.

Dear Sir—If you have not left town, Mr. Cooke will communicate to you the despatches received this day from Sir Harry Burrard. You will observe he has, at the instance of the Regency, sent two regiments to Oporto by sea. As all disturbance is at an end there, I hope the necessity of continuing a British force at Oporto will be but temporary.

It appears to me desirable that the Portuguese Government should, as early as possible, charge itself with the police of their own great towns, particularly Lisbon and Oporto, and that the British troops should occupy the fortresses. I trust you will be enabled, with six regiments of infantry and the regiment of cavalry which I propose to send you as soon as circumstances will permit, to do every thing that British troops ought, under certain circumstances, to be charged with in Portugal, including the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida.

If you find Oporto continues quiet, I should hope one of the regiments might be brought down to Lisbon immediately, and the other as soon as the Portuguese Government can make the necessary arrangements for relieving them. It is equally important to them and to us that the tranquillity of their country should not rest in appearance upon British troops.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Brighton, November 22, [1808].

My dear Wellesley—I congratulate you on the success of the militia volunteering in Ireland, which, certainly, upon the whole, has worked more favourably than either in England or Scotland, and leaves us no room to doubt that, before the expiration of the twelve months, either out of the old or the new men, we shall have derived the full quota authorized to enter into the line.

I observe, by a letter from Sir G. Littlehales to my brother, that the progress hitherto made in the new levies in Ireland is not so satisfactory, notwithstanding the various facilities that you have afforded the counties for raising men. As I conclude that few, if any, will proceed, in the first instance, to a ballot, which, by the by, is the only complete and perfect security for obtaining the number required; and as the period for completing the levy is limited to six months, I wish to submit to your consideration whether it would not be desirable now to name the time, that every county should peremptorily proceed to a ballot for any men then deficient. The effect of this, I should think, would be that this notice would operate as a stimulus, during the interval, to exertion; and that, by ordering them to have a list previously prepared, sufficient time might still remain, by the process of ballot, to obtain the men, and thereby prevent the counties having the penalties levied upon them, for default, before the expiration of the time allowed by Act of Parliament for the termination of the levy. You can best judge what period may be most advisable to fix, in this point of view. I should conceive it ought not to be postponed beyond the 1st of January.

Yours, my dear Wellesley, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.

Downing Street, November 25, 1808.

My dear Lord—I send you two letters received yesterday from Corunna, stating the defeat of Blake's army, but in so loose a manner, as to leave us altogether without the means of extracting either the extent or nature of the disaster; and it is singular that we have no later intelligence from General Leith than a letter of the 11th.

As Sir D. Baird so pressingly demands instructions, it appeared to the Cabinet advisable to direct him, in the only case in which it is possible to give him from hence any instructions,

to go with his army to Portugal, and not, in the event of his being obliged to re-embark, to bring it immediately home.

As the next intelligence may possibly be of an important nature, we hope it may not be inconvenient to you to afford us your assistance on Tuesday next.

I am, my dear lord, yours very truly,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.

Stanmore, November 26, 1808.

My dear Lord—The only communications received by me from the army, with respect to supplies, have been transmitted through Colonel Neville for your information. Sir John Moore appears to have directed a supply of ammunition for the troops advancing from Portugal to be moved forward with Sir D. Baird's corps from Corunna, which demand appears to have induced Sir D. Baird to desire an increased supply to be sent out; but I have not received any direct requisition from Sir John Moore; but, in one of his letters, he stated Corunna as the port through which he should look hereafter to receive his supplies.

I have given directions that the Transport Board should provide, as early as possible, the necessary tonnage for the 600 artillery horses; in this number I suppose the 300 before ordered, and for which tonnage has already been set apart, are included. The transports for the 300 horses were reported to me yesterday as ready. My intention was to embark a regiment of cavalry in the next ships that should come forward; if you deem the artillery service—that is, the sending the additional 300 horses—the more pressing of the two, it shall have the precedence; if not, I should propose to provide for it immediately after the first regiment of cavalry is embarked.

We have, at present, between Portsmouth and Falmouth, tonnage for about 4,000 horses, only requiring to be overhauled after their voyage, and to be reforaged. The tonnage for any

supplies of ammunition or stores, which, in the absence of requisitions, it may appear to you prudent to forward to Corunna, can be instantly supplied upon your orders being signified to the Transport Board through Colonel Neville.

I am, my dear lord, very truly yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Report from Brigadier-General the Honourable Charles Stewart to Lieutenant-General the Hon. J. Hope.

Naval del Re, December 13, 1808.

Sir—You are apprized, by my letter of yesterday, that I deemed it expedient to proceed to this place instead of Carpio, in order more effectually to cover, according to your orders, the right division of the army. On my arrival in the evening, with the 18th Dragoons, I received information that a party of French, consisting of about 50 infantry and 30 cavalry, had arrived from Valladolid at Rueda, with the intention of carrying from thence a large quantity of cotton, to the amount of 3,200 arobas, which General Junot intended to send as his plunder from Lisbon to Bayonne; but which had been arrested in its progress by General Cuesta, at the commencement of hostilities in Spain, and had been warehoused at Rueda. The party above alluded to had put seventy cars in requisition, to accomplish their purpose.

Under such information, I deemed it my duty to prevent the execution of the enemy's design; and I detached Lieut.-Colonel Jones, with eighty men, to Rueda, with orders not to commit the cavalry in the town, but to surround it, and to place himself especially between Rueda and Valladolid, and report the result to me. Not hearing from him so soon as I expected, I proceeded myself with fifty men, and found that he had executed my orders with the same ability as on all occasions. And, as my aide-de-camp, Captain Dashwood, had entered the town in disguise as a Spaniard, I was enabled to ascertain the post where the infantry was and their advanced piquet.

To cut off the latter, I detached a small party under Lieut.-Colonel Otway, which succeeded perfectly, while Lieut.-Colonel Jones and a dismounted party, with their rifles, and dragoons on the road to support them, entered the place; and, after a brisk fire for a few minutes, succeeded in surprising the enemy's post. I have the pleasure to add that we have brought in thirty prisoners; their number killed I have not been able yet to ascertain, it being nearly dark during the skirmish. I have to regret the loss of one man killed and two dangerously wounded, and four horses killed. Some French horses and mules taken make up for the latter loss. The seventy cars embargoed by the French will, I hope, transport hither to-day the cotton alluded to, for the further disposal of which and of the prisoners I shall wait your orders. I have left Lieut.-Colonel Otway with fifty-six men, to cover the removal of the former.

Although this has been merely a little outpost affair, I cannot help assuring you, for the information of the Commander of the forces, that I have every reason to be satisfied with the zeal, spirit, and intelligence, of those officers and men I had the honour to command.

The French arms and cartridges were distributed among the peasants, and I am pleased to add that they manifested every disposition to assist us.

CHARLES STEWART, Brigadier-General.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.

Draft. Downing Street, Wednesday, December 14, 1808.

My dear Lord—The Moniteurs to the 11th are in town —nothing from the right of the French army. That of the 6th gives the 11th and 12th Bulletins, dated Miranda del Douro. You will best judge what the extent of Castaños' defeat was; but it appears to me that both his wings have got off in a better or worse state, his right having fallen back upon Saragossa, his left towards the centre of Spain.

We have nothing from the westward. The importance of having a corps disposable for Cadiz, as Moore may possibly retain his position on the frontier of Portugal, and not have the means of detaching without much delay to Cadiz, has induced the Cabinet to detain a sufficiency of troop tonnage, to send the 5,000 men under orders, if they shall see occasion upon the next accounts; and I have settled with the Duke to assemble the regiments in the neighbourhood of Ramsgate pier, whence they can get down Channel more easily than from the River. The service of this corps may be the more pressingly important at Cadiz, as Cradock will probably, under the requisition from Madrid, have sent every thing to reinforce Moore.

It is hardly fair, after your late visit to town, to express a wish that you could be present next Tuesday; but, as the consideration of this question may arise out of our first despatches, and it is also thought desirable by Cabinet that we should make up our minds whether some measure should not be proposed immediately on the meeting of Parliament, for strengthening an army, incessantly exposed, as it must be, if it remains either in Spain or Portugal, to a considerable reduction of its numbers. I should be very glad if you could make it convenient to attend. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Colonel Sir George Smith.

Draft. Downing Street, December 18, 1808.

Sir—Under the reverses the Spaniards have sustained, and the position the enemy now occupies at Madrid, I consider it of much importance to have a confidential officer stationed at Cadiz, who knows the leading individuals, and can keep our naval and military officers in that quarter informed of the events that are passing in that important place.

With this view, I am desirous, if your health will admit of it, that you should immediately proceed in the vessel which carries this letter to Cadiz. Your own sagacity and experience render it unnecessary for me to furnish you with de-

tailed Instructions for the direction of your conduct. You will watch the events that are passing, and keep Sir John Cradock and Sir John Moore informed of them. Mr. Duff will assist you, on explaining to him the object of your mission, as far as his means will enable him.

You will feel the delicacy of avoiding any step which might excite jealousy and alarm; but, if such a crisis should be approaching as may make the Spaniards desirous of receiving either naval or military aid from us for the security of Cadiz, you will lose no time in forwarding any requisition they may be disposed to make to the Tagus. Proper directions will be given to the naval and military Commanders to furnish every possible aid in their power, should it become necessary.

CASTLEREAGH.

Plan for the Defence of Spain and Portugal.

BY GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.[1]

Copie. Le 19 Decembre, 1808.

Quoique exclus de toute communication des affaires de votre patrie, Monsieur le Général, par le silence de la Junte Suprême sur mon plan de guerre des Pyrénées que l'Amiral Apodaca et vous m'avez certifié avoir envoyé à votre Gouvernement à la fin de Septembre; quoique, par le funeste résultat des opérations subséquentes, j'aye lieu de croire qu'on n'y fait aucune attention, et même qu'il a été réjetté; je ne peux pas croire que la perte de votre capitale, que je n'avois que trop prévu, (si on se livroit au système des battailles, qui avoit déjà perdu les trois plus grandes puissances militaires du Continent) puisse plonger une nation aussi énergique que la votre dans le désespoir et luy faire accepter des fers d'autant plus pésants que vos premiers efforts ont excité la vengeance d'un tyran impitoyable, que vous n' avez ménagé ni dans vos écrits ni par vos armes.

[1] There is nothing to show to which of the Spanish Generals this letter was addressed.—EDITOR.

Les défaites glorieuses du Général Blake ont été inutiles, parceque il ne devoit se porter en Biscaye qu' après la jonction du Marquis de la Romana. La battaille presque décisive de Tudela n'auroit pas eu lieu, si le Général Castaños avoit jetté plusieurs ponts sur l'Ebre, et avoit mis cette rivière entre l'ennemi et luy, ou si, bien informé des mouvements de l'ennemi, il l'avoit dévancé à Soria, pour se rétirer devant luy dans la chaine des montagnes de Guadarrama.

L'armée d'Estramadure, composée de nouvelles levées au lieu de s'avancer imprudemment sur Burgos, où elle s'est fait anéantir, auroit du se joindre à l'armée Angloise du Général Moore, et alors, postée le long du flanc droit de l'ennemi, elle auroit empêché Buonaparte de s'avancer sur Madrid même après sa victoire de Tudela.

On ne pouvoit pas, avec espoir de succès, confier à cette armée dispersée, battue, effrayée, désorganisée, la défense du défilé de Somosierra, où il n'a pu faire qu'une foible résistance. Le projet de défendre Madrid, à l'exemple de Buenos Ayres, étoit impratiquable. Les François n'auroient pas fait les mêmes fautes que les Anglois, et auroient écrasé avec leur nombreuse artillerie toutes ses foibles défenses avant d'y entrer. Ce foible effort du désespoir auroit terminé la guerre par un massacre effroyable, sans une grande perte de la part de l'ennemi. Une fois les gorges de la Guadarrama forcées, Madrid n'étoit pas ténable, et il valoit mieux l'abandonner, emmener tous ses habitans, et bruler tous les magasins que de le fortifier.

En Catalogne on n'a point adopté mon plan de guerre des Pyrénées; on a négligé de détruire et rendre impratiquable la grande route de Perpignan entre Tunquiera et Bellegarde; on s'est occupé trop tard de cette province; on y a envoyé trop tard le Général Reding. Les François en ont profité; ils ont renforcé la garnison de Figueras; ils ont assiégé et pris l'importante place de Rosas; ils sont vraisemblablement à présent maîtres de Girone; l'inutile blocus de Barcelone est certainement levé. La Catalogne est certainement entre les mains

des François; ainsi Saragose est entièrement cerné et tombera infalliblement; et vos troupes de Catalogne et d'Aragon seront très heureuses si elles peuvent se rétirer sur Tortosa et Méquinença, pour défendre le bas Ebre et couvrir de ce côté le royaume de Valence qu'il faudra trouver un autre moyen de couvrir du côté de Madrid. Voilà le tableau exact de votre position: elle n'est pas entièrement désespérée, si vous adoptez un plan sage et de bons conseils.

Vous vous trouvez maintenant au *premier mouvement*, ou *première position*, indiqué dans mon premier mémoire intitule *Guerre environnante* &c. Vous avez l'avantage d'avoir le Portugal délivré et occupé par 40 mille hommes de braves Anglois, sans compter les Portugais, qui peuvent fournir encore 40 mille hommes, si les Anglois s'y prennent bien. Vous avez vos Colonies intactes et assurées, vos ports en liberté, votre marine à vous, pour vous assurer les provisions, munitions de guerre et de bouche, et votre ennemi n'a pas le même avantage. Plus il s'avancera, plus il ressentira la disette et la difficulté de transports. Vous avez perdu la Catalogne, au moins je le crois. Vous perdrez l'Aragon, au moins je le présume. Il vous reste à l'Est le royaume de Valence à défendre; au Sud la Sierra Morena est impratiquable si vous employéz à sa défensive un plan méthodique et sage, lié avec celui du Portugal par l'armée Angloise. Vouz tenez encore la Galice et les Asturies, pays difficiles où vous pouvez empêcher les François de pénétrer. Si vous étes soutenus par les Anglois, dont il est l'intérêt autant que le votre, pour ne pas être tournés par les deux provinces du nord, *Entre-Minho* et *Tras-os-montes*, que la Galice couvre. Voilà votre premier mouvement, ou votre première position, à la quelle vos désastres vous ont ramenés.

Si j'avois un conseil à donner à M. d'Apodaca, je luy suggérérois, sans attendre les ordres de son Gouvernement (car le moindre rétard augmente vos dangers, vos désordres, et vos malheurs) de demander instamment au Gouvernement Anglois:

1°. D'ordonner au Général David Baird de joindre avec son

infanterie, son artillérie, et 1,000 ou 1,200 hommes de cavalerie, le Général de la Romana, pour défendre avec luy la Galice et les Asturies, pied à pied, et de ne renvoyer au Général Moore que sa cavalerie ;

2°. De charger le Général Moore de défendre le Portugal et lier cette défense avec celle de la Galice et de l'Andalousie, sur un plan général, en attendant que la dispersion, la disette, et les maladies ayent affoibli l'armée Françoise, et le mettent à même de prendre l'offensive contre eux ;

3°. De faire partir pour Lisbonne les troupes déjà embarquées ou destinées pour l'Espagne, dont, sur les mauvaises nouvelles on a suspendu le départ, afin que ces troupes remplissent le déficit du corps du Général Baird, qui resteroit en Galice ;

4°. De faire arriver dans l'embouchure de l'Ebre le renfort qui avoit été destiné de la Sicile, à moins qu'il ne soit destiné à faire une diversion prompte sur le continent de l'Italie.

Si M. d'Apodaca réussit dans cette négociation, il aura rendu un service essentiel, et j'aurois toute la confiance sur le succès ultérieur de cette guerre. Je suis si loin d'en désespérer que si j'étois en Espagne, je m' appliquerois hardiment ce vers de Virgile—

"Nil desperandum Teucro duce, et hospite Teucro."

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

GENL. DUMOURIEZ.

The Right Hon. R. Ryder to Lord Castlereagh.

Judge Advocate-General's Office, December 31, 1808.

My Lord—I had the honour of receiving a letter from his Royal Highness the Commander-in Chief, of yesterday's date, acquainting me that his Royal Highness has laid before his Majesty the proceedings of the Board of Inquiry, of which General Sir David Dundas was President, together with their Report and Opinions, as transmitted to his Royal Highness by

me, and that his Royal Highness had sent a copy of the said Report and Opinions to each of the parties concerned, viz., Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley.

His Royal Highness has conveyed to me his Majesty's commands that the Board may be dissolved; and his Royal Highness has desired me to take the earliest opportunity of submitting the proceedings, together with the Report and Opinions, to his Majesty's Government. In pursuance of his Royal Highness's directions, I have the honour to transmit the same to your lordship, for the purpose of being laid before his Majesty's Ministers.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. RYDER.

Mr. Cooke to Colonel Neville.

Draft. Downing Street, January 4, 1809.

Dear Sir—As 5000 men are embarking for Corunna, and do not carry out with them artillery, it may still be necessary that they should be furnished with spare ammunition and the proper quantity of tumbrils. Lord Castlereagh has directed me to desire that you will mention this to Lord Chatham, and his lordship, if he thinks right, could furnish Major-General Sherbrooke, who has charge of the corps, with a power to apply to the Ordnance Store-keeper at Portsmouth for the articles he may find necessary. Believe me, &c.,

E. COOKE.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. R. Ryder.

Draft. St. James's Square, Friday evening.

Dear Ryder—In addition to my official letter, I send, for your private information, Sir Hew Dalrymple's letter and my answer. When his paper is read, you will be enabled to inform me whether, from the nature of the reference, it is necessary for me to make any explanation to the Board why the letter of

the 20th is not before them. It is a letter altogether relating to our future operations in Spain, and unfit to be produced; and, as it appears to me, wholly unnecessary to Sir Hew, 1st, for the reasons I have stated, and, 2ndly, because he did not receive it till after the Convention was ratified.

I shall be very grateful if you will enable Cooke to send me to Stanmore a hint of anything material that may occur.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Dublin Castle, January 9, 1809.

My dear Lord—As the Board of Inquiry have made their Report, it is now necessary for me to determine what I am to do. I am very desirous to avoid to take any step which can embarrass the King's Government, and particularly in reference to this country; but it is necessary that I should join the army, if it should remain on service in Spain, within a limited time.

I shall say nothing about the Report of the Board of Inquiry; but I shall be obliged to you if you will take the opinion of the King's Ministers, and let me know what line they propose to take respecting it in Parliament. Do they mean to consider it as conclusive, and, on that ground, to justify it and all the measures of which the Report approves; or do they mean to leave the whole question to be scrambled for as it may suit those who choose to mix in the scramble?

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Downing Street, January 11, 1809.

Your Majesty's confidential servants being of opinion that no time should be lost in bringing the Spanish Government to a declaration whether they will accept the co-operation of your

Majesty's army in the South of Spain, admitting a British force into Cadiz, humbly recommend to your Majesty that the force under Major-General Sherbrooke should proceed direct to Cadiz for this purpose, proceeding on to Gibraltar, in case Mr. Frere should notify to the Major-General that their services have been declined by the Central Government.

Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh.

Corunna, January 13, 1809.

My Lord—Situated as this army is at present, it is impossible for me to detail to your lordship the events which have taken place since I had the honour to address you from Astorga, on the 31st of December. I have, therefore, determined to send to England Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, as the officer best qualified to give you every information you can want, both with respect to our actual situation, and the events which have led to it.

Your lordship knows that, had I followed my own opinion, as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca—the Spanish armies were then beaten. I was sensible, however, that, had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat. It was for this reason that I made the march to Sahagun: as a diversion, it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it without a single movement being made to favour my retreat.

The people of the Gallicias, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through their mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach; and drove away their carts, oxen, and everything that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been that our sick have been left behind; and, when our horses or mules failed, which, on such marches, and through such a country,

was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed or abandoned.

In front of Villa Franca, the French came up with the reserve, with which I was covering the retreat of the army. They attacked it at Calcabiles. I retired, covered by the 95th Regiment, and marched that night to Hererias, and from thence to Nogales and Lugo, where I had ordered the different divisions which proceeded to halt and collect. At Lugo, the French again came up with us. They attacked our advanced posts on the 6th and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts, with little loss on our side.

I heard from the prisoners taken that three divisions of the French army were come up, commanded by Marshal Soult. I therefore expected to be attacked on the morning of the 8th. It was my wish to come to that issue. I had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops; and it was only by crippling the enemy that we could hope either to retreat or to embark unmolested. I made every preparation to receive the attack, and drew out the army in the morning, to offer battle. This was not Marshal Soult's object. He either did not think himself sufficiently strong, or he wished to play a sure game, by attacking us on our march, or during our embarkation. The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The want of provisions would not permit me to wait longer. I marched that night; and, in two forced marches, bivouacking for six or eight hours in the rain, I reached Betanzos on the 10th instant.

At Lugo, I was sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, which was at too great a distance, and offered no advantages to embark in the face of an enemy. My intention then was to have embarked at the peninsula of Betanzos, where I hoped to find a position to cover the embarkation of the army, in Ares or Redes Bays; but, having sent an officer to reconnoitre it, by his report I was determined to prefer this place.

I gave notice to the Admiral of my intention, and begged

that the transports might be brought to Corunna. Had I found them here on my arrival on the 11th, the embarkation would easily have been effected; for I had gained several marches on the French. They have now come up with us; the transports are not arrived; my position in front of this place is a very bad one; and this place, if I am forced to retire into it, is commanded within musket-shot; and the harbour will be so commanded by cannon on the coast, that no ship will be able to lie in it. In short, my lord, General Stewart will inform you how critical our situation is.

I find I have been led into greater length and more detail than I thought I should have had time for. I have written under interruptions, and with my mind much occupied with other matter. My letter, written so carelessly, can only be considered as private; when I have more leisure, I shall write more correctly. In the mean time, I rely on General Stewart for giving your lordship the information and detail which I have omitted. I should regret his absence, for his services have been very distinguished; but the state of his eyes renders it impossible for him to serve; and this country is not one in which cavalry can be of much use.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir John Moore.

Draft. Downing Street, January 14, 1809.

Sir—You will receive enclosed the orders which have been transmitted to Major-General Sherbrooke, now ready to sail from Portsmouth; also instructions from his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Frere, directing him to ascertain, without loss of time, the sentiments of the Spanish Government upon the proposed concert in the South of Spain, the necessary preliminary to which must be that we should have the free use of Cadiz, with a participation in the garrison thereof, as the only fortified position, under the protection of which our army can be assembled with advantage, and upon which it may retire in case of disaster.

His Majesty trusts that his motive for this demand cannot be misunderstood. The last despatches from you and from Mr. Frere render it, in the judgment of his Majesty's Government, necessary that no time should be lost in obtaining a decision on a point of such importance; and, on these grounds, General Sherbrooke's corps has been ordered to proceed direct to Cadiz.

Mr. Frere and Major-General Sherbrooke will transmit to you the earliest intelligence of the result, for the direction of your conduct under the instructions you have received.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore.

Downing Street, January 14, 1809.

Sir—A French Bulletin, No. 16, was sent into this country from Boulogne, purporting to be an official publication made by the Government of France. In this paper it is stated, "The English fly on every side: the division of Lasalle has, however, fallen in with sixteen of them, who have been put to the sword. They were stragglers, or such as had gone astray."

His Majesty cannot overlook this account, descriptive, according to the obvious sense of it, of the murder of some unresisting stragglers of his army; although his Majesty is disposed to disbelieve a transaction, however officially recorded, which is so utterly repugnant to the usual laws of war, and to every principle of humanity. His Majesty, therefore, desires that you will take the earliest means of ascertaining the truth of the fact so recorded, and the circumstances under which it was perpetrated—if perpetrated at all.

If it shall, upon investigation, appear to be founded, I am to desire that you will cause a protest to be made by you to the nearest head-quarters of the French army, and that you will take such measures as shall appear to you most expedient for the protection of the troops under your orders, against conduct so barbarous and disgraceful. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief.

Draft. Downing Street, January 18, 1809.

Sir — The proceedings of the Board of General Officers appointed by his Majesty to inquire into and report upon the Armistice and Convention lately concluded in Portugal, which were communicated to me by the Judge-Advocate General, at the desire of your Royal Highness, for the information of his Majesty's Ministers, having been fully considered, I have received the King's commands to transmit to your Royal Highness the decision which his Majesty has taken upon the review of these proceedings, a copy of which your Royal Highness will receive enclosed; and I am to desire that your Royal Highness will be pleased to cause the necessary communication to be made to Sir Hew Dalrymple accordingly.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Draft. St. James's Square, January 21, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh, having brought the despatch received from Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, under the consideration of your Majesty's confidential servants, they beg leave humbly to recommend to your Majesty that the orders sent to Sir John Moore with respect to the disposal of his army, in the event of his re-embarkation from Gallicia, should be rendered so far discretionary, as to leave it to that officer to decide, according to the state and condition of his troops, whether they can, with advantage to your Majesty's service, be immediately employed in the execution of those orders, or must return home to be refitted and prepared for service.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Without date. Endorsed, January, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh humbly submits to your Majesty the substance of intelligence received from Lord Paget, who reached

town this evening, at nine o'clock. General Hope's despatch was forwarded by a gun-brig not yet arrived. Lord Castlereagh, in laying before your Majesty this unofficial Report of the heavy loss your Majesty's service has sustained, in the fall of so brave and distinguished an officer as Sir John Moore, has to assure your Majesty, from Lord Paget's authority, that the conduct of your Majesty's troops in action was most exemplary, and such as to uphold, in the highest degree, the reputation of your Majesty's arms.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir David Baird.

Draft. Downing Street, January 24, 1809.

Sir—I have received and laid before the King your despatch of the 18th, stating the complete repulse and defeat of the enemy on the 16th, at every point of attack on his Majesty's army in the position which had been selected by Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, near Corunna, and enclosing a detailed Report from Lieutenant-General Hope of the action, and of the subsequent embarkation of the army.

I am commanded by his Majesty to convey to you the satisfaction his Majesty feels in this additional instance of the superior discipline, firmness, and valour, which distinguish his army, wherever brought into engagement with the enemy, and which reflects high honour on the officers who command the troops; and I am particularly commanded to desire that you will convey to Lieutenant-General Hope and the General Officers of the army that his Majesty entertains a just sense of their intrepid and meritorious exertions in supporting the glory of the British arms in the battle of Corunna; and you will also convey to the rest of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers his Majesty's acknowledgments of their brave and spirited conduct on that occasion.

His Majesty feels the strongest regret for the loss of so distinguished and meritorious an officer as Lieutenant-General

Sir John Moore, which he considers as a national loss; and whilst his Majesty sensibly regrets the circumstance which compelled you to quit the field early in the action, when you were displaying your accustomed valour in leading the troops into action, it affords his Majesty satisfaction to have observed that your despatch is signed with your own hand, which his Majesty considers as a circumstance encouraging the hope of recovery.

I am further commanded to desire that you will signify to Lieutenant-General Hope that his Majesty is not only fully impressed with a sense of his able and judicious conduct, when he succeeded to take the command in action, but that he considers the arrangements made by him for the immediate embarkation of the troops as highly meritorious.

The conspicuous skill and celerity with which this arduous service was carried into execution by the efforts of his Majesty's navy, under the command of Rear-Admiral de Courcy, is a pleasing proof that the same spirit equally actuates both departments of service in the cause of their Sovereign and their country. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Draft. St. James's Square, [January 24, 1809].
Tuesday morning, 2 A.M.

Lord Castlereagh has the satisfaction of humbly submitting to your Majesty the accompanying despatches, communicating the meritorious services and the safe re-embarkation of your Majesty's army from Corunna. The Honourable Captain Gordon left the whole fleet at sea on the 18th, all well, with a fair wind, steering for the Channel.

Your Majesty will observe that Sir David Baird's despatch is signed with his own hand, and the report of the prospect of his recovery is favourable. Sir John Moore lived to be informed of the fate of the day, and seemed only apprehensive, from the degree of strength he retained, that, being assured of this fact, the close of his life might be unnecessarily protracted.

Lord Castlereagh humbly hopes your Majesty will approve of proposing to the House of Commons to address your Majesty to direct a monument to be erected to the memory of this distinguished and meritorious officer.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Downing Street, January 25, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh, in submitting to your Majesty Lieutenant-General Hope's letter, and a report from Captain Bowen, agent for transports, on the embarkation of the troops at Corunna, begs permission humbly to observe that any inconvenience that arose from the empty store and forage ships not having been supplied with provisions did not result from there not having been with the army a due proportion of victuallers, but from a distribution not having been previously made into those ships, which are seldom used for the reception of troops.

A large fleet of empty transports, with some additional victuallers, sailed from Portsmouth on the 14th for Corunna.

Lord Castlereagh hopes your Majesty will pardon his entering into this detail; but he is anxious your Majesty should be persuaded that, whilst your Majesty's troops have been engaged in their late arduous and trying services, there have been no exertions omitted on the part of your Majesty's servants, in contributing to their comforts, and in keeping them largely provided with every article of supply from home, which could be made available, according to the nature of the service in which the army was engaged.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Lord Castlereagh begs leave humbly to acquaint your Majesty that he has received from Spain three boxes addressed to your Majesty, containing books, of which the Bishop of Leon solicited your Majesty's acceptance some time since. The boxes have been detained for a length of time at Gihon. Lord

Castlereagh humbly requests to receive your Majesty's commands with respect to their disposal.

St. James's Square, February 8, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Beresford.

Draft. Downing Street, February 15, 1809.

Sir—The Portuguese Government having solicited that a British General Officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, I am to acquaint you that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this important service.

You will, in obedience to his Majesty's command, proceed without delay to Lisbon, where, on your arrival, you will report yourself to the Commander of the forces under Sir John Cradock, who will be informed of the object of your mission. When the Portuguese troops take the field, you will, of course, act under his orders; but, in conducting the other details of your command, you will consider yourself as in the Portuguese service; communicating, however, constantly with the Commander of the forces, and using your best endeavours to carry his views with respect to the common exertions and means of defence into effect.

I enclose a letter from Mr. Secretary Canning to his Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, Mr. Villiers, who is instructed to present you to the Regency, and to promote those arrangements which you may consider necessary to the effectual execution of your orders. Mr. Villiers will also be charged with the arrangement of any pecuniary advances which the service may require. A due proportion of British officers will be appointed to assist you; and a supply of arms, to the extent of 10,000 stand, has been for some time embarked, and waits only for a wind to sail from Portsmouth to the Tagus.

I enclose a copy of an Instruction to Sir John Cradock, relative to your command, and to the officers accompanying you on the present service, and I have no doubt he will afford you all the assistance in his power. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir John Cradock.

Draft. Downing Street, February 15, 1809.

Sir—In compliance with the wishes of the Portuguese Government, his Majesty has been graciously pleased to permit Major-General Beresford to take the chief command of the Portuguese army, with the rank of Lieutenant-General in that army. The General will be accompanied by a certain number of officers, who will each have one step of rank in the British army, giving up their present regimental commissions.

It is intended that these officers should serve and be distributed in the Portuguese corps as Major-General Beresford may direct. Should affairs assume a favourable aspect, it may be expedient considerably to increase the number of these officers; but, at present, only a few are sent: and I have to request you will, in consequence, afford to Major-General Beresford, from the force under your orders, such assistance in officers as you can conveniently give. It must, however, be left to your discretion to judge how far the numbers, from the prospects in Portugal, should be increased or limited.

I enclose, for your information, a copy of the Instructions which I have given to Major-General Beresford, by his Majesty's command. CASTLEREAGH.

Major-General Leith to Lord Castlereagh.

10, Cork Street, Burlington Gardens, February 24, 1809.

My dear Lord—The non-arrival of my papers in London, and misinformation as to the time of discussing the Spanish war in the House of Commons, have prevented my writing some memoranda on the subject of the conversation which I had in St. James's Square: I, however, think that the project of landing an army of between 30 and 40,000 men to the eastward of Santoña, or at Santander and Santoña, except in detached and successive corps, not exceeding 10,000 each, and carrying with them every individual article they should require,

if not impossible, at least attended with such difficulties and dangers as scarcely to come within the scope of calculation, as a military operation to be undertaken with a view to act in the rear of an enemy equally numerous in Biscay.

Hasty Memoranda.

No naval commander of experience would trust a fleet of Transports, except in the summer season, to the eastward of Santoña; and even so far to the eastward, if they should miss Santander or Santoña, with a fair wind blowing strong, they run the greatest risk of being wrecked on the Spanish or French coast. Single men-of-war find it difficult enough to weather those shores, and the communication between the coasts of Biscay and Guipuscoa, and even the eastern parts of Santander (Province), in all of which there is no port except Passage, without capacity for a fleet, and no anchorage of safety, is so precarious, that no dependence could be placed on disembarking stores of any kind, or of keeping up any intercourse whatever between the shore and shipping.

But, suppose an army of 40,000 men fairly on shore in Guipuscoa, how are they to be fed or equipped? Biscay and Guipuscoa, before they were exhausted by the long continuance of the enemy in those provinces, never fed their own population, which was actually starving in the month of October. Was it at the bottom of the Pyrenees that the British army was to find equipment for 40,000 men; poor, mountainous, and drained of all military resources as those countries had been in equipping every French corps which had entered Spain, as it necessarily passed that way? Was it to act on the circumference, while the enemy was at liberty to follow the radius of a circle, either to attack the British or Spanish army as he might choose, without a possibility of their reciprocally communicating or aiding each other, that the former was to be placed between France and its army, if the thing had not been, in the first instance, almost chimerical? In short, it appears

altogether so impracticable a measure, that it is unnecessary to ask the solution of the other numerous difficulties to be considered.

With regard to the other parts of the war of which I had a knowledge, your lordship, of course, well knows that every aid, in the way of money and supplies of all kinds, was most liberally given ; and that the Provinces and Generals expressed, on many occasions, their gratitude for the manner in which their wants were provided for by the British Government, of which I have many written proofs among my papers. Had not a plan of operations the most disjointed and absurd led the Spanish Generals latterly to expose unnecessarily their armies to famine and defeat, there ought to have been a formidable army concentrated (no matter how far they had retreated, provided they had judiciously and in proper time fallen back) to nave met and been supported by the British army, instead of the entire dissolution of Blake's army, (which consisted of 50,000 men) before they were supported, by his want of judgment, in his ultimate operations on the frontiers of Biscay.

Although your lordship is so well acquainted with and can so ably handle the subject, I should have felt much gratification if the arrival of my papers had enabled me to state, as they forcibly struck me on the spot, many circumstances which bore upon the question of the war in the northern provinces : as it is, I have now neither time nor materials to do more than to address this hasty and imperfect letter, which, at least, however, affords me the means of assuring your lordship of the great respect and esteem with which I always am, my dear lord, your most faithful servant,

JAMES LEITH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock.

Draft. Downing Street, February 27, 1809.

Sir—Immediately upon the receipt of your letters of the 12th and 14th instant, from Lisbon, by which it appears that

the services of the corps detached by you under the orders of Major-General Mackenzie have been declined at Cadiz, Instructions were sent to Major-General Sherbrooke, which I hope may find him at Cork, or meet him at sea, directing him to proceed, with his armament, at once to the Tagus instead of Cadiz.

As the Spanish Government has not thought fit to accede to the arrangements, which were stated to you in my letter of the 14th January, as the preliminary conditions on which alone the British army could be assembled for service in the south of Spain, his Majesty feels that there no longer remains any military consideration on which he should narrow the means which can be applied to the defence of Portugal, for the purpose of directing them to a more remote point of the Peninsula, unsupported by any secure position, from which the British army might advance, or on which it might retreat, if pressed by a superior enemy.

Under these circumstances, I have to acquaint you that his Majesty's pleasure is, that you do take immediate steps for ordering both Major-General Sherbrooke (if the orders above referred to shall not have reached him before his arrival at Cadiz) and Major-General Mackenzie's corps to join you forthwith in Portugal, unless they shall have been actually received into Cadiz in the manner before directed. The 40th Regiment may be ordered to march from Seville to Gibraltar, to reinforce that garrison.

As it is the King's determination to use every exertion to strengthen the defences of Portugal, with this view you are authorized to avail yourself of the support of the troops above stated, and you will endeavour to draw every aid from the exertions of the Portuguese, to whom Mr. Villiers will be directed to afford such pecuniary aid as may assist them in rendering their army capable of service in the field.

You will take the necessary measures for rendering your army effective for field service. Maintain yourself as long as

possible in Portugal. Should you be compelled to embark, you will proceed, with the troops, as before directed, to Gibraltar, there to wait further orders, considering yourself, however, as still authorized to land your army at Cadiz, if required to do so by the Spanish Government, through Mr. Frere.

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum concerning the Defence of Portugal.

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

March 7, 1809.

I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain; and that, in the mean time, the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French. My notion was that the Portuguese military establishments, upon the footing of 40,000 militia and 30,000 regular troops, ought to be revived, and that, in addition to these troops, his Majesty ought to employ an army in Portugal, amounting to about 20,000 British troops, including about 4,000 cavalry. My opinion was that, even if Spain should have been conquered, the French would not have been able to overcome Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men; and that, so long as the contest should continue in Spain, this force, if it could be put in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might have eventually decided the contest.

It is obvious, however, that the military establishments of Portugal could not be revived, without very extensive pecuniary assistance and political support from this country; and the only mode in which it appeared to me to be safe, or even practicable, to give this assistance and support, or to interfere at all, in a military way, in the concerns of Portugal, was to trust the King's ambassador at Lisbon to give or to withhold such sums as he might think necessary for the support of military establishments only, and to instruct him to see that

the revenues of Portugal, whatever they might be, were, in the first instance, applied to the same objects. By the operation of these powers and instructions, it is probable that he would have had a complete control over the measures of the Portuguese Government, and we might have expected, by this time, to have in the field an efficient Portuguese army.

As it was not possible, however, to adopt those measures at that time, and as the attention of the Government has necessarily been drawn to other objects, it was probable that the military establishments of Portugal have made but little progress; and, in considering of the extent of British force required for the defence of that country, and of the other measures to be adopted, the small extent of the Portuguese force, and the probability of an early attack by the enemy, must be considered, on the one hand, and, on the other, the contiuuance of the contest in Spain, and the probability that a very large French force will not be disposable, in a very short period of time, for the attack on Portugal.

I would still recommend the adoption of the political measures above suggested, with a view to the revival of the military establishments in Portugal. It is probable that the expence of these measures will not, in this year, exceed a million sterling. But if they should succeed, and the contest should continue in Spain and Portugal, the benefit which will accrue from them will be more than adequate to the expence incurred.

The British force employed in Portugal should, in this view of the question, not be less than 30,000 men, of which number 4 or 5,000 should be cavalry, and there should be a large body of artillery. The extent of force in cavalry and artillery above required is because the Portuguese military establishments must necessarily be deficient in these two branches, and British or German cavalry and artillery must be employed with the Portuguese infantry.

The whole of the army in Portugal, Portuguese as well as

British, should be placed under the command of British officers. The Staff of the army, the Commissariat in particular, must be British; and these departments must be extensive in proportion to the strength of the whole army which will act in Portugal, to the number of detached posts which it will be necessary to occupy, and with a view to the difficulties of providing and distributing supplies in that country.

In regard to the detail of these measures, I recommend that the British army in Portugal should be reinforced, as soon as possible, with some companies of British riflemen; with 3,000 British or German cavalry; that the complement of ordnance with that army should be made 30 pieces of cannon, of which two brigades of 9-pounders; that these pieces of ordnance should be completely horsed; that 20 pieces of brass 12-pounder ordnance, upon travelling carriages, should be sent to Portugal, with a view to the occupation of certain positions in that country; that a corps of engineers for an army of 60,000 men should be sent there, and a corps of artillery for 60 pieces of cannon.

I understand that the British army now in Portugal consists of 20,000 men, including cavalry. It should be made up 20,000 infantry at least, as soon as possible, by additions of riflemen and other good infantry, which, by this time, may have been refitted after the campaign in Spain. The reinforcements may follow as the troops may recover from their fatigues.

The first measures to be adopted are to complete the army in Portugal with its cavalry and artillery, and to horse the ordnance as it ought to be. As soon as this shall be done, the General and Staff Officers should go out; as it may be depended upon that, as soon as the newspapers shall have announced the departure of officers for Portugal, the French armies in Spain will receive orders to make their movements towards Portugal, so as to anticipate our measures for its defence. We ought, therefore, to have everything on the spot,

or nearly so, before any alarm is created in France respecting our intentions.

Besides the articles above enumerated, 30,000 stand of arms, clothing, and shoes, for the Portuguese army, should be sent to Lisbon as soon as possible.

Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Hill.

Draft. Downing Street, March 12, 1809.

Sir—I am to convey to you the King's commands, that, so soon as the troops placed under your orders are embarked and ready for sea, you do proceed without loss of time to the Tagus, there to place yourself under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir John Cradock, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's forces in Portugal.

Three hundred artillery horses are to accompany your corps. The necessary proportion of artillerymen and guns have already been sent to Portugal. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Hill.

Draft. Downing Street, March 12, 1809.

Sir—I trust the occasion may not have arisen. I think it right, however, to inform you that Sir John Cradock's orders, in the event of being compelled to evacuate Portugal, are to proceed with his forces either to Gibraltar or Cadiz. In the above case, you will lose no time in forming a junction with that officer, wherever he may be. CASTLEREAGH.

The Hon. Charles Stewart to Major-General Hill.

Draft. Downing Street, March 13, 1809.

Sir—I am directed by Lord Castlereagh to acquaint you that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have ordered the Tribune and Africaine frigates to proceed from Plymouth to Cork, to convey the troops under your command to the Tagus. The general officers will be accommodated in these

ships. His lordship trusts that every exertion will have been made by you to have the troops and artillery horses embarked, and that every thing will be in a state of readiness to proceed to sea very soon after the frigates' arrival.

CHARLES STEWART.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Your Majesty's confidential servants having had under their consideration the amount of force (in infantry, amounting to about 18,000 men) which will be assembled in Portugal upon the arrival of Major-General Hill's corps from Cork, and the return of Major-General Sherbrooke and Major-General M'Kenzie's from Cadiz, are humbly of opinion that it may be expedient to order three regiments of cavalry, for which the necessary tonnage is prepared, to proceed immediately to the Tagus from hence.

They further beg leave humbly to propose to your Majesty that Sir J. Cradock should be appointed to succeed Sir Hew Dalrymple in the command at Gibraltar, and that the chief command in Portugal should be entrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

In submitting the latter appointment to your Majesty's approbation, your Majesty's servants have not been unmindful of the inconvenience that might arise, in case of any considerable increase of this force, from Sir Arthur Wellesley's being so young a Lieutenant-General. But, as any material increase of the army in Portugal cannot be at present looked to as probable, either from the state of the regiments at home, or the immediate circumstances of the war, they humbly conceive that your Majesty's service (without prejudice to the claims of the distinguished officers in your Majesty's army who are his seniors in rank) may have the benefit of Sir Arthur Wellesley's being employed where he has had the good fortune of being successful, and that it will remain open for your Majesty's future consideration to make a different arrangement of the

command, if, under all the circumstances, it shall appear to your Majesty proper to confide it to a general officer of higher rank.

Downing Street, March 26, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Cradock.

Draft. Downing Street, March 30, 1809.

My dear Cradock—In communicating to you the arrangement which has been determined upon, with respect to the two commands in the Peninsula, at present of importance, I cannot but feel much personal solicitude that the decision which the King's Ministers have come to upon this subject may not be unacceptable to you.

It would neither be kind nor manly in me not to avow that the advice they have felt it their duty to offer to the King on the present occasion has been dictated by the peculiar value they are disposed to attach to Sir A. W.'s services generally, and particularly in Portugal. You will believe me sincere when I assure you, with respect to yourself, in addition to much personal confidence, they feel very strongly indeed; with respect to the whole of your conduct in Portugal, which, in times and under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has in every instance met with their unqualified approbation, and, I can truly say, fulfilled every wish and expectation I had or could have formed, when you were selected for the command.

I trust the change now proposed may not be unacceptable to your feelings: I am very solicitous indeed they should be consulted to the utmost extent which considerations of duty will permit; and I am sure, whatever shade of preference your own mind might feel with respect to the labour of service allotted to you at the present moment, you will liberally interpret the weighty considerations which compel the King's Ministers to meet the difficulties of the times in the manner which may not only best provide for the respective objects confided to their care, but in the mode which, from adventitious

circumstances, may conciliate public impression with respect to their measures.

In proposing to you the command at Gibraltar, I feel that it is, in the first instance, transferring you to a less active scene; but the time may not be very distant when the picture may be reversed, and the eyes of the country be turned, as they were in the year 1782, to Gibraltar, as the point of contest between the two powers, where as much solid service may be rendered, and as much personal glory acquired, as at the head of an army.

It is with this view, and under a conviction that, if Spain is conquered, Gibraltar will be seriously attacked, that the command is offered to you; and it is done so under a conviction that this trust cannot be placed in better hands; and his Majesty has very graciously authorized me to intimate to you that he proposes to give you the local rank of General at Gibraltar.

I should much wish that, in proceeding to Gibraltar, you could take Seville in your way. Your being enabled to communicate with Mr. Frere and the Central Government might lay the foundation of future facilities in conducting the many delicate and important duties that must devolve upon you in the command in Gibraltar. I have not thought it necessary to direct this measure in my Instructions: I wish to leave it as a suggestion in your hands, to decide on as you may judge best for the King's service.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cradock.

Draft. Downing Street, March 30, 1809.

Sir—In the present state of affairs in the south of Spain, it appearing to the King's Ministers indispensably necessary that an officer of high rank and experience should be entrusted with the chief command at Gibraltar, as well to communicate with the Spanish Government upon military affairs as to be charged with the defence of that most important fortress, in the event of the enemy making himself master of that part of Spain, I am to acquaint you that his Majesty has been graciously

pleased to select you for this service, than which, in the event supposed, none can be of more signal importance to his Majesty's interests.

It is his Majesty's pleasure that you do proceed, without delay, to Gibraltar, there to assume the chief command of the garrison; and you will, on your arrival there, open such communication with the Spanish Government, through Mr. Frere, and with the provinces in the south of Spain, as may enable you to keep his Majesty's Government regularly informed of the operations carrying on, and the measures by which, in your judgment, the enemy's designs may be counteracted.

I am commanded by his Majesty to signify to you his Majesty's most gracious approbation of your services in Portugal. Every part of your conduct has been guided not less by prudence and judgment than by the most marked zeal for his Majesty's service; and his Majesty is persuaded that the same temper and generous fulfilment of the spirit of your Instructions, which has so honourably distinguished the whole of your late proceedings in Portugal, will continue to actuate your conduct at all times in the discharge of your military duties.

His Majesty has been pleased to order Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley to proceed to Portugal, to take upon him the chief command of the army now assembling there; and his Majesty leaves it to your discretion to decide, according to the events in progress, whether you will await Sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival, or assume the command at Gibraltar, leaving the temporary charge of the force in Portugal in the senior officer on the Staff.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, April 2, 1809.

Sir—His Majesty having been graciously pleased to nominate Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cradock to the chief command

at Gibraltar, has thought fit to select you to replace that officer in the command of his Majesty's forces in Portugal.

You will receive enclosed a return of the troops, either actually arrived, or under orders for Portugal; and it is his Majesty's pleasure that you do proceed without delay to Lisbon, in execution of these orders, which I am now to convey to you by his Majesty's command. Your attention will be directed, in the first instance, to prepare and equip the British army for the field. You will, in the next place, direct your utmost exertion to the bringing forward the Portuguese army, and rendering it capable of co-operating with his Majesty's troops. In furtherance of the latter object, in addition to the arrangements already made, you will make such requisitions, from time to time, either to the Portuguese Government, or to the Government at home, as, upon communication with General Beresford, you may deem requisite for rendering the Portuguese troops fit for service.

The defence of Portugal you will consider as the first and immediate object of your attention. But, as the security of Portugal can only be effectually provided for in connexion with the defence of the Peninsula in the larger sense, his Majesty, on this account, as well as from the unabated interest he takes in the cause of Spain, leaves it to your judgment to decide, when your army shall be advanced on the frontier of Portugal, how your efforts can be best combined with the Spanish, as well as the Portuguese troops, in support of the common cause. In any movements you may undertake, you will, however, keep in mind that, until you receive further orders, your operations must necessarily be conducted with especial reference to the protection of that country.

Mr. Villiers will be instructed to procure for you every necessary assistance from the Portuguese Government; and you will consider him as the proper channel for such communications as you may have to make to the Regency.

CASTLEREAGH.

Effective Strength of the Forces serving in Portugal, and of the Troops embarked and under orders for Foreign Service.

14th Light Dragoons, 8 troops . . .	672	
20th „ „ 4 „	304	
Royal Waggon Train 3 „	250	
	——	1,226
In Portugal.		
2nd Foot Guards, 1st Battalion . .	1,198	
3rd „ „ . .	1,229	
	——	2,427
3rd Foot 1st Battalion . .	856	
9th „ 2nd „ . . .	645	
27th „ 3rd „ . . .	811	
29th „ „ . . .	726	
31st „ 2nd „ . . .	784	
40th „ 1st „ . . .	871	
45th „ 1st „ . . .	856	
60th „ 5th „ . . .	828	
87th „ 2nd „ . . .	710	
88th „ 1st „ . . .	758	
97th „ . . .	660	
King's German Legion. 1st Line Battalion . . .	748	
King's German Legion. 2nd „ . . .	801	
King's German Legion. 5th „ . . .	765	
King's German Legion. 7th „ . . .	721	
King's German Legion. Garrison Comps. . . .	49	
	——	11,589
Embarked at Cork—Sailed 29th March.		
7th Foot 2nd Battalion . .	576	
30th „	630	
48th „	717	
53rd „	699	
66th „	677	
83rd „	850	
	——	4,139
		19,381

		Brought forward		19,381
3rd Drg. Guards,	8 troops,	Portsmouth	672	
1st Dragoons	4 „	Cork . .	672	
4th „	„	Portsmouth	672	
16th Light Dragoons	„	Falmouth .	672	
1st German Light Drgs.		Ipswich .	606	
				3,294
24th Foot, 2nd Battalion				780
				23,455

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, April 3, 1809.

Sir—Upon the fall of Madrid, and the retreat of the Spanish armies into the south of Spain, his Majesty was pleased to signify, through his Minister to the Central Government of Spain, that his Majesty was ready to send an auxiliary army, to sustain the Spanish efforts in that quarter, provided the British troops were assured of the port and fortress of Cadiz, as a secure point of retreat, in case of disaster in the field.

The Government of Spain not having thought fit to accede to this preliminary and indispensable condition, and having actually declined to permit the British troops, under Major-Generals Sherbrooke and Mackenzie, who were sent as the advanced guard of the British army, to land at Cadiz, his Majesty does not feel that he can, in justice to the safety of his own troops, again employ an auxiliary army in Spain, till the Spanish Government and nation shall cease to entertain those feelings of jealousy, which are equally inconsistent with their own interest and the effectual prosecution of the war.

You will therefore understand that it is not his Majesty's intention, in authorizing you to co-operate with the Spanish armies in the defence of Portugal and of the adjacent Spanish provinces, that you should enter upon a campaign in Spain without the express authority of your Government; and, in any concert you may form with the armies of Spain, you will

cause it to be understood that it is to be confined to the specific object in view; and that the service of your army (under the orders you have received) cannot be employed in general operations in Spain, as the force under Sir John Moore was intended to have been, without a previous arrangement being settled to that effect between the two Governments.

Should the enemy penetrate in force towards Cadiz, it is not improbable that the reluctance of the Spanish Government to admit a British force into Cadiz may yield to the sense of immediate danger. Should such a change of sentiment take place, every effort should be made to assist in the preservation of that important place; and I am to convey to you the King's commands that, in case Mr. Frere should at any time notify to you the actual consent of the Spanish Government to admit a British garrison into Cadiz, you do detach an adequate force immediately, notifying to me the amount of such force, that measures may be adopted for supporting the corps so detached, and for replacing it in Portugal.

Should you receive a requisition to the above effect from the Governor of Cadiz, or other competent authority, you are authorized to act without waiting for a communication through the British Minister. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, April 5, 1809.

Sir—You will receive enclosed a list of transports now in Portugal, or under orders.[1] As it is of the greatest importance that a greater number should not be detained abroad than you deem indispensably necessary to the security of your army, in the event of its being obliged to re-embark, I am to desire that you will, immediately on your arrival, cause a careful survey to be made of the whole, sending home the least effective, and to as great an amount as you may deem consistent with the above object.

[1] This list enumerates 83 transports, carrying 17,980 tons.—EDITOR.

A regiment of cavalry being under orders to join you from Ireland, you will lose no time in sending tonnage for the reception of 800 horses from the Tagus to Cork.

You will report your opinion, according to the state of affairs in the Peninsula, what further reduction may, in your judgment, be made from time to time in the transport tonnage attendant on the army, the expense of which, more especially the horse transports, presses severely on the public finances at the present moment.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Lord Castlereagh, in submitting for your Majesty's approbation Sir Arthur Wellesley's Instructions, in the present state of the campaign in Portugal, and the peculiar circumstances of the command, hopes your Majesty will not disapprove of his humbly soliciting your Majesty's permission to order that officer to proceed immediately on service, without having previously had it in his power to pay his duty to your Majesty.

St. James's Square, April 8, 1809.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Portsmouth, April 10, 1809, ½ past 10 A.M.

My dear Lord—Your letter from Stanmore arrived about half an hour ago, from which I should judge that you are not aware that we are detained by an order from the Admiralty to the Surveillante, not to sail till further orders. This order appears, by a letter from Pole to me, to have been sent down at the suggestion of Cooke. Pray let me know as soon as possible what we are to do. Ever yours, most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Memorial on the State of Spain, by a Spanish Officer.

April 10, 1809.

Few persons in Europe, or even in Spain itself, can speak upon the affairs of this country with that impartiality and

truth, which are necessary to completely understand them. There are some who, filled with fears and the terror of losing their property, believe that the fate of Spain is already decided, and that she must submit to the yoke; while others, inspired with enthusiasm for the holy cause which we defend, view every occurrence in too favourable a light. It is proper to adopt a middle course between these two; and, while we persuade ourselves that, while it is impossible that we should be conquered so long as we possess valour and fortitude, we must not conceal the misfortunes which have continually attended our armies ever since the battle of Baylen.

Something might be said about the operations during the winter, and particularly of those armies under La Romana and Sir J. Moore; but neither the brevity of this memoir will allow of the discussion of matters which have already passed, nor could such discussion produce anything but soreness and exasperation. Let us draw a veil over those unfortunate misunderstandings between the Generals, which prevented them from deriving those advantages that might have been expected from the very considerable forces which they commanded in a country that offered so many advantages for defence. We will only speak of the positions which our armies actually occupy, that, from these data, we may calculate with accuracy what may be done under present circumstances.

Cuesta's army is posted on the heights of Monasterio and Santa Olaya, which, on being joined by 3,000 from Granada, and 1,200 from the Canaries, will amount to 30,000 men, of whom 6,500 are cavalry. Opposed to this army is that under Marshal Victor, which has already been, or is to be, joined by 5,000 men under General Lapisse, who was at Alcantara.

The army of Vanegas, amounting to 16,000 men, and 1,500 cavalry, occupies the gorges of the Sierra Morena, and is opposed to the army of Sebastiani, which cannot exceed 12,000 men.

I am totally uninformed of the force under Reding in Cata-

lonia; but, taking into consideration the little progress that the French have made in that province, notwithstanding they are in possession of all the strong places, which were delivered up to them by the infamous Godoy, (Prince of the Peace) it may be supposed that the French forces are about equal to those of Reding.

General Blake has united the command of the kingdoms of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon, and has assumed the command of a division of the latter, which was before under the Marquess of Lanzas, and amounted to 10,000 men. We know that the disposable force of Valencia positively amounted to 23,000 soldiers.

It is well known that the southern parts of Galicia are in a state of complete insurrection, and that, according to the latest advices, the same spirit pervaded the whole of that country.

The Marquess of Romana, with what force I know not, after having attacked and made prisoners a French regiment in Villa Franca del Bierzo, had proceeded towards the mountains of Leon, where he was to be joined by the reinforcements of Asturias, which had on foot a force of 30,000 men in arms. By the positions which the General (Romana) has taken up, all communication between the French in Galicia is cut off from Madrid; and, although this important operation has not yet been actually carried into effect, yet it may be inferred that the enemy has not a large disposable force in Castille to oppose to Romana.

Such is the present actual state of the armies of Spain; and it should not be forgotten that Marshal Ney now occupies Coruña, Ferrol, and Santiago, with 12,000 troops; and Oporto is occupied by 9,000 men under Soult, who is opposed by the Portuguese General Silveira, with about 13,000 men; while there is in Lisbon an English army of 17,000 men, at least.

In an intercepted letter from Joseph to Marshal Victor, are the following expressions: "General Sebastiani must employ

himself in disarming the people, and putting down the spirit of insurrection in La Mancha, without attempting any attack upon the Sierra Morena, until your Excellency shall have forced Cuesta, whom you will, however, not attack, until you have been joined by the division of Lapisse, nor without an understanding with Marshal Soult, who is at Oporto."

Under such circumstances, it does not require much military knowledge to decide how to act. Cuesta ought to be strictly forbidden making any attack upon the enemy; and in the mean while, an active and intelligent person should be despatched, with the plans of the enemy, to the English army at Lisbon, to whom he should propose either to march against, and (with the assistance of the Portuguese) to destroy Soult; or, with their whole force, to march upon Elvas and Badajoz, and threaten the enemy's flank from these points.

Should Soult be conquered, Ney is lost; for, with his communication with Castille cut off by Romana, the whole country in insurrection, and his flank threatened by Silveira, he would be compelled to surrender at discretion. What would be the fate of Victor and Sebastiani? Providence, which, with a protecting arm, has favoured us since the commencement of our revolution, could never present us with a fairer opportunity for destroying the armies of our foe, and particularly while the events in Germany must prevent his receiving any reinforcements from France.

In the mean time, the want of firearms is great, and must be remedied. England, whose friendly assistance we have experienced from the commencement, can alone aid us with the same promptitude and activity. Cadiz is the most convenient port for the armies of Estremadura and La Mancha, Carthagena for Murcia, Tortosa for Aragon, and Tarragona for Catalonia, Vigo for Galicia, and Gijon for the Asturias.

Above all, it is necessary to support the patriotic spirit of the people of La Mancha and of the capital, which, according to intercepted letters, becomes every day better and better. On

this account, we ought not to relinquish our ideas concerning that province. And while in the position Cuesta now occupies, he does not require so numerous a cavalry, it might be important to increase that arm of the army of La Carolina to the number of 4,000 horse, which, accompanied by a proportionate force of infantry and artillery, might make a powerful diversion in La Mancha.

The memorable retreat of, and that spirit of enthusiasm and confidence inspired by, the worthy General (Duke of Albuquerque) who commanded on that day, point him out as the proper person to be placed at the head of this proposed expedition. With this powerful diversion in La Mancha, it would be necessary that the English should co-operate by other strong demonstrations, which they could do with great facility.

Were the English to land at Vigo the forces which they have embarked at Portsmouth, the fate of Galicia would be more completely decided than ever, and consequently the fate of Portugal, Asturias, Leon, nay, even Castille itself. On the other hand, what is the use of the English army in Sicily? A powerful fleet is quite sufficient to prevent a landing of the enemy on that island. And if the Sicilian army (English) could be immediately conveyed to Catalonia, to co-operate with Reding, I do not conceive how the enemy could resist, when attacked at so many points, and by forces so considerable.

Such are my ideas on the actual state of affairs. I have not the presumption to imagine that they are the most correct and indisputable; but I can affirm that, in drawing up this memorial, I have had no other object than the public good, by undeceiving those who consider that all is lost, and thus diffuse universal despair, which is the greatest of all our misfortunes.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, April 11, 1809.

Sir—I am to acquaint you that, upon a full consideration of the state of affairs in Portugal, as communicated in the

despatches received up to the 24th ult., inclusive, from Lisbon, it does not appear to his Majesty's Government expedient that any alteration should take place in the measures in progress for reinforcing the British army in that country.

Should the British army be unfortunately compelled to evacuate Portugal, his Majesty, notwithstanding the late refusal to admit his troops into Cadiz, is nevertheless prepared to renew that offer on the same conditions. And, in the event of its acceptance, it is the King's pleasure that the whole force now in Portugal, including the cavalry, should be disembarked at Cadiz, from thence to be employed in such manner as may appear to you expedient for the support of the common cause.

Should this proposal of generous and disinterested aid be again declined by the Government of Spain, it is his Majesty's intention (unless you receive orders to the contrary) that, after reinforcing the garrison of Gibraltar to 8,000 British infantry, the detailed arrangements of which you will concert with Sir John Cradock, you do return home with the remainder of the force. A copy of these instructions will be sent to Mr. Frere, through whom, in the above contingency, you will make the offer hereby directed to the Central Government.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, April 11, 1809.

Sir—Brigadier-General Stewart, on his arrival in town, has, in obedience to your orders, communicated to me your very honourable feelings of disinclination to interfere with Sir John Cradock's command in Portugal, in the event of finding that officer engaged in active operations in the field. Should the case exist, which you have represented as by no means improbable from the movements the enemy is making towards Portugal, his Majesty trusts that the same feelings of zeal for his service, which induced this suggestion on your part, will determine you to place yourself under the orders of Sir John Cradock till his Majesty's further pleasure is known. And I

have no doubt that every communication which you may have with Sir John Cradock, on this point, will be conducted on both sides by considerations only of what may, at the moment, be most for the advantage of his Majesty's service.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Portsmouth, April 12, 1809.

My dear Lord—Charles arrived this morning, and we intend to endeavour to sail this afternoon, notwithstanding that the wind is contrary. As it is possible, however, that it may prevent us from getting out, I take the opportunity of the return of the messenger to draw your attention again to the orders which you have last sent me, in respect to my leaving the command in the hands of Sir John Cradock.

It occurred to me, when I read the accounts of the state of affairs in Portugal up to the 25th of March, that it might be expedient that Sir John Cradock should continue to exercise the command after I should arrive at Lisbon, even if no event should have occurred; and I certainly considered that I could not with propriety assume the command if he had been in any manner successful. The question whether it is expedient or not that I should assume the command will become difficult only in case no event should have occurred; and the difficulty will consist in its being one personal to the two parties most interested in it, and resting entirely upon a consideration of the personal qualifications and means of bringing the army through the difficulties in which it is supposed they will be involved. The decision of this delicate question must, in a great measure, rest with me, and I hope that I have fairness and firmness to decide it according to the best of my judgment. But I acknowledge that I think I shall find the difficulty of making the decision much increased by having in my possession the orders sent to me last night; and I could prefer to let the decision on the question rest, as indeed it must in any case, upon my private judgment.

The only possible inconveniences which can result from my want of these official orders are, that General Cradock may be inclined to refuse to remain in command of the army, and that his remaining in command would be, in fact, an official irregularity. But it must be recollected that, if he is likely to refuse the command in this case, he would keep it unwillingly in the other; and, in respect to the official irregularity, I conceive that it would be remedied by both of us stating to the Secretary of State our opinion that, upon my arrival, we considered it expedient that he should retain the command.

I wish, upon the whole, not to have these despatches; and, as we may be detained, I beg you to reconsider the necessity of leaving them with me. If we should be able to sail, or if you should decide to leave them in my possession, you may depend upon it that I will endeavour to decide upon the delivery of them, or otherwise, according to the best of my judgment. Pray send down the messenger as soon as you can, in case I should be detained.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

St. James's Square, April 13, [1809].

My dear Wellesley—I consider that you have the most entire discretion to abstain from making any communication to Sir J. Cradock under the instructions sent you, which were framed only with a view of giving a regular sanction to any arrangement with respect to command, which, under peculiar circumstances, you and Sir J. Cradock might, upon personal communication, deem best for the King's service. They were not meant to encourage any unnecessary alteration of the former orders to Cradock to deliver over the command to you—they were not intended to *force* Sir J. Cradock to continue in a temporary command, under circumstances unpleasant to his own feelings—they were merely calculated to give the King's

sanction to a suspension of the former orders to Sir J. Cradock, which he might otherwise consider *obligatory*, if the circumstances should induce *you* to *propose*, and *him* to *concur* in, the propriety of such a suspension. It certainly did appear to the King's Government that, if such an arrangement once took place, the moment when it should cease and the former arrangement revive was a point of so much delicacy, that it was hardly fair to leave it to the parties concerned to settle, and that a point of this nature, hanging upon circumstances, might be productive of *much embarrassment* to both. It was, therefore, decided that, in the event of *your determining* to leave the command with Cradock, he should continue to exercise it till he received further orders from home.

Where there is no difference of opinion as to the substance, my wish would certainly have been, in the execution of a suggestion entirely proceeding from yourself, to have conformed implicitly to your feelings upon it. On the subject having been brought under the consideration of Government, the Cabinet having felt themselves called upon to form an opinion upon it, and that opinion having been submitted to the King, I do not feel that I can now propose a reconsideration of it, without considerable delay and inconvenience; and I persuade myself, from the terms in which your letter is expressed, that, under these circumstances, you would not wish the question to be revived. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

St. James's Square, April 14, [1809].

Dear Wellesley—The accounts are very unfavourable from Portugal, but not such as to induce the King's Government to make any alteration in the course they are pursuing. The only additional instruction that occurs is to avoid the appearance of being a second time refused at Cadiz. With this view, we think it desirable that the army should rendezvous at Gibraltar, rather than in Cadiz Bay. The troops can be

landed there, if necessary for their health and accommodation, either within or without the fortress. We shall also have time to send you any further instructions that circumstances may point out, before your arrangements can be completed for breaking up the army.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, April 14, 1809.

Sir—Should you, in execution of my orders of the 11th inst., have occasion to proceed with the whole of your force to the southward, before the determination of the Spanish Government as to your reception is ascertained, it is the King's pleasure, in that case, that you do repair, in the first instance, to Gibraltar, and not to Cadiz, unless previously assured of being admitted. As it is material, however, that the intentions of the Spanish Government should be known without delay, Mr. Frere will be directed to press for a decision on this point, in order that his Majesty's Government may know how far they are to consider the force now in Portugal as required for service in Spain, or disposable, in the event of the evacuation of Portugal, for other services. Mr. Frere will communicate to you, for your guidance in the execution of the orders you have received, the result of his inquiries.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Sir D. Dundas.

Draft. St. James's Square, April 28, 1809.

Dear Sir—Permit me to renew the subject of supplying the army in Portugal as early as possible with such a proportion of light troops as our means will admit of. The critical situation of the British army in that country, the importance attached to this species of force by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the assurances he received before he left England that a corps of this description should follow him without delay, will, I am

persuaded, justify me with you for pressing this subject again upon your attention, and with an earnest request that such an arrangement as may be within our power to make with a view to this object may be accelerated.

Believe me, dear sir, with great regard,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Villa Franca, April 29, 1809.

My dear Lord—I write in the chance that this letter may still find the packet at Lisbon, to inform you that I have received a very bad report indeed of the state of the artillery horses, lately arrived from England with the heavy dragoons, being very old, diseased, and out of condition. I shall receive it officially probably in a day or two, when I shall transmit it to England. In the mean time, I think it proper to acquaint you with the state of these horses, and to recommend that, for that reason, as well as because it would be very desirable to attach a troop of horse artillery to so large a body of cavalry as we shall have, that a troop of horse artillery should be sent out. Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 13, 1809.

Sir—I am to acquaint you that a light brigade, consisting of the battalions stated in the margin,[1] are ordered for immediate embarkation, to join your army in Portugal.

The officer in command of this brigade will receive directions, in pursuance of the suggestion contained in your letter marked "Private," of the 24th ult., to call off Aveiro and the Mondego river for orders.

[1] The 1st battalions of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th Foot, of 1,000 men each.

I am further to inform you that orders have been given for sending to Portugal the men who have volunteered from the Militia into the regiments under your command, completing, as far as circumstances will permit, the several battalions to their full establishment. An additional quantity of forage has been ordered for the cavalry, upon the requisition of Sir John Cradock.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 13, 1809.

Sir—Having received a private letter from Lieutenant-General Beresford, expressing a strong wish that he may have the assistance of an additional number of British officers to aid in the organization of the Portuguese army, I am to acquaint you that, exclusive of the twenty-four officers who are allowed to transfer their services to the Portuguese army, receiving in the British army one step of permanent rank, as a compensation for relinquishing their regimental commissions, the Commander-in-Chief has received the King's pleasure for permitting such officers belonging to the regiments now in Portugal as were permitted by Sir J. Cradock, or may receive your permission to that effect, to do duty with the Portuguese army till further orders, receiving therein one step of rank, with the pay thereto belonging.

As it has appeared to his Majesty's Government that the number of officers which you may be enabled to spare, without prejudice to the efficiency of your army, may be inadequate to General Beresford's wants, I have signified to the Commander-in-Chief his Majesty's pleasure that thirty officers, from the regiments at home, may be forthwith sent to Portugal, to be employed upon the like terms as those detached from your army, under General Beresford's orders.

The requisition made by General Beresford for an increased supply of arms and clothing has been forwarded to Mr. Secretary Canning, whose province it is to receive his Majesty's

commands upon all aids to be granted to the Government of Portugal. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. London, May 13, 1809.

My dear Wellesley—I have waited with much impatience for the first accounts from Portugal after your arrival, and rejoice to find that none of the embarrassments which we had so much reason to apprehend, with respect to the state in which you were likely to find the army, have occurred.

It is highly satisfactory to me to observe that you are likely to get your army assembled, with a large proportion of the cavalry, before you are pressed by the enemy, and that you will have been enabled to originate, instead of conduct, a campaign, the nature of which had been decided for you.

I regret that it has not been in my power sooner to accomplish your wishes with respect to the light brigade. I have pressed the subject almost daily; and, to do the Commander-in-Chief justice, no exertion has been wanting on his part; but the effects of the late campaign in Spain have operated so deeply, that it is only by a selection of men from both the first and second battalions, that we have been enabled to prepare this brigade for service. They are, however, now promised for the 24th. We embark the 1st of the 43rd at Harwich, and the 1st of the 52nd and 95th at Deal. Each of the three battalions will go out 1,000 strong.

I have also ordered all the battalions now in Portugal to be completed to their full establishment, as far as we have the means at home of doing so. The 23rd and Commissariat horses will proceed from Cork, according to your directions; and both the cavalry and light brigade will be directed to call at Aveiro and Mondego for orders.

As Cradock, in his last despatch, speaks of the difficulty of foraging the cavalry, I have directed, in addition to the hay which sailed about the same time as you did, and which was,

I believe, equal to five weeks' consumption for 6,000 horses, a supply for the same number of horses for a month to be sent. We calculate that, including what is proceeding from Cork and the Shannon, you have oats for a like number for three months. There was an order issued some time since, directing a statement of supplies on hand and deficiencies every fortnight. I should be glad you would see this order complied with.

Your brother's appointment to Spain has given great satisfaction; and every hope is formed from your joint exertions. I fear Austria has begun the campaign under very unfavourable auspices; but our information as yet does not warrant despondence.

In addition to the officers already sent from hence, and those which Cradock has permitted to serve under Beresford, receiving a step of rank in the Portuguese service, Sir David has promised me to forward immediately thirty more selected from the army at home, who go upon the same terms, retaining their regimental commissions.

Muskets are a scarce article, as you know; but, in proportion as prospects brighten in Portugal, the motive for making every effort will be felt and acted upon.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. St. James's Square, May 16, 1809.

My dear Wellesley—I send you such suggestions as have occurred to us on Argenton's *projet*, which you will modify as you think best. There can be no doubt that the army is the true instrument with which to destroy Buonaparte's power, and that, if that game could be played with any solid prospect of success, it is beyond all others the best; but we have never yet seen the disposition exist to any extent, and we must therefore act cautiously, and, without throwing out of our hands

such a weapon (if it really exists), try to avoid the difficulties of Conventions on disputable grounds. Is it not suspicious that Argenton, coming with a proposal, should expose himself to all the *éclat* of a journey to Lisbon, where his arrival became notorious, and the news of which must meet him at Oporto?

We have not any intelligence from the Continent since I wrote last, nor has there been any firing on the opposite coast, where the battle of the 23rd was celebrated on the 28th. We may, therefore, hope that no further disaster of importance had occurred down to the 10th.

The L'Orient squadron, of three sail of the line and two frigates, finding Martinique in our possession, has taken shelter at the Saintes, where Cochrane is blockading them, having sent to Beckwith for a corps to reduce the island. If we should get this detachment, Martinique will have done well for us. The movement of the Brest fleet having been ordered for the express purpose of liberating this squadron, to proceed to Martinique, they have a large supply of provisions, but no troops on board.

The detachment ordered to Portugal are about 2,000 men: the light brigade, 3,000, embarks the 24th. I have written to Lord C[hatham] for the troop of horse artillery.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 16, 1809.

Sir—Your despatches of the 27th ult., from Lisbon, have been received and laid before the King. That which relates to the communication received from Captain Argenton has occupied the immediate attention of his Majesty's Government. They are fully impressed with the important consequences which might be expected to flow from the revolt of any considerable part of the French army at the present moment, which, if it should be followed, would afford the surest means

of dissolving the power against which we are now contending; but, in proportion as they feel all the importance of this view of the subject, they cannot disguise from themselves the doubts that must attach to the proposition, in point of sincerity; the obstacles that stand in the way of its successful execution; and, finally, to the difficulties which present themselves at the outset, in reconciling the measures to be taken with our present relations with the Governments of Spain and Portugal.

With this general view of the subject, I am to signify to you his Majesty's approbation of the caution with which you have received the overture alluded to; and I am to desire that you will continue to observe the same prudent line of conduct, taking care that any arrangement which you may adopt with the French army, so far as it affects the interests of Spain or Portugal, shall be made subject to the ratification and concurrence of their respective Governments.

With the above restriction, his Majesty is pleased to confide to your discretion to decide, according to circumstances, on the spot, by what course the objects his Majesty has in view can best be promoted. You will not fail to hold in mind that nothing short of the most unequivocal proofs of determination to turn their arms against Buonaparte could induce the Spaniards to permit a French army (more especially one which has acted in the manner Soult's corps is reported to have done in Gallicia) to retire unmolested through Spain, with the power to change its purpose, at any moment, on its march to take up new and perhaps more advantageous positions, or even to concentrate themselves with other corps, the better to prosecute their operations in other parts of Spain. The same difficulty, on the part of the Portuguese, will attach to any arrangement, by which the British shall charge themselves with the protection of troops which have so recently committed the utmost excesses within their territory; and we must not also lose sight of the just dissatisfaction which Austria would feel, if facilities were given for the transfer of a great proportion of

the French force now in Spain to contend against her in Germany.

On the other hand, although every proposition of this nature must be received with distrust (and the present is not free from some features of strong suspicion in the mode of bringing it forward), yet it is impossible to contend that a case may not arise, which might render it politic for you to endeavour to reconcile the difficulties of such a measure, great as they are, with the principles upon which your conduct towards the powers with whom we are acting in concert must necessarily be governed.

I am, however, persuaded that, whatever means you may have of prosecuting military advantages against Soult, you will not forego them for any other species of advantage, except upon the strongest grounds; that you will not encourage those officers who profess a disposition to revolt to expect your countenance and intervention with the Allies, unless they are prepared to give you every pledge of their sincerity, by committing themselves at once in the most unqualified and irrevocable manner against their own Government, and by submitting it to your discretion to direct how their concert with the other French armies in Spain shall be conducted, and their future plans arranged with the Spanish and Portuguese Governments.

Till such measures can be agreed upon, they must consent to occupy such cantonments as you may assign to them, not attempting to march forward into Spain, without the express consent of the Spanish Government having previously been obtained; and, as an indispensable preliminary, you will require the surrender into your hands of their General and other officers not engaged in the measure; adopting such further measures of precaution with respect to artillery, ammunition, &c., as you may think fit.

I have not attempted to do more than point your attention to the outline of the policy, on which it appears to his Majesty's

Government expedient that you should act, wishing to leave to your own judgment the fullest latitude.

The plan announced by Captain Argenton is so crude and undigested at present, so full of hazard and difficulty in the execution, and so formidable in prospect to those who embark in it, as not to justify any sanguine expectations that it is likely to take effect on the larger scale. The disposition, however, of the army in which it originated (if truly represented), may render it less formidable as an antagonist in the field. Should Soult retire his corps so far to the northward as to preclude you from following him, and that you should see no prospect of being enabled to bring him to a decisive action, the encouragement of such a spirit of revolt, if it really exists in his army, may be the best, perhaps the only means of disembarrassing yourself of a corps, which would probably again return to the southward so soon as you moved to the eastward. If such should be the case, and the presence of your army is deemed by those who may be engaged in this design material to protect and facilitate their revolt, it will remain for you to profit by that disposition, under such stipulations as you think best.

His Majesty's Government can have no objection to the principle of the measure: they are only anxious that it should be duly guarded in its provisions, so as not to involve them in any embarrassments with those powers with whom they are acting. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 22, 1809.

Sir—By the accompanying return, it appears that there is now assembled or assembling in Portugal tonnage for 5,654 horses. The arrangements in progress at home, with a view to the operations of the ensuing campaign, make the *immediate* return to England of transports for 3,000 horses an object of the utmost importance to his Majesty's service. With this

view, orders will be immediately sent to the officer commanding his Majesty's naval forces in the Tagus to prepare a division of the above amount, and to despatch them to Portsmouth so soon as he receives your authority for so doing. You will be enabled to judge from the aspect of affairs how far this important aid to the public service can be afforded.

The residue of this description of tonnage may for the present remain at your disposal; and you are also at liberty to retain a sufficiency of troop ships to receive, with the aid of the navy, the whole of the British army, should a re-embarkation, contrary to our present hopes, become necessary.

I do not make this order peremptory; but, unless when you receive it you should have reason to consider that a crisis is approaching, I attach so much importance to this resource being placed, without delay, at my disposal, that I should wish you to order the transports off without a moment's loss of time, as much depends on their arrival being accelerated.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 22, 1809.

Sir—The light brigade, under Brigadier-General Sir R. Craufurd, will embark at Harwich and Deal on the 24th instant. The Brigadier-General will be directed to join you by the shortest route, calling off Oporto, Aveiro, and Mondego, successively, for intelligence of your movements, or any orders you may have despatched to meet him at either of those places.

A troop of horse artillery will also embark about the same time from Ramsgate with similar orders; and, in case you should consider a second troop requisite for the service of your army, the Master-General of the Ordnance will direct the troop now in Ireland, with 300 additional artillery horses of the best description, to be held in readiness at Cork, to be embarked so soon as you send tonnage to receive them. The

troop of horse artillery will embark about 190 horses. You will give your own orders to the convoy with respect to the point of debarkation in Portugal. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Draft. Downing Street, May 25, 1809.

Your Majesty's confidential servants, upon a full consideration of the efforts making by the enemy to reinforce their army in Gallicia by a corps of from 12 to 15,000 men detached from Arragon (*viâ* Burgos) for that purpose, and the critical situation in which the British army may be placed in Portugal, if it should be threatened by a force of equal strength with itself on each of its flanks, beg leave humbly to submit to your Majesty's consideration the expediency of reinforcing Sir Arthur Wellesley to the extent of 5,000 infantry, exclusive of the light brigade now under orders for Portugal.

Your Majesty's servants humbly conceive that a corps of this extent may be drawn from the regiments now stationed in Ireland and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, without improperly reducing the respective garrisons, and without breaking in upon the large disposable force at present in Great Britain, so as to interfere with the execution of any service to which it might be in your Majesty's contemplation to apply it.

They are induced the rather to recommend this arrangement for your Majesty's sanction, as, in whatever proportion it may operate to render the position of the British army secure in Portugal, it will enable Sir Arthur Wellesley to place at the disposal of Government a considerable proportion, if not the whole, of the transport tonnage, which is now detained, at a heavy expense, in the Tagus, and without the assistance of which Lord Castlereagh apprehends it will be extremely difficult, in the present state of the commercial marine of the country, to provide the means of rendering any considerable proportion of the force at home moveable in the course of this campaign.

His Majesty's answer.

Windsor Castle, May 26, 1809.

The King acquiesces in the arrangement proposed by Lord Castlereagh for sending a further reinforcement to the army assembled in Portugal, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, of 5,000 infantry. GEORGE R.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 25, 1809.

Upon referring to my instructions to you of the 3rd April, and the course that operations may take, should Victor retire upon your moving towards the Tagus, I have received his Majesty's commands, in order that you may be enabled the better to co-operate with the Spanish armies against the common enemy, to authorize you to extend your operations in Spain beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontier, provided you shall be of opinion that your doing so is material, in a military point of view, to the success of your operations, and not inconsistent with the safety of Portugal. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 26, 1809.

Dear Wellesley—Accept my congratulations and thanks for what you have already accomplished, and my best wishes for your future success and personal glory. I am doing what I can to promote it by strengthening you from hence, and shall press everything forward as much as possible. If you want another regiment of cavalry *very much*, send transports for 800 horses to Cork, in which I will send you the 1st Dragoons, unless events should require us to give it another destination. The Transport Board have directed Fleetwood to place himself under your orders, and to execute all your arrangements. I hope Craufurd is going down Channel to-day. Two transports

have received damage at Dover, which will render it necessary for them to call at Portsmouth. The transports for the horse artillery are not arrived at Ramsgate.

I shall do what I can for Stanhope; but, in the present temper of the times, you will easily believe that promotion against regulation cannot be attempted.

Ever sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 26, 1809.

Sir—I have received and laid before the King your despatches of the 12th instant, stating your successful commencement of the campaign in Portugal. His Majesty commands me to express his entire satisfaction in the decision and the celerity of your operations, the excellence of your dispositions, and the vigour of your attacks, by which you have been enabled to defeat the enemy in three actions, to pass the Douro in his presence, to recover Oporto, and to force the army under Marshal Soult to retire with much loss, and abandon great part of their ammunition and artillery.

You will make it known to the officers and troops under your command that the conspicuous valour and intrepidity they have displayed is highly satisfactory to his Majesty. The conduct of the 1st battalion of the Buffs, commanded first by Lieutenant-General Paget, and afterwards, when he was compelled to leave the field, by Major-General Hill, reflects the highest credit on that corps, and the officers who led them.

Whilst his Majesty is sensible to the loss his service must sustain by the absence from duty which the wound received by Lieutenant-General Paget must necessarily occasion, he feels great satisfaction to learn that there is a fair prospect of his speedy recovery. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, May 26, 1809.

Sir—I am to acquaint you that, in addition to the light brigade, which has embarked, and, I hope sailed, under the orders of Brigadier-General Craufurd, his Majesty has ordered the seven regiments of infantry enumerated in the margin[1] to proceed immediately to Portugal, to reinforce your army. The three first are now stationed at Jersey and Guernsey, and will go by a separate convoy, with instructions to call off Oporto, Aveiro, and Mondego, successively, for your orders. The remaining four battalions will assemble and embark at Cork.

When the service will admit of your sending home the two battalions composed of detachments, it is my wish they should return to their regiments; but I am disposed to leave the moment at which this shall be done to your discretion; as also when the detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons shall proceed to the Mediterranean; only pointing out the inconvenience that arises from troops being long suffered to remain in this dispersed state, and trust that it will not be unnecessarily delayed.

Steps have been taken for collecting a remount for the cavalry, to the numbers required in your letter of the [blank], and for purchasing a number of aged horses for the regiments actually on service. Hay for one month, for 6,000 horses, is embarked and embarking for the use of your cavalry. I should be glad to know your further wishes on the subject of forage.

[1]

34th,	2nd battalion	693
47th,	do.	730
39th,	do.	603
5th,	do.	718
28th,	do.	725
42nd,	do.	723
88th,	do.	779
		4,951

The Master-General of the Ordnance, adverting to the proportion of artillery now in Portugal, and the two troops of horse artillery under orders (one immediately to proceed from hence, the other to be held in readiness at Cork, till transports are sent from Portugal to receive it), does not conceive it necessary that any further detail of artillery should accompany the infantry now going. The 300 additional artillery horses, which you are authorized to send for to Cork, will render all your brigades completely moveable and efficient.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir J. Cradock.

Draft. Downing Street, June 2, 1809.

My dear Cradock — I have delayed my answer to your letters, written on your departure from Lisbon, till I could be assured that it would find you at Gibraltar. Your wish to return has been so strongly conveyed to me by your friends here and by Lady Theodosia, that I can have no other desire than to fulfil your request. You have done every thing that honour and duty could require from you towards the service and towards the Government. Whatever is most satisfactory to your own feelings it is only necessary for me to be assured of, to feel it incumbent on me to promote; and, in this sense, I have most cheerfully advised the King to leave your return in your own hands. If I have not entered into the extent to which some of your friends, whose judgment upon such a point may be more correct than mine, have felt upon the nature of your command at Gibraltar, I am aware you will believe that it has not proceeded from indifference to your military character or reputation.

For both I must always feel the utmost solicitude, and shall be happy to avail myself of any occasion of marking it. As we shall probably soon meet, I shall only assure you of the regard and esteem with which I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, June 6, 1809.

Sir—Your despatches of the 15th, 18th, and 20th, have been received and laid before the King. His Majesty has been pleased to express his gracious approbation of the whole of your conduct during the late arduous service on which you have been engaged. The rapidity of your movements to the northward, if not attended with the complete reduction of Soult's corps, has, it is to be presumed, for a length of time, disqualified the remains of his army from acting offensively against Portugal, and left you at liberty to prosecute operations against Victor.

The decision and skill with which the British army has been led, and the animated bravery displayed by the officers and troops in the passage of the Duero, cannot fail to confirm the confidence which they are entitled to feel in their own superiority over the enemy, and to prepare the way for future successes. The result of the present operation, under the relative circumstances of the two armies, has in no respect fallen short of what might have been expected from the talents of the General and the gallantry of the troops.

Your determination not to follow Soult's army further to the northward, but to return towards the eastern frontier of Portugal, to watch and repel the enemy's advance on the Tagus, has been entirely approved by his Majesty.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Sir David Dundas.[1]

Thomar, June 7, 1809.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 13th of May, relative to the appointment of officers in his Majesty's service to serve with the Portuguese

[1] On the envelope of this letter there is the following note, addressed

troops under Marshal Beresford. It appears to be his Majesty's intention that the number of officers who should receive one step of British promotion on being permitted to serve with the Portuguese troops should not exceed twenty-four, and that thirty officers, who were to be sent from England to serve with the Portuguese troops, and all who should be appointed from the army in Portugal, for the same duties, should continue to hold in the British army the commissions which they had hitherto held; and to be allowed to serve with the Portuguese troops, with one step of advanced Portuguese rank, and the pay of the Portuguese commission in which they should serve with the Portuguese army.

The King's commands, as thus conveyed, differ from what were understood to be the intentions of his Majesty's Government, I believe, by the late Commander of the Forces in Portugal, and from his practice and from that which I have followed since the command has devolved upon me. He understood that the officers who should be allowed to serve with the Portuguese troops from the regiments of the army in this country were to stand in the same situation, and were to accept their appointments in the Portuguese service upon the same conditions with the officers first appointed in England, to serve with the Portuguese troops; and he, and I, since the command has devolved upon me, have allowed officers, of whose names I lately transmitted you lists, to serve with the Portuguese troops on those conditions.

As but few officers have applied to serve with the Portuguese troops, even with the advantage of receiving one step of British promotion, I should doubt whether any would be willing to

by Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, Quartermaster-General, no doubt to Lord Castlereagh, though he is not named:—

"My dear Lord—The enclosed leads to a minute detail, but I understood you wished to see what had been said.

"Yours, most respectfully, J. W. Gordon.

"July 14, 1809."

serve in this manner, upon the advantage now held out to them of receiving one step of Portuguese rank, which can be but local and temporary, together with the pay of the Portuguese rank in which they should be employed, if you had not transmitted me a list of the names of thirty officers who are willing to be so employed, upon the terms held out to them in this list: however, I beg to observe that it contains the names of some officers now in Portugal, who will refuse to serve with the Portuguese troops on the terms proposed. One of them, indeed, Captain Fordyce, of the 81st Foot, who is Brigade-Major to Major-General Hill, and who has been recommended as an officer to serve with the Portuguese troops, upon the more advantageous terms, (which it was imagined here that it was intended we should hold out) has desired that he may not be employed with the Portuguese troops, and that he may not be considered as having expressed a wish to be so employed, unless he should receive one step of promotion in the British army, and that this promotion should be notified to the army in this country. I am convinced that no officers in this country will offer their services upon the terms which, I now understand, are to be held out to them.

There is one branch of these terms to which I wish to draw your particular attention and early decision: it is that part which gives to British officers one step of Portuguese rank above that which they held in his Majesty's service.[1]

The Portuguese Government claim a right, which, I believe, cannot be refused to any independent State, of granting commissions in their army, and that the officers holding these commissions should rank, according to seniority of dates, with the officers holding commissions of the same denomination and rank in the service of other powers.

Under the terms proposed to be held out to the officers of the British army in Portugal, to induce them to serve with

[1] The marginal observations attached by the Commander-in-Chief to this and subsequent parts of this letter will be found at the end.

the Portuguese troops, they are to receive one step of Portuguese rank above that which they hold in the British army; and as, under their Portuguese commission, they are to rank with British officers holding his Majesty's commission of the same denomination and rank, according to the seniority of dates, the result of this offer will be, to give to all who accept of it local or temporary rank over the heads of their seniors, employed in the same foreign service. This effect would not be felt, if the British and Portuguese troops were not likely to serve together; but, as they do and must serve together, it will be felt daily, and will give occasion to dissatisfaction and constant complaints.

I have to mention, upon this part of the subject, that this dissatisfaction has already existed; and I have been called upon to decide upon a complaint made in consequence. The practice has been hitherto to give an officer, who had already been promoted, one step of British rank, to induce him to serve with the Portuguese army, another step of Portuguese rank when he entered that service, thus making those promoted to be British Majors Portuguese Lieutenant-Colonels, and giving them temporary and local rank over all the Majors of the British army.

In consequence of this dissatisfaction and complaint, I have already had some discussion with the British ambassador and Marshal Beresford upon the subject, and I proposed either that British officers appointed to serve in the Portuguese army should have Portuguese commissions only of the same rank with those which they held from his Majesty; or that, if they should hold superior Portuguese commissions, in a view to give them more extended command over the Portuguese troops, they should rank with British officers, when they should meet them on service, only by the dates of their commissions in his Majesty's service.

As, however, his Majesty's commands, as conveyed in your letter of the 13th of May, recognise the principle of a British

officer holding advanced Portuguese rank, and consequently a local temporary superior commission to those held by his seniors in the British service, I think it proper to delay to give any decision upon these complaints, and to refer the following points for your consideration and that of his Majesty's servants:

1st. Are officers in the Portuguese service to rank with officers in his Majesty's service, according to the dates of their several commissions?

2ndly. If they are, is it intended that officers of the British army, who have been or shall be appointed to serve with the Portuguese troops, shall serve with a Portuguese commission of the same rank with that which they hold in the King's service, or with a Portuguese commission of a superior rank?

3dly. If with a Portuguese commission of a superior rank, in what manner is the relative rank of these officers to be settled with the rank of officers senior to them in the British service, although junior in reference to their Portuguese commissions?

4thly. If officers belonging to the British army in Portugal are not to serve with the Portuguese troops, with advanced Portuguese commissions, what other encouragement is to be held out to them, to induce them to accept of this employment?

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marginal Observations, by the Commander-in-Chief (Sir David Dundas).

It is understood that a British officer employed in the Portuguese service receives one step of Portuguese rank on his entrance into that service: that is, a British Captain, if employed in the Portuguese army, receives a Portuguese commission as Major. In this capacity of Portuguese Major, he must, to all intents and purposes, be considered as a Portu-

guese officer, ranking with other Portuguese officers according to the dates of their respective commissions.

It is also clearly understood that Portuguese officers, when serving or co-operating with British officers, rank with them according to the dates of their respective commissions, a Captain with a Captain, a Major with a Major, a Lieut.-Colonel with a Lieut.-Colonel. This being the case, it follows that a British officer, acting with the Portuguese army, under a *Portuguese commission*, must be considered, to all intents and purposes, as a Portuguese officer, without any reference whatever to his *British* rank, which British rank lies dormant, (though progressive in the British army) so long as he is employed under a Portuguese commission.

It is not possible for the two services to be carried on together under any other arrangement with respect to the rank of their several officers than that above mentioned; and it must, therefore, remain with the Commander-in-Chief of the united British and Portuguese army to determine as to the number and elegibility of officers to be lent to the Portuguese service; and the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's army cannot recommend to the King that the *number* of British officers with permanent rank and promotion, when employed in the Portuguese service, should be *extended;* and he is of opinion that the number, twenty-four, is already too large—such a promotion bearing hard upon that part of the British army whose service in distant possessions precludes them from being advantaged by it; and, in fact, it operates as a very extensive and partial promotion to the army employed in Portugal alone.

Besides this, as officers must be obtained upon the spur of the occasion for the organization of the Portuguese army, this brevet promotion is granted of necessity to young men, who, though deserving, have, by no means, those claims which attach to the majority of the army; and consequently, the major part of the most deserving officers in the army would be passed over, and become thereby dissatisfied with their situation.

To Question 1. This has been the invariable practice in all united armies.

To Question 2. If a British officer serves with the Portuguese army, under a Portuguese commission, which it is supposed he must do, to render his services effectual, he becomes *a Portuguese officer, in toto*, and no reference is to be made to his British commission.

To Question 3. Answered above.

To Question 4. His Majesty permits his officers to serve in the Portuguese army on the following terms, viz.:

Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant-Colonel, may serve in the Portuguese army, retaining their situations in the British army, and with one step of rank in the Portuguese army, or such other promotion therein as the Commander-in-Chief in Portugal and the Portuguese Regency may direct, senior to that which they held in the British; their British commission remaining dormant, though their rank in the British service would be progressive. Thus, if the senior Captain of the 1st Regiment of Foot was serving as a Major in the Portuguese army, and the Majority of the 1st Regiment was to fall vacant, his pretensions to succeed to such Majority would be strengthened, according to the character he supported under the Portuguese commission.

D. DUNDAS, Commander-in-Chief.

Horse-Guards, July 10, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh to Major-General Lightburne.

Draft. Downing Street, June 9, 1809.

Sir—I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you do proceed with the regiments named in the margin,[1] now in Ireland, to Portugal, to join the army under the command of

[1] 5th Foot 2nd Battalion
28th „ do.
42nd „ do.
88th „ do.

Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. You will call off Oporto, Aveiro, and Mondego, successively, in case the Lieutenant-General should have left at either of those places instructions for the guidance of your proceedings.

The Hon. F. Robinson[1] *to Major-General Lightburne.*

Draft. Downing Street, June 10, 1809.

Sir—Referring to Lord Castlereagh's Instructions to you, I am directed by his Lordship to acquaint you that, as there is little prospect of Sir Arthur Wellesley's being engaged in operations in the north of Portugal at the time that you may arrive off that coast, his Lordship desires you will omit calling off Oporto, if your doing so is likely to occasion much loss of time, but that you do proceed without delay to Aveiro and Mondego, where, and particularly at the latter place, you will probably find Instructions for your guidance.

F. Robinson.

Similar letters sent the same day to Brigadier-General R. Craufurd and to the officer commanding the Royal Artillery embarking at Ramsgate.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. London, June 11, 1809.

Dear Wellesley—It is a lamentable proof of the uncertainty of all military combinations, which depend on maritime movements, to state that Craufurd's Brigade is still in port, having been ready since the 24th of last month. It went to sea from the Downs, but was driven into Portsmouth. As the transports going to Cork and the Islands to receive the seven regiments ordered from thence were also blown into Falmouth and other ports to the westward, I fear the 23rd must have suffered from the late gales from the southward.

Since I last wrote, I have ordered a Veteran Battalion to

[1] Now Earl of Ripon.

Madeira, to relieve the 11th Regiment, which, being a first Battalion, of 1000 strong, will be an acquisition to your army.

By the enclosed Return, I conclude you will have 35 battalions of infantry, exclusive of the two battalions of detachments when the 11th, now under orders, joins you. The proportion of second battalions is larger than I could wish; but this you may mend by taking the 48th, 57th, and 61st, from Gibraltar, and replacing them with the three least serviceable of your army. I shall be satisfied if the garrison is composed of 3,000 men, of which the two Veteran Battalions now there may be taken for 1000.

The four regiments from Cork, viz., the 5th, 28th, 42nd, and 88th, are ordered to call off the coast for your instructions, particularly at Mondego. The brigade from the islands, viz., the 34th, 39th, and 58th, will proceed to the Tagus; the reason for which is that the 34th and 39th have a considerable number of men, clothing, &c., which are to embark at Portsmouth, on the 20th, to join them. Till these arrive, they will not be as efficient as they ought to be, and I have promised that you will detain them at Lisbon till the whole is put together. The 34th was reported you at 693; it will now be completed by Militia to 1000. The 39th, I understand, will also be augmented, probably to 800. When these are arrived, you will have as large a force as we can for the present spare you, or indeed (including Portuguese) as we can find the means of paying; specie being here at the lowest possible ebb. What do you now reckon the Portuguese force at, distinguishing what is in British pay?

The Continental prospects have much improved since I wrote last. The battle of Aspern, the details of which have not yet been received, has, by Buonaparte's own admission, thrown him back a month in his campaign; and it is to be hoped that its moral influence over the mind of the Continent, as well as of the Austrian army, will be even more important than the reduction it has caused in his ranks. The prospect

of something being done against the enemy in the North is, from this circumstance as well as others, so much increased, that we shall be anxious to receive whatever transport equipment you can spare us.

Huskisson will write to you on the subject of money. A considerable sum is on its way to the Tagus; but so great is the pressure, that I have to recommend your drawing all possible aid both from Cadiz and Gibraltar—in short, wherever a bill upon England can be realized.

Gordon will explain the difficulties that are felt at the Horse Guards to give rank to all the officers who have joined Beresford. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, June 13, 1809.

Sir—Your despatches of the 31st ultimo, from Coimbra, have been received and laid before the King.

In reply to that which requests a supply of different articles for the use of your army, I am to acquaint you that directions have been given for forwarding to Portugal the supplies therein named.

In order to prevent any future want of so important an article as shoes, 50,000 instead of 30,000 pair will be sent. The bread will be forwarded as speedily as possible; but it has been deemed advisable that half the quantity mentioned in your despatch should be in the shape of flour.

No time will be lost in forwarding an additional proportion of hay; but, as there is already a large supply which waits only for a fair wind to proceed to Portugal, I trust no inconvenience will arise, if the whole additional quantity required—3,000,000 pounds—be despatched at different and successive periods, on account of the great extent of tonnage, which would otherwise be occupied at once on this service.

The same remark will also apply to the oats, of which a

considerable quantity has sailed lately from Ireland, but probably had not arrived when your letter was written.

The necessity of sending out money has been represented to the Treasury, and your wish will be complied with, as far as the means exist.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Abrantes, June 17, 1809.

My dear Lord—My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a very curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentleman at the head of an army need be. He would not alter his position, even to ensure the safety of his army, because he supposed that this measure might be injurious to himself; notwithstanding that this alteration would have been a part of an operation which must have ended in the annihilation of Victor's army, if he stood our attack, or, in his retreat through the mountains to Arche Bispo, with the loss of all his cannon and baggage, if he went away. I hope I acted right in giving way; more particularly as the operation was to be carried on in Spain; and the argument urged to me was that the safety of Cuesta's army depended on my compliance. The best of the whole story is, that Cuesta, in a letter of the 27th of May, which I did not receive till after I had written to him to propose my plan of operations, proposed to me the same plan, with very little alteration.

I hope that, notwithstanding Colonel Roche's delays, and the partiality which the Admiral has for the employment of the horse transports on all services, the horse transports will have arrived in time. It is desirable that all the transports, for horses as well as infantry, should have a thorough cleaning; for I have reason to believe that some of the former, in particular, are infected.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Abrantes, June 17, 1809.

My dear Lord—I cannot with propriety omit to draw your attention again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers.

Notwithstanding the pains that I take, of which there will be ample evidence in my Orderly Books, not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of irregularities committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, or who have been left in hospitals.

We have a Provost Marshal and no less than four assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage, never leave an hospital, without a number of officers and non-commissioned officers proportionate to the number of soldiers; and never allow a detachment to march, unless under the command of an officer; and yet there is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who have never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation.

In the first place, I am convinced that the law is not strong enough to maintain discipline in an army upon service. It is most difficult to convict any prisoner before a regimental Court-Martial; for, I am sorry to say, the soldiers have little regard for the oath administered to them; and the officers, who are sworn "well and truly to try and determine, *according to their evidence,* the matter before them," have too much regard to the strict letter of that administered to them. This oath to the members of a regimental Court-Martial has altered the principle of the proceedings of that tribunal. It is no longer a Court of Honour, by the hands of which a soldier was certain

of receiving punishment, if he deserved it; but it is a Court of Law, whose decisions are to be framed according to the evidence principally of those on whose actions it is constituted as a restraint.

But, admitting the regimental or detachment Court-Martial, as now constituted, to be a control upon the soldiers equally efficient with that which existed under the old constitution of a Court-Martial, which my experience tells me it is not, I should wish to know whether any British army (this army in particular, which is composed of second battalions, and therefore but ill provided with officers) can afford to leave with every hospital, or with every detachment, two captains and four subalterns, in order to be able to hold a detachment Court-Martial. The law, in this respect, ought to be amended; and when the army is on service in a foreign country, any one, two, or three officers, ought to have the power of trying criminals, and punishing them instanter, taking down all proceedings in writing, and reporting them for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, on their joining the army.

Besides this improvement of the law, there ought to be in the British army a regular Provost establishment, of which a proportion should be attached to every army sent abroad. All the foreign armies have such an establishment; the French, their *Gendarmerie nationale*, to the amount of thirty or forty, with each of their corps; the Spaniards, their *Police militaire*, to a still larger amount; while we, who require such an aid more than any of the other nations in Europe, (I am sorry to say) have nothing of the kind, excepting a few sergeants, who are taken from the Line for the occasion, and who are probably not very fit for the duties which they are to perform.

Then the authority and duties of the Provost ought in some manner to be recognised by the law. By the custom of the British armies, the Provost has been in the habit of punishing on the spot, even with death, (under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief) soldiers found in the act of disobedience of

orders, of plunder, or of outrage. There is no authority for this practice, excepting custom, which, I conceive, would hardly warrant it; and yet I declare that I don't know in what manner the army is to be commanded at all, unless the practice is not only continued, but an additional number of Provosts are appointed.

There is another branch of this subject which deserves serious consideration. We all know that the discipline and regularity of all armies must depend on the diligence of the regimental officers, principally the subalterns. I may order what I please, but, if they don't execute what I order, or execute it with negligence, I can't expect that British soldiers will be orderly or regular. There are two incitements to men of this description to do their duty as they ought—the fear of punishment, and the hope of reward. As for the first, it cannot be given individually; for, I believe, I should find it very difficult to convict any officer of doing this description of duty with negligence, more particularly as he is to be tried by others probably guilty of the same offence. But these evils of which I complain are committed by whole corps, and the only way in which they can be punished is by disgracing them by sending them into garrison, and reporting them to his Majesty. I may and shall do this by one or two battalions, but I cannot venture to do it by more, and then there is an end to the fear of this punishment, even if those who received it were considered in England as disgraced persons, rather than martyrs.

As for the other incitement to officers to do their duty zealously, there is no such thing. We, who command the armies of the country, and who are expected to make exertions greater than those made by the French armies, to march, to fight, and to keep our troops in health and in discipline, have not the power of rewarding or of procuring a reward for a single officer in the army; and we deceive ourselves and those who are placed under us, if we imagine we have that power, or if

we hold out to them that they shall derive any advantage from the exertion of it in their favour.

You will say, probably, in answer to all this, that British armies have been in the field before, and that these complaints, at least to the same extent, have not existed; to which I answer, first, that the armies are now larger, their operations more extended, and the exertion required greater than they were in former periods; that the mode of carrying on war is different from what it was; secondly, that our law, instead of being strong, in proportion to the temptation and means for indiscipline and irregularity, has been weakened; and that we have not adopted the additional means of restraint and punishment adopted by other nations and our enemies, although we have imitated them in those circumstances which have increased and aggravated our irregularities; and, finally, that it is only within late years that the Commanders-in-Chief abroad have been deprived of all patronage, and of course of all power of incitement to the officers under their command.

It may be supposed that I look for this patronage, to gratify my own favourites; but I declare most solemnly that, if I had it to-morrow, there is not a soul in the army whom I should wish to promote, excepting for services performed.

I have thought it proper to draw your attention to these subjects; which, I assure you, deserve the serious consideration of the King's Ministers. We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight: we are bad in quarters, when campaigning.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to the Chevalier de Souza Couttinho.

Draft. June 20, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh presents his compliments to the Chevalier de Souza Couttinho, and has the honour to acknowledge his letters of the 13th and 15th instant.

Lord Castlereagh has taken an opportunity of communicating with the Commander-in-Chief on the subject of them, and finds that he does not think it proper to permit any additional British officers to proceed to Portugal with permanent rank in the Portuguese army, under the circumstances of their services being at present required with the corps to which they respectively belong.

With respect to Captain Prior, of the 5th West India Regiment, Lord Castlereagh is informed that it is thought advisable to keep the Black corps as efficient as possible in their complement of officers, and that Captain Prior received his appointment under the assurance that he would immediately proceed to join his regiment. CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Abrantes, June 27, 1809.

My dear Lord—The money for which I have been waiting arrived here on Sunday, and the army has marched forward. Our advanced guard will enter Spain at Zarza Mayor on the 2nd of July.

The French retired from Almaraz, on the road to Madrid, on the 24th; and General Cuesta was at Almaraz on the same day, and was making arrangements to cross the river Tagus. Sebastiani was retiring towards Toledo. He was, on the 22nd, at Madrigoes, and Vanegas at Villasta, on the Zancara.

It is unfortunate that I could not march ten or twelve days ago; but, just to show you the uncertainty of all communications in this country, and probably the deficiencies of our Commissariat, I mention that the money which arrived on the 15th at Lisbon, and was sent off immediately, did not arrive here till late on the 25th. It is the same with every thing else. On the day I determined to move into Spain, from Abrantes, I ordered every thing that would be required for the

army, and I have not had occasion to add to or alter the original order. And yet the articles ordered are not yet arrived, notwithstanding that there is a water communication to Lisbon, and officers and others come up in five days. I believe much of this delay and failure is to be attributed to the ignorance and inexperience of our Commissariat, much to the want of money, and to our discredit in Portugal, on account of our large and long owed debts, and something to the uncertainty and natural difficulties of all the communications in Portugal.

We shall not go into Spain quite so strong as I could wish; but, when Craufurd's brigade will arrive, I think we shall have nearly 20,000, rank and file, of infantry, and about 3,000 of cavalry. I will desire that a weekly statement may be sent to your lordship, that you may see how we really stand, for I observe that it is frequently imagined in England that armies are much stronger than they really are, and expectations are formed which cannot be realized. It is a most difficult task to keep up numbers in this country and climate, particularly of cavalry. The brigade of heavy cavalry, which has not yet done a day's duty, is obliged to leave here nearly 100 horses; and that brigade, which has been to the northward, is so much reduced, that they are happy to take 110 of the Irish Commissariat horses as a remount. I hope, therefore, that you will send us the remount as soon as possible.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Castel Branco, June 30, 1809.

My dear Lord—I received your letter of the 11th yesterday. I am much obliged to you for the reinforcements you have sent, and you may depend upon it that I will make the best use of them in my power when they shall arrive; but none are arrived yet, excepting the 23rd Dragoons. It is impossible to say how we shall stand in point of numbers when these

troops will arrive till I shall see a return of their numbers. But nothing is more fallacious than a return such as that which you have sent me. It contains an enumeration of no less than 11 battalions not arrived, of two gone to Gibraltar, and of two (the detachments) ordered home, and the 20th Dragoons, ordered and gone by this time to Sicily: and it omits, on the other hand, two battalions, the 61st and 48th, arrived from Gibraltar.

The mischief of these returns is that they never convey an accurate notion of the strength of the army. According to your account, I have 35,000; according to my own, I have only 18,000; and the public will not be satisfied either with you or me, if I don't effect all that 35,000 men can effect. Including officers, who ought to be counted, I make no doubt that before long I shall have more than 35,000 men; but, from all these returns, a deduction of ten in the hundred ought always to be made for sick; and then you might expect to come nearly to the mark.

I enclose an extract of the last return I have seen of Victor's army, which shows the comparative numbers of effectives and total. I hope that our effectives will never be so much reduced in comparison with our total as that is:[1] but surely it must be admitted that, if our army is now to be called 23,000, and hereafter to be called 35,000, rank and file, the French army opposed to us ought to be called 44,000. And yet neither you nor I will be forgiven by those who will see your return, if I don't now perform deeds, which might with justice be required from 35,000 men.

If I am to have the 57th from Gibraltar, you should send an order to the Governor, and that corps to Portugal, in exchange for one which I shall send to Gibraltar to relieve it.[2]

I enclose you an abstract of the last return of the Portu-

[1] The return in question states the total amount of the French corps to be 44,358, of whom 29,321 were present under arms.—EDITOR.

[2] Done. Note by Lord Castlereagh.

guese force which I have received.[1] Of this number we pay for 20,000 men, I believe, £480,000 or £500,000 per annum. My belief is that the Portuguese Government cannot go on unless Great Britain will assist them with a million.

The Portuguese army is not yet in a state of discipline, or organized as it ought to be for service. I have settled with Beresford that he shall collect all that part of it not required for garrisons in a camp on the most exposed frontier, for the double purpose of watching the enemy's movements and disciplining his officers and troops. If he can get them together for two or three months, they will be a fine army, and probably very useful; but, in order to effect this object, they must be kept clear of the desultory operations of Romana and the other Spanish chiefs in Gallicia. Besides these troops, called Regulars, there is an army of militia, amounting, I believe, to 30,000 men, divided into battalions of 1,000 each. We propose to discipline the whole of these by 600 at a time, in reliefs of 200 each; and, when the whole are disciplined, to call out the whole in camps of 8 or 10,000 men, at a season of the year in which the country can spare the labours of the men, and perfect them, and then send them all to their homes till they shall be wanted.

I conceive that, exclusive of militia, the Portuguese army will be 50,000 men when complete; and the question is, in what way this force ought to be employed. There is no doubt but that that part of the Portuguese force which is not required for internal purposes ought to be employed against the common enemy in Spain, if that addition of force is likely to be of any avail. But if circumstances should bring the contest in Spain to that state, that, notwithstanding all our efforts, the enemy should still be superior to us in the field, I should then doubt the expediency of marching the Portuguese

[1] This return of the force of the Portuguese army, under the command of Marshal Beresford, exhibits a total of 58,489, including 22,341 militia.—EDITOR.

troops beyond their own frontier. These doubts turn upon a view of the military operations which it would be expedient to adopt in that case throughout the Peninsula; which, I think, should be founded upon strong reserves in parts of Spain as well as Portugal, by means of which the contest would be indefinitely prolonged, even if it should ever be in the enemy's power to make the conquest. They are also founded upon my apprehension that great length of time will elapse before we can make the Portuguese sufficiently good troops to retire before a superior enemy, and my opinion that they, as well as we, might be lost before we could re-enter the frontier of Portugal.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Admiral, from which you will observe that you will have home the ships in the Tagus of all descriptions excepting 5,000 tons of infantry coppered transports; and I purpose to keep horse transports for 300 horses, (when returned from Ireland) in case I should have occasion to move horses by sea.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I will send you a return of our actual strength by every opportunity.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to the Hon. Admiral Berkeley.

Copy. Castel Branco, June 30, 1809.

Sir—His Majesty's principal Secretary of State having intimated to me the wish of his Majesty that, if I should not require their services, I should send home the transports now in the Tagus, I have the honour to inform you that it is my opinion that all the transports now in the Tagus may be sent home without inconvenience, with the exception of 5,000 tons of transports for infantry, of the coppered ships.

I some time ago gave directions to the commanding officer of the artillery and to the Commissary-General to have disembarked from the Ordnance store-ships, victuallers, &c., and put in store at Lisbon, all the Ordnance and military stores,

provisions, forage, &c., which were in those ships, and destined for their departments respectively; and I have called upon these gentlemen this day to let me know what progress has been made in the execution of those orders.

It is my opinion that all the store-ships and victuallers, as soon as their contents will be disembarked, may be sent home, as well as the transports, to which I have above referred.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, July 11, 1809.

Sir—Your despatches of the dates and numbers mentioned in the margin[1] have been received and laid before the King. His Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of the whole of your proceedings, as communicated in those despatches, and hopes the arrival of the reinforcements will have enabled you to act with effect, in concert with General Cuesta, against the enemy.

The scarcity of specie is become the subject of much anxiety. The supply sent out by the Rosamond and Niobe (which left this country early in June) of dollars, doubloons, and Portugal gold, to the amount of about £230,000 sterling, arriving so immediately after that you received from Cadiz, will have relieved your wants for the present; but, as there is not more than £100,000 which can now be sent from hence, in addition to what you have, till dollars arrive from South America (the period of which is uncertain), it becomes a subject of the most serious consideration for you to concert with the Commissary-General how you can realize the funds necessary for your army in the Peninsula by Bills on England.

The first division of Horse Transports has arrived, and furnishes a very seasonable supply for the expedition under equipment. A long continuance of north-easterly wind has

[1] June 7th, 11th, 14th, 17th.

delayed the second. I trust the state of affairs in Spain and Portugal will now admit of your sending home all the transports, of every class and description, which are not indispensably required for the local services of your army.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Downing Street, July 17, 1809.

My dear Wellesley—I have communicated your letter on the discipline of the army to the Judge-Advocate, Attorney and Solicitor-General. They feel all its importance, and have desired time to confer together upon it. I have also conversed upon it with Sir D. Dundas, who seems quite clear upon the practice, in all times past, of summary punishment for marauding, when armies have been in the field on actual service. He says it was done by the Duke of York, an instance of which I enclose; by Sir Ralph Abercromby; by many others; and, in the last campaign, by Moore—in short, he thinks, by all commanders, who felt it necessary to the discipline of their army; and he has no conception that any army, more particularly a British one, can go on without it.

You will observe, in the enclosed precedent, that the execution is ordered, not upon the view of the Commander-in-Chief, or the Provost Marshal, but upon the report of another General Officer that such an offence had been committed. There is no doubt that such a practice always has existed, and has never been questioned when exercised to repress gross breaches of discipline in the progress of a campaign; but, as this extraordinary remedy is supposed to arise out of and to be alone justified by the necessity of the case, it does not appear that the mode and circumstances under which it is to be exercised have ever been defined with any precision. It is that extreme remedy which never can be made the subject of enactment, and will, therefore, probably always remain to be measured by the conscientious sense of its necessity operating at the moment on the judgment of the officer who authorizes

it; and I know of no other protection he has for such exercise of authority than precedent, and the disposition all reasonable men would feel to support him, were it questioned.

As far as I can collect any principle, it seems to be most clearly justifiable, when inflicted instanter on the commission of the offence, and when the proofs are of a nature to place the guilt of the party beyond all doubt. Where time has intervened, and the offenders been committed to custody, where the guilt is to be collected from the evidence rather than from the view, there the intervention of a Court-Martial seems the preferable course.

I have not found any one who doubted that it would be clearly competent for the General commanding to punish with death, *upon his own view of the guilt;* but whether he can delegate such a power to his Provost Marshal seems more questionable. The Commander-in-Chief thinks he can, according to the usages of war.

As soon as Ryder returns to town, I propose having a meeting between the military and the legal authorities, and shall send you the result. What I have stated in this letter you will consider as not more than what I have been able to collect in conversation. There seems much difficulty in treading back our steps on the mode of constituting Courts-Martial. I much regretted the innovation in the Mutiny Act at the moment; as it was obvious it was relinquishing to theory and reasoning what you could hardly ever hope to resume by force of argument from an Assembly not composed of professional men. On this part of the subject we are helpless till Parliament reassembles, and, even then, I cannot look forward with much confidence to the system being restored.

This consideration does not alter the grounds materially on which the summary exercise of punishment is to be justified. It certainly, however, renders it the more indispensable, and in *so far* it may fairly be considered as one feature more in the necessity that warrants it. The only additional part of the

question, upon which it may be necessary in this preliminary communication to say a word, is that, whatever increase of the Provost establishment you may find requisite will be cheerfully sanctioned, and I conclude you can be at no loss for proper instruments on the spot to employ.

I find Sir David has written to you upon the relative rank of officers in the British and Portuguese armies. In point of principle and reasoning, he appears to me to be right, that our army has no business to inquire into any other commission than that under which the officer is serving in the regiment to which he is posted. It may be a question of prudence with the Commanders-in-Chief of both armies what degree of encouragement should be held out to secure the supply of officers you may require; and there may be the same motive as in any other promotion for attending to the claims of old officers, if the preference is really one that can amount to a grievance when the senior officer is passed over; but, having determined on the extent of the encouragement to be given, (which none can allege to be taken too high, when it carries permanent advancement with it in our own service) I am very much inclined to think, with Sir David, that you can consider the officer so serving in no other light than you would any other Portuguese officer of the same rank, and that his being still in the British service cannot be suffered to affect the question.

The doubt I have pressed upon the Commander-in-Chief is, whether we shall accomplish our object under the limitation imposed. I certainly feel that I have no right to press upon him more than that the number of officers required should be furnished. Provided the service can be carried on, it is for him to judge how they can be given with the least prejudice to the efficiency or permanent interests of the army. Sir David seems to be very peremptory that officers enough will be found to serve in the Portuguese army on the terms he offers; and he supports his assertion by stating that he found

no difficulty in obtaining the number of officers asked for from among the corps at home, and entertains no doubt that he can replace any who choose to return to their regiments, upon finding their rank not confirmed.

It is now unfortunate that permanent rank was given at all: to take up a principle which we could not follow up has produced discontent by the force of contrast; and I also cannot but regret that an expectation given to a number of officers by a person in General Beresford's situation should not be confirmed; but, as it certainly was done without authority, I do not feel that I can press on the Commander-in-Chief, on that ground merely, to do what he considers would be unjust and prejudicial to the army. I, therefore, hope you will make the best of his decision, and that, if you want more officers, you are entitled to call upon us to find them.

Ever, my dear Wellesley, yours, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Extract of a General Order.

Head Quarters, St. Amand, April 10, 1794.

Major-General Abercromby reported yesterday to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief that two men of the 14th Regiment had, during the preceding evening, attempted to rob the house of a countryman, and, in the course of the attempt, they had murdered the woman of the house, and that a child had been also so much wounded that there was little prospect of its living.

His Royal Highness feels himself called upon, by every tie of justice, of humanity, and duty, to punish, by a signal act of severity, the perpetrators of so horrid a fact. Under this impression, he did not hesitate a moment to order the Provost to proceed to the spot, and, by the instant execution of the offenders, to put a stop to conduct, of which too many instances have occurred lately to leave his Royal Highness any

doubt of the necessity of an immediate and vigorous interposition.

The two men were executed this morning, at the head of the brigade.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Talavera, August 1, 1809.

My dear Lord—My public letter will give you some idea of my situation. It is one of some embarrassment; but I think I shall get the better of my embarrassments, I hope without fighting another desperate battle, which would really cripple us so much as to render all our efforts useless. I certainly should get the better of every thing if I could manage Cuesta, but his temper and disposition are so bad, that that is impossible.

Vanegas' movement will probably relieve our front. I think it probable also that the French will not like to press through the Passo de Baños, having Beresford's army in their rear, and a victorious army in their front; and indeed that front would be quite secure, if I could prevail upon General Cuesta to reinforce his troops at Bejar, so as to secure that point, as I understood it already was.

We are miserably supplied with provisions, and I don't know how to remedy this evil. The Spanish armies are now so numerous, that they eat up the whole country; they have no magazines, nor have we, nor can we collect any, and there is a scramble for every thing.

I think the battle of the 28th is likely to be of great use to the Spaniards; but I don't think them yet in a state of discipline to contend with the French; and I prefer infinitely to endeavour to remove them from this part of Spain by manœuvre to the trial of another pitched battle. The French, in the last, threw their whole force upon us; and, although it did not exactly succeed, or will not succeed in future, we shall lose great numbers of men, which we can but ill afford; and we cannot attempt to relieve ourselves from the weight of the

attack, by bringing forward the Spanish troops, owing to their miserable state of discipline, and their want of officers properly qualified. The troops are entirely incapable of performing any manœuvre, however simple; they would get into irretrievable confusion, and the result would probably be the loss of everything.

I have received your lordship's letter of the 11th of July, for which I am much obliged to you. I hope that your expedition will succeed. I guessed the point to which it was directed.

I understand, from your letter of the 11th, that you intend that we should take the accoutrements in the Hannah.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, August 12, 1809.

Sir—Your despatches of the 15th and 24th ultimo have been received and laid before the King. I am commanded to signify to you his Majesty's entire approbation of your proceedings, as stated in those despatches.

The considerations which determined you to decline undertaking any further operations, till the wants of your army shall be fully and satisfactorily supplied, and every arrangement made which may appear to you necessary for the protection of your army against similar embarrassments in future, has received his Majesty's entire approbation.

I am happy to acquaint you that the course of measures you have adopted for affording aid to the Spaniards, and the reasons which have influenced your determination, are considered to have been throughout in strict conformity to the spirit of your instructions; and I have only to recommend a perseverance in the same line of conduct.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, August 12, 1809.

Sir,—You will receive, herewith, enclosed, copies of two despatches addressed by Mr. Secretary Canning to the Marquess Wellesley. The sentiments of his Majesty's Government on the present state of the war, and the campaign in the Peninsula, are brought so fully under your consideration in that despatch, that I have only to recommend it to your serious consideration, and to request that you will convey, with as little delay as may be consistent with due deliberation, your opinion on the several important questions therein proposed to his Majesty's Ambassador in Spain; transmitting to me, for the information of his Majesty's Government, duplicates of your correspondence on the subject with his Excellency.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Downing Street, August 12, 1809.

My dear Wellesley—I send by a messenger the official despatch on the subject which I opened to you in my last private letter. You will receive the fullest approbation of your proceedings with Cuesta. In order to do any good even to Spain, we must take care of our own army. You are always ready to make an effort when an adequate object presents itself; but, rely upon it, whenever you feel it right to play a more cautious game, we shall be disposed to give you full credit for adequate motives, and I am confident the country will do so also.

I have sent you the latest intelligence from the army in the Scheldt. They have had constant gales of wind, which have retarded very much the naval movements. You will perceive that, notwithstanding the delicacy of giving, either to the *enemy* or the public, the case as between ourselves and an ally, we have thought it right to publish enough of your letter to mark, 1st, that the battle was not postponed by you; 2nd, that

you did not suspend your operations without justifiable grounds; and, 3rdly, that your reinforcements had not joined you.

I saw Lord William Bentinck yesterday: he will proceed to join you in a few days. I believe you will have Lowry Cole in Murray's room.

I have had my conference with the Attorney-General and Ryder, on Martial Law. They do not enable me to say much in addition to my former letter. They seem fully impressed with the persuasion that the power of summary punishment, even to death, must reside in the commanding officer of an army in the field, but in what precise mode, or under what particular circumstances to be exercised, they can give no opinion. They consider that the necessity of the case can only be the rule, and that the power must be regulated by the conscientious sense of the commander, and, of course, upon his responsibility. They admit that this is a painful duty, and of some hazard to an officer to undertake; but they say, at the same time, that, to be effectual, it must be both *summary* and *arbitrary*, and that it is impossible, in this Constitution, that such a power should be entrusted, *à priori*, to any man. All they can say, with respect to the safety of having recourse to the exercise of such extraordinary means of repressing disorders is, that they have reason to believe that such powers have been in very general use in the field; and that they know of no instance in which the acts so done in the face of the army, for the preservation of its discipline, have ever been subsequently questioned. The only practical suggestion they have enabled me to offer on your letter is, that the Mutiny Act allows three officers to sit on detachment Court-Martial, if more cannot be had.

The 6th Regiment of Dragoons now with you have only 250 horses at home fit for service. These are ordered to assemble at Portsmouth for embarkation.

Ever, my dear Wellington, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Downing Street, August 17, 1809.

The splendid services of your Majesty's army in Spain have induced your Majesty's confidential servants humbly to submit to your Majesty the propriety of a general order being issued by your Majesty's Commander-in-Chief to the army, signifying the sense which your Majesty is graciously pleased to entertain of the conduct of your troops in Spain upon the late occasion. They also beg leave to submit to your Majesty that the commanders of corps should receive the same distinction which your Majesty was pleased to signify your intention of conferring, in the instances of the action of Vimeira and Corunna.

His Majesty's Answer.

Windsor Castle, August 18, 1809.

The King approves of Lord Castlereagh's proposal, that a general order should be issued to the army on the occasion of the late victory in Spain, and that medals should be conferred on the commanding officers of corps engaged on the 27th and 28th of July.

GEORGE R.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Truxillo, August 21, 1809.

My dear Lord—My despatches of this date will give you an unpleasant account of our situation in this country, than which nothing indeed can be worse. We want every thing, and can get nothing; and we are treated in no respect as we ought to be, and hardly, I might almost say, as friends. I'll just give you one instance that has occurred this day. In this town, there are two deputies of the Junta; one Monsieur de Calvo, a member of the Government; the other, Lazaro des Torres, employed with the British army, and supposed to carry with him supreme powers in all parts of Spain. Some

sick had been removed here, who, by accident, had not been taken care of in the arrangement made at Taraigo for removing the sick; and I wanted six carts to remove them, for which I applied last night to these deputies, but in vain; and I have been obliged to remove them in the best way I could. And yet, Monsieur de Calvo declared in writing, on the 19th, that he had means of transport in sufficient quantities at his command here, to forward supplies to the British army and its detachments from hence daily, some of them being at thirty miles distance, and the quantity to be carried daily being 100,000 pounds. In the same manner, no assistance whatever was given to our wounded when they passed to Elvas.

Just to show the difference in a country in which good-will compensates for the deficiency of means, I mention that General Leité at Elvas, having heard that our wounded were going there, prepared for their reception, and the preparations were actually made, when the officer whom I sent to him with my letters arrived to make the preparations.

In the same manner, stores, which were written for to Lisbon on the 8th of this month, will be at Elvas on the 26th; and yet Lisbon is farther from us than Seville is, and the means of transport in that country not so abundant by one-half as in Spain.

However, I acknowledge that I go with regret, and I wish that I had been able to stay a little longer. Not that I think I could have done much good, for I am convinced that we should not have been able to resume the offensive. Our own cavalry and artillery are very low indeed; Cuesta's army is much weakened; I understand that it has lost 10,000 men since it crossed the Tagus, although not 500 in action. Whole corps, officers and all, have disbanded, and gone off.

If we could have fed and got up the condition of our horses, we might probably, after some time, have struck a brilliant blow upon Soult at Placencia, or upon Mortier in the centre; but, till there should be a force in the centre of Spain

capable of keeping in check Ney's corps, and probably Soult's, or of alarming Joseph for Madrid, or till we could put a force in Baños on which we could depend, we could not hope to make any progress with the offensive in this quarter. The Marquess de Romaña, who alone has numbers, has neither cavalry nor artillery, and cannot venture to quit the mountains; and he, I understand, was still at Corunna on the 5th, and we could depend upon nothing to keep Ney, and eventually Soult, out of Estremadura, after what I have seen of the Spanish troops, excepting British.

I will not now answer your letter respecting the discipline of the army, notwithstanding that I am more than ever convinced that something is necessary to be done. But I believe the Government is not sufficiently strong, and the times will not admit of doing this and many other good things.

Believe me, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Draft. Downing Street, August 21, 1809.

Sir—Your letters of the dates referred to in the margin[1] have been received and laid before the King.

That of the 29th of July, which reports the result of an attack on the combined British and Spanish armies near Talavera de la Reyna, on the 27th and 28th ultimo, by the united corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and the troops from Madrid, has been received by his Majesty with the utmost interest and satisfaction.

The nature of the position occupied by the Spanish army, and the deliberate purpose of the enemy to direct his whole efforts against the troops of his Majesty, as it has thrown upon the British army nearly the entire weight of this great contest, has afforded them an opportunity of acquiring for themselves the immortal glory of having vanquished a French

[1] July 29, August 1, and August 1.

army of more than double their numbers, not in a short and partial struggle, but in a battle obstinately contested on two successive days, not wholly discontinued throughout the intervening night, and fought under circumstances which brought the mass of both armies into close and repeated combat.

The King, in contemplating so glorious a display of the valour and prowess of his troops, has commanded me to declare his royal approbation of the conduct of his whole army.

His Majesty has commanded me to signify to you, in the most marked and especial manner, his gracious sense of your personal services on this ever-memorable occasion; not less displayed in the glorious result of the battle itself, than in the consummate ability, valour, and military resource, with which the many difficulties of this arduous contest were met and provided for by your tried experience and judgment.

The conduct of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, second in command, has entitled him to the King's entire approbation. His Majesty has observed with satisfaction the manner in which he led on the troops to the charge with the bayonet—a species of attack which, on all occasions, so well accords with the dauntless character of British soldiers.

His Majesty has noticed, with the same gracious approbation, the conduct of the several general and other officers. All have done their duty—most of them have had occasions of eminently distinguishing themselves—the particular instances of which, as reported by you, have not escaped his Majesty's attention.

In signifying to the officers of the army in public orders his Majesty's approbation and thanks, it is his Majesty's pleasure that they be extended in the most distinct and particular manner to the non-commissioned officers and men. On no occasion have they displayed with greater lustre the inestimable qualities which they possess as soldiers; nor have they, on any former occasion, more nobly sustained the military character of the British nation.

In acknowledging the services of the brave army under your command, his Majesty cannot refrain from those expressions of sorrow and regret with which his royal mind has been affected at observing the great number of gallant officers and men who have fallen in the battle of Talavera. His Majesty's paternal feelings derive their best consolation on this occasion from the persuasion that bravery so distinguished, and exertions so heroic, cannot but have obtained for their country the most important and lasting advantages; and that, whilst the security and glory of his own empire have been confirmed by the achievements of his troops, his Majesty trusts that their efforts will not prove unavailing, under the favour of Divine Providence, in defence of the rights and liberties of the Spanish nation.

His Majesty has directed a medal to be distributed to the general and other officers commanding corps, in commemoration of the victory of Talavera, and has further commanded that his royal approbation of the services of his gallant troops in Spain should be published in general orders to the whole of the British army.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Merida, August 25, 1809.

My dear Lord—I received by Mr. Hoey, on the day before yesterday, your letter of the 4th of August; and, having for some time past, turned my mind very seriously to the consideration of the points to which it relates, I am not unprepared to give you an opinion upon them. The information which I have acquired in the last two months has opened my eyes respecting the state of the war in the Peninsula, and I'll just state a few facts, which will enable you and the King's Ministers to form your own opinions upon it.

I calculate the French force in the Peninsula now to consist of about 125,000 men: of this number about 70,000 are in this part of Spain; St. Cyr's corps, about 20,000 men, en-

gaged in the siege of Gerona; Suchet's, about 14,000, in Aragon; and the remainder are employed in different garrisons, such as Avila, &c., and in keeping up the communication with France; all of which, if necessary, are disposable for the field. These 125,000 men are exclusive of the garrisons of Pampeluna, Barcelona, &c.

These troops, you will observe, are all in Spain, and against this force the Spaniards have under Vanegas and Eguia, late Cuesta's army, about 50,000 men; Romana, the Duque del Parque, and every thing to the northward, about 25,000; Blake may have got together again about 5 or 6,000; and I believe there is nothing in Aragon and Catalonia, excepting armed population. Thus the Spaniards have not, at the end of eighteen months nearly after the commencement of the revolution, above 80,000 men, of which the composition and qualities will be found still more defective than the numbers are deficient, to carry on the contest with the French, even in their present strength. To these numbers add all the troops we can bring into the field at present, which are about 25,000 men, and about 10,000 Portuguese, and you will see that the allies are, at this moment, inferior in point of numbers only to the enemy in the Peninsula. However, in this account of the troops of the allies, I don't reckon many garrisons and towns occupied by the Spaniards and Portuguese, nor do I reckon the French garrisons: I count only those men on both sides who can be brought into the field to fight.

In respect to the composition of these armies, we find the French well supplied with troops of the different descriptions and arms required, viz., artillery, cavalry, and infantry, heavy and light. Cuesta's army had about 7,000 cavalry, Vanegas' about 3,000; and there may be about 2,000 more cavalry distributed throughout Spain. The English have about 2,500 cavalry left, and the Portuguese may have 5 or 600. Probably, if all this cavalry were efficient, and could be divided as it ought to be, it might be sufficient, and might be found more

numerous than that of the French in the Peninsula; but you will observe that all the cavalry is now in the south; and Romaña's army, which it is most important to bring forward (as, unless it is brought forward, the allies can make no impression on the French to the southward), has neither cavalry nor artillery, and cannot quit the mountains. Neither has the Duque del Parque more than one regiment, or Blake more than the same number.

I come now to the description of the troops, and here, I am sorry to say, that our allies fail us still more than they do in numbers and composition. The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, almost entirely without discipline. They are, in general, well clothed, armed, and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their horses are in good condition — I mean those of Eguia's army, which I have seen. But I have never heard any body pretend that, in any one instance, they have behaved as soldiers ought to do in presence of the enemy, excepting the King's regiment in the battle of Talavera. They make no scruple of running off; and, after an action, are to be found in every village and every shady bottom within fifty miles of the field of battle.

The Spanish artillery are, as far as I have seen of them, entirely unexceptionable, and the Portuguese artillery excellent.

In regard to the great body of all armies, I mean the infantry, it is lamentable to see how bad that of the Spaniards is, and how unequal to a contest with the French. They are armed, I believe, well; they are badly accoutred, not having the means of saving their ammunition from the rain; not clothed in some instances at all; in others, clothed in such a manner as to make them look like peasants, which ought, of all things, to be avoided; and their discipline appears to me to be confined to placing them in the ranks three deep, at very close order, and to the manual exercise. It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with these troops. It is said that sometimes they behave well; though, I acknowledge, I

have never seen them behave otherwise than ill. Basserona's corps, which was supposed to be the best in Cuesta's army, and was engaged on our left in the mountains, in the battle of Talavera, was kept in check throughout the day by one French battalion. This corps has since run away from the bridge of Arzo Bispo; leaving its guns, and many of the men, according to the usual Spanish custom, throwing away their arms, accoutrements, and clothing. It is a curious circumstance respecting this affair at Arzo Bispo, (in which Soult writes that the French took thirty pieces of cannon) that the Spaniards ran off in such a hurry that they left their cannon loaded and unspiked; and that the French, although they drove the Spaniards from the bridge, did not think themselves strong enough to push after them; and Colonel Walton, whom I sent in with a flag of truce on the 10th, relating to our wounded, found the cannon on the road, abandoned by the one party, and not taken possession of, and probably not known of, by the other!

This practice of running away and throwing off arms, accoutrements, and clothing, is fatal to every thing, excepting a re-assembly of the men in a state of nature; who as regularly perform the same manœuvre the next time an occasion offers. Nearly 2,000 ran off, on the evening of the 27th, from the battle of Talavera, not 100 yards from the place where I was standing, who were neither attacked nor threatened with any attack, and who were frightened only by the noise of their own fire. They left their arms and accoutrements on the ground; their officers went with them; and they and the fugitive cavalry plundered the baggage of the British army which had been sent to the rear. Many others went, whom I did not see.

When a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, it is surprising that so little progress has been made in the composition of the officers of the army, and that the business

of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war; and I cannot say that they do any thing as it ought to be done, except, as I have said, running away, and assembling again in a state of nature.

I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the existing Government in Spain. They have attempted to govern the kingdom in a state of revolution by an adherence to old rules and systems, and with the aid of what is called enthusiasm. And this last is, in reality, no aid to accomplish any thing, and is only an excuse for the irregularity with which every thing is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies. People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through the Revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but, if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument, under the system of terror, which brought forward those great resources which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying by force every individual and every description of property in the country to the service of the army has since conquered Europe.

After this statement, you will judge for yourselves whether you will employ any and what strength of army in the support of the cause of Spain. Circumstances with which you are acquainted have obliged me to separate myself from the Spanish army; and I can only tell you that I feel no inclination to join in co-operation with them again on my own responsibility, and that I shall see my way very clearly before me indeed before I do so; and I do not recommend you to have any thing to do with them in their present state.

Before I quit this part of the subject, it may be satisfactory to you to know that I don't think matters would have been much better, if you had sent your large expedition to Spain instead of the Scheldt. You could not have equipped it in

Gallicia or any where in the north of Spain. If we had had 60,000 men, instead of 20,000, in all probability, we should not have got to Talavera to fight the battle, for want of means and of provisions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could not have gone further, and the armies would probably have separated for want of means of subsistence, probably without a battle, but certainly afterwards. Besides, you will observe that your 40,000 men, supposing them to be equipped and means to exist of feeding them, would not compensate for the deficiency of numbers, of composition, and of efficiency in the Spanish armies; and that, supposing they had been able to remove the French from Madrid, they would not have removed them from the Peninsula, even in the existing state of the French force.

I now come to another branch of the subject, which is Portugal itself. I have not got from Beresford his report upon the present and the probable future state of the Portuguese army, and therefore I should wish to be understood as writing upon this part of the subject liable to corrections from him.

My opinion is, and always has been, that the mode of applying the services of the English officers to the Portuguese army has been erroneous. I think that Beresford ought to have had the temporary assistance of the ablest officers the British service could afford; that these officers ought not to have been posted to regiments in the Portuguese army; but, under the title of Adjutants to the Field-Marshal, or any other, they ought to have superintended discipline, military movements, and arrangements of all descriptions, wherever they might be. Fewer officers would then have answered his purpose, and every one given to him would have been useful; whereas many (all in the inferior ranks) are, under existing arrangements, useless. Besides this, the selection of the officers sent out to Portugal for this service has been unlucky, and the decision on the questions which I sent to England on the 7th of June has been made without reference to circumstances or to the feelings of the individuals on whom it was to operate, and just like every

other decision I have ever seen from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and stones. To this add that rank (Portuguese rank, I mean) has been given in the most capricious manner. In some instances, a man not in the army at all is made a Brigadier-General; in others, another, who was the senior of the Brigadier-General, when both were in the army, is a Lieutenant-Colonel; then a junior Lieutenant-Colonel is made a Brigadier-General, his senior a Colonel, and his senior a junior Colonel; and there are instances of juniors being preferred to seniors in every rank. In short, the Prince Regent[1] is a despotic prince, and his commissions have been given to British officers and subjects in the most arbitrary manner at the Horse Guards; and the answer to all those complaints at the Horse Guards must be uniform. Nobody has any right to complain; the Prince Regent has a right to give to anybody any commission he pleases, bearing any date he chooses to assign to it.

The officers of this army have, to a man, quitted the Portuguese service since, as I said they would; and there is not an officer who has joined it from England who would not quit it if we would allow them. But here we keep them. So much for that arrangement.

The subject upon which particularly I wished Beresford to report was the state of the Portuguese army in respect to its numbers. The troops have latterly deserted to an alarming degree, and, in fact, none of the regiments are complete. The Portuguese army is recruited by conscription, constitutionally very much in the same manner as the French army; but then it must be recollected that, for the last fifty years nearly, the Portuguese have never left their province, and scarcely ever their native town, and their discipline and the labours and exertions required from them were nothing. Things are much altered lately, and, notwithstanding that the pay has been increased, I fear that the animal is not of a description to bear up against what is required of him; and he deserts most terribly.

[1] Of Portugal.

The military force stationed in the provinces enabled the civil Government to carry into execution the conscription; but, under present circumstances, the military force is, upon principle as well as from necessity, removed to a distance; the civil Government has been so frequently overthrown in all parts of Portugal that it can hardly be said to exist; and there is another circumstance which, I am afraid, cramps its operations, particularly those operations which are to put a restraint upon the people, and that is, that they are all armed; and they defy the civil magistrate and the Government, who order them to march as conscripts, whose authority is unsupported by a sufficient military force. I am therefore very apprehensive that Beresford will find it impossible to fill his ranks. However, as I said before, I should wish Government to delay to make up their minds upon this part of the subject, till I shall be enabled to send them Beresford's report, for which I have called.

The next point on this subject is, supposing the Portuguese army to be rendered efficient, what can be done with it and Portugal, if the French should obtain possession of the remainder of the Peninsula? My opinion is, that we ought to be able to hold Portugal, if the Portuguese army and militia are complete. The difficulty upon this whole question lies in the embarkation of the British army. There are so many entrances into Portugal, the whole country being frontier, it would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating; and it is probable that we should be obliged to confine ourselves to the preservation of that which is most important—the capital. It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring the contest for the capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark the British army. You will see what I mean by a reference to the map. Lisbon is so high up the Tagus, that no army that we could collect would be able, at the same time, to secure the navigation of the river by the occupation of both banks and possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear,

be given up; and that which the Portuguese would give up would be the navigation of the Tagus, and, of course, one means of embarkation. However, I have not entirely made up my mind upon this interesting point; I have a great deal of information upon it, but should wish to have more before I can decide it. In the mean time, I think that Government should look to sending back at least the coppered transports, as soon as the grand expedition will have done with them, and as they receive positive intelligence that Napoleon is reinforcing his armies in Spain; for I think that you may depend upon it that he and his marshals must be desirous of revenging upon us the different blows we have given them, and that, when they come into the Peninsula, their first and great object will be to get the English out.

I think the first part of my letter will give you my opinion respecting one notion you entertained, viz., that the Spaniards might be induced to give the command of their armies to a British Commander-in-Chief. If such offer should be made me, I shall decline to accept it, till I should receive his Majesty's pleasure; and I strongly recommend to you, unless you mean to incur the risk of the loss of your army, not to have any thing to do with Spanish warfare on any ground whatever, in the existing state of things.

In respect to Cadiz, the fact is this, that the jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most attached to us, respecting Cadiz, is so rooted that, even if the Government should cede that point, (and in their present difficulties I should not be surprised if they were to cede it) to induce me to remain in Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could spare to be safe in the place. If you should take Cadiz, you must lay down Portugal and take up Spain. You must occupy Cadiz with a garrison of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and you must send from England an army to be employed in the field with the Spaniards, and make Cadiz your retreat instead of Lisbon. You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the

command of the armies. I think you would certainly be able, in that case, to get away your troops, secure the Spanish ships, &c. But you see, from the facts in the commencement of this letter, how little prospect you have of bringing the contest to the conclusion for which we all wish.

I shall be very glad if you will send us the remount horses and any regiment of dragoons that is to come, as soon as possible. The best thing to do then probably would be to draft the horses of one of the regiments to complete the others, and send that regiment home dismounted. It would be very desirable also to send us 600 or 700 sets of horse appointments.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Viscount Wellington.

Draft. Downing Street, August 26, 1809.

Sir—I feel myself most highly gratified in obeying his Majesty's gracious commands, to acquaint you that, in order to mark his distinguished sense of your services in the several engagements you have conducted in Spain and Portugal, and particularly in the late action at Talavera, against a superior enemy, his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon you the dignity of a peerage, by the style and title of Baron Douro of Wellesley, in the county of Somerset, and of Viscount Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington in the said county.

I sincerely offer to your lordship my congratulation upon a distinction so well calculated to perpetuate the well-earned fame of yourself and the gallant army under your command, whose exemplary courage and discipline have drawn upon them the warm applause of their Sovereign, and the admiration of their country.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Badajoz, September 4, 1809.

My dear Lord—I have received your letters of the 12th, and I am happy to find that the King's Ministers approved of

my conduct up to the 24th of July. I hope that they will approve of my subsequent measures.

I send you by this occasion a copy of a correspondence which I have had with Lord Wellesley, which will give the Government my opinion upon the points referred for his and mine, in Mr. Canning's despatches of the 12th. They are nearly to the same purport with my last letter to you. There is only one point in that letter which I wish to alter, and that relates to the garrison required for Cadiz. Upon further inquiry, I find that there are means in Cadiz of putting in security from a *coup de main*, by the inhabitants, 4,000 or 5,000 men; and I should think that number sufficient to give us a footing there, of which we might take further advantage, by throwing in more troops if we should find it expedient.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Draft. Downing Street, September 12, 1809.

Dear Wellington—I am much obliged to you for your early and very satisfactory reply to my private letter. I ventured to communicate it unofficially to the Cabinet; and, in compliance with your suggestion, I shall lose no time in ordering an increase of your tonnage in the Tagus. About 10,000 tons of copper troop-ships are directed to proceed to Lisbon, now ready at Portsmouth, and the quantity required for the reception of the whole army may be completed, as soon as the transports return from the Scheldt.

Should the defence of Portugal be persevered in, troop-ships capable of withdrawing the *men* of the army may possibly be kept there, although not without a heavy expense—say 40,000 tons, at an expense of about £50,000 a month; but I should apprehend it quite impossible to think of retaining in the service tonnage for the horses, unless with a view to an immediate evacuation, the monthly expense of each horse not being less

than £10. The Government will, therefore, probably, have to make up their mind, in the event of the army continuing indefinitely in Portugal, to leave the horses to their fate, that is, to be put to death, should you be forced to retire.

In addition to the general report which Mr. Canning's despatch to Lord Wellesley will bring before the Government, on the conduct of the war in the Peninsula, it has been deemed advisable to call for a distinct report on the question of Portugal, with a view to the deliberate consideration of that important branch of the subject.

Believe me, dear Wellington, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Downing Street, September 14, 1809.

My Lord—The King having been pleased to nominate Lieut.-General Sherbrooke to be a Knight Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, the insignia of which order are now forwarded to him, I have received his Majesty's command to desire that your lordship will avail yourself of the first opportunity to invest him therewith in a manner suitable to the occasion.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Downing Street, September 14, 1809.

My Lord—Your lordship's despatches of the dates stated in the margin[1] have been received, and laid before the King.

I am commanded to signify to your lordship his Majesty's approbation of the conduct you have pursued, as therein detailed. The considerations which have influenced your determination to fall back on the frontier of Portugal not only appear to have warranted that decision, but to have rendered it indispensable for the supply of the army; and, if the Spanish Government have to regret the loss of your support, they can

[1] August 2nd, 8th, and four of the 21st.

only attribute it to their own want of resources, or to their inability to call them forth.

The judgment which marked your determination, at the critical moment the step was taken, to retire behind the Tagus; the success and ability with which your retreat, encumbered with the wounded, has been conducted, through a country difficult in itself and destitute of supplies; and the determination you have shown to regulate your operations with as much attention to the safety and health of your troops, as to their reputation and glory, have received his Majesty's entire approbation.

Lord Castlereagh to Viscount Wellington.

Draft. Downing Street, September 14, 1809.

My Lord—I am to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you dismount and send to England the weakest of your regiments of cavalry, transferring the horses to others most in want of them. I am to acquaint you that the 1st Regiment of Dragoons, or Royals, sailed from Cork for Lisbon, about the beginning of this month, to join the army under your command.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Draft. Downing Street, September 14, 1809.

My Lord—As the return of the British army to Portugal will afford you an opportunity of turning your undivided attention to the defence of that kingdom, I have to request that you will, as early as possible, transmit to me, for the information of his Majesty's Government, a full report upon that subject, stating your opinion of its defensibility, with what force, British and Portuguese, and at what annual expense.

You will consider the question of maintaining Portugal in the distinct cases, first, of the utmost effort the enemy can be expected to make against it by any probable disposition of the military force now in the Peninsula; secondly, of the French

force being largely reinforced, should a peace in Germany leave Buonaparte at liberty to turn his efforts in that direction.

You will also state your opinion upon the practicability of embarking the British army in the Tagus, (regard being had to its local circumstances) in the event of its being obliged to fall back for that purpose in the presence of a superior enemy. And, further, you will suggest such measures as may appear to you necessary to be adopted within the country, either with a view to its defence, or which, in the event of its evacuation by the British army becoming necessary, should precede such an evacuation, with a view to the interests of the Prince Regent, and to the counteraction of the designs of the enemy; and, in the former alternative, you will state at what expense, and within what period of time, the measures you would recommend for placing Portugal in an adequate state of defence could be carried into effect.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Wellington.

Downing Street, September 23, 1809.

My Lord—I have received and laid before the King your lordship's two letters of the 4th of September; the one containing your reasoning for adopting the measure of falling back on the frontier of Portugal, and your correspondence with Lord Wellesley on that subject; and the other, the information you had received of the enemy's probable intentions upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and your design of endeavouring, if possible, to prevent their success.

You have already received a signification of the King's approbation with regard to the measures you are pursuing for retiring upon Portugal, and I am to express the confidence his Majesty feels that you will not neglect any consistent opportunity of defeating the enemy's views, and of obstructing his designs upon that kingdom, which you shall find within the power of the forces you may command.

Remarks on the Defence of Portugal.

FROM THE PORTUGUESE.

The preceding plan is admirable, but it will not be found practicable to execute it entirely, for the following reasons. In the above Memoir,[1] the General, its author, considers all the fortresses of the frontier of the first order, as well as of the second, as being in a state of defence, notwithstanding the greatest part of them is reduced to a heap of ruins, as appears from the survey which, in the year 1790, Count d'Aeynhausen made of the northern provinces of this kingdom. Excepting Almeida, in Beira, and Valença, in Minho, no other fortress is capable of defending itself; and even those two labour under so many inconveniences, and are so extensive as to require a very considerable number of troops to garrison them. Those of Alentejo are not in a much better condition. But Elvas, with its appendages, Almeida, and Valença, in Minho, to make any resistance, necessarily require competent garrisons, composed of troops of the line and militia. The three latter may justly be called the keys of the kingdom. As to Campomayor, Aronches, Castello de Vide, and Monte Alvao, they must also be preserved, in order to keep up the communication between the two armies of Beira and Alentejo, as well as between Elvas and Abrantes, which is the chief depôt of ammunition and provisions for the above armies.

To remedy, as far as it is possible, the inconveniences alluded to, I am of opinion—

1. That the plan of the General in question, with regard to the distribution of our troops in the northern provinces and Alentejo, ought to be adopted.

2. That the three principal fortresses, Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in Minho, be, without loss of time, furnished with the necessary provisions and ammunition, especially firewood

[1] The Memoir, with the plan referred to in this paper, has not been found.

and oak timber, as the country does not produce these two requisites, and as they can be procured only with difficulty.

Nota bene. The garrisons of the above fortress require also provisions for only two months, unless particular circumstances should render a larger supply necessary.

3. The fortresses of Campo-mayor, Aronches, Castello de Vide, and Monte Alvao, need not be provisioned with any particular care.

4. In order to concentrate the largest possible number of troops in the three armies of Alentejo, Beira, and Minho, the frontier fortresses are to be looked upon as objects of secondary consideration.

5. That the Generals of the provinces ought, without delay, to examine and report on the actual condition of the regiments of the line and militia, their appointments and barracks, and whether they are in a state to take the field at a moment's warning.

6. That the Generals of the different provinces should, in anticipation, form the regiments of the line and the militia into brigades, each brigade consisting of one regiment of the line and of two of militia, so that they may fight in conjunction, but by no means separately, as General Dumouriez advises, there being many reasons for adopting the method just mentioned, and particularly this—that the militia is ignorant of the general and indispensable rules of field service; add to which, that both kinds of troops will fight with more confidence and emulation, which, in the end, must lead to very happy results.

7. That the necessary orders ought immediately to be given for forming competent parks of artillery for the above three armies, and that the two principal ought to be at Abrantes, and that of Minho at Oporto.

8. That the Generals of the provinces ought to make out lists of all the beasts of burden in their respective districts, that they may be distributed among the different regiments

a few days before the march begins; and that, when wanted, they are to be sent to the above depôts.

N.B. These beasts are to be provided with straw and barley on account of the Royal Treasury, and their drivers with ammunition-bread: the latter are also to receive one crusade per diem for each beast of burden. This provision is of the utmost necessity, that the drivers may remain with the armies, and be subject to military laws in the event of desertion, or the commission of some crime.

9. That, if circumstances and time permit, twelve companies of horse-artillery ought to be formed, each of sixty men, furnished with four 6-pounders and two howitzers; two of these companies to be attached to the army of Minho, six to that of Beira, three to that of Alentejo, and one to the defence of Algarve; the whole in conformity to General Dumouriez's suggestions.

10. In each regiment of the line, as well as militia, a certain number of men ought to be instructed in the working of their field-pieces.

11. That, conformably to the ideas of the same General, head telegraphs and corresponding telegraphs ought to be established in Valença, Monforte, Miranda, Almeida, Guarda, Abrantes, Elvas, Beira, and Faro, as well as signals by means of fire, smoke, and flags, especially upon the coast, and above the principal passes of the mountains, beginning from the Minho, and extending to the mouth of the Guadiana. These telegraphs are of the greatest use, not only in any enterprise against the enemy, but for the purpose of apprizing us of their movements.

12. That immediately large depôts of provisions ought to be established, such as wheat, millet, barley, and straw, for 80,000 men, and four months.

13. That there be likewise formed magazines of wine, brandy, oil, vinegar, dried cod, bacon, and cheese. The principal magazines ought to be in Lisbon, Oporto, Abrantes, and Lamego;

those of the second class at Estremoz, Thomar, Guarda, and Ponte de Lima. Without these steps, all the rest would be fruitless.

14. That the Generals of the provinces, immediately after the declaration of war, and when the enemy is near at hand, force all peasants and inhabitants of frontiers to convey into the interior and into places of security, not only their cattle, but such provisions as are not wanted for immediate use.

15. That the same Generals raise immediately in their respective provinces companies of sixty men each, and consisting of such persons as are best acquainted with the roads, that they may serve as guides to the armies.

16. As we have no other light troops in our army than the Legion, flank companies must be formed both from the troops of the line and the militia; they must constitute separate corps attached to the three armies, and, destined for that service exclusively, must be under the command of proper officers.

List of the National Troops.

Infantry of the Line	30,000
43 Regiments of Militia, when complete .	33,600
Artillery	5,000
The Legion	1,500
Cavalry	4,000
	74,100
Deduct for garrisons of the chief fortresses .	15,000
Remain for military operations . . .	59,100

In this number are not comprehended the train-bands, and others capable of doing duty on posts of advice, and in interior and marine forts. As to the navy, they will combine their operations with those of the military in the defence of sea-ports, and assist them in any other way that may contribute to attain the general object in view.

Memorandum upon Operations in Spain.

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

If the French retire with a view to evacuate Spain, no effort on our part can, in point of time, be made, either to harass or cut off their retreat.

If Spain is evacuated, the Spaniards will have to form their Government and their army. They cannot, for the present, think of moving into the south of France, and will probably limit their military efforts to the occupation and defence of the Pyrenees.

If the Spaniards do not act offensively against France in that quarter, the British army cannot separately enter upon operations.

The same disposition to throw off the French yoke may probably show itself in Italy, and we be invited to co-operate. The scene is too remote to admit of our acting with the gross of our army in that quarter. It may be a question, according to circumstances, whether the disposable corps in Sicily should be somewhat more or less strong; but the object must be to bring home the mass of our force, and to look to its employment nearer home.

Till the abandonment of Spain by the French is indisputably established, we are bound, on every ground, to assume the reverse; and it is our duty to make every exertion that is calculated to accelerate their expulsion, and, if possible, to lay the foundation of their reduction, in case their retreat shall be protected.

Supposing the French have retired from Madrid, as the natural province of our army is to avoid an extended line of operations, in separation from our fleet and its supplies by sea, it seems obviously to belong to the Spanish armies of the southern and western provinces to press the French in front, and on their left flank, whilst we, in co-operation with the northern and eastern provinces, menace their right flank and rear.

In order that the army of Gallicia may be enabled to advance into the open country, and form the left of the Spanish army which is to press the French in front, the cavalry in Portugal, and three of the five regiments under orders at home, should be directed to join Blake's army—a brigade of British infantry to be attached to this cavalry as a reserve for their protection.

Whilst the armies of Andalusia, Valencia, Estramadura, and Gallicia, are moving to occupy the enemy in front, a British corps of 10,000 infantry, with two regiments of cavalry to be detached from home, to animate and support the Asturias, to encourage Biscay and Navarre to rise, and to act upon the French lines of operation, viz., those of Vittoria and Pampeluna, in concert with the Aragonese. This corps to be reinforced from Portugal, as early and to whatever extent force can be spared from that country.

Supposing 20,000 men can be drawn from Portugal, the enemy, unless his reinforcements are immense, greater than he could possibly move or subsist in such a country, deprived of all supplies by sea, could never maintain himself either at Burgos or behind the Ebro, while a British corps of 30,000 men, aided by the Asturians, &c., were upon his right flank and rear, and the accumulated armies of Spain pressed him in front.

The point in the north of Spain to which the British troops should, in the first instance, be directed, may admit of some doubt—the more to the eastward, the more menacing to the enemy; but, until the troops from Portugal can be positively reckoned upon, too advanced a position must not be taken up.

There are three points of debarkation for consideration: St. Andero, Gijon, and Corunna. The first and last are good harbours. The port of Gijon hardly affords accommodation for a large fleet. Corunna is rather too much retired for the purposes proposed. It is to be well weighed whether St. Andero is too near the enemy, whether it is defensible against superior numbers, and what description of retreat it affords.

Supposing the French in force at Burgos, and that the Spanish armies of Gallicia and the southern provinces are in their front, they must be very strong to risk detaching a corps into a mountainous country, of strength sufficient to dispost the Asturian army, supported by 10,000 British troops; the distance of St. Andero from Burgos being 100 miles.

If this is true with respect to 10,000 men, the argument is stronger, if there is reason to hope that the corps may soon be reinforced from Portugal. If the French cannot successfully attack this corps without weakening themselves in front, and consequently exposing themselves to immediate destruction, they must retire; and, if they have not taken their measures for doing so in time, pressed as they would be on all sides, and embarrassed by the armed peasantry in the Pyrenees, they may find it impossible to defile, with so large a force, through the gorges of the mountains, in presence of an enemy, without losing a great proportion of their army.

The policy of the war, supposing the enemy not to be capable of acting offensively towards Portugal, seems to be to strengthen the North, to render that invulnerable, which must be conquered, before the enemy can establish any sure footing in Spain; and, having first provided for its security, to make it the basis from whence offensive operations may be carried on against the enemy's line of operations.

SUPPLEMENT

TO

OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

NO. I.

PRÉCIS OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM SIR H. DALRYMPLE,

RELATING TO SPANISH AFFAIRS.

Gibraltar, January 3, 1808.

Sir Hew Dalrymple states, from private intelligence, that at the Spanish head-quarters a very considerable French force is expected to be assembled in that vicinity. It appears that troubles were to be expected at Tangier, and that, in less than a month, the operations would commence. It is said that Buonaparte has desired the ports of Morocco to be shut against us, which the Emperor has refused; and that orders have been sent from Madrid to the Commandant in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar to prepare covering for 120,000 men; the cork woods near St. Roque to be cut down for fascines, and an embargo laid on all vessels at Cadiz, fit for gun-boats, of which 200 are to be equipped.

Gibraltar, January 16, 1808.

In consequence of the actual state of Spain, and of the general rumour that French troops will be brought against him, he has called upon Sir Charles Holloway (Commanding Royal Engineer) for a report on the state of the defences, which he encloses, as also an estimate of the expence of constructing the batteries therein recommended by Sir Charles, amounting to £396 3*s*. 3½*d*.

[1] Governor of Gibraltar.

Gibraltar, February 9, 1808.

He has learned that Buonaparte is expected at Madrid on the 20th February; that no French troops had entered that capital, and that, up to the 18th, not above 70,000 in all had passed the Spanish frontier. He believes that at Algesiras no immediate attempt is expected on Gibraltar; but that, if French troops come to that coast, a design such as described by Lord Strangford may be in contemplation, of which it is not yet necessary to apprize General Castaños. The population of Gibraltar certainly gives encouragement to such a project.

Gibraltar, February 19, 1808.

Encloses General Junot's Proclamations, by which it would appear that Portugal is annexed to France. Heavy contributions have been exacted from the inhabitants, particularly the clergy. The lower classes are resorting in great numbers to Gibraltar, where they prove burdensome, from the want both of space and of the means of maintaining them. He has not heard of more than 71,000 French as having entered Spain and Portugal.

Gibraltar, March 12, 1808.

The French have seized the citadel of Pampeluna by perfidy, and have occupied Barcelona. The Duke of Infantado and the Archdeacon of Toledo (who had been tutor to the Prince of Asturias) have been banished; and beds are preparing at Seville for 160,000 soldiers, of whom 60,000 are for the camp at St. Roque. It is reported that Tunis is the place fixed on for the junction of the French, Spanish, and Russian squadrons.

Gibraltar, March 24, 1808.

By information from Madrid, dated the 8th and 11th, Murat was at Bayonne, and Buonaparte had not left Paris. It appears, by an enclosed Proclamation of the Count of Espeleta, that the people were impatient under the French innovation.

It has been supposed, from the seizure of Barcelona and Pampeluna, and the entry of so many columns of French troops, that Buonaparte meant to possess himself of Biscay, Navarre, and Catalonia; but a Proclamation from Murat, declaring that the strictest friendship subsisted between the two countries, had tended to restore public credit.

French troops are stated to be approaching Malaga and the camp of St. Roque; but Sir Hew considers these reports to be founded more on the probability of the facts than on actual intelligence.

Gibraltar, March 26, 1808.

The Prince of Peace has been banished, in consequence, it is said, of his correspondence with Admiral Valdez about the sailing of the Carthagena squadron. It is rumoured that the Prince has endeavoured to escape with his guards, and that an action ensued, in which 60 men were killed and the Prince wounded. A detachment of the Imperial and one of the Empress's guards, and some *seamen* of the Imperial guard, had passed through Madrid.

Gibraltar, March 31, 1808.

States that from the 13th to the 19th of March, Madrid was filled with scenes of insurrection and violence, which terminated in the abdication of Charles IV., and succession of Ferdinand VII. Some blood was shed, and many houses of persons attached to the Prince of Peace were burnt. The Duke of Infantado, and the nobles lately banished or imprisoned, surround the new monarch. Buonaparte's opinion on these events is not yet pronounced, and no allusion is made in the details of them to French influence.

The Grand-Duke of Berg was advancing on the 13th from Burgos to Madrid. On the 18th he was waiting for definite orders whether he should enter Madrid on his route to Cadiz, of which he would give previous notice, as well as of the views of the Emperor, whom he expected in person in four or five days. Encloses copies of the Proclamations and decrees.

Gibraltar, April 8, 1808.

Buonaparte was not expected immediately at Madrid, and his sentiments on the late revolution were not received. The Grand-Duke of Berg, with 30,000 men, was on the 1st of April in the vicinity of Madrid.

Encloses an extraordinary Gazette, in which the King has explained the mysterious business of his imprisonment. A French officer, said to be Murat's aid-de-camp, has passed through Algesiras from Cadiz, in his way to Madrid. It is said that French troops are pressing towards Andalusia, probably to secure the fleet in Cadiz.

Gibraltar, April 8, 1808.

He has seen a Spaniard whom he believes to be in the confidence of General Castaños, and from whom he has learned that a conspiracy had existed (with the Prince of Peace, under French influence, at the head) to induce the late King to fly from Madrid, under the notion of emigrating to South America, in doing which he was to be intercepted, and the Prince of Peace was to proceed to Mexico, and assume that Government. Godoy, however, had been himself betrayed by those in whom he confided, but who secretly communicated with the Prince of Asturias; and, in his first attempt to alarm the King, and induce him to fly, under the pretext that Madrid was in insurrection, he was denounced as a traitor, in a Council which had been held to forward his own views, by the Marquess of Cavallero. Murat, on his arrival, was unprepared for the change, and unauthorized to acknowledge the new Government: and Godoy, in confinement, had shown an anxiety to be informed of Murat's arrival, which was considered as the proof of an understanding between them. The new King's advisers seem to have been prepared for the event; and the throne is surrounded by persons whose political abilities have been long sanctioned by public opinion. The nation seems preparing to support the new monarch. Catalonia, Arragon, and Valencia, have offered to raise and maintain 150,000 men;

and when the suspicions of the perfidy of the French shall be confirmed by future acts, it is thought they will be overwhelmed by an enraged population. Already the populace of Madrid have forced the French Generals to remit punishments on the soldiers for acts of insubordination. It is not true that Murat has detached any part of his army, which, it is plain, he cannot at present venture to do. Buonaparte's visit to Madrid is no longer talked of.

From the same source, Sir Hew learns that, had the Prince of Asturias been constrained to fly, he would have taken refuge at Algesiras, and thence have passed over to Gibraltar, relying on the generosity of the King of England, and the personal consideration subsisting between the British commanding officer and General Castaños. It appears obvious that the intention of the French to seize Ceuta and blockade Gibraltar was for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the Spanish royal family; and Sir Hew trusts that the Spanish Government will place Ceuta and the other fortresses on the coast in hands they can fully rely on.

Gibraltar, April 15, 1808.

Doubts still subsist at Algesiras as to the designs of the French, though a more favourable construction (however founded) seems to be put on them. Sir Hew will receive by *signal* the earliest information of the result.

Buonaparte's journey to Madrid has been delayed by sickness, or under that pretext. The Infant Don Carlos left Madrid on the 5th to meet him; and it is stated that he will proceed to Paris, if necessary, for that purpose. His suite is small, and one of Murat's aid-de-camps is in it.

Gibraltar, April 28, 1808.

From a private, authentic source, as well as partly from Mr. Hunter at Madrid, he states that 56,000 French were actually in or near that capital, and 24,000 more were expected—that, from a quarter connected with Government, a desire had been expressed to Mr. Hunter to know whether a

supply of arms could be got from Sir H. Dalrymple, if wanted; that Mr. Hunter answered that he could make no reply to unauthorized insinuations, bnt would faithfully communicate every overture made to him in a regular form; that the King of Spain was arrived at Burgos, and was every where received with enthusiasm; that he had afterwards departed from Vittoria; that Buonaparte arrived at Bayonne on the 15th; that a violent fermentation prevailed in Spain against the French.

He encloses a copy of a communication from Count Espeleta, Commandant at Barcelona, to the General of Division Duhême; also the answer to some queries sent by Sir Hew's desire to the person from whom the private intelligence has been received.

Gibraltar, April 30, 1808.

Encloses the substance of intelligence received from Algesiras dated the 28th, by which it appears that, on the 20th, an interview took place on the frontier between Buonaparte and Ferdinand VII., when the former agreed to acknowledge the latter, and to grant him the administration of Portugal till a peace, Spain acceding to the Confederation of the Rhine, and furnishing 50,000 men. It appears further that, in consequence of Murat having sent a Proclamation to be printed in the name of Charles IV., an angry correspondence took place between him and the Government, when Murat intimated that, if his orders were not complied with, he should level Madrid with the ground. The arrival of the treaty between Buonaparte and Ferdinand VII. put an end to this altercation; but the populace endeavoured to set fire to the houses of Infantado and Escoiquiz, and were much exasperated with the treaty, and with the delivering up of Godoy to the French. It was reported that the late King and Queen were voluntarily going to France, escorted by 20,000 French, who were at Aranjuez.

Gibraltar, May 7, 1808.

Encloses further accounts received from the same private source, which state that the French continued to enter Spain

with ammunition and warlike stores, insulting and injuring the inhabitants; that at Madrid the populace were much incensed against Murat; and that it was thought the conferences at Bayonne would end soon, there having been some movements in France and in the North.

In a subsequent letter from Algesiras, dated the 5th of May, it is stated that Napoleon does not acknowledge Ferdinand VII., insisting that Charles IV. shall be reinstated; that the old King and Queen continue their route to Bayonne, where the rest of the royal family, the nobility, bishops, merchants, &c., are to be assembled; and that the members of the present Government resist transferring the Regency to Murat, who, it is said, will appoint himself Regent by proclamation.

Gibraltar, May 8, 1808.

A conference has taken place between General Castaños' confidential secretary and Mr. Viale, a merchant of Gibraltar, through whose means Sir Hew has hitherto received his intelligence, and Mr. Viale's report of the result is enclosed, by which it appears—

That there was an insurrection on the 2nd at Madrid, which was quelled the same evening—

That it was apprehended Murat would attempt by force to possess himself of the Regency, in which case the Province would arm with the regulars and inhabitants, and the General, at their head, would move to Sierra Morena, to check the progress of the French, and prevent their getting out on that side of the mountains; and that, if the other provinces should concur, the General would ask assistance, and even enter into a formal written convention.

That the insolent and sanguinary Proclamation by Murat, on the 3rd, was likely, if followed up, to lead to more serious insurrections: in that on the 2nd there was much slaughter; the French had the worse, and Murat had declared he would try the Spaniards concerned by a military commission, punish them with death, and destroy every house where a French soldier had been killed—

That, if Buonaparte attempted to put an end to the dynasty of the Bourbons, they would concert timely measures to secure South America—

That to a proposal made by Mr. Viale for our being put in possession of the French fleet at Cadiz, it was answered that, so soon as the nation should consider itself to be at war with the French, the Spanish fleet would sail to South America, with the Infante Don Francisco, under escort of British ships, if it should then be agreed upon; and that the other British ships might enter Cadiz, and rely on the support of the Spaniards towards taking them away—

That General Castaños has no doubt of the concurrence of General Pena, who commands the province of Andalusia, and of Don Ventura Escalante, Captain General of Granada—

That, with respect to Ceuta, nothing is to be apprehended from the French, nor at Minorca or Majorca; and that at Barcelona, though the French were numerous, the Spaniards were unanimous—

That, of the nobles whom Murat had ordered to go to Bayonne, only the young grandees have gone; that, if the royal family be destroyed, the throne would be prepared for the Archduke Charles; and a British frigate is requested to be kept in readiness to bring him from Trieste.

Sir Hew adds, that a copy of this Report has been transmitted to Lord Collingwood, and will be sent to Admiral Purvis; and he encloses another paper just received, as he believes, from General Castaños himself, urging the co-operation of the British, but using at present reserve and disguise, and stating that the French in Guipuscoa having taken possession of the royal fabric of Plasencia, carrying to France 30,000 stand of arms, he should wish to commence by making reprisals, to revenge that outrage. They have disarmed all the towns they occupy; and within Madrid have 33,000 men with cannon, and all the squares and gates.

Gibraltar, May 13, 1808.

Encloses a Madrid Gazette, containing Proclamations from the Duke of Berg, who has assumed the Regency in the room of Don Antonio. It does not appear how the latter has been disposed of; but the youngest brother has repaired to Bayonne.

The system of severity seems to have broken the spirit of the people of Madrid, and in other parts the tone is considerably lowered. Cadiz being in an unquiet state, General Spencer's corps is preparing to join the Admiral, to take advantage of circumstances.

Gibraltar, May 30, 1808.

Encloses some Madrid Gazettes, containing a series of official publications, which terminate in announcing the exclusion and banishment of the royal family. The late King has left Bayonne for the interior of France. He encloses also two Diaries, containing some political essays, which have caused a great sensation in Spain. Buonaparte has summoned the Cortes to meet him at Bayonne on the 15th of June, to obtain, it is supposed, their sanction to the succession of his family to the throne.

Gibraltar, May 31, 1808.

He has received notice from Algesiras of the declaration of a Council of Government at Seville, in the name of Ferdinand VII., that the Spanish cockade and scarf are to be worn by all Spaniards, and vigorous measures carried into execution. General Castaños has received instructions from this new Government, which he proposes to obey.

Sir Hew has been requested to facilitate the conveyance of the acts of the new Government to Barcelona and Minorca, which he intends to do.

Gibraltar, June 2, 1808.

Encloses an official communication which he has received from General Castaños, with overtures of amity between Great Britain and Spain. The pecuniary resources of the provinces seem considerable; and in Andalusia alone 300,000 armed

men are expected to come forward. The enthusiasm is general, led on by men of influence, and kept up by the clergy. The proceedings of the Junta are marked with vigour. A Spanish officer of rank has already been shot publicly at Seville. The same spirit prevails in Valencia. It is believed that Murat has retired from Madrid. He has consented that the communication between Gibraltar and Spain should be opened upon such restrictions as should be agreed upon between General Castaños and himself, and to send Captain Dalrymple to Seville, to treat with the Government on matters relating to the common cause. He encloses a copy of his instructions to Captain Dalrymple.

Gibraltar, June 7, 1808.

He has received demands from several places for small arms and cartouch-boxes for the infantry, and pistols and sabres for the cavalry, but had none in the stores. Whatever could be obtained from privateer-owners or individuals would be furnished. Suggests that there should be an ample supply of moulds for the arms sent out. He expects to be called on for gunpowder, which he shall not hesitate to supply, requesting it may be replaced from home. Through the intervention of Mr. Viale, General Castaños, by Sir Hew's authority, has negociated a loan of 42,000 hard dollars, on the security of the Junta at Seville, and without interest or premium. Sir Hew expresses a high sense of Mr. Viale's services.

Gibraltar, June 9, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatches of the 25th May. Has communicated with Lord Collingwood, who agrees with him in thinking that they should be ready to grant, but be very cautious as to the assistance they press, or even offer.

He has despatched Captain Whittingham to General Castaños, to receive accounts of the proceedings of the army, and discuss questions that may arise; and, being unable to dispense with Captain Dalrymple's assistance, will send Major Cox to Seville.

Encloses the copy of a despatch he forwarded to General Spencer upon receiving his Majesty's commands, also the official publications at Valencia, and the translation of a letter to the present commandant at Algesiras, Don Juan Ordoñez, from a friend, relating to the proceedings in other parts.

He likewise encloses a letter from General Don Eusebio Herrera, respecting troops for service in the interior, with his answer, stating that he has no authority to furnish them for such a purpose, but would suffer them to replace an equal number of Spaniards in garrison or port duty, and would send an officer to Seville, to communicate with the Junta on the sort of aid which can be afforded.

Gibraltar, June 10, 1808.

Encloses the translation of a letter which he has received from the Junta at Valencia, requesting that he would direct the captains of all English vessels to suspend acts of hostility on that coast against Spanish vessels, and that he would send arms and ammunition. Sir Hew encloses also his answer, stating that he will communicate the former request to the Vice-Admiral; but that, with regard to the latter, he has few equipments for service in the field, and has already promised most of them to General Castaños. He urges a further supply of arms, and of cavalry appointments.

Gibraltar, June 14, 1808.

States that General Dupont has defeated the Spanish post at Alcolea, and obtained possession of Cordova. General Castaños, who is appointed Captain-General of Andalusia, had his head-quarters on the 10th at Carmona. He is much in want of camp equipage, of which Sir Hew can furnish him with enough for 3,000 men; but, as that falls very short of what is required, he requests an immediate supply. He has also received a request for arms from the Supreme Council of Granada.

Gibraltar, June 14, 1808.

Encloses a detail of the services upon which Captain Whit-

tingham has been employed since he joined Castaños. He has sent General Castaños tents, and requests a supply for 20,000 as soon as possible.

Gibraltar, June 18, 1808.

Encloses letters from Carthagena and Granada, with a printed declaration from the latter, by which it is evident that Granada does not acknowledge the Junta of Seville to be supreme. He also encloses a letter from Don Eusebio Herrera, who has sent a person, in the name of the Junta, to negociate a loan, for which purpose further powers and the detail of the proposed security are promised. Sir Hew furnished the officer from Granada with a supply of arms, and has sent 2,000 barrels of powder to the army of Seville. It is said, that from 20 to 30,000 men are already in the field to cover Valencia, against which place it is believed that Marshal Moncey is advancing from Madrid with 14,000 French. Murat remains entrenched at Buen Retiro. Dupont is, by the activity of the peasantry, believed to be deprived of all communication and of the means of reinforcement.

Gibraltar, June 18, 1808.

Encloses the copy of a letter from Major-General Spencer, acknowledging Sir Hew's of the 12th of June, and stating that it would be imprudent, with his corps of 4 or 5,000 men, to join the Spanish army, were they even equipped for the field, being ignorant of Castaños' operations, and of the means of supplying the corps in the way which would be necessary. He thinks he should be usefully employed by making diversions, and, if he should find any French corps pushing towards the coast, frustrating their views. He adds that the Spaniards preserve a jealousy relative to his landing, and thinks they would relax in their exertions were he to join them. General Spencer further states that his approach has already checked the French corps pushing to join Dupont, which has now fallen back from Elvas to Mora, 68 miles.

Gibraltar, June 18, 1808.

Encloses a correspondence with General Spencer, Don Eusebio de Herrera, and Captain Whittingham, on the proposal of General Spencer's landing. Also a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, stating the advantages that would arise from General Spencer's joining him off the Tagus, which Sir Hew has in consequence authorized General Spencer to do, subject to Lord Collingwood's approval.

Gibraltar, June 18, 1808.

Encloses a letter from the Government of Valencia, requesting that a letter enclosed may be transmitted to the Marquess of Romana, and expressing confidence that speedy means will be taken to transport the corps under his command to a Spanish port.

Gibraltar, June 19, 1808.

Encloses a Report from Captain Whittingham of General Castaños' operations, by which it appears that the Spanish army had been greatly reinforced, and had taken up a very favourable position.

Gibraltar, June 20, 1808.

Encloses the translation of a letter received by Mr. Viale, from Madrid, stating that the new King, Joseph Napoleon, has issued three decrees from Bayonne, confirming the nomination of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom to the Grand-Duke of Berg, and also confirming the councils and other tribunals, and the corps of Body Guards.

Sir Hew adds the report of a victory by the Portuguese and Spaniards over the French garrison at Almeyda.

Gibraltar, June 25, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatch of the 4th of June. He encloses two despatches from Captain Whittingham, enclosing General Spencer's letter to General Castaños, announcing his intention to proceed to the Tagus with the Spanish General's answer.

He has received notice from the Count of Castro Marin that the province of Algarve, in Portugal, has declared against the French. The Count has requested arms and ammunition, of which Sir Hew could only furnish him with a very small proportion.

Gibraltar, June 30, 1808.

Encloses a patriotic paper published at Valencia, and gives some account of the leading characters of the Junta at Seville, as well as of the views of that body, which he has obtained from Major Cox.

Gibraltar, July 4, 1808.

Encloses a despatch from Major Cox, at Seville, stating the unwillingness of the Spanish Government to permit the British forces to occupy Ceuta, and enclosing a correspondence he has had with Father Gil, relative to the conduct of the Spanish agent in Tangier.

Gibraltar, July 17, 1808.

States that a Minister has arrived from Sicily, to protest against the late renunciations in Spain, and to assert his Sicilian Majesty's claim to the succession. Encloses the Protest and a letter from the Marquess de Circello to Admiral Thornborough, introducing to him the Chevalier Roberto (the Sicilian Minister), and explaining the object of his mission.

Gibraltar, July 17, 1808.

Encloses copies of a correspondence between Major Cox and Father Gil, with other papers, illustrating the temper and character of the Junta of Seville, and displaying the jealousy which prompts the exclusion of the British troops from the Spanish fortresses, which, in Sir Hew's opinion, has been increased, if not occasioned, by the urgency we have displayed on this point.

Gibraltar, July 17, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's two despatches of the 28th June. He has reinforced General Spencer with the

6th Regiment of foot, and a strong detachment of artillery: the former he can continue to spare from the garrison, but not the latter, which he has directed General Spencer to send back. The guns were not equipped for the field, and, therefore, rather impeded than helped the corps. He cannot venture to send a second regiment from Gibraltar, unless reinforced by a second Veteran Battalion.

Gibraltar, July 20, 1808.

Encloses a Report from Captain Whittingham, showing the movements of Castaños' army, and its relative situation to that of the French, under Dupont, on the 17th July: and also stating that, on the 16th July, an action took place on the Guadalquivir near Mengibar, between General Reding, with 8,000 men, and a French force of 5,000, including a regiment of cuirassiers, which terminated in the defeat of the French with great loss. General Reding, however, was obliged to abandon the advantages he had gained, and retire to Mengibar, for want of provisions. It appeared, by an intercepted letter, that Dupont was in great want of provisions, and expected reinforcements.

Sir Hew also encloses a letter from the President of the Junta at Seville to General Spencer, informing him that General Castaños concurs with him in the expediency of his joining the British army in Portugal, General Castaños' army being sufficiently strong to meet the enemy opposed to it.

Gibraltar, July 24, 1808.

Encloses a Report from Captain Whittingham, containing the details of a complete victory obtained on the 19th by General Castaños over Dupont and Wedel. Also a letter to Sir Hew Dalrymple from General Castaños, expressing the satisfaction he has received from Captain Whittingham's services.

Gibraltar, July 28, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatches, Nos. 24, 25,

and 26, and has taken measures to circulate in Spain the King's Speech and the Orders in Council touching the affairs of that country.

Mr. O'Ryan has been sent to Gibraltar by the Junta at Seville, to negociate a loan, but without success. Sir Hew encloses two letters from Major Cox on this subject; he will endeavour to raise 100,000 dollars for the immediate use of the army. He encloses a printed letter from the Count de Tilly to the Junta at Seville, on the victory of Baylen.

Gibraltar, July 30, 1808.

Encloses a letter from Lord Collingwood, recommending that £20,000 should be raised, if possible, for the use of the Junta at Seville; and states that he has, in consequence of this letter and the failure of Mr. O'Ryan's attempt to negociate a loan, advertised for money, but the sum offered does not yet amount to £20,000; specie being scarce, and the Exchange consequently very disadvantageous to the public.

Gibraltar, August 2, 1808.

He has drawn Bills on the Treasury for £13,620, to make an advance, by Lord Collingwood's desire, to the Government of Andalusia, to answer the most pressing wants of the army, and has sent the above sum to his lordship by the Espoir brig.

Gibraltar, August 8, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatch of the 15th July, communicating his appointment to the chief command of the forces in Portugal and Spain. He will proceed to join the army as soon as the necessary arrangements are completed. Transports are preparing for the 42nd Regiment, which he means to carry out with him. He has had a demand from Catalonia for arms and stores, which he has complied with in part. He represents that province to have become an important point, and that it is in want of every thing.

Gibraltar, August 9, 1808.

Encloses the extract of a letter from Major Cox, stating that doubts have arisen in the Junta at Seville, whether the terms granted to General Wedel ought to be carried into execution; also Sir Hew's answer to Major Cox, expressing his surprise that the question should have arisen.

Gibraltar, August 10, 1808.

States that the Duke of Orleans and the second Prince of the Two Sicilies have arrived at Gibraltar, with the view of establishing the residence of the latter at that place, for the avowed purpose of negociating for the Regency of Spain. Sir Hew, having represented to them the impropriety of this measure, has agreed to communicate the whole matter to Lord Collingwood, for his opinion; and, in the mean time, the Prince is not to be allowed to land.

Encloses a letter on this subject from Sir Alexander Ball, with a correspondence between him and Mr. Drummond, and a letter from Sir Hew Dalrymple to the Duke of Orleans.

Gibraltar, August 11, 1808.

He has succeeded in convincing the Duke of Orleans of the necessity of his going to England, to communicate with his Majesty's Ministers on the proposed plan. He encloses a letter which he addressed to Prince Leopold, disclosing the terms upon which he can be permitted to reside in the garrison.

The evacuation of Madrid has not been in consequence of any defeat, but for the purpose of concentrating the French force.

Gibraltar, August 12, 1808.

He has had a further conference with the Duke of Orleans, on the proposed attempt to obtain the Regency of Spain for Prince Leopold, and encloses a Declaration from the Junta at Seville, which the Duke interprets as favourable to that project.

The Duke of Ascoli, Adjutant to the King of Naples, whom

it had been proposed to send to England, having strongly objected to that measure, has been permitted to land, and to remain with the Prince, on condition that he would not communicate the despatches which he brought for the Spanish Government.

Gibraltar, August 26, 1808.

Major-General Drummond encloses a copy of despatches received from the Junta of Valencia, announcing that the French have raised the siege of Saragosa and fled to Tudela; but stating also that the enemy has received a considerable reinforcement in Catalonia, which places in imminent danger the garrisons of Girona, Rosas, and Hostalrich, where the inhabitants are chiefly unarmed. The Government of Valencia solicit an immediate supply of arms to be sent to Tarragona, which General Drummond is unable to furnish; but requests that he may have the means of doing it, and suggests the propriety of making Gibraltar a depôt for arms, stores, &c., in large quantities, to be distributed as exigencies may require.

General Drummond was left in the command of the fortress on the 13th of August by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and has received Lord Castlereagh's despatches, Nos. 24, 25, and 26, of the 6th July.

NO. II.

PRÉCIS OF LETTERS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SPENCER,

RELATING TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

H.M.S. Antelope, off Tagus Bay, February 29, 1808.

States that he arrived off the Tagus on the 26th. He has communicated with Sir Charles Cotton, who agrees with him that their hostile attempts are impracticable, occupied as the Tagus and forts are by 16,000 French, making altogether in Portugal 36,000 French and 20,000 Spaniards. The inhabitants have been disarmed by Junot, and reduced to subjection; and, severely as they feel the French yoke, they are

in no material want of provisions. The Russian ships (eight sail of the line) were ready for sea, with a Portuguese line-of-battle ship and a frigate. The Russian Admiral has intimated to Sir Charles Cotton that, when he receives orders from his Emperor, he shall not scruple to venture out of the Tagus. The French, it appears, are marching a formidable army into Spain. General Spencer's troops are in perfect health.

Off Cape Espartel, March 10, 1808.

He has had a tedious passage from the Tagus, but expects to be at Gibraltar in the course of the day. Encloses a list (received from Sir Charles Cotton) of the troops and transports which arrived at Gibraltar on the 17th January—2,280 rank and file.

Gibraltar, March 13, 1808.

He arrived there on the 10th. Encloses the reports of Captain Usher, R.N., and Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, relative to Ceuta, with other papers on the same subject, and states that, in consequence, with the unanimous opinion of Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Sidney Smith, and other officers assembled with them, he has thought it his duty to relinquish an attack upon that fortress.

Gibraltar, March 13, 1808.

Agreeably to his instructions, he has determined to remain at Gibraltar, with the British force under his orders, a detachment of the Staff corps, and a part of the artillery. The four regiments of the King's German Legion, the rest of the artillery, and the recruits for the regiments at Sicily and Malta, he has directed to proceed without delay for their destination, under Brigadier-General M'Farlane.

Encloses a list of the victuallers he has forwarded to General Beresford.

Gibraltar, March 18, 1808.

Encloses a letter confirming the impossibility of carrying Ceuta by a *coup de main*. The reinforcements (nearly 6,000 men) are nearly ready to sail for Sicily.

Gibraltar, March 27, 1808.

The reinforcements for Sicily sailed on the 20th, and the victuallers for Madeira will proceed immediately.

H.M.S. Minorca, Gibraltar Bay, May 14, 1808.

In consequence of a communication to Sir Hew Dalrymple from Rear-Admiral Purvis, he is under weigh with the troops to proceed off Cadiz, to co-operate with the Rear-Admiral in any enterprise likely to benefit the service.

H.M.S. Atlas, off Cadiz, May 29, 1808.

Having joined the Rear-Admiral on the 15th, the first step they took was to make known their sentiments and disposition to the Spaniards, and endeavour to open a private communication with the Spanish officers at Cadiz. Encloses copies of their proclamation for the former purpose, and of their letters to the Governor of Cadiz, the Marquess of Socorro (Solano) to obtain the latter. They have studiously avoided any specific proposition which might commit the British Government. No answers have been received; but there is every reason to believe that the proclamation has been favourably received by the people, who are highly exasperated against the French, and would receive the English, if there was a Spaniard of influence to head and lead them.

To facilitate the means of communication, the Admiral, at his request, has anchored the transports near the shore, under the protection of the in-shore squadron. He has at length received a note from the Marquess de Socorro, who does not appear to feel himself strong or bold enough to oppose the views of the French, and seems, with the rest of the Spanish nobility, to prefer security and submission to the danger of an honourable resistance.

H.M.S. Atlas, May 29, 1808.

States that, from the information which Sir Hew Dalrymple has received, concerning the dispositions of the Spaniards, he

conceived that an opportunity would offer for our taking possession of the French squadron at Cadiz. But, though the British proclamation has been favourably received by the people, there is reason to suspect the intentions of Socorro, who, however, has lost by his late conduct much of his popularity. He is still without the detachment from Sicily.

Off Cadiz, June 6, 1808.

Reports that, on the 30th May, (when, from the unfavourable complexion of things, he was preparing to return to Gibraltar) two deputies arrived from Seville, to know if the British Commanders were disposed to afford that co-operation and assistance which had been proffered in their public address. On receiving strong assurances of the affirmative, the deputies returned, having informed the British Commanders that a Supreme Council had been constituted at Seville, in the name of Ferdinand VII., for the four provinces of Seville, Andalusia, Valencia, and Cordova; also, that Socorro, in consequence of a proclamation he had issued, and of his being considered as gained over to the French interest, had, on the 28th, fallen a sacrifice to the people of Cadiz.

The following day, the deputies returned, inviting a conference of accredited British officers on shore with members of the Supreme Council. The British Commanders desired previously to stipulate that the French flags in the harbour should be struck, the crews made prisoners of war, and the ships taken possession of, for the future disposal of the British and Spanish Sovereigns; to which it was replied that this seizure must be the consequence, and not the price, of an alliance with Great Britain, and that the appearance of British officers on shore would be attended with the happiest effects.

On this, the Commanders thought it right to appoint Captain Sir John Gore, R.N., and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Smith, to be the bearers of any propositions that might be made to them. These officers were received on shore with general

respect, and with the acclamations of the people: and, after a long conference, they returned with proposals, a copy of which is enclosed.

The proposals have for their objects—1. The revival of the peace of 1782 [1783]. 2. The assistance of Great Britain against the common enemy. 3. The protection of vessels sent with intelligence from Spain to the colonies. 4. The security of Spanish vessels against the British. 5. The reduction of the French squadron as soon as peace is confirmed. 6. The appointment of plenipotentiaries, to arrange the details.

These propositions appearing to the British Commanders to involve important national questions, they convened a council of officers of the army and navy, who agreed that other propositions (also enclosed) should be submitted in answer to those received from Spain. The British propositions state: 1. That the Commanders are not authorized to receive propositions as the basis of a peace, but will convey to England such Spanish Commissioners as may be selected to treat for one. 2. That the Admiral's instructions prevent him from acceding to more than a partial armistice, which he grants on condition that British vessels shall have ingress and egress at Cadiz, with all commercial advantages, and allowing Spanish coasters to navigate from and to Cadiz, with provisions and merchandize, but not naval or military stores, which must be admitted under a special communication. 3. That passports will be given for feluccas conveying officers and intelligence to the colonies, to counteract the views of the common enemy. 4. That immediate steps must be taken to reduce or destroy the French squadron and making the crews prisoners of war; and that all French privateers, &c., shall be excluded from the Spanish ports.

These proposals were accordingly despatched to the Supreme Council, whose answer is not yet received, but is expected to be satisfactory. In the mean time, the Spanish General at Cadiz is preparing to attack the French squadron with batteries,

which are nearly completed, and Admiral Purvis has been requested to anchor his ships at the mouth of the harbour, and give assistance, if necessary; but the aid of the British troops in the batteries has been declined. Sir George Smith is to remain at Cadiz, to communicate between the Spanish and British Generals.

Off Cadiz, June 6, 1808.

Encloses proclamations and papers, marking the general disposition of the Spanish people to resist the French. He adds that a most respectable form of government has been temporarily established at Seville, according to laws of the nation on occasions like the present, and at the instigation of the people themselves, who appear to pay due obedience to it. He learns that there is at present no want of money; but that some pieces of ordnance, 50 or 60,000 stand of arms, and a large supply of ammunition, are indispensable. 200,000 men are said to be in arms, in the different provinces, and are taking up the positions thought to be the most eligible. It is intended to act on the defensive as much as possible, confining their offensive operations to cutting off the enemy's supplies and small detachments.

It has been hinted to him that it might be advantageous for a British force to advance to Seville, and to act with the Spanish troops; he has determined, however, not to venture into the interior, but to confine his co-operation to the garrisoning of Cadiz (if called upon), till he shall receive orders from home. Sir Hew Dalrymple suggests a diversion at the Tagus, but General Spencer thinks it his indispensable duty to remain off Cadiz till the Spanish and French squadrons are secured from the enemy, or till all hopes of that object are at an end.

He thinks the objects on his present station too important to be relinquished for Minorca, which, if the former succeed, must be gained as a natural consequence. Brigadier-General Nightingale and Sir George Smith concur in this opinion;

but he will keep himself prepared for the latter object, if necessary.

It is reported that 10,000 French have entered Estremadura, and that a similar force has passed the Sierra Morena—4,000 are also said to be marching for Portugal. The Spaniards have already assembled 35,000 at and near Seville. General Castaños has moved to Ecija with 15,000 men from St. Rocq, Algesiras, and a part of the garrison of Ceuta: he commands the advanced corps to be opposed to the French. The highest enthusiasm animates all classes.

Off Cadiz, June 10, 1808.

The Spaniards seem unanimous in resisting the French. At Barcelona they have surrounded the French corps, and all the coast is in arms. In the southern quarter, they have assembled more than 60,000, including 15,000 regulars, the whole already armed, and forming into battalions: their head-quarters are at Cormona, the advanced guard at Ecija, but an irregular corps is still more in advance, and has had a skirmish with the French advanced corps near Cordova.

The French, under Dupont, are said to be 16,000: they crossed the Sierra Morena without opposition, and have reached Cordova. The Spaniards have requested General Spencer to march to Xeres, but he does not feel himself justified to do this, either by his instructions, or the strength and equipments of his corps. It has since been proposed that he should proceed to Ayamonte, as a French corps is assembling at Tavira, with the probable intention of continuing their route along the coast, until they can land in the rear of the Spanish troops defending the Guadiana (about 6,000), and either turn them, or effect a junction with Dupont. General Spencer proposes to proceed against this corps immediately, which does not exceed 5,000. General Spencer's, including the 6th regiment and the detachments from Sicily, amount to 4,500.

The Spaniards think themselves fully capable of defending Cadiz, provided there is an open communication from the sea.

In addition to the 60,000 stand of arms before mentioned, they will want 40,000. There is likely to be a want of provisions. Four Commissioners are named for England, but made known to the British Commanders. In a PS., he adds that Brigadier-General Nightingale's brigade is under weigh for Ayamonte. The negociation still continues, and hostilities may commence again. Lord Collingwood has arrived.

Off Cadiz, June 12, 1808.

The French squadron, five sail of the line and a frigate, having placed themselves in a defensive position in the Channel leading to the Caraccas, out of the reach of the works of Cadiz, and having refused to listen to any terms, were attacked on the 9th at 3 a.m., by the Spanish gun and mortar boats, and the batteries erected for this purpose on the Isle of Leon, and near Fort Louis. The firing continued till next day, when the French hoisted a flag of truce; but the terms proposed being inadmissible, the Spaniards intend to recommence hostilities with an additional battery to the eastward of St. Louis. The British Commanders would have co-operated, but the Spaniards declined their offer.

The Supreme Council of Seville have applied for a frigate, to convey their Commissioners to England. He will sail immediately against the French corps at Tavira; Lord Collingwood approving of the measure. He encloses the proposals of the French Admiral Rossilly to quit the Bay, with the answer of Governor Morla, that nothing but an unconditional surrender can be accepted.

H.M.S. Windsor Castle, off Ayamonte, June 17, 1808.

The French squadron surrendered on the 14th, when the Spanish colours were flying in all the ships. He has not received the particulars. His movement to Ayamonte has been successful. The French are retiring in every direction towards Lisbon, except some small parties occupying the forts

and posts in the south of Portugal. The Portuguese are rising in all parts, encouraged by the appearance of the British; and the Spanish frontier on the Guadiana is effectually secured.

Off Ayamonte, June 17, 1808.

The French corps has retired, leaving only 2 or 300 men at Villa Real, and very small detachments at Castro Marin, Tavira, and Faro. About 4,000 men are collected at Mora, twenty leagues from Ayamonte. A considerable body of Spanish troops have escaped from the French, and are on their way, through Portugal, towards Ayamonte. He has supplied the Spaniards at Ayamonte with 200 stand of arms. It was proposed to him to dislodge the French at Villa Real; but, as they had a secure retreat to the forts at Castro Marin, which could not be taken without landing guns, and consequently occasioning delay, he did not think it worth while.

The Portuguese are universally desirous to oppose the French, but are without arms, which General Spencer is not able to supply. Sir C. Cotton has requested him to proceed off Lisbon, which he is desirous to do, if Lord Collingwood should approve it.

H.M. Brig Scout, off Lagos.

The information of the forced renunciation of the Crown of Spain by Charles IV., Ferdinand, and all the royal family, in favour of Buonaparte, has excited a general feeling of indignation, though some of the upper classes appear to temporize, as if they dreaded the consequences of resistance. The Council of Seville have assumed an independent authority, in the name of Ferdinand VII., whom they have proclaimed King, and have formally declared war against France, appealing to the Spanish nation to support them. Their supremacy has been acknowledged by several other provinces, though each Council assumes a separate authority in its own district.

In Andalusia, from 15 to 20,000 regular troops and 60,000 peasants are in arms. Castaños is appointed Commander-in-

Chief. The defeat of 17,000 peasants by Dupont at the bridge of Alcolea has made them look up to the regulars, who are, in general, in good order, and well equipped. They have a proportion of near 4,000 cavalry and a large quantity of artillery, as Seville has a foundry and large depôt. Many small detachments of the enemy have been cut off. Dupont has pushed to Cordova, where he is strengthening himself. The Morena passes have been occupied by 5,000 Spaniards, the road broken up, and, it is supposed, all communication cut off.

Proclamations are circulated by the Spaniards, inviting the Portuguese to join in their cause. The latter have already risen at Faro, where they have taken or destroyed 200 French, and have seized the arms and ammunition, which the French had collected in a depôt, as well as 40,000 dollars.

Considering the Spanish frontier on the Guadiana secure for the present, he will proceed to the Tagus: he has written letters (of which he encloses copies) to Castaños and the Council of Seville, acquainting them with his motives for this determination.

H.M.S. Hibernia, off Lisbon, June 24, 1808.

On his arrival off Lisbon, he learned from Sir C. Cotton that the Portuguese are in a ripe state to throw off the French yoke; but the French force, concentrated at Lisbon and the neighbourhood, is very considerable, and fully capable of resisting a much larger force than he could land. He has determined, with Sir C. Cotton's concurrence, to return with the troops to Ayamonte; and, if he finds the frontiers quiet, to proceed to Cadiz, to act as circumstances may require.

H.M.S. Scout, off St. Lucar, June 26, 1808.

Ayamonte is perfectly quiet. The Portuguese are in possession of Villa Real and Castro Marin, where the French have surrendered. The whole province of Algarve is in the possession of the Portuguese. He has announced his return to Castaños and the Council.

Puerto Santa Maria, July 3, 1808.

General Morla having offered him barracks at Porto Santa Maria, he has landed there. Morla has stated to him that he shall look to his assistance to defend Cadiz, in the event of any misfortune happening to Castaños' army. With this view, he will remain on shore, but will not advance into the interior, as his corps is too small and insufficiently equipped for field operations. The French are said to have been completely defeated near Saragossa; and Dupont is reported to have retired to Andujar, much in want of supplies, while Castaños is marching to give him battle.

Puerto Santa Maria, July 13, 1808.

The deranged finances of the Government at Seville having compelled them to resolve on dismantling the ships, General Spencer applied for pecuniary aid for them to Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple, who did not think proper to give it for the purpose for which it was required. General Spencer, however, having held out expectations of relief to the Spaniards, considered himself pledged to advance fifteen days' pay for their navy, which he has accordingly done.

He has been pressed by General Castaños to place his corps at Xeres, to support the Spanish army, in case of a defeat. This he has consented to; but the exhausted state of the country presents obstacles to the proposed movement. He will not march without cannon; and Andalusia has been drained of horses to supply the Spanish army. He has resolved not to move beyond Xeres, and will take with him only two regiments, with four light companies, and some artillery, leaving the remainder ready to support General Morla.

It is believed that Dupont has been reinforced by 5,000 men; but Castaños has 25,000 regulars, besides many thousands of peasantry. The sum he has advanced to Morla is 40,000 hard dollars.

Bulwark, off Cadiz, July 22, 1808.

Castaños, by repeated attacks on Dupont, has reduced him

to ask for terms, which have been refused. As these successes have removed General Spencer's doubts with respect to the propriety of his leaving that country, he has communicated to the Junta his intention of joining Sir A. Wellesley, if they did not think his departure prejudicial to them. The Junta having assented, as well as Lord Collingwood, he has embarked all the troops, who are under sail.

The conduct of the troops at Santa Maria gained the good-will of the inhabitants. He adds, in a PS., that Castaños will march to Madrid, joined by the Valencian army.

Bulwark, off Cascaes, August 2, 1808.

He has arrived off Cascaes with the whole of his force, and they are beating up to join Sir Arthur Wellesley at Figuera. He is proceeding in the Nautilus, to meet Sir Arthur, without delay, leaving the troops under Brigadier-General Nightingale.

NO. III.

PRÉCIS OF DESPATCHES FROM SIR A. WELLESLEY,

RELATING TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

On board H.M.S. Crocodile, Corunna, July 21, 1808.

States that, having adverted to the tenour of Lord Castlereagh's instructions of the 30th June, he quitted the fleet, as soon as it was clear of Ireland, and arrived at Corunna.

From several conferences with the Junta of Gallicia, he learns that the whole of Spain, except Navarre and Biscay, is in arms against the French, who have been defeated in many places. This information is not official, but is contained in private letters which are not doubted.

The combined Gallician and Castilian armies (50,000 men, of whom 20,000 were regulars) were, on the 14th, attacked at Rio Seco, by Bessières, with 20,000 men, of which 4,000 were cavalry. The Spaniards were defeated on the left, and lost 7,000 men, with two pieces of cannon; the French are stated

to have lost 7,000 men, and six pieces of cannon. The Spaniards retired to Benevente, by which the French have acquired the command of the Duero, and are enabled to impede the communication between Gallicia and the southern provinces. The Junta have consented that Sir Arthur should use the port of Vigo, if necessary, to shelter the fleet, or even land the troops.

The French troops in Portugal appear to be about 15,000, of which 12,000 are at or near Lisbon, and a small corps occupies Almeida. The three provinces north of the Duero are in arms against the French. A Portuguese corps of 10,000 is in Oporto, and a Spanish corps of 2,000 on its march thither from Gallicia. He has not learned whether General Spencer will be able to proceed to Lisbon. He will sail immediately for Oporto, requesting Captain Malcolm to follow him with the convoy.

H.M.S. Crocodile, July 26, 1808.

Having joined the fleet off Cape Finisterre, on the 22nd, he arrived at Oporto on the 24th, and the fleet next morning. He has learned from the Bishop of Oporto, the Portuguese General, and Lieut.-Colonel Browne, that the Portuguese troops, militia, and regulars, amounted to about 5,000, and were posted at Coimbra; that there were also in advance about 2,000 peasants; and a corps of 1,500 Portuguese and 300 Spanish infantry at Oporto, besides volunteers and peasants; the whole, however, badly armed and equipped—the peasantry armed only with pikes—and those called regulars are individuals belonging to different corps of the Portuguese army. The Spanish corps of 2,000 men mentioned in his last letter had not left Gallicia, and were not expected at Oporto. A post at Figuera, on the Mondego, is occupied by Captain Bligh, of H.M.S. Alfred, with 300 marines.

He encloses a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, recommending him to leave the fleet at anchor to the northward, and to go to the Tagus, to communicate with him, thinking it might be

deemed advisable to land the troops at Mondego Bay, or Peniche. He has accordingly desired Captain Malcolm to anchor at Mondego.

He provided with the Bishop for a supply of 150 horses, for the 20th Dragoons, and 500 mules, for carrying musket-ammunition, &c., or camp equipage, if necessary; also, for a supply of fresh meat, forage, and grain. He left Oporto on the 25th, joined the fleet, and is proceeding to the Tagus.

On board the Donegal, off Mondego River, August 1, 1808.

Encloses despatches which he received on the 25th July from General Spencer, who had landed at Puerto Santa Maria, and had determined to remain in Andalusia. After consulting Sir C. Cotton, Sir Arthur thought it proper to order General Spencer to embark and join him, unless he should be engaged in any operation which it might be unsafe to relinquish. General Spencer being in great distress for money, Sir Arthur has authorized him to draw upon England for £100,000. He encloses copies of his letters to General Spencer, stating that the orders he has given have been occasioned by the positive directions of his Majesty's Ministers that he should make an attack on the French troops in the Tagus; and he has since learned that Dupont was defeated and surrendered on the 20th; consequently, the assistance of General Spencer's corps in that quarter could no longer be necessary.

In consequence of the information he has received concerning the enemy's forces in Portugal, he is induced to delay the commencement of his operations till the arrival of the reinforcement from England, or of General Spencer. The enemy's position near the Tagus appears so strong, that an attack there is impracticable, without making a diversion to the northward. Cascaes Bay cannot be approached without silencing the forts and works, which the shipping seem scarcely able to do. From Cascaes to the northward of Cape Roca, there are small bays, where small bodies of men could be disembarked in moderate

weather, but the surf would render the landing of stores precarious, and the vicinity of the enemy, joined to the want of resources in the country, would increase the embarrassment. These considerations, added to the advantages to be calculated from the co-operation of the Portuguese troops, have induced him to decide on a landing to the northward.

No place to the north of Lisbon, nearer than Mondego, would answer for landing, except, perhaps, Peniche; but the fort on that peninsula is strong and well garrisoned; and the ordnance and ammunition mentioned in Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 30th June are not yet arrived.

He considers the possession of the city and harbour of Lisbon as his immediate object. The forts at the mouth of the Tagus must first be attained; those of Cascaes and St. Julian must be attacked with heavy ordnance, which it is obvious the enemy will not allow until driven from the field. He therefore prefers attacking the enemy's line of defence from the heights to the northward of Lisbon, which is likely to bring the contest to the issue of a battle in the field.

He has begun to disembark in the Mondego River, where the landing is attended with some difficulties, and would be impossible without assistance from the country. If either General Spencer or the reinforcements from home should arrive (which is probable) before the troops are landed, he will commence his march. He has issued 5,000 stand of arms for the Portuguese regulars, who are to co-operate in the attack on the French.

Camp at Lavaos, August 8, 1808.

States that General Spencer arrived in Mondego Bay on the night of the 5th August, followed by part of his corps on the 6th, and the remainder on the 7th: the whole have disembarked.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 21st July; he had already given orders for apprizing all vessels coming from England that the army was landing in Mondego Bay.

He proposes to commence his march on the 10th, and encloses the copy of a letter which he has left to be delivered to Sir H. Burrard, communicating what he had learned of the state of affairs in Spain and Portugal. In this enclosure, (of which he has sent a copy to Sir Hew Dalrymple) he states that the enemy's force in Portugal, as far as he can form an opinion, is from 16 to 18,000 men, of which about 500 are in Almeida, the same number in Elvas, 6 or 800 in Peniche, and 16 or 1,800 in the province of Alentejo; the remainder, disposable for the defence of Lisbon, are in the forts of St. Julian and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast, and in the old citadel, where the enemy have added works.

About 2,000 of the disposable force have been detached, under General Lhomenie, principally, as Sir Arthur believes, to watch his movements, and are now at Alabasa; 4,000 men, under General Loison, were sent to Alentejo on the 26th, to disperse the Portuguese insurgents; to force a Spanish corps of 2,000, advanced to Evora, to retire; and thus to add to the force destined to defend Lisbon the French troops stationed in Alentejo. At all events, Loison's corps will return to Lisbon; and the disposable strength of the enemy will be about 14,000 men, of which 3,000 must be left in the garrisons.

Sir Arthur proceeds to acquaint Sir H. Burrard that Dupont surrendered on the 20th July; that on the 14th the Spaniards received a check at Rio Seco; that he understands there has since been an affair in the neighbourhood of Benevente; that the enemy had been beat off from Saragossa and Valencia, and are reported to have been cut off in Catalonia, where Barcelona is blockaded. He adds, that it is obvious that the insurrection against the French is general; that the latter cannot carry on their operations by means of small corps; and that, from their inactivity and their misfortunes, he imagines they cannot collect a force large enough to oppose the insurgents, or cannot carry on their operations with armies so numerous without magazines.

The whole of Portugal, except the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in insurrection against the French, but their means of resistance are less powerful than in Spain, having suffered more from the enemy. In the northern parts, the Portuguese have about 10,000 men in arms, of which 5,000 are to march with the British to Lisbon. The remainder, with about 1,500 Gallicians, are to blockade Almeida and protect Oporto. The insurrection is general in Alentejo and Algarve, to the southward, Entre Minho e Duero, Tra los Montes and Beira, to the north: but they can do nothing for want of arms.

He acquaints Sir Harry Burrard with his reasons for landing in Mondego Bay, and states that he has desired Brigadier-General Acland, on his arrival, to proceed along the coast to the southward, in order to attack Peniche, if it be found necessary; and, if not, to join the fleet off the Tagus, with a view to disembark near the Rock.

Head-Quarters at Caldas, August 16, 1808.

He marched from Lavaos on the 10th, and was joined at Lynga, on the 12th, by 5 or 6,000 Portuguese, under General Bernardin Freire, who, he is concerned to state, have accompanied him no further. The General and other Portuguese officers wished the British Commissariat to support their troops from the British stores during the campaign, which Sir Arthur had declared to them to be impossible. Before he advanced, they requested him to secure a magazine at Lynga, which had been formed for the British troops. This was done, but he received no supply from it, as it was kept entire for the Portuguese. Some extraordinary messages were sent on the subject of the supplies; and, the next morning, when the Portuguese troops were to have marched at an appointed time, General Freire proposed to detach the Portuguese troops, unless Sir Arthur would feed them; under the pretext of the probable want of supplies on the road which Sir Arthur proposed to take, and their great plenty on the other road, where, too,

the Portuguese might be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Sir Arthur, in reply, pointed out the danger and inefficiency of this plan, requesting Freire to send him 1,000 infantry, all his cavalry and light troops, whom Sir Arthur engaged to feed, and either to join with the remainder, or keep in the rear in safety. Freire has sent 1,400 infantry and 260 cavalry; but has announced that he perseveres in his proposed plan for the remainder; though Sir Arthur has since informed him that he has found resources in the country adequate to subsist all the troops. This conduct of General Freire Sir Arthur attributes to apprehensions that the combined force is not sufficiently strong for the enemy.

He marched from Lynga on the 13th, reached Alcobaça on the 14th, which the enemy had abandoned the preceding night, and arrived on the 15th at Caldas. The enemy, 4,000 in number, were posted ten miles from thence, at Borica, and they occupied with their outposts Obidos, three miles from Caldas, of which Sir Arthur dispossessed them, by detaching four companies of riflemen, of the 60th and 95th Regiments. They made a trifling resistance, retired, and were pursued for three miles, where they were reinforced by a superior body of the enemy; and it was with difficulty that Major-General Spencer was enabled to effect the retreat of the riflemen to Obidos, of which they keep possession; the enemy having retreated entirely from the neighbourhood. In this affair, Lieutenant Bunbury, of the 95th, was killed, and the Honourable Captain Pakenham slightly wounded.

Besides the corps of 4,000 men, commanded by Laborde and Lhomenie, retiring in front of the army by the sea-road towards Lisbon, there is another of 5,000 at Rio Major, under Loison, likely to retire by the great Lisbon road, and to join the former near Lisbon, with whatever troops can be spared from the defence of the fortifications. Loison's corps is understood to have suffered in its operations against the Spanish troops and the insurgents in Alentejo.

At Alcobaça, Captain Malcolm landed a supply: he is now off Peniche.

Head-Quarters at Caldas, August 16, 1808.

Encloses copies of letters which he has received from Mr. Stuart and Colonel Doyle, from Corunna, and of letters which he has in consequence written to Sir Harry Burrard, to be delivered on his arrival. The letters from Corunna state that Cuesta, having quarrelled with General Blake, after the battle of Rio Seco, had gone with all the cavalry (600 men) to Santander, where he was endeavouring to organize the peasants; while Blake had established himself near Astorga. Santander, being evacuated by the French, was taken possession of by the Asturians on the 15th. Bessières, reinforced, had advanced to Benevente, from whence he detached 4,000 men to Leon, which capitulated on the 21st. His object seemed to be either to advance on Astorga and attack Blake, or to push on towards Portugal, in order to join the corps at Almeida, and extricate Junot.

Castaños had proposed to Blake that he should march forward to Madrid; but, in the present state of his army, (consisting of 23,000 men, chiefly recruits, and badly armed) that seems impracticable. The Asturians have received stores and money from Government, but are not going on as could be wished, owing to their disputes at home and with the other provinces and Juntas. It is added by Colonel Doyle, who encloses a statement of the disposition and force of the Gallician army, that he understands the army of Estremadura has a large body of cavalry, which he wishes to join Blake, supposing it no longer wanted in Estremadura or Portugal, and that the French have been beaten at Valencia, and have lost 2,000 men, General Moncey being wounded.

Head-Quarters at Villa Verde, August 17, 1808.

States that Laborde, having continued in his position of Roleça, an eminence with a plain in its front, at the end of a

valley, and closed to the southward by mountains having four or five passes, which were covered by the enemy, he determined to attack him that morning. Laborde's force consisted of at least 6,000, with five pieces of cannon; and there was reason to believe that Loison (who was at Rio Mayor) would join him in the course of the night. Sir Arthur formed three columns, and moved from Obidos at 7 in the morning. The enemy, on the advance of the British, retired into the mountains with great celerity and little loss. They were attacked with great impetuosity, made a desperate defence, but were at length driven from all their positions. They effected their retreat, however, in good order, owing to Sir Arthur's want of cavalry, and to the difficulty of bringing troops and cannon with celerity up the passes of the mountains. The enemy's loss has been very great, including three pieces of cannon. Only the 5th, 9th, and 29th, the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of Major-General Hill's brigade, were actually engaged. Their numbers were by no means equal to the enemy's, and their conduct deserves the highest commendation. He expresses his acknowledgments for the support he has received from Generals Spencer, Ferguson, Hill, Nightingale, and Fane, as well as other officers; and laments the loss of the Hon. Lieut-Colonel Lake, who had gallantly distinguished himself.

Head-Quarters, Lourinha, August 18, 1808.

Having heard that Brigadier-General Anstruther was off Peniche, with the victuallers and store-ships, he has ordered him to land, and has moved to Lourinha, to protect his landing and facilitate the junction.

Loison joined Laborde the preceding night at Torres Vedras, and they are stated to be marching towards Lisbon. He also hears that Junot has arrived at Torres Vedras, with a small corps from Lisbon, and concludes that the whole French force will be assembled between Torres Vedras and the capital in the course of a few days.

Vimiera, August 21, 1808.

Reports that the enemy had attacked him at Vimiera that morning—describes Vimiera to be in a valley, through which runs the river Maceira; at the back and to the west and north a mountain, which touches the sea on the west, and is separated by a deep ravine on the east from the heights over which the road passes from Lourinha to Vimiera. The greater part of the British infantry was posted on this mountain with eight pieces of artillery. Brigadier-General Fane, with his riflemen, and Brigadier-General Anstruther's brigade, with artillery, were posted on a hill on the east and south side of the town, commanded by the mountain, and commanding all the neighbouring ground to the south and east. The cavalry and reserve were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry stood, both flanking and supporting Brigadier-General Fane's advanced guard.

The enemy appeared at 8 p.m., in large bodies of cavalry on the left, upon the heights on the road to Lourinha. Their attack began in several columns upon the whole of the troops on these heights, to which the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Bowes, and Acland had been moved on the appearance of the enemy in that quarter. On the left, the enemy, having advanced close, notwithstanding the fire of the riflemen, were driven back by the bayonet. On the right, they were also repulsed by the bayonet; and they were attacked on the flank by Brigadier-General Acland's brigade and the artillery on the heights. At length, after a desperate contest, the enemy was driven back in confusion, with the loss of seven pieces of cannon and many prisoners. The detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons pursued, but the enemy's cavalry was greatly superior in number.

The attack upon the heights had been supported by a large body of cavalry with great impetuosity, but which were gallantly repulsed by General Ferguson's and the other brigades on that position, and six pieces of cannon were taken, with

many prisoners. The enemy afterwards attempted to recover a part of the artillery, but was again forced to retire.

The whole French force appeared to be employed in this action, under Junot in person. The enemy was certainly superior in cavalry and artillery; has lost thirteen pieces of cannon, twenty-three ammunition waggons, one general officer (Brenière) wounded and made prisoner, and a great number of officers and soldiers, killed, wounded, and taken. Not more than half the British army was actually engaged. Sir Arthur bestows great praises on the troops, General Officers, and Staff. He encloses a return of killed, wounded, and missing; and adds that he has learned that a French General Officer, supposed to be General Thiébault, has been found dead on the field.

NO. IV.

PRÉCIS OF LETTERS FROM BRIGADIER-GENERAL BARON DECKEN,

ON THE AFFAIRS OF PORTUGAL.

Oporto, August 18, 1808.

He arrived at Oporto on the 17th. He has seen the Bishop, who requests that money and arms may be sent to Oporto; 30,000 stand of arms being required for the inhabitants of the provinces Entre Minho y Douro, Tra los Montes, Beira, and Estremadura; and also requests that 2,000 British troops be sent without delay to Oporto, to protect the temporary Government against the French and the French party there, which the Bishop represents to be very strong. Baron Decken has represented to the Commander of the British forces that, by forming militia at Oporto and in the province of Entre Minho y Douro, it would be easy to defend the passes, as, in the present circumstances, the French could not send a large force thither; but, to remove the Bishop's fears respecting the disposition of the inhabitants, he has recommended the sending a small garrison of British troops to Oporto.

The Bishop further requests that 4,000 British troops might

be sent to Coimbra, to which Baron Decken has answered that this must depend on the plan of operations formed by the British General, who would no doubt protect as much of the country as possible.

The utmost confusion prevails with respect to military arrangements, and he doubts whether he shall be permitted to interfere in forming a system of order.

Oporto, August 18, 1808.

Relates a conversation which he has had with the Bishop of Oporto, in which the latter confidentially communicated his intention of resigning the government into the hands of the Regency established by the Prince Regent on his leaving Portugal, and requested Baron Decken to make his resolution known to the British Government and the British Commanding Officer in Portugal. The Baron, however, has reason to believe that the Bishop would not dislike to keep the government in his hands, if it could be done by the interference of the British Government.

Oporto, August 19, 1808.

States that the Bishop of Oporto does not appear to have certain intelligence of Spain, but supposes Joseph Bonaparte to have returned to Paris. With respect to Portugal, it is understood that 6 or 700 French are at Almeida, (a fortress requiring a garrison of 3,000) and are observed by 6,000 Portuguese militia; that 1,000 French are at Abrantes, observed by 1,500 Spaniards at Castel Branco; that 2,500 French are at Elvas, the most important post in Portugal; and that the rest of the French, said to consist of 10,000 men, are at Lisbon, their advanced posts extending from Peniche to Santarem. Almeida and Abrantes seem occupied with a view to facilitate Bessières' movement to their assistance. The French at Lisbon can retire on Elvas, which Junot is likely to do; from thence, however, his junction with the army at Burgos will be difficult, Estremadura being in arms. Badajoz is stated to be strongly occupied by the Spaniards.

The Bishop believes the French to have retired to Burgos with a view to concentrate their forces, and receive reinforcements from France, and that they will soon advance. Junot's position is very strong, and the Baron fears he will be reinforced. Some Portuguese, chiefly of the nobility, who have been arrested for being friendly to the French, are to be sent to the Brazils. Out of 10,000 Portuguese troops raised by the French, only 1,600 are said to have reached Paris. The rest have deserted, and have chiefly joined the Spaniards.

Oporto, August 24, 1808.

Encloses a report from the General commanding the Portuguese troops with the British army, detailing the proceedings up to the 19th August, including the attack made by Sir Arthur Wellesley on the enemy, on the 17th.

There is a great want of communication with Spain. The Bishop learns that the French have been reinforced at Burgos, and possess Valladolid; and, fearing that an army might appear on the frontiers before the French at Lisbon have surrendered, he has desired Baron Decken to request that some British troops should attack Almeida, which he considers as the key to the province of Beira. He also wishes Abrantes to be occupied, and detachments sent from thence to cut off the communication of the French between Lisbon and Elvas. Baron Decken has persuaded the Bishop to send an officer to the Spanish armies, and establish a mail between Braganza and Oporto.

The Bishop is less anxious for British troops at Oporto, from being convinced of the great risk the French would run, in advancing so far, of being cut off by the British, and also from considering the strength of the mountains separating the provinces of Tras os Montes and Entre Minho y Douro.

From the confusion which prevails in the temporary Government at Oporto, Baron Decken has found it impossible to obtain a correct knowledge of the Portuguese force. The Bishop

has permitted him to make proposals for a regular distribution of the principal branches of Government, including particularly a War Office. By a printed edict of the Bishop, the regular force of the three northern provinces is to consist of

Infantry of the line, 8 regiments, each .	1,659
Battalions, Light Infantry, 4	846
Cavalry, 4 regiments	453
Making a total of	18,468 troops.

These are old regiments, which have been garrisoned in the three provinces; but many of the officers are gone to the Brazils, and others, with many privates, have entered the corps raised by the French, so that two-thirds are new levies.

Sir John Moore arrived on the 21st at Figueras, where his landing is delayed until mules or draught bullocks are sent from Oporto, for which the Baron is using every exertion. In a PS. he adds that intelligence has been received from Coimbra of Sir Arthur Wellesley's victory on the 21st.

Oporto, August 26, 1808.

The Bishop of Oporto has signified that, if the British Government should wish him to remain at the head of affairs till the pleasure of the Prince Regent be known, he could only accept it under condition of remaining at Oporto, where, in that case, the rest of the temporary Government must remain, even after the French have been forced to evacuate the country. This the people at Lisbon will most probably oppose; but the Bishop is persuaded that the people at Oporto will not suffer him to depart from thence, and thinks that Lisbon, when the French leave it, will be in too much confusion for the seat of Government. If his proposals be adopted, he wishes that deputies from the other provinces should be sent to Oporto.

The jealousy subsisting between the northern and southern provinces is likely to present many obstacles to this plan, which would be warmly supported by the northern provinces,

where the people are proud of having first taken up arms, and are more warlike and industrious than the southern inhabitants, as well as more attached to the English.

The present revolution is the work of the common people, excited by the Spaniards, and brought into some system by the priests; and Baron Decken thinks that the Church alone can keep the people in order. The nobles are opposed to the Church, and suspected by the people. The Bishop is of a mild and affable disposition, without great knowledge or talents for business; but appears to be the best person to be at the head of the Government. Religious motives alone can actuate the Portuguese, as they have no attachment to their royal family, and no constitution to defend. Nothing can be done in Portugal, if their Government be not supported and directed by England; with which view the Baron recommends that a Minister of great experience should be sent from England. The Portuguese might contribute in a great measure to the defence of Spain; but, unless forced by Great Britain, they will form no regular troops, under pretence that they cannot pay them: their revenues will go to the Church, as well as the money from England; and Portugal will require British troops to protect its own Government against the disaffected. The Prince's return will be no remedy, but may even increase the evil. These dangers may be averted by the presence and exertions of a British Minister, which would be more effectual than the influence of a military commander, whose interference might wound the pride of the nation, and irritate the monks.

Oporto, August 28, 1808.

Alentejo and Algarve have sent deputies to the Bishop of Oporto, to whose authority a part of Estremadura has likewise submitted; and the whole kingdom seems to acknowledge this temporary Government, except Lisbon and St. Ubes. Those towns are still in possession of the French; but the Bishop is convinced that Lisbon, when evacuated, will oppose the Oporto

Government, and will be supported by the members of the former Regency, who are anxious to resume their power, for which they have already taken steps. Baron Decken thinks the opposite parties might be reconciled by adding to the present temporary Government such of the members of the Regency as have preserved their loyalty and the confidence of the people. To this the Bishop will not object, if it be proposed by the British General. Baron Decken has therefore proposed to the British General to make known, by a Publicandum to the Portuguese, as soon as Lisbon is in our hands, that he will consider the temporary Government at Oporto as the lawful Government of the kingdom till the Prince's pleasure be known; adding to it the following four members of the former Regency: Don Francisco de Noronha; Francisco da Cunha; the Montiro Mor; the principal Castro. These four have been pointed out by the Bishop as faithful to their sovereign. The Bishop should be considered President, which is less objectionable, as the President of the former Regency is in France.

The confusion likely to prevail at Lisbon offers a fair pretence for fixing the temporary Government, in the first instance, at Oporto. The Bishop sees the necessity of placing a British garrison at Lisbon; but, wishing the feelings of the people to be wounded as little as possible, he urges the placing some Portuguese troops in garrison there, under a Portuguese officer, who would receive his orders from the British military Governor, but might direct the police of the city; and he might likewise organize the military force of Estremadura. The Bishop is convinced that the Government cannot exist without the support of British troops, and hopes that 6,000 men will be left till the Portuguese troops are organized.

Oporto, September 9, 1808.

He has received a letter from Sir Hew Dalrymple, expressing some apprehension of the nature and tendency of his communi-

cations with the Bishop of Oporto. He observes that he has never been considered by the Bishop as an official character; that the latter has assumed more power than he had before the Baron's arrival; and that the Bishop's willingness to resign the Government is the best proof that the communications between him and the Baron have not been of a nature to interfere with any plans which Sir Hew may wish to adopt for the Government of Portugal.

Baron Decken requests to be recalled. The Bishop wishes to give him the direction of the organization of the Portuguese troops, but this he is desirous to decline, feeling his situation in Portugal extremely unpleasant.

Oporto, September 10, 1808.

In consequence of a letter which the Bishop of Oporto has received from Sir Hew, the former, conceiving that Sir Hew could not do otherwise than fix the seat of Government at Lisbon, wishes to resign his share in it, but will use his influence as a Bishop to support the measures of the Government which Sir Hew may establish.

Baron Decken regrets the Bishop's resignation, but thinks that the Bishop himself is not dissatisfied with the removal of the responsibility attached to his situation. The latter has sent an officer to Sir Hew with his proposals respecting the Regency. The Baron thinks that the people of Oporto and the northern provinces will be displeased with the Bishop's resignation. Some commotion has already taken place at Oporto, and the Bishop has taken strong measures to stop it.

Oporto, September 13, 1808.

Encloses a statement of the establishment and organization of the Portuguese troops. By this the whole force, exclusive of artillery, is stated to be: Infantry of the Line, 13,272; Light Infantry, 3,384; Cavalry, 1,812; Militia, 19,200; and this force, supposed to be fit for service, was to be divided into three parts, viz.:—

1. A corps of observation, consisting of Militia, 8,800, Line, 2,634; commanded by Brigadier Bacellar, blockading Almeida, and defending Tras os Montes. But of the troops of the line only small divisions have joined, and the corps actually consists of about 5,000 men, badly armed in general. 2. Principal army in Estremadura, commanded by Mareschal de Campo Bernardin Freire d'Andrade, to consist of 15,902 men; but, as many of the regiments have not yet joined, the whole army at present does not exceed 8,000. 3. Reserve, destined for the ulterior defence of the country, and to reinforce either the corps of observation, or the army of Estremadura. This reserve is to consist of 10,400 Militia, under Brigadier Parreirar, but the number armed does not exceed 600, who belong to different regiments of Militia, and are in garrison at Oporto.

The want of money, officers, arms, clothing, and accoutrements, has occasioned much delay and irregularity in organizing the troops, which has gone on slowly from the time that it became doubtful whether the Bishop was to remain at the head of the Government. The officers, too, who are superintending the formation of the army, have neglected to send proper reports to the Bishop. Nothing can be done till the Regency is established, and a certain plan made out. He has not yet been able to obtain any correct information respecting the artillery and ammunition.

Oporto, September 20, 1808.

Brigadier-General Anstruther has arrived at Oporto, from Sir Hew Dalrymple, to propose to the Bishop that he should be appointed President of the Regency.

Encloses the Report of Captain Heiliger, whom Baron Decken had sent to examine the provinces of Tras os Montes and Entre Minho y Douro. The former province Captain Heiliger describes to be defended by two chains of mountains running from north to south, and by the Tamega, which forms the frontier of Gallicia, and has a deep channel. The roads are generally uneven and narrow, passable only by mules.

The province is destitute of fortresses, but seems, from its situation, to be capable of an easy defence, for which purpose Captain Heiliger offers a plan.

The few cavalry which Captain Heiliger saw in the two provinces were tolerably mounted, but indifferently armed and accoutred. The Militia were, the greater part of them, neither armed nor clothed; and the volunteers wear their peasant's dress, armed partly with guns, partly with pikes. Magazines are established, and commissaries appointed to supply them. The breed of horses is indifferent in both provinces; the mules good and easy to procure. Bullocks are generally used for draught, and may be easily supplied: those of Tras os Montes are of most excellent quality. There are good sheep, swine, and goats, in abundance.

The country is better calculated for defensive than offensive warfare; it is mountainous, but Entre Minho y Douro is well cultivated and peopled. Tras os Montes is rocky, thinly peopled, and indifferently cultivated. The valleys are well wooded. The lower orders and clergy are much attached to the old Government. The noblesse are chiefly absent in the Brazils, or at Lisbon, and seem little interested in the cause of the country. The climate is colder than in the South, though healthy. The winter sets in in November, and is attended with heavy rains, which make the roads nearly impassable. Both provinces abound with water.

Oporto, September 25, 1808.

The Bishop of Oporto, having been informed by Sir Hew Dalrymple that he has been elected a member of the Regency, has thought it his duty to accept the appointment; he apprehends that the members of the new Regency will be against him; but flatters himself that he shall have Sir Hew's support, if necessary, especially if, after some time, he should wish to resign, which he thinks probable. The Bishop's appointment will have a great effect towards reconciling the inhabitants of the North to the new Regency.

London, November 25, 1808.

Encloses an estimate of the expense of a Portuguese army of 10,000 men for 365 days, including pay to officers and men, and of the number of rations required for men and horses. The former he calculates would amount to £113,443 14*s.* 1½*d.* sterling. Encloses also some military memorandums respecting Portugal, under the following heads:—

1. Organization of the Portuguese army: with respect to which he thinks, from the jealousy already excited, the British Government ought to interfere as little as possible. The Portuguese Government intends to form the army on the same establishment as it was before; but he thinks, considering their wants, it would be advisable to reduce the regiments to half the number. He recommends a subsidy for that part only of the Portuguese troops which will act in Spain. He believes the revenues of Portugal (which have always been carefully concealed) could maintain 25,000 regulars and 30,000 militia; and he recommends that, if money be granted to them, it should not be under the head of levy money, or for equipping, arming, and clothing the soldiers, but merely for subsistence to those who have taken the field.

2. Co-operation of the Portuguese troops in Spain: which he proposes should be effected by sending 10,000 men immediately to Catalonia, in English transports, to land at Tarragona. He points out the particular regiments which are in sufficient forwardness for this service, and mentions Brigadier D. Miguel Pereira Forjas as the best officer to command them. He thinks the Portuguese themselves would prefer serving in Catalonia to any other part of Spain, many of them having formerly served there, and he believes they would rather serve with Spanish troops than with British.

3. Arrangements to be made for the defence of Portugal. He thinks, while a British army is in Spain, 4,000 British troops, including some cavalry, would be sufficient for Portugal. Our foreign troops would answer for the purpose, but should

be commanded by a British General officer of high rank, stationed at Lisbon. The appointment also of a British Minister at Lisbon might do away the prevailing idea that England intends to treat Portugal as a colony. The British troops should chiefly occupy Lisbon, and the forts on the Tagus. The fortresses of Almeida and Elvas should be put in a state of defence. As the provinces of Tras os Montes and Entre Minho y Douro can be defended by an irregular force, the Militia there should be formed and armed immediately.

4. Supplies to be drawn from Portugal for the British army in Spain. Under this head, Baron Decken observes that bullocks, mules, horses, &c., can be largely supplied, as well as drivers; and a corps of pioneers and artificers might be easily formed; also, he believes, one of pontoneers. The northern provinces might furnish some cattle and Indian corn.

NO. V.

PRÉCIS OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM LORD COLLINGWOOD,

RELATING TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

Ocean, off Cadiz, June 17, 1808.

States that, on receiving intelligence from Sir Hew Dalrymple of the state of affairs in Spain, he left the squadron off Toulon, under Vice-Admiral Thornborough, and arrived at Cadiz on the 11th, where he received, on the 17th, Lord Castlereagh's two letters, of the 4th of June, addressed to Rear-Admiral Purvis. Since the temper of the nation has ceased to be doubtful, the Spanish leaders have altered their tone with respect to the surrender of the French ships to us, which they mentioned in their earlier communications. The French Admiral drew them up in the channel of the Caraccas, hoping that a part of the French army might make its way down to the Island of Leon. On the 8th and 9th, they were bombarded, and on the 14th struck, when the Spanish flag was hoisted.

The country seems to be unanimous in resisting the French, who are said to be exceedingly embarrassed by the want of communication between their armies. Lord Collingwood states the present form of Government in Spain to be very defective. The Juntas appear to be independent of each other, and at present their correspondence is difficult.

Lord Collingwood has informed the Spanish chiefs that it was his Majesty's command that every aid should be given them to repel the French, and desired them to point out how the British forces could be most useful to them. The proposal for landing our troops at or near Cadiz had before been rejected; and, as jealousy and apprehension with respect to our views appeared to exist on the part of the Spaniards, Major-General Spencer had acceded to a proposal of theirs to go to Ayamonte, to be ready to act as circumstances might require.

Lord Collingwood has opened a communication with Minorca and Majorca. The Spaniards had nearly 12,000 men in those islands, of whom a large portion had passed over to join the army in Catalonia, under a convention made by Vice-Admiral Thornborough.

The French have drawn some of their troops from Portugal to Spain: they have not more than 6,000 men in the former, where the people are animated in proportion as the French force is lessened. Sir C. Cotton has already pointed out the advantage to be derived from General Spencer's appearance on that coast; and there is no indication of much zeal in the Russians towards their allies.

Off Cadiz, June 17, 1808.

States that the Deputies from the Supreme Council at Seville have embarked for England; that he has urged that despatch vessels should be sent to the Governors of the Colonies, with intelligence of recent events, for which purpose he has kept a sloop of war in readiness; that the Council allows the necessity of this; but there is still some delay, which Lord Collingwood attributes to their correspondence

with the other provinces not being yet fully established. He encloses a letter from Captain Bradford, who had been sent by Major-General Spencer to the Spanish head-quarters, giving an account of the armed force in that neighbourhood, which consists of 12,000 regulars and three regiments of peasantry; stating also that the arrival of the English at Ayamonte has had the best effect on the minds of the people.

Ocean, off Cadiz, June 19, 1808.

States that Sir Hew Dalrymple and Major-General Spencer having both approved of the proposal that the latter should proceed to Lisbon, he has appointed convoy for the transports whenever the General determines to go, and will take measures for informing the Commanding Officer of the reinforcement coming from England of this proceeding.

General Morla and General Herrera have applied to him for passports for a ship of the line and frigate, to carry quicksilver to America, which he will grant. He has also granted passports without limit to vessels conveying supplies along the coast, line-of-battle ships excepted.

States that a Spanish gentleman, who had gone on shore at Cadiz for information, received an impression not very favourable to the talents of the persons composing the Junta. There being no accounts from Biscay, and unfavourable ones from Catalonia, (Barcelona being totally subdued), much anxiety prevails at Seville. Their wants are very great. The Supreme Council have requested a loan from Gibraltar, a subsidy of fifty or sixty millions of reals, and a supply of arms and ammunition, of which they are almost destitute. There is still a backwardness in sending their despatches to America. The Governor of Cadiz has addressed a letter to the Marquess de Romana, commanding in the North of Germany, which Lord Collingwood forwards, noticing that the Spaniards express great hopes that their troops in that quarter may be in such a situation as to enable British vessels to embark them.

He encloses a Proclamation, issued by the Captain-General of the Baleares Islands, and a deposition of the master of a Spanish packet from Barcelona, describing the attack of the French there by the populace and a few regulars.

Ocean, off Cadiz, June 25, 1808.

Encloses a list of requisitions of cloth, linen, horses, and mules, which he has received from the Governor of Cadiz and the President of the Junta. He will send an officer to communicate with the Emperor of Morocco's Minister, in order to obtain a license for purchasing horses, and will pay for them when bought.

Dupont's army is reduced to great extremity; the Spanish army advanced, but their head-quarters are still at Utrera. The appearance of the troops off Ayamonte had a good effect; 200 muskets were given from the ships; and the few French left in the small forts, being abandoned, surrendered to the peasantry.

The winds have been unfavourable to General Spencer getting round Cape St. Vincent. Sir C. Cotton still urges that measure. Lord Collingwood encloses a letter he has received from General Castaños on the subject of the employment of our army, with his lordship's answer, in which he lays great stress on the advantages to be expected from General Spencer's appearance off Lisbon. He has ordered ships off Barcelona to cut off the communication with France by sea, and expects that the troops left in Monjuich will surrender. Two Spanish vessels have sailed for Rio de la Plata and La Vera Cruz with despatches. As vessels from America are still exposed to capture, he has requested the Governor of Cadiz to use precaution for preventing the risk, as well as to prevent vessels sailing from the Canaries.

26th June. The Sabrina sloop has sailed with three officers for the Caraccas and Carthagena; also, a manifesto to be distributed in the colonies. Lord Collingwood encloses one of

them, with a political tract published at Cadiz. The Volontaire is gone to Barbary, for the license for the horses and mules. He forwards more letters to the Marquess de Romana and his officers, for whom the Spaniards express great anxiety. Transmits a copy of the proposals made by Vice-Admiral Thornborough to the Governor of the Baleares, with the answer, and a copy of a letter to the latter from Lord Collingwood. Also a letter from Major Cox, stating that the proposed movement of the British troops to Lisbon was approved by the Junta, and detailing the proceedings of the Spanish army against Dupont, who was attempting to recross the Sierra Morena.

Ocean, off Cadiz, June 28, 1808.

States that the Portuguese have risen against the few French remaining at Faro, who surrendered without much opposition. A Junta has been formed at Faro, of which the Bishop is president; they have requested troops and arms from Lord Collingwood, who encloses their letter and his answer, in which he has referred them to Sir Hew Dalrymple. Major-General Spencer, having gone on to Lisbon before the troops found the enemy in such force as made any attempt upon them hopeless, has therefore returned, and part of the transports are gone to water at Cadiz.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 3, 1808.

States that Major-General Spencer, having consulted with the Governor of Cadiz, had settled that all the troops should go into that port, and such as could have barracks be landed at Port St. Mary, where the General will wait until Sir A. Wellesley's arrival. The Spaniards seem equally averse to our holding any important garrison, or taking the field with them: and, on learning that Lord Collingwood intended to propose that their fleet should join his Majesty's squadron whenever the movements of the enemy should render it necessary, they ordered their ships to the upper part of the harbour, and began to dismantle them. On this subject, he encloses letters from

Father Gil and the Governor of Cadiz, and from himself to Major Cox, the Governor, and the President Saavedra. Lord Collingwood attributes this extraordinary movement not to their want of funds to maintain their navy (which the Governor assigns as the reason), nor to any want of confidence in us, but to a feeling that they are not acknowledged as the Supreme Council of the nation. They refer Lord Collingwood to the Commander at Carthagena, to whom he has written a letter, of which he encloses a copy.

He transmits a paper from Badajoz, giving an account of a battle, said to have been fought on the 16th June near Saragossa, in which the French army in that quarter is said to have been annihilated. He encloses a letter from the Emperor of Morocco's Minister, and has not much hope of being able to purchase the horses required, as the Mahometan religion forbids them to be sold to Christians. It seems, however, that, if Ceuta could be given up to him, (of which Lord Collingwood sees no prospect) the Emperor would furnish not only horses, but whatever else his country produced.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 7, 1808.

Encloses a letter from General Morla, with intelligence of the success of the army and peasantry of Catalonia and Valencia, who have repulsed the army under Marshal Moncey, with great loss, and routed General Legi near Barcelona. The inhabitants of Roussillon have joined the Catalonians. Dupont expects reinforcements at Anduxar, but General Castaños means to attack him, and has requested that General Spencer should take a position at Xeres, which he means to do with part of his forces. The want of horses prevents his moving the whole. He encloses two intercepted letters from Junot at Lisbon, one to Buonaparte, the other to Murat: he thinks they were meant for deception, and that Junot is about to abandon Lisbon, either for Madrid, or to reinforce Dupont.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 12, 1808.

Encloses a letter from the Supreme Council (received from

Cadiz), stating that the want of money and stores was the only reason for dismantling their ships, which, in consequence of Lord Collingwood's letter, they have now resolved to be fitted, depending on the assistance of England to do it. Lord Collingwood is satisfied with the stop put to the dismantling of them until affairs are more advanced; as he thinks the expence of maintaining them will be more than adequate to their services.

The southern provinces are importunate for arms, ammunition, and money. In the North, the armies are active and successful: the pass of Figueras is in possession of the Spaniards. The French hold Barcelona, but their reinforcements have been cut off. He will apply for two of the Spanish ships at Minorca, to join in sustaining our frigates on that coast. General Spencer, for want of horses to draw his cannon, has not advanced beyond Port St. Mary; and General Morla does not seem anxious that he should do so.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 15, 1808.

The demand for arms, &c., being every where urgently made, he has directed the ships on the eastern coast to supply them as far as they can, and has written to Sir Alexander Ball for 2,000 muskets, and to the Governor of Majorca to employ the forges in the islands in making pikes for the peasantry of Valencia and Catalonia. By the best accounts, it seems that the enemy in the whole Peninsula do not exceed 60,000, about 40,0000 having fallen.

General Spencer, with part of his forces intended for Xeres, is still at Port St. Mary; the rest on board the transports. By late accounts, it appears that Figueras is not absolutely in possession of the Spaniards, but expected to be so.

He has sent Sir C. Cotton a communication from Mr. Brande at Magdalene Islands, that the French Government had seized on all Russian vessels in Italy; that the two Russian ships at Toulon were unrigged in the inner harbour; and

that a report was current in Italy of hostilities between Russia and France. And he has proposed to Sir C. Cotton to open a correspondence with Admiral Siniavin, giving him this information.

On the 11th, General Castaños was preparing to attack the enemy the next day. Some of his officers have been arrested, and sent to Seville. The war is supported by the common people, instigated by the clergy. Amongst the higher orders there are many doubtful characters. The Marquess de la Solana, just before his death, convened a council of nine general officers at Cadiz, who (except one) gave their opinion that no resistance should he made to the French. General Morla was of the number, as well as some who are now in Castaños' army.

Encloses a copy of an application from the merchants for a packet between Cadiz and England, and some papers relating to Valencia, and the instructions to Rear-Admiral Martin for supplying arms to the Valencians, &c.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 17, 1808.

States that he has assured the southern provinces they may expect supplies of money, arms, and ammunition, and suggests that a person should be appointed to manage his accounts with the Treasury.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 21, 1808.

States that Dupont and 12,000 men have surrendered as prisoners of war on the 26th.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 24, 1808.

Gives further particulars of Dupont's surrender, as well as of the capitulation of General Bedel and 5,000 men, about to reinforce Dupont. The latter are to be sent to Rochefort in Spanish vessels, carrying away their arms. Mentions a report that Admiral Valdez has been murdered by the people in his way to Madrid; and encloses a list of the persons who composed the Marquess de Solana's council, noticed in his letter of the 15th.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 25, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 7th of June, and replies to his instructions on the subject of occupying an island in the Archipelago, and of entering the Black Sea. Encloses a letter from Captain Whittingham, detailing the operations against Dupont and Bedel, with the terms on which they respectively capitulated; also a letter from Captain Stewart, on Turkish affairs.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 25, 1808.

From the delay likely to take place before supplies of money can arrive from England, he has been induced to request Sir Hew Dalrymple to raise £20,000 at Gibraltar, for the Government of Seville.

Ocean, July 25, 1808.

Encloses a letter from the Junta of Seville, with one written in July, 1805, by the Prince of Peace, to the Governor of the Spanish settlement of Melilla, in Africa, proposing to support a chief, called Ali Beck, in his rebellion against the Emperor of Morocco. Lord Collingwood also encloses a copy of his letter to Major Cox, suggesting the good policy of avoiding measures which would make an enemy of the Emperor.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 29, 1808.

He had understood that only Bedel's division was to be carried to France; but now it appears that all the French, above 16,000, are to go; Bedel's division keeping their arms. He encloses a copy of the capitulation, and comments on the impolicy of its terms. It has caused much agitation, and he understands that the Junta at Seville disapprove of it entirely, though they do not think it proper to make such declaration. He transmits an extract of a letter on this subject from Major Cox, enclosing a confidential letter on this subject.

He has told the Junta that he will aid them in fitting their transports, but cannot allow them to pass on the sea without instructions from home. He has, moreover, observed that, as

they have not the means of sending the enemy to Rochefort, the obligation to do it ceases.

The Spanish army will not proceed immediately to Madrid, for want of arrangements and equipage, particularly canteens. He encloses a copy of his letter to General Morla, relative to the conveyance of the troops; also a plan of the position of the Spanish and French forces, when the latter surrendered.

Ocean, off Cadiz, July 29, 1808.

Mentions that he has heard that, after Dupont's surrender, General Castaños proposed to the Count de Tilly to advance and get possession of Madrid, in co-operation with the Gallician army, and to procure the Cortes to be assembled, and a Council of Government formed for Spain; but that the Count de Tilly opposed this, suggesting that their care should be Andalusia and Portugal, and leave the rest of Spain to take care of themselves, without embarrassing themselves with Cortes or Princes. Castaños desired Captain Whittingham to mention this to Sir Hew Dalrymple; Lord Collingwood not liking to write on the subject.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 4, 1808.

States that his objections to the transporting of the French troops had been well received by the Spaniards, who were glad that a difficulty was started. A council of general officers is assembled at Seville, to arrange future proceedings. He learns from Admiral Martin that the eastern provinces are in great want of arms, and the French maintain themselves in Catalonia, and have relieved Figueras. A great part of the garrison of the Balearic Islands had passed over to the Continent, and the Marquess de Palacio was gone to command in Catalonia. He has received from Gibraltar about 55,000 dollars, which he shall supply to the Spanish Governor.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 6, 1808.

He believes the Spaniards are satisfied as to the views of

the British Government. He hopes that the supply of arms for Catalonia and Valencia will be sent *direct*, as their wants are urgent. The Emperor of Morocco has refused the Spaniards mules as well as horses. The Dey of Algiers has applied for naval stores, but, as his ships are to cruise against those provinces which we are protecting, Lord Collingwood has recommended the Consul civilly to represent that we have not the means of furnishing what he requires. The Phœbe frigate is ordered to receive Sir Hew Dalrymple.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 11, 1808.

States that Cuesta has beat the French in an action which lasted four days, ending on the 18th July. Joseph Buonaparte arrived at Madrid on the 20th, and quitted it on the 31st, with all the French there and those attached to them, and with such valuable effects as were portable. On the 3rd August, Castaños received a message from Grouchy, the French commandant, wishing him to occupy Madrid, preserve order, and protect the French sick. Don Pedro Cevallos, who returned from Bayonne with Joseph Buonaparte, remains at Madrid, and has proposed the assembling of the Cortes.

The French have left the cannon uninjured at Madrid, and are marching towards Segovia, perhaps to join Bessières. At Seville and Cadiz there is abundance of cannon, but no disposition to send them to Valencia or Catalonia, where they are much wanted. Lord Collingwood pressed this on General Morla without effect.

The Junta of Seville have disavowed claiming any superiority in an Address which is enclosed. He has given General Morla passports for the French Admiral and some other officers. The General has also applied for two ships of war, to go to the West Indies for money.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 14, 1808.

Sir Hew Dalrymple has informed him that the Duke of Orleans, with Prince Leopold of Sicily, has arrived at Gibraltar, with a view to make some proposal to the Junta of Seville as

to a Regency. Fearing that this intelligence might countenance suspicions unfavourable to the British Government, he has written to the President of the Junta at Seville and the Governor-General of the province, announcing that the arrival of the Princes was unexpected by Sir Hew Dalrymple and himself; and requesting to know whether it was in consequence of any correspondence of the Junta with the Court of Palermo.

He encloses General Morla's answer, stating that he is uninformed on the subject, but is inclined to doubt that the Junta had any knowledge or share in the step which the Princes have taken. Lord Collingwood has been informed by Sir Hew Dalrymple (in his way to Portugal) that the Duke of Orleans is to proceed to England, and the Prince to return to Palermo as soon as a ship is appointed to convey him: but, as some of the Queen of Sicily's councillors are in the suite of the latter, Lord Collingwood is not without fear that they will, from Gibraltar, make proposals to the Junta.

General Reding, with the army of Granada, is said to have advanced towards Madrid, and the Andalusian army to have three weeks' leave of absence, to recover from the fatigues of the campaign at their houses.

Dupont and some French officers have been brought to Port St. Mary's, to embark: the mob attacked them, and took away their plunder. Dupont, after being wounded in the head, escaped to a Spanish ship.

A number of Spanish vessels are said to have sailed from the Bay, with Joseph Buonaparte's despatches to the different colonies, bearing Spanish colours, but with an eagle instead of the lion.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 16, 1808.

Encloses a letter from the President Saavedra, stating that the Junta knew nothing of Prince Leopold's voyage to Gibraltar. Lord Collingwood has seen the Duke of Orleans, who expressed his desire to stay there to support the views of Prince Leopold; but, Lord Collingwood having stated to him that

it was impossible any propositions could go to Spain from the ships or garrison without the directions of his Majesty's Government, at the same time representing the impolicy and inutility of making any such proposals to a provincial Junta, the Duke seemed satisfied with this reasoning, and resolved to proceed to England.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 16, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 28th July, received by the vessel which has brought Mr. Consul Duff and the money for the Spanish Government at Seville. He had already written to General Morla, recommending him, in order to reduce the expences, that the ships should be dismantled, which the Governor meant to do. He believes that the transports already sent will be sufficient for embarking Sir John Stuart's troops.

Ocean, off Cadiz, August 16, 1808.

He has been informed by Major Cox that General Reding had proceeded to the northward of the Sierra Morena, and that Castaños meant to go to Madrid, to meet Cuesta and the Valencian General, and with them settle some plan of general operation.

The French force has increased in Arragon, and Lord Collingwood has great apprehensions for Catalonia, where there is a great want of cannon, which the Junta of Seville and Governor of Cadiz will not supply. He learns from Major Cox that, Granada having refused to acknowledge the authority of the Junta of Seville, it had been determined by a majority of the latter that the army of Andalusia should be sent to Granada, to reduce it to obedience; but General Castaños (who was present, though not a member) warmly and resolutely refused to employ his army against the subjects of the King, or for carrying on a civil war between the provinces; asserting that it was not the army of Andalusia, but part of the army of Spain, assembled to expel the invaders of their country. Before the debate, it was said that the Andalusian army was not

to pass the mountains. Now, the Junta only style themselves the Supreme Junta of Government, "Spain and the Indies" being left out.

NO. VI.

PRÉCIS OF DESPATCHES FROM SIR HARRY BURRARD.

Audacious, St. Helen's, July 29, 1808.

He has not yet decided whether he shall proceed in a light vessel to Oporto, or send thither a confidential person to collect information.

Audacious, off Falmouth, August 8, 1808.

The convoy has been prevented from proceeding any further by contrary winds. One of the horse transports has been so much damaged by a Jamaica-man, as to be obliged to put into Plymouth, with thirty-six artillery horses and their drivers, which, together with the 1st brigade of German Artillery, and the detachment of the 36th reported to have been sent into Portsmouth, he is anxious may be ordered to follow as soon as possible.

Off Macera, to southward of Peniche, August 20, 1808.

Mentions his having quitted the Audacious, and proceeded in the Brazen to Oporto and Mondego, and thence to Macera, opposite to which anchorage he learns that Sir Arthur Wellesley is arrived. Brigadier-General Acland's brigade is preparing to land, and Sir Harry has no doubt that the Audacious and convoy have arrived at Mondego. He means to be with Sir Arthur Wellesley in the evening.

Macera, August 21, 1808.

This despatch is accompanied by a report from Sir Arthur Wellesley, containing a detailed account of the action, which, Sir Harry states, had commenced with the enemy previous to his arrival in the field of battle. He observes that Sir Arthur's disposition rendered it quite unnecessary for him to direct any alteration, and bears testimony to the great spirit and good conduct displayed by his Majesty's troops on this occasion.

Lisbon, October 7, 1808.

In consequence of letters, copies of which are enclosed, from Lord William Bentinck, he is preparing to march 20,000 men to the north of Spain in three divisions: one large column of infantry through Coimbra, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, upon Burgos, under Sir John Moore; the cavalry and artillery to join General Hope, already on the route to Elvas; and Lieutenant-General Fraser's division by a middle route, if supplies can be furnished.

In consequence of an application from Don Jozé Elola, deputy from Catalonia, he has granted him a warrant for £25,000, one-half of which he had received in dollars, and the other in bills, and has proceeded with them to Cadiz. The Catalonians have also been furnished with 13,000 stand of arms.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Lord Collingwood, containing an application from the Supreme Junta of Arragon for stores, money, and a corps of 10 or 15,000 men, to which he has returned for answer, that he has been obliged to employ the troops in another direction.

Encloses copies of two letters, &c., from Lord W. Bentinck to Sir Hew Dalrymple, dated Madrid, the 2nd of October, containing the particulars of several communications which he has had with the Spanish Government and General Castaños, on the expediency of concentrating the British force, their line of march, general system of co-operation, &c.

Encloses also a copy of a letter from Mr. Stuart to Sir Hew Dalrymple, dated Aranjuez, September 25th, recommending his using every endeavour to retard the execution of the capitulation concluded with the French, as far as it regards the departure of Junot's army, and assigning his reasons.

Lisbon, October 8, 1808.

Is making every exertion to detach 20,000 men, with the 18th and German Light Dragoons and a proportion of artillery, under the command of Sir John Moore, to whom he has trans-

ferred the superintendence of this service, and directed him to correspond with Lord Castlereagh. He will consider his command in future as confined to Portugal, and obey his instructions with regard to the remainder of the troops, and the detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons. It is probable that Sir John Moore will move the whole of his armament by land, with the exception of some ordnance and other heavy stores.

Lisbon, October 8, 1808.

Expresses great satisfaction with the appointment of Sir John Moore to the command in Spain. Laments that the cessation of hostilities was never communicated, until the account of it went home with the ratification of the Convention, and then in general terms, without explanatory reasons. He has taken up his head-quarters at Lisbon, for the purpose of facilitating an intercourse with the Regency and other leading persons, from whom he experiences more cordiality than he did at first.

Lisbon, October 15, 1808.

Transmits a copy of a letter and its enclosures, which he has received from Sir Charles Cotton, by which it appears that, on the arrival of the garrison of Almeida at Oporto, great dissatisfaction was expressed by the populace at the French troops having their arms; in consequence of which, and a suspicion that they had Portuguese property and Church plate concealed in their baggage, they were attacked by the mob, and plundered, in despite of the English escort, consisting of 200 men; that the effects which had not been searched by the mob were embarked and inspected by a deputation of Portuguese magistrates, but nothing found; that some few church ornaments, however, being contained in the remainder, the populace assembled in arms, to the amount of 12,000 men, with artillery, and, threatening to sink the vessels, obliged the Frenchmen who had been embarked in the night [to submit?] and plundered the transports even of their provisions, and of the clothing of the master and men; that the French troops were

afterwards disembarked without arms, and put into the Fort of St. John for security; and that the English convoy is not suffered to put to sea, the Government possessing no power to restrain the populace.

Sir Harry transmits a note, containing the particulars of an interview which he has had with the Marquess des Minas and Mr. Freire, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: by which it appears that certain symptoms of dissatisfaction had previously existed among the Portuguese troops, in consequence of having their pay lowered to what it had been before the arrival of the French, which, they urged, was contrary to the promise made them when they took up arms. He observes, that they made this claim with arms in their hands, and that the Government, being either intimidated, or convinced, at length have agreed to comply with it, although their determination has not yet been made known to the army. He is of opinion, however, that the insurrection was instigated by some dangerous people in the Junta, in which it appears, by a minute (enclosed) of a conversation between Colonel Donkin and Mr. Freire, that the Bishop is suspected of intriguing, to establish a separate interest at the expense of the Regency, to which he is believed to be unfriendly, from having refused to join it. The translation of a letter is enclosed from the Bishop to Sir Harry, in which the former is considered to write in the style of an independent Government on the subject of the capture of some Portuguese vessels by the Barbary cruisers; likewise a copy of Sir Harry's answer, expressing a wish that he should proceed to Lisbon, to take his share in the Regency, with the view to the restoration of order, which he considers absolutely necessary, even at the expense of delaying the march of the army into Spain. Sir Harry has despatched General Beresford to Oporto, with directions to march thither the whole of the six battalions now on their route to Almeida, in case of necessity. He will also be followed by a detachment of the troops destined to remain in Portugal, consisting

of the 40th, 45th, and 97th Regiments, and a brigade of artillery, to act according to circumstances.

He transmits papers, containing the particulars of several communications which he has had with the Regency, in consequence of the issue of an edict, directing foreign corn to be considered as merchandize, &c., which effected such a considerable deterioration in the value of the Spanish dollar, that great dissatisfaction was manifested by his Majesty's troops, who were subjected thereby to distress, and serious consequences were apprehended. It appears, however, that the representations which he made were productive of the desired effect; that an edict was issued, declaring the value of the dollar to be 4*s*. 6*d*.; and that the matter has, in consequence, been amicably adjusted.

He represents the difficulty of procuring waggons; as the officers who have received orders for the purpose from the Regency do not consider themselves authorized to enforce them; he fears, therefore, that the baggage of the army must remain on the ground, for want of conveyance, unless the system of pressing waggons is resorted to, which he does not think advisable, as it will only serve to demonstrate the weakness of the Government.

He has desired General Beresford to make a report upon Sir Robert Wilson's corps, which does not appear to be approved by the Regency; and he shall, therefore, direct it to be discontinued, unless the objections to it are counterbalanced by much advantage. The General states that sickness has been very prevalent among the British troops, and in some cases fatal. He has sent the 3rd and 50th Regiments, with Sir John Moore, in lieu of the 40th, which is in a very sickly state; the above to be replaced from the division expected at Corunna. He has just been informed that the Regency have ordered General Bernardin Freire to go to his Government at Oporto, and to take the command of the troops, and that they have written a strong letter to the Bishop, to invite him again to

come and head the Regency. He observes that the General is suspected of not being a well-wisher to the English, and that the Bishop is vain and easily led.

States that it has been thought best to compress all the ordnance and provision stores, now in many bottoms, into as few as will hold them; and he thinks it would be most advisable to have them afloat. He laments that it has been thought right to charge the allowances granted for bat, baggage, and forage-money, with the income-tax, and encloses a memorial, signed by himself and Sir John Moore, on the subject. He transmits a plan delivered by General Beresford to the Regency, for re-organizing the Portuguese army, but does not believe it has been acted upon. He urges the great importance of sending out a British Minister to Portugal, and states that there is good reason to believe that there is a strong French party in Lisbon and its neighbourhood, as well as in other parts of the country.

Lisbon, October 18, 1808.

Transmits the minute of a conversation between Colonel Donkin and Secretary Freire, on the subject of the riot at Oporto, together with the copy of a letter from Sir Robert Wilson, containing a detailed report of this affair, and recommending the General to send thither a corps of 3,000 infantry and 200 cavalry to preserve tranquillity. Sir Robert also strongly recommends, by any fair means, the removal of the Bishop and Major Raymundo, who commands the fort.

Encloses also a report from Brigadier-General Anstruther, of the evacuation of the fortress of Almeida, which was taken possession of by the British troops in the name of the Prince Regent, and afterwards delivered over to a corps of Portuguese, under the command of Major-General Botetho.

Lisbon, October 27, 1808.

Reports that Sir John Moore has left Lisbon, and that the only part of his army remaining are the Buffs and the 50th, who will march in a few days. Great difficulties have been

experienced in procuring mules, owing to the want of power and inclination on the part of the magistrates, in consequence of which it was necessary to resort to coercion.

Tranquillity having been restored at Oporto, he had altered his intention of sending General Stewart with a brigade to that place; but, finding the Regency extremely urgent that he should do so, he proposed to send thither by sea the 82nd and 97th Regiments, with a German brigade of light 6-pounders; and he transmits a copy of a note announcing this determination. The Bishop of Oporto has not yet arrived at Lisbon. Sir Robert Wilson, who has conducted himself extremely well, represents him to be attached to the British interest. Mr. Secretary Freire has represented the absolute inability of the Government to enforce the separation of the Oporto (native) garrison from that city; but that leave of absence and furloughs would be granted, and the corps of chasseurs allowed to remove to Viana.

Mr. Freire having hinted to Colonel Donkin the probability that the Regency would apply for money, alluding, at the same time, to the aids granted to Spain, the Colonel replied that the cases were widely different; that Sir Harry Burrard could not take upon himself any such responsibility; and that the Portuguese Government had better at once address themselves to his Majesty's Ministers in England. Sir Harry observes that the resources of the country are adequate to its expenses; but that the Government is so embarrassed by its own weakness, that, unless a Minister is sent out from England, with powers to excite the present rulers to a more decisive line of conduct, they are not likely to be of any service to the interests of Europe.

He has received an application from the Junta of Estremadura for a loan of one million of dollars, with equipments, clothing, and arms, to an amount nearly equal. He has referred the deputies who made the application to Madrid, and in the mean time has granted them a loan of 20,000 dollars

in bills, with 2,000 stand of arms, ammunition, &c.; and he transmits a copy of a letter which he addressed to the deputies to this effect.

States that there are three brigades of artillery on shore without horses, and recommends that a detachment of light cavalry may be sent to Portugal.

Transmits an application from the chaplains of the army, together with an opinion of Mr. Commissary Erskine thereon, and recommends that they may not be subjected to any deduction from their pay. Recommends, also, that a claim made by Sir A. Wellesley, Major-Generals Murray and Fergusson, and Brigadier-General Nightingale, for bat, baggage, and forage money, may be complied with.

He regrets that the Regency have refused to accede to a proposal from Colonel Donkin, for establishing a line of communication between the British armies in Spain and Portugal, by means of Portuguese dragoons.

Lisbon, November 6, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 29th ult., and will set out for England as soon as Brigadier-General Stewart or Major-General Mackenzie shall arrive at Lisbon, to take the command of the troops.

Lisbon, November 6, 1808.

Returns thanks for the obliging manner in which Lord Castlereagh has addressed him in his private letter of the 29th ult.

Lisbon, November 14, 1808.

He is fearful that Brigadier-General Stewart will not return to Lisbon for a week to come, when he will embark for England, and will reserve, until his arrival, any other communication, except submitting a report from the Deputy Commissary-General; on which he observes that a conversation was held by Mr. Secretary Freire, who, in a very high and peremptory manner, declared that the Regency could not deliver over or return the stores therein mentioned, without danger of starving: and he has every reason to believe that they do not mean to

allow them to be the property of the British Government. He states that there is a prospect of fair weather; that the army is proceeding on its march to Spain; that the convalescents are recovering rapidly, and the sick decreasing.

NO. VII.

ABSTRACT OF PAPERS RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL,

PREVIOUS TO SIR H. BURRARD'S DEPARTURE, AND TRANSMITTED BY HIM TO LORD CASTLEREAGH SINCE HIS RETURN TO ENGLAND, BUT UNACCOMPANIED BY ANY OFFICIAL LETTER.

Sir R. Wilson to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, October 11, 1808.

States the arrival and embarkation of the garrison of Almeida, and gives an account of an insurrection of the populace, in consequence of having discovered in their baggage some silk and velvet belonging to the churches. It appears that the rioters were joined by the artillery, and went the length of pointing their guns at a boat which was conveying some of the baggage on board, where they have insisted on its being searched; and Sir Robert is apprehensive that they will not be satisfied without disarming the French, and is under some fear for the lives of the people in the ships.

He observes that the order to reduce the pay has united the soldiery and the people, and that the views of both seem to be to transfer the seat of Government to Oporto; that the presence of 3,000 British infantry and 200 cavalry is absolutely necessary to preserve tranquillity; that the removal of the Bishop and of Major Raymondo, who is a popular favourite, and who ordered the opening of the trunk in which the velvet, &c., were found, being, besides, a man of extremely bad character, is very desirable.

Sir Robert speaks highly of the conduct of his corps on the occasion; and transmits a copy of a letter which he has written

to Brigadier-General Perreira, commanding the troops, stating that he has no objection to make any arrangement that may satisfy the public, notwithstanding there may be some deviation from the articles of the Convention; but that the lives of the French must be considered as a sacred deposit, and that any hostile attempt on the vessels under the British flag must be considered as a violation of the alliance with Great Britain.

Sir R. Wilson to Mr. Canning.

Encloses a copy of the preceding letter, and giving a further account of the proceedings of the rioters, who, assisted by the regular troops and artillery, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Bishop, the Governor, the magistrates, and British officers, compelled the French to disembark without their arms and baggage, and plundered the vessels of every kind of property whatever. Every thing is now quiet, and the Bishop, who has conducted himself extremely well throughout the business, has promised that every public and private satisfaction shall be made.

Sir Robert expresses his intention to obtain the removal of Major Raymondo, and to gain every information respecting the leaders of the mob; but is confident that the British must abandon the country, or send thither 3,000 men, with some cavalry. He states that the French behaved with great propriety, and are sensible that every possible exertion was made by the British for their protection and safety.

Sir Robert Wilson to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, October 13, 1808.

Enclosing a copy of the preceding letter, and stating that the mob appeared again in arms, and, in the most tumultuous manner, were proceeding to further acts of plunder, when the Marquess of Valladares arrived, with 1,500 Spaniards, by whose assistance, and that of the British troops and Portuguese Legion, the populace were again quieted. The Government

assembled, and an edict was issued to enforce due obedience to their authority. The French are in consequence to have their arms restored, and all property which is not Portuguese, and they are about again to embark.

Major Raymondo, whose conduct he thinks more indiscreet than criminal, has behaved much better, but Sir Robert does not think it prudent that he should be suffered to remain in the province.

Sir R. Wilson to Sir H. Burrard.

Coimbra, October 20, 1808.

Reports his arrival at Coimbra, and states that the order for increasing the pay of the soldiers, and for repealing that which diminished the value of foreign specie, has restored quiet, and that he does not think there is any immediate necessity for the presence of a British garrison at Oporto. He suggests, however, that the removal of the Bishop to Lisbon is very desirable; recommends occupying the northern provinces by troops from the South, as the regulars of Oporto, &c., are identified with the inhabitants, with whom they will make common cause, particularly under the commander who is expected, and who possesses neither the respect of the people, nor the love of the troops, and against whom the Bishop's partisans will always be active. He has hitherto been obliged to procure supplies for the hospital, &c., by personal favour, and has written to Mr. Erskine on the subject of money, which he recommends may be sent into the Duero by some ship of war. Authority to draw bills is of no use, as there is no negociation with Lisbon, and drafts on England bear a discount of from 10 to 14 per cent.

He has enlisted for general service, and without bounty, 200 Swiss from the garrison of Almeida.

Colonel Bathurst to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, October 21, 1808.

Reports his arrival at Oporto, where he found every thing quiet; but he understands that the plunder of the French was

only the outward and plausible pretence of the late commotion. The whole of the Portuguese regular troops took a part; and it does not appear that any of their officers attempted to prevent them. He found the Bishop surrounded by guards, and thinks he is too fond of this description of pomp and ceremony to abandon it for the more humble station he would fill at Lisbon—having sent a special sort of ambassador to the Prince, at the Brazils, with the supposed view of securing to himself the situation of Viceroy; having, moreover, assumed the power of granting military rank, and given Sir Robert Wilson that of Brigadier-General.

Colonel Bathurst observes that the clergy in general have taken the most active part in the late revolution, and have acquired an influence which they wish to retain: that the nobility are so weakened by the absence of those who emigrated with the Prince, that they can scarcely maintain their ground; and that there appears to be a disposition in Oporto and that quarter, said to be fomented by the Bishop and his friends, very hostile to the Regency. He suggests that a few British troops might possibly prevent any further disturbance, and thinks the Portuguese Legion may be as well completed at Lisbon as at Oporto; but is not aware that British artillery can be of any use there.

Sir Charles Cotton to Sir Harry Burrard.

Informing him that the French troops composing the garrison of Almeida were so completely plundered of all their effects by the Portuguese, that it has rendered them susceptible of contagion and disease.

Dr. Thompson to Sir H. Burrard.

October 29, 1808.

An inspection report of the French sick and wounded on board two transports, amounting to 148, whom he has supplied with the necessary medicines, &c., and recommends that they

may be allowed the use of bedding and a proportion of soft bread.

Captain Grant to Sir Harry Burrard.

Mary Transport, November 3, 1808.

Stating that 100 of the French troops on board are dead or dying; that they are in want of every thing; and praying immediate assistance, particularly that some of the sick may be removed on board of another vessel.

Major-General Beresford to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, November 3, 1808.

He arrived at Oporto on the 31st ult., and on the 2nd instant had an interview with the Bishop, who expressed a strong disinclination to join, or to have any communication with the Regency, stating that several proposals which he had made had never been noticed by Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had not acknowledged the Government of Oporto, and that the advice which he had given for continuing the Government of the kingdom at Oporto had been treated with silence and contempt.

General Beresford enters into a detail of the arguments he offered to convince the Bishop of the impracticability of such arrangement, and to induce him to join the Regency, which he reluctantly consented to do in the course of a month; but dwells much upon the opposition he shall meet with, and the little service he shall be able to perform. He has given public notice, however, of his intention to proceed to Lisbon; but General Beresford believes that his object in postponing his departure for so long is the hope that arrangements may be made in the mean time for placing him at the head of the Government. The General observes that the Bishop is fully devoted to the common cause, and that, notwithstanding he is actuated by personal vanity, ambition, and local prejudice, he possesses an energy which is much wanting in the Regency; that he has an unbounded influence at Oporto, where nothing is done which is known to be disagreeable to his Excellency, even by

the populace, who are still ripe for insurrection, and are kept in a state of hostility to the Regency by some secret means, which he fears are not greatly discouraged by the Bishop. He does not, however, think his Excellency would wish any other effects to result from their present temper than this show of affection. Under these circumstances, he is of opinion that it would be most desirable that the Bishop should proceed to Lisbon, and that a pressing letter from Sir Harry Burrard and Mr. Stuart would hasten his departure. He moreover strongly recommends the removal of the Portuguese troops from Oporto, and the arrest of the principal movers of the late insurrection, particularly of Senhor Raymondo, the Governor of Fort St. John.

Major-General Beresford to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, November 4, 1808.

He has inspected Sir Robert Wilson's Legion, which is about to undergo a medical examination, and to be established according to a regular standard as to age and size. It now consists of the skeletons of three battalions of infantry and one company of artillery; but he has recommended Sir Robert to complete one of the battalions in the first instance, and so each in succession. Without questioning the propriety of forming this corps, the General observes that his Majesty's orders have been acted upon at a very considerable expence, which will be entirely lost if a stop is put to its completion; besides that it would be disgusting to the Bishop, who considers it a measure of his own promoting. He thinks, moreover, that it might be made very useful, by the assistance of an additional number of English officers, but that it would be better without cavalry or artillery, the former of which he has desired Sir Robert Wilson to postpone raising. The latter is already formed, and proceeding in discipline. He thinks it probable that there would not be so much objection to the Legion, on the part of the Regency and other persons of consideration, if the choice

of the officers were not so independently left to Sir Robert Wilson, who, however, wishes his recommendations to pass through Sir H. Burrard, and their commissions are signed by the Regency. He has sanctioned Sir Robert's taking what recruits he can to complete the battalion.

Sir Robert Wilson to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, November 4, 1808.

He is putting his corps under British regulations, and has drafted about 30 men: 5 feet 3 inches to be the future standard. The artillery company is completed and well disciplined in gunnery, the greater part being old soldiers, who were sent from England, and commanded by a very valuable officer. Only a few officers of cavalry have been nominated. He trusts the Regency will grant permission for 600 men who are at Viana, and not attached to any regiment, to join his corps, and that he shall also be allowed to receive such men of the Marquess d'Alora's Legion as choose to enter, in which case it would be immediately completed.

States that the appointment of officers, according to the Portuguese regulations, always passes through the Chief of the Corps; but that he has always considered this an honorary power, having constantly received the Bishop's private nomination before he officially presented the promotions; and their patents are signed by the Bishop and the Junta.

His object has been to select for commissions young men of education, who speak English, and are connected with England; and, with a few exceptions, he believes he has secured the *élite* of Portugal, but still wants two Lieutenant-Colonels and several Captains, and solicits Sir Harry Burrard's nomination to the vacant commissions.

States the reason why he should be loth to wave the right invested in him, as Chief of the corps, and expresses a wish to remove it from Oporto, as soon as it is complete, to Viana. Applies for a medicine-chest and surgical instruments, omitted

to be sent out with the stores, and is anxious for a British Commissary, Paymaster, and Surgeon, to be attached to the Legion.

Observes that the corps is to have full Portuguese pay, and that 50,000 additional dollars have been sent out for its present expences. He trusts that the *étapes* will not be deducted, and states that the fidelity of the Legion, and its co-operation with the British, may be depended on; and that, whilst they feel a military spirit distinct from the Portuguese army, they begin to pride themselves on a martial system, which has been introduced without any rude innovation.

As it is not possible to procure any money under 11 ½ discount, he has applied to the Bishop and General Freire for £10,000 of the money sent out from England, on condition of depositing Treasury bills to that amount, and the discount, but not to be negociated until the British Government has the option of repaying the above sum at Oporto, or to the Portuguese ambassador in England. He expects that these proposals will be accepted, and suggests that an application may be made to the Regency for 20 or £30,000 more, on the same conditions. He is making arrangements for the reception of the British troops, whose quarters will be in the town and a convent; but the regiments of Oporto occupy San Oviedo, and cannot be moved.

Sir Robert Wilson to Sir H. Burrard.

Oporto, November 7, 1808.

The Bishop has ordered £10,000 to be issued on the terms proposed in the preceding letter, and there remains in the Treasury about £40,000 of the money sent out from England, which he thinks, by proper management, may be obtained for the use of the British on similar conditions. The Bishop proposes to set out for Lisbon within a fortnight.

General B. Freire offered to draw £5,000 from his chest, in case the Bishop had refused to advance the whole £10,000,

the greater part of which will be sent to Brigadier-General Anstruther. Sir Robert states that the barracks will be ready for the British troops, and that he has been obliged to draw for £600. He trusts that an arrangement will be made with the Regency that the Legion may be under the orders of Sir H. Burrard, as it will be impossible to conduct its discipline, if subject to the interference of the Portuguese Generals.

Sir H. Burrard to Colonel Kemmis.

Lisbon, November 1, 1808.

Instructs him to take the command of the garrison of Elvas; to maintain the best understanding with the inhabitants and with General Listé, the Governor, under whose orders he is to appear to act *to a certain extent;* to avoid interfering, with the British troops, in domestic broils, as much as possible; but to support the Government, if called upon so to do; to occupy Fort La Lippe with the 40th Regiment, and not to evacuate it without orders; and to make confidential reports of the state of the province and its neighbourhood.

Colonel Donkin to Mr. Freire.

Lisbon, November 1, 1808.

Pointing out the necessity of acquainting General Beresford with the nature of the instructions sent to General B. Freire, on the subject of the late disturbances at Oporto. Apprizing him that three British regiments have been ordered to Oporto, and the 40th, with a detachment of artillery, is about to proceed to Elvas, where it will be provisioned either by a British Commissary, from Lisbon, or by the Portuguese Commissary in Alentejo, the account to be settled between the two Governments.

Informing him that the heaviest complaints have been made of the disinclination of the magistrates to forward the British troops on their march, and particularizes the misconduct of the Juiz de Mora of Alcoentra; transmitting a memorial from

the Vicar of the Convent of Santa Cruz, at Coimbra, who has given every possible assistance to the army, and recommending that it may be complied with.

Colonel Donkin to Mr. Freire.

Lisbon, November 5, 1808.

Transmitting a demand from the officer commanding the French troops in the Tagus for the restitution of the arms, military chest, and personal property, stated to have been taken from the late garrison of Almeida, while marching through Oporto; and requesting that the same may be complied with.

Mr. Freire to Colonel Donkin.

Lisbon, November 6, 1808.

Informs him that orders have been given to inquire into the circumstances of this demand.

Mr. Commissary Rawlings to Sir H. Burrard.

Lisbon, November 9, 1808.

Representing that a quantity of stores, belonging to the garrison of Almeida, and for which he had given receipts to the French Commissary-General, had been removed without the least intimation, by the order of the Portuguese Government, having forcibly broken open the lock of a door where part of them were secured.

Sir H. Burrard to Mr. Rawlings.

Lisbon, November 15, 1808.

Informing him that he had referred the above complaint to the Regency, and would send a copy of this letter to his Majesty's Ministers.

Lisbon, November 9, 1808.

Minute of a Conversation between Colonel Donkin and Mr. Secretary Freire, to whom the former made an application for the release of a Mr. Baretto, a merchant of Lisbon, who had

been imprisoned by the Regency on, as he alleged, the ground of his having illuminated his house on the arrival of Junot, and of having shown himself a partisan of the French. Some papers are enclosed, to prove that this accusation is not well founded: but Colonel Donkin observes that he principally rested his application on a claim made by Mr. Baretto on the protection of England, under the 17th Article of the Convention of the 30th of August; but that Mr. Freire inveighed against that instrument in a very high tone, and in the most unqualified terms, declaring that it had given over the Portuguese bound, and, as it were, into the hands of the French, towards whom it had been fulfilled with scrupulous exactness, while they had been stripped and insulted in all possible ways; that it had never been communicated officially to the Government, and that they were not bound to acknowledge it; complaining of the style of a letter written by Brigadier-General Cameron on the subject; and, having intimated that the General Officer was not entitled to interfere in matters relating to the Government, declaring that nothing should induce him to consent to the release of Mr. Baretto.

Colonel Donkin proceeds to observe that Mr. Freire took occasion to remark more than once that England had come forward with her usual generosity to relieve her old ally from slavery, and had expelled the enemy; that the Portuguese felt every possible gratitude; but trusted that she did not mean to trample upon them by a Convention which exposes them to the cruellest insults, and which has been favourably executed towards the French, even by "connivance," while they have experienced all its severity; that Mr. Freire declared, moreover, in the most violent manner, that he would rather have died under their late slavery than suffer such indignities from a friend.

Being anxious to discover the true feelings of the Government, Colonel Donkin states that he did not interrupt Mr. Freire, for whom he was willing to make every allowance, more

particularly as the Portuguese had been cruelly pillaged, and the Convention did not put a stop to the French system of extortion, which was carried on after the 30th of August. He thinks, however, that what he said evidently amounted to a declaration that the Regency are determined to emancipate themselves from British influence, and to act as an independent Government.

It appears that the conversation passed on to the circumstance of the removal by the Portuguese Government of the stores transferred by the French garrison of Almeida to the British Commissary, which Mr. Freire justified, on the ground of their having been pillaged from the Portuguese by the French; and, asking whether the English were come to live upon them, and make them die with hunger, stated that with the stores in question they could not feed their army, in order to pay which the Regency were obliged to beg a subscription with hats in their hands.

Colonel Donkin apprized Mr. Freire that Sir H. Burrard would probably demand the restitution of the stores, which Mr. Freire, after renewing his picture of the extreme distress of the Government, hoped he would not do, as it would lead to the most unpleasant discussions between the two countries.

Colonel Donkin then asked whether, if Sir H. Burrard should give up the claim above mentioned, the British troops, who are suffering extremely for want of bedding, would be supplied with paillasses, and whether the barracks would be put into repair, for want of which their health is equally injured; to which Mr. Freire answered, that the Portuguese Government would do everything that they could—that they considered the British army their own, and were equally interested in its well-being; that the barracks were repairing in some places, and that furniture, such as tables, &c., would be put into them as soon as possible; that paillasses, however, were a heavy expense, which they would meet if they could afford it; but that, when payments were made on the part of the French by

the Commissioners for settling the Convention, the debts of the great contractors were discharged, while those of the smaller ones, such as would furnish paillasses, were left unpaid, and they are ruined; that, consequently, they cannot work without ready money, of which the Portuguese Government have none to advance.

Colonel Donkin states that he did not very well know what answer to make to these observations, and, therefore, merely reminded Mr. Freire that there were 500 ready-made paillasses in store. These Mr. Freire promised should be issued immediately; but, the order having been given for that purpose to Mr. Forjas, the Minister for the War Department, who is remarkable for his inattention to all applications from the English, Colonel Donkin observes that none had been delivered ten days after, and adds that, unless they are supplied by the Portuguese Government, it will be necessary to purchase at least 10,000 for the troops, who will perish without them. He concludes by observing, that he parted with Mr. Freire with much less cordiality than usual, after a long and unpleasant interview, in which it was manifest that that Minister meant to make a formal declaration of the feelings of his Government as well as his own.

Mr. Ferguson to

Lisbon, November 4, 1808.

An inspection Report of the Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, containing an account of the state of the transports in the Tagus, having on board the French troops, in the greater part of which it is represented that pestilence is making the most dreadful ravages, in consequence of the want of discipline, cleanliness, and even common attentions.

Sir H. Burrard to Lieut.-Colonel Trant.

Lisbon, November 7, 1808.

Instructions to renew the investigation of the claims on disputed property, under the Convention of the 30th of August.

Lieut.-Colonel Trant to Sir H. Burrard.

Lisbon, November 16, 1808.

Relative to a claim made by a division of Spanish troops to some cotton avowedly belonging to the French, by whom it was seized in the province of Alentejo, during the existence of the French Government in Portugal; but against which demand Mr. Freire protests, on the ground of its belonging to the Portuguese Government.

NO. VIII.

PRÉCIS OF DESPATCHES FROM MAJOR-GENERAL BRODERICK.

Corunna, August 28, 1808.

Reports his arrival on the preceding day at Corunna, where he found that the Junta of the province had established itself at Lugo, with the view of concerting measures with the Deputies from Leon and Asturias. He represents General Blake's anxiety for cavalry, of which he has not more than from 130 to 200 dragoons with his army, and there is not yet a sufficient cordiality of co-operation between the different provinces to enable him to supply the deficiency. General Broderick observes that there is no disinclination to receive succours, whether of infantry or cavalry, but considers it most desirable that the requisition should come from General Blake himself, in which he hopes to induce him to include the former. He is of opinion that infantry, in the proportion of two-thirds of the number of cavalry, would enable the British troops to act indepen dently on any probable emergency. He has directed Captain Kennedy to ascertain the different calibres of the Spanish artillery, and to communicate the same, and if possible to procure a set of rings through which they prove the shot. He proposes to set out for Astorga on the next day.

Lugo, September 1, 1808.

The provinces have been induced to send deputies to a

General Assembly, to be convened probably at Ocana, but with the express exception of Madrid as the place of meeting. General Blake has proceeded in person to Leon, and has sent forward a part of his army, but his head-quarters remain for the present at Astorga. No deputies have been yet sent or named by the Asturias; and the General fears that there is more noise and clamour than effective execution in that province.

Reynosa, September 10, 1808.

Reports his arrival at Reynosa, the head-quarters of General Blake, who, by having reached that position, has overcome all the difficulties, which rendered a reinforcement of cavalry so essential to his movements, and to which he is consequently more indifferent. General Broderick represents the plains of Leon and Castille as calculated, in a remarkable manner, for the operations of cavalry, and how much the common cause has been injured by the needless retreat and inactivity of General Cuesta, with the united assistance of whose corps and the army of Arragon he has no doubt that General Blake would have driven the French from their present position. He states that the French have 6,000 cavalry, very finely mounted.

General Blake means to take up a position between Bilbao and Vittoria, in the hope of accomplishing the liberation of Arragon, Alava, and Biscay. He has applied for an advance of £11,000, and General Broderick has taken upon himself the responsibility of recommending his being furnished with that sum from on board the frigate off St. Ander, on condition of its being returned into the general stock, out of the funds in the hands of the Junta of Corunna. He requests Lord Castlereagh's instructions for his conduct on future occasions of a similar nature.

General Blake has also applied for 12,000 pouches and belts, (the new levies being obliged to carry their ammunition in their pockets) together with 40,000 great coats. General Broderick

represents the latter to be absolutely necessary, as the Spanish army is not allowed blankets, and there is no doubt but the war will be carried on without going into winter-quarters.

The first division of Castaños' army, consisting of 11,000 men, has proceeded nearly half way between Madrid and Saragossa, on its road to Soria. Cuesta's army will be in communication with the left of this force; and General [Colonel] Doyle is gone to Saragossa, to induce the army in that quarter to combine its operations with the above.

General Broderick suggests that the port of St. Ander will be much more convenient for communication than that of Corunna or Gihon. He represents the army to be advancing in numbers and discipline, but has more faith in the good will than the manœuvring even of the Spanish troops of the line.

PS. Some prisoners just brought in state the French to be only 30,000 strong, cavalry included; that Burgos is occupied by 800 French, and that Lasalle is ready to quit the town, keeping his mules constantly harnessed to bring off his cannon. Captain Birch is ordered to St. Ander, to forward the arms to Biscay and Guipuscoa.

Reynosa, September 17, 1808.

He complains of a great want of communication on the part of General Blake, from whom he cannot procure frank statements, even of his wants. He attributes this reserve to a wish of the Junta of Corunna, on whom the General is dependent, to avoid an examination into the funds remaining in their hands, as they are desirous that the provinces which are the seat of war should bear the expenses of it, and that these, in their turn, should refer demands for money to those provinces which have received subsidies from England. He thinks it right to add that he has received the utmost personal civility from the General, whom he does not suspect of having any designs which he is afraid of bringing into view; but, under all circumstances, thinks it would be extremely desirable to

get the remaining money out of the hands of the Provincial Junta, and to throw the whole subsidy into some common fund, to be distributed under authority to the different armies, as occasion may require. In any event, he thinks it would be derogatory, as well as useless, to prosecute the objects of his mission any further, unless the General affords him the means of more confidential intercourse.

The army is on its march to Bilbao, and the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa will probably be in arms in a few days. General Blake has informed him that he depends chiefly on the country through which he passes for supplies; but that he has been promised biscuit from Corunna and Ferrol, with which he means to establish magazines near St. Ander. Being induced, however, by his conversation, to suspect that he places great dependence on the frigate off that port, General Broderick thought it right to explain that something very far short of a day's supply to his army might produce a famine on board the frigate. He is waiting for a communication from the General of the situation of his head-quarters, in order to join him, but has endeavoured in vain to procure from him the positions he means to occupy during his march.

Traspaderne, September 22, 1808.

He has had a more satisfactory conference with General Blake, of whose intended movements he gives a general outline. He is posted along the Ebro, where he is waiting for the 4th division of his army now at Bilbao, which place they have entered after a three hours' attack. In consequence of the want of cavalry, he means to await the attack of the French, who are strong in force, and have reconnoitred his posts. The Asturian army, 10,000 strong, is in the neighbourhood of St. Ander, on its march to support that point.

General Broderick regrets that the leaders in the Councils persist in employing General Cuesta in the command of the corps, which should communicate immediately with the right

of Blake's army, as no cordiality can subsist between these Generals.

Reynosa, September 26, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatch of the 31st of August, and states that the explanation contained in it perfectly coincides with the ideas he had formed of his mission, except that he had not conceived that there would be any objection to his stating directly the wants of the corps with which he may have occasion to communicate. He is fully aware of the necessity of some central point of application, but is afraid that some inconvenience will arise from the General with whom he may have to communicate being able to procure supplies by other means than those of the British General Officers commissioned to attend them.

He has only lately received any communication from Sir John Doyle, but has sent him instructions, and expects to meet him at Madrid, whither he is going for a few days, with the view of extending his means of intelligence, which he finds extremely limited at the head-quarters of the Gallician army. He gives some account of the position of Blake's army, the head-quarters of which are advanced to Frias; mentions his having written to press Major-General Leith to forward the 10,000 Asturians, for the purpose of maintaining Bilbao, until the arming of the Biscayans is completed; observes that the arrival of the liberated Spanish troops, who are all veterans, in the northern provinces, will constitute a very preponderating force; but that such numerous bodies, assembled in a quarter from which the French have designedly, perhaps, drawn much of their subsistence, will render supplies very precarious, unless special means are taken to secure them. He has, therefore, suggested to General Blake the necessity of establishing magazines on the coast, and has requested Mr. Stuart to recommend a similar measure to the high authorities at Madrid. He points out Bilbao as the most convenient port for communication in future.

Corunna, October 29, 1808.

He did not receive Lord Castlereagh's instructions to prepare for Sir David Baird's army, until after it had arrived at Corunna; but states that Captain Kennedy, to whose reports he refers, had taken every previous step for this purpose, which the shortness of the passage of the troops would allow. He observes that the embarrassments which at first impeded their disembarkation have subsided, and that the Junta shows the greatest disposition to provide for their accommodation on their route, and that all classes of individuals expressed their joy on their arrival.

Having determined on hiring, as the most efficient as well as economical mode of providing mules for the army, he has suggested the following terms to the different officers employed, viz., 16 to 18 reals per day for mules of burden in general, 20 for those carrying ammunition, and 24 for draught mules, at the rate of 20 to the dollar. The purchase of horses and of a small proportion of mules will come in aid as a secondary means of supply.

General Broderick states that the hurry with which he was obliged to pass through the country, to join the army of Gallicia, prevented him from furnishing any information respecting its nature and resources.

Corunna, November 4, 1808.

Forwards a despatch from Lieut.-Colonel Doyle, and gives some account of an action between Blake's army and the advanced guard of the French, near Zornosa, in which the latter were driven back with some loss. There is a good deal of desertion in Blake's army, from which the young recruits are returning home, discouraged by the hardships of the campaign. The French, moreover, have so completely exhausted Bilbao and the neighbourhood by their exactions, that the Spanish troops begin to feel a want of provisions, and Admiral de Courcy has taken measures for forwarding to that port a portion of those destined for the use of the army of the Marquess Romana.

States that Sir D. Baird has directed him to remain at Corunna, to superintend the disembarking of troops from England, to forward stores, and to communicate with the Commander of the forces; but trusts he shall be allowed to resume his former station, as soon as the cavalry have been forwarded towards the frontier. Captain Kennedy has been appointed to act under him in the same service at Corunna, as Assistant Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Corunna, November 15, 1808.

Reports state that the French have advanced beyond Burgos, and have cut to pieces a corps of 4,000 Spaniards. The whole of Sir D. Baird's army have left Corunna, except a part of the 10th Light Dragoons. Sir John Moore was at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 12th, setting out for Salamanca.

Corunna, November 22, 1808.

He gives some account of several actions between Blake's army and the French on the 31st of October, and on the 5th, 8th, 10th, and 11th of November; when, after various success and considerable loss on both sides, the former was obliged to retreat with not more than 7 or 8,000 men. The Marquess of Romana was at Santander, and expected to collect about 35,000 men from the remains of Blake's army, the militia of the province, the Asturian reserve, and his own dismounted cavalry.

Corunna, December 2, 1808.

Encloses three letters from Captain Carroll, containing detailed accounts of the above actions. States that, in consequence of instructions which he has received, preparations are making for the re-embarkation of Sir D. Baird's army, which, he supposes, has commenced its retreat: 140 sail of transports and store-ships have sailed for Vigo, and 32 remain at Corunna. The greatest part of the heavy baggage is on board, and the stores are embarking. Sir John Moore was at Salamanca on the 28th of November.

Corunna, December 4, 1808.

He is apprehensive that there will be a deficiency of horse transports at Vigo, and recommends the sending out some ships of this description to that port.

Corunna, December 9, 1808.

Reports the arrival of the Lavinia frigate with 1,500,000 dollars, of which 700,000 have been left at Corunna for the use of Sir D. Baird's army, and for the chance of being able to forward a proportion of them by land to Sir John Moore. The Lavinia will, if possible, land part of the remainder at Oporto, and proceed with the surplus to Lisbon.

General Broderick suggests that a further supply may probably soon be wanted, as there is a claim on Sir D. Baird from the Spanish Government for the reimbursement of upwards of $100,000. He mentions his having apprized Lieut.-Colonel Gordon that Sir J. Moore's army will probably want shoes and blankets.

Corunna, December 13, 1808.

Transmits a letter in the Spanish language, which he has received from Don Alv[s] Flores, Procurador-General of the Asturias, in which it is stated that the French cannot penetrate and maintain themselves in that province; that they have 6,000 men opposed to them in the passes; and that, if they should enter the province, the people will attack them *en masse*, to the number of 120,000; also, that the Junta are full of confidence. Adverts to the suggestion contained in the preceding letter, relative to a further supply of money; and observes that, under present circumstances, Sir John Moore will probably be obliged to draw his supplies from Corunna, from whence the greater part of the specie has been sent to Lisbon. $305,000 have been sent to the Paymaster-General, and $92,000 have been repaid to the Junta of Gallicia by order of Sir David Baird; so that there remain less than $300,000 on board the Tonnant.

Corunna, December 17, 1808.

Has just received an express, desiring him to forward all the money remaining at Corunna to Villa Franca; states that it is impossible to comply literally with this request, without protesting bills to a large amount, which come in daily from various quarters, in advance: after reserving, however, a moderate sum for this purpose, and for the eventual arrival of troops from England, he shall forward $200,000, when the whole of the specie will have been distributed.

General Craufurd's brigade and the Guards have arrived at Benevente, and Sir J. Moore at Valladolid.

Corunna, December 31, 1808.

He has received a letter from Sir J. Moore, referring to an application made to Lord Castlereagh for light transports to be sent to Vigo, and observes that the light horse transports which came out under convoy of the Venus to Vigo, to the number of 27, have been sent back; but that there are 10 sail of the line at Vigo, which will afford considerable additional accommodation to the infantry.

The want of specie is likely to be felt very sensibly at Corunna, and it is doubtful how far the money intended to be landed at Oporto can be conveyed in time to the present position of the army. Admiral De Courcy has sent an order for bringing the £100,000 sterling, which came out under convoy of the Venus, to Corunna, provided it appears to be destined for the army in Spain: but General Broderick fears the order will arrive too late, and, therefore, directed bills to be drawn on the Paymaster-General for as much money as could be raised at or below 5*s*. per dollar, from which he has not been able to procure much more than £4,000. He had hoped for authority to dispose of part of the sum consigned to Mr. Frere; but letters have arrived from his Excellency, directing it to be delivered over to the use of the army under the Marquess Romana.

NO. IX.

PRÉCIS OF LETTERS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL LEITH,

RELATING TO SPANISH AFFAIRS.

Gihon, August 31, 1808.

States that he arrived on the 23rd at Santander, where he found Major Roche, who had arrived at the same time. Regrets that an earlier supply of arms, money, &c., had not been given to the Biscayans, who seem well disposed to throw off the French yoke; to which, indeed, with very slender means, they have shown some resistance at Bilbao. At that town (which is open and unfortified) they lost from 5 to 700, and the French 300. The importance of arming the Asturias, Las Montañas de Santander, Biscay, and Guipuscoa, is very great, though he thinks that, in the two latter, which are occupied by the enemy, nothing can be done at present. He has expressed to the Deputies of those two provinces the wishes of Great Britain to assist them; but has recommended them to act with great circumspection, so as not to bring down the French unavailingly on their heads. He furnishes them with vessels for their return, and passports against British cruisers.

The enemy left but 1,000 men in Bilbao, after the attack, in consequence, probably, of Palafox's success at Saragossa, (of which he encloses an account in an Extraordinary Gazette) or the re-occupation of Burgos on the 21st; but it appears that some part of the corps has returned to Bilbao, where, on the 26th, they were reported to have between 3 and 4,000 men.

With respect to the province of Las Montañas de Santander, he has learned from the Bishop that five millions of reals would be necessary to be advanced to it; that there was no immediate want of arms or ammunition, but money was indispensable. This demand appearing to General Leith large and unnecessary, he wrote to the Bishop, requesting to be informed of the nature of the proposed expenditure, (of which letter, as well as of the Bishop's answer, he encloses a copy) and subsequently agreed to pay down 25,000 hard dollars only, stipu-

lating, at the same time, for the progress of the armament, and for the immediate circulation of a proclamation, which he encloses. He observes that, on his landing, he found the state of the public mind very lukewarm; the military force not exceeding 700 men, badly appointed; reports continually arriving of the intended approach of the enemy; and the Government principally in the hands of the Bishop, an active and apparently firm man, but without method, and surrounded by ecclesiastics. The frontiers, hitherto protected by 6,000 Asturians, under General Ballasteros at Reynosa, were threatened to be exposed by the return of those troops to their own province—2,000 had actually withdrawn. He could not obtain any information at Santander, of the state, strength, and position of the enemy; but, having despatched his aid-de-camp, Captain Hay, to General Ballasteros, he has received from the latter a report, (which he encloses) stating that the enemy, 30 or 40,000 in number, occupy all the country between Itaxo and Bilbao, laying waste the neighbourhood of the Spanish advanced posts; also describing the positions occupied by General Ballasteros' troops. He encloses also a sketch of the roads from Santander to Reynosa.

Having employed Captain Birch of the Engineers to examine the port of Santander, with a view to the operations of a British force, he encloses his instructions and Captain Birch's report, which gives an unfavourable opinion of it, and represents the batteries to be in a very bad state. There is another post twenty miles to the eastward, called Santona, which is reckoned the best in North Spain; and, considering it of great importance, he has sent Captain Birch thither.

Being informed by Colonel Doyle that 15,000 British troops were to land at Gihon, he left Santander (where every thing was in train of preparation) on the 27th, and arrived on the 30th at Gihon. The new modelling of the Junta at the latter place will prevent him, for a few days, from setting out for Oviedo; but he has, in the mean time, written to the Com-

mander-in-Chief, recommending that Ballasteros should be reinforced. He learns that 12,000 Gallicians and Asturians are advancing upon Burgos, and that Palafox will attack the enemy on the side of Navarre from Arragon.

Suggests the expediency of requiring detailed information relating to the future expenditure of money advanced to the Governments, and that clothing, shoes, hats, &c., whenever required by them, should be sent from Britain.

Oviedo, September 8, 1808.

He arrived at Oviedo on the 31st, and was received with the greatest respect. Nothing can exceed the gratitude of the province towards the British.

Mentions that Mr. Hunter had stated that he also was appointed to communicate with the Junta equally, in a civil capacity; but observes that no such instructions appear to have been received by that gentleman from Mr. Canning; and represents that much inconvenience would result from a joint mission, though he is desirous of taking every opportunity of consulting with Mr. Hunter, of whom he speaks in high terms.

In reply to a letter which he addressed to the President of the Asturian Junta, he has received a letter, which he encloses, informing him that the junction of the provinces of Spain will take place on the 10th of September, at Ciudad Real; describing also the internal government of Asturias as divided into 58 districts, and stating that it has now under arms 16,000 men, (all recruits, except 700) and to be increased to 24,000, when means arrive from England for supplying their wants. Of this force, it has been agreed that 10,000 are to serve out of the principality; the rest are thought necessary to preserve its internal tranquillity. The President concludes by representing the great urgency of a supply of clothing, tents, and money.

General Leith has not been able to induce the Government to reinforce the troops at Reynosa, which would defeat another

operation, which they consider more important, that of supporting with 10,000 Asturians the advance of the Gallician army under Blake towards Burgos; for which purpose the Asturians are to assemble at Llanes, which General Leith does not think an advantageous position, but states that it is too late to effect any alteration.

The Bishop of Santander has pressed him for a further supply of money, but without detailing the nature of the expenditure; and he has been informed privately that the Bishop has been paying off the debts of the province, incurred by a former feeble attempt at arming. He will endeavour, without giving offence, to prevent such proceedings in future, and has sent the Junta 25,000 hard dollars. He encloses his correspondence with the Bishop on the subject; also a letter from Mr. Dickenson, relative to the furnishing of provisions for the troops at Santander, on which General Leith does not think any thing necessary to be done at present.

He has written to the President of the Junta of Leon and Castille, to whom 250,000 hard dollars were transmitted by Mr. Hunter; but no account has been received of the expenditure, or of their army, if they have any.

He strongly represents General Blake's want of cavalry, from which he has already suffered greatly, having in vain solicited those with Cuesta's army, amounting to about 1,500. He therefore recommends that a force of British cavalry should be sent to Coruña without delay. He will be at Llanes when the Asturians assemble, and will try to spur them to exertion. Two of the Junta have been sent as deputies to Ciudad Real from Asturias: those from Leon and Gallicia have also set out; and he has urged the Junta of Cantabria to send theirs without delay.

He encloses a secret communication from the Bishop of Santander, relative to the prospect of the escape of Ferdinand VII.; but General Leith thinks that, if this were practicable, the indiscretion of some persons at Santander has already put the

enemy on his guard. He has, however, requested assistance for this purpose from the squadron, and the Iris frigate has accordingly sailed from Gihon for the coast of France.

In a PS., dated September 8th, General Leith states the arrival of the news of the surrender of the French in Portugal; and that he learns from Captain Carroll that the Gallician army is in motion, and will be at Reynosa on the 7th or 8th. He adds the report, which he considers doubtful, of a victory by Palafox near Calahorra, and mentions that the enemy have increased the garrison of San Sebastian to 3,000 men who are provisioned for three months.

Gihon, September 13, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatch of the 23rd of August, with its enclosures, by Captains Lefebre and Jones, and of the 31st, by Captain Pasley. Encloses a letter from Major Roche at Leon, by which it appears that a new Junta had been formed there, in consequence of the extreme unpopularity of the late President Valdez; that this new Junta had annulled the acts of the former; that, part of the 250,000 dollars advanced by the British Government being yet unappropriated, the new Junta had desired Major Roche's sanction to their laying hands upon it, which measure he declined giving any opinion upon, not wishing to interfere between the two parties; but he recommends that no further advance should be made to them; that there are about 9,000 men in arms within the province, 3,000 of whom were drilling at the capital, and the remainder divided between the armies of Blake and Cuesta; that Blake's army, 33,000 strong, chiefly of what *they call* troops of the line, marched on the 2nd towards Burgos, which was evacuated by the enemy on the 2nd or 3rd of September; that 15,000 men, under Cuesta, are at Valladolid; and that an extensive combined operation is forming at Madrid by a council of war, at which Castaños, Cuesta, and Palafox, are assisting.

General Leith has endeavoured, without effect, to establish a correspondence with General Palafox. He has succeeded in

putting the Asturian head-quarters in motion. The Captain-General and Staff have set out for Llanes.

He transmits a return of the army of Asturias, which amounts to 16,302 men. He has no doubt that, if necessary, and if they could be paid, it might be increased to 35,000. He transmits also answers to the Memorandum of Instructions entrusted to him by Lord Castlereagh, thirty-one in number.

He encloses Captain Birch's report concerning the port of Santona, with a plan, by which it appears that the peninsula of Santona is a very strong position, and, with some labour, might be made capable of defence by a very few men; and that the harbour is very good, even for line-of-battle ships; but the advantages and resources afforded by the peninsula are not to be compared with those of Santandero, and the anchorage is not entirely protected.

He also transmits letters from Captains Birch and Carroll at Reynosa. The latter states the present strength of Blake's army at 30,000 infantry, 100 dragoons, 36 pieces of artillery; but three-fourths of this army are new raised peasants. The army has hitherto been inactive for want of cavalry, which Cuesta, from private pique towards Blake, has refused to furnish. This want prevented Blake from attacking Bessières in his retreat from Astorga and Leon to Burgos. Captain Carroll adds, that Blake's object is to advance towards Miranda, there to occupy a favourable position, and thus cut off communication with France, cover Biscay and Guipuscoa, facilitate the arming of the peasants, and, when joined by 10,000 Asturians, (as promised) to distract with a formidable force the attention of the enemy, and co-operate with Castaños' army in offensive operations. The wants of this army are stated to be many, and there is a scarcity of bread; but, as corn is abundant, this will soon be remedied. Captain Carroll informs General Leith that Brigadier-General Doyle is at Madrid, with the Duke of Infantado, making arrangements for forming a general council The French army is believed

to be 40,000 strong, a reinforcement of 8,000 having arrived from France. Marshal Ney has superseded Bessières.

General Leith also encloses a sketch from the map, showing the positions of the armies, some extracts of letters received from spies, and an extract from a Madrid letter of the 7th, noticing the movement of the Andalusian army to support Palafox. Castellar's army, late Cuesta's, is said to be in motion towards Valladolid. He has no doubt that Asturias would be capable of defending itself, if its army and population were armed and organized; but defers sending regular answers to Lord Castlereagh's despatch of the 26th on this subject, till he can collect more perfect information. On one point, however, he speaks with decision: that the port of Gihon is one of the worst possible, and, after the present season, would expose a fleet of transports to the greatest danger.

On the subject of Lord Castlereagh's secret despatch of the 27th, he refers to the copy of a letter which he has written to Sir Hew Dalrymple, or officer commanding in Portugal, describing the state of the armies, and urging him to despatch all his disposable force of cavalry, horse or car artillery, and light infantry, to move on Palencia, where they will receive such intelligence as will enable them to give the most effective co-operation.

In Biscay and Guipuscoa there is again a prospect of resistance, and he encloses applications for assistance from those provinces, which have induced him to embark for Santander, with 7,500 stand of arms, borrowed from the Junta of Oviedo, and other stores. He has also written to Admiral de Courcy, General Broderick, and Mr. Stuart, requesting 25,000 stand of arms, with stores, to be sent off Santander with all speed.

From Castro, he learns that the French intend to maintain and strengthen themselves from the Ebro to that place, and to post troops along the whole coast of Biscay; but General Leith hopes they will not reach Santona, relative to which post he encloses a memorandum from Captain Digby, of H.M.S. Cossack, representing it in favourable terms, and as a much

better port, both for men-of-war and transports, than Santander, being easier of access, having more water and better anchorage. General Leith recommends the sending of the Spanish troops from the North, to rendezvous off Santander, where their landing, should no previous disaster occur to the province, would be of infinite importance, and where the accommodations are very good, and provisions easily obtained.

He recommends that shoes, stockings, hats, surgical instruments, drums, and camp equipage, should be sent from England instead of money; and represents that the governments of those provinces are most anxious for British troops.

Gihon, September 16, 1808.

Encloses letters from General Broderick, Captain Birch, and Captain Doyle. The first, from Reynosa, requests the supply of one million of reals to General Blake, to enable him to undertake the liberation and organization of Biscay and Guipuscoa. The second adds, that 15,000 stand of arms are also wanted for this service; and Captain Doyle details the intended movements of the Asturian army, and the measures necessary to be pursued, in case a British force should arrive, who are recommended to disembark at Guetaria. Under these circumstances, General Leith represents the support of the Spanish army from the North, or a British corps, to be most material. Santander affords a good point of debarkation; and he has already noticed the merits of Santona.

He encloses also extracts of letters from Mr. Stuart, at Valladolid, and other persons, by which it appears that Cuesta is moving to Segovia; that Castaños sends his cavalry to Burgos, and the rest of his army to Arragon; that recruits are levying throughout the country, and the French retreating; that the enemy's force is believed to amount to about 33,000 infantry, and 6,000 cavalry; and that 20,000 men in the province of Santander can be supplied with provisions. He has proposed to Mr. Hunter to send to Blake 100,000 of the hard dollars

intended for Asturias, and has shipped for Santander all the arms and stores he could procure. Suggests the expediency of the packets going to Santander; the communication from the line of operations by Gihon being circuitous. Requests a field telegraph for the coast, and shoes and clothing for the Asturian and Cantabrian armies.

Head-Quarters, Gallician Army, Quincoas, October 1, 1808.

The wind being unfavourable, he set out for Santander by land, having previously instructed Major Roche and other officers to examine by different routes the roads and communications in Asturias and Gallicia. On arriving at Santander, he learned that, on the 20th of September, the 4th division of the Gallician army, under the Marquess Portago, (near 5,000 infantry, four pieces of artillery) took possession of Bilbao, where the enemy amounted to 1,500 men; there was little firing, and no material loss.

General Leith, on this, proceeded to Bilbao, where, in conjunction with the Spanish General, he proposed a secret meeting with the Lords of Biscay; but the unsettled state of the province, still menaced by the enemy, prevented an effectual arming of the peasantry. He sent out officers to obtain intelligence, who reported that the Spanish outposts were extremely well posted, and that, without being fully apprized of his approach, the enemy could not attack Bilbao. Reports, however, having been received that the French were advancing in force, General Leith, in conjunction with the Spanish General, (who, he complains, has treated him with too little confidence and respect) made dispositions to cover the town for a time, on the principal approaches, as well as so untenable a position against a superior force might permit; and, if the enemy should prove as strong as was reported, the reserve to cover the retreat of the column after dark.

The enemy (who proved to be from 11 to 12,000 strong, of which 1,500 were cavalry) approached in three columns.

After firing a few guns, the Spanish column, perceiving the enemy's superiority, retired by Soroza, and made good their retreat. General Leith remained with the column till it reached Valmaseda, from whence he set off to General Blake's head-quarters at Quincoas. He found that Major-General Broderick was gone to Madrid. Blake was very communicative to General Leith, who received a most favourable impression of his abilities, coolness, and intelligence. Blake stated the enemy's forces (exclusive of those in Catalonia) at from 40 to 45,000, of which from 5 to 6,000 are cavalry.

Portago, when attacked at Bilbao, appears to have been ignorant of the situations of the other divisions of Blake's army, supposing them to be at a greater distance from him than they actually were; and Ney, by quitting his position to cut off the 4th division, (in which he miserably failed) left the right and left wing of the French army disjointed, and the latter exposed to the combined attack of Palafox, Castaños, and Cuesta, whose effective force amounts to 43,000 men, while that under Moncey cannot exceed 17,000. As soon as Ney's movement was known, an express was sent to the Spanish armies, to press Moncey, and not to lose sight of him. Blake keeps some battalions to figure on his right, while he concentrates himself behind the mountains of Castille and Biscay, keeping well to his left, in order to draw the enemy as far from a junction between his right and left as possible, to give better opportunity for striking a decided blow on his left.

Blake intercepted Buonaparte's despatches from Paris to King Joseph, with one from the Commandant at Bayonne to Jourdan, stating that, from the 10th of October to the 10th of November, from 60 to 66,000 infantry, and from 7 to 8,000 cavalry, would enter Spain by the route of Vittoria; while, from another intercepted despatch, it appears that St. Cyr is marching with reinforcements by the side of Roussillon and Cataluña.

The Spanish soldiers, although without great coats, blankets,

brandy, or covering over their heads of any sort, endure the extreme severity of the winter without suffering much: they live temperately, and, in marching, are very superior to our soldiers. He urges the sending blankets, clothing, tents, &c., from England without delay, as well as rum; and he has again sent expresses to the officer commanding at Lisbon, requesting him to send everything disposable from that quarter with the greatest speed: 400 barrels of powder, aground when Ney occupied Bilbao, have, by great exertions, been saved. He wishes for two or three armed luggers, or small vessels, to attend him on the coast.

Encloses the Madrid Gazette Extraordinary, in which the General Government is announced. He has prevailed on the Biscayans to send Deputies, which has also been promised by the Bishop of Santander.

Santander, October 4, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 14th September. He has already arranged to send certain quantities of biscuit, rum, and salt pork, to the Gallician army. He understands that the enemy has not above 12,000 men in Bilbao, and that Ney is gone again towards Durango. The left of the Gallician army has its advanced posts at La Errera, a league in front of Valmaseda: the main body of the 4th division still at Nava, a league behind Valmaseda.

Santander, October 5, 1808.

He has taken the necessary means to supply the Gallician army, for the present, with rum, biscuit, and salt meat. Suggests that no local allotment of money, &c., should henceforward be made in the rear; as the armies near, and on the line of operations, on whom the fate of the campaign depends, indispensably require supplies. By his own and Mr. Hunter's exertions, the wants of the Gallician army have been in some measure relieved, principally by advancing to them money which had been promised to Asturias; for which step, under present circumstances, he trusts he shall stand excused.

The first division of the Asturian army has arrived at Torre la Vega, four leagues from Santander. The whole column of 10,000 is to proceed to Villarcayo, behind the Gallician right, where General Leith will attend to their wants, being near the line of operations. The regiment of Laredo will take care of the country from Valmaseda and Nava to Castro Urdiales, near which the predatory parties of the enemy have pushed, and from whence the powder landed near Bilbao was rescued with difficulty.

He has received despatches from Sir Hew Dalrymple, dated the 7th September; the advanced guard was at Almeida, and as Sir Hew had not received his letters, he is still at a loss as to any aid from Portugal advancing towards Palencia. The officers of his staff show the utmost zeal and activity. The baggage of Captains Lefebvre and Jones fell into the enemy's hands at Bilbao, where there are now supposed to be not more than 1,500 French, who cannot long subsist there. The retreat from Bilbao was very orderly and quiet.

Having insisted, before he advanced another shilling, that the Bishop and Junta should name Deputies to the General Government, they have appointed M. Cevallos the Minister, a native of that province, and the Marquess Cillezudos.

Santander, October 16, 1808.

The army of the Marquess de Romana is safely landed at Santander, except the troops on board of three transports, who landed at Ribadio, and are marching through Asturias. They amount to 8,671 non-commissioned, and rank and file, are very fine troops, and their arrival is of great importance. The cavalry are unfortunately without horses. He requests horses and saddles for 2,500 men. He has been able completely to arm the infantry, and supply the army with money, and he is expecting the arrival of orders for their movement from the Supreme Junta at Madrid. The Gallician army has again occupied Bilbao. No action of moment has yet taken place

between the armies, but their position must speedily produce something of interest.

Santander, October 18, 1808.

Encloses a letter addressed to Lord Castlereagh by Captain Carroll, dated Bilbao, 13th October, stating that that town was re-captured on the preceding day by the vanguard and 4th division of the army of Gallicia. The enemy, who occupied the town, (nearly 5,000) retreated at two in the morning of the 12th towards Durango, before any part of the troops could come up with them. Few of the enemy, if any, were killed in the pursuit; but a lieutenant, sergeant, and fourteen privates were taken—also, several stragglers. The Spanish troops were joyfully received by all ranks of people: there cannot now be any impediment to the immediate arming of the province. The French have been guilty of extreme cruelty at Bilbao: two sick Spanish soldiers, who had been left there, were publicly shot, by order of General Merlin.

General Leith, on learning that Bilbao was re-occupied, wrote to the Lords of Biscay, acquainting them that he was proceeding to Bilbao, with arms, ammunition, and money. He will expedite the march of the Marquess of Romana's army, and complete the arrangements for the reception of a British corps. He thinks that hiring mules of burden or draught will be the best mode of fulfilling Lord Castlereagh's instructions on that subject, the purchase being very expensive. He has, therefore, made arrangements for procuring 1,000 mules, at from 17 to 25 reals a day, according to the nature of the service required of them.

He encloses a letter from Colonel Murray, in answer to his letter from Oviedo to Sir Hew Dalrymple. Colonel Murray states that the great distance, the natural difficulties of the intervening countries, and the advanced season, must oppose great obstacles to the arrival in Biscay of any reinforcements from Lisbon; but every exertion will be made to prepare the army for so long a march.

He also transmits the copy of a letter from Captain Birch at Valmaseda head-quarters, who states that Cuesta is gone to Madrid, whither he had been called by the Deputies, who, it is said, are displeased with his conduct towards M. Baldeis; and it is reported that another commander will be appointed to his division, which has marched under General Gia for Berlangen, on its way to the Ebro. The head-quarters of the Andalusian and Valencian armies are at Soria and Taragona: that of Arragon had, on the 29th September, its advanced corps near Langueira, which is on the river of Arragon, opposite to Pampeluna. The Valencian army will be at Alfarro, Corella, and Tudela, on the 7th or 8th; and the Andalusians at the same time at Calahorra and Lodosa: the army of Leon and Castille follows the march of the latter, and is to file from Calahorra to Logrono on the 11th. Their ulterior movements are not fixed on, for want of a Commander-in-Chief: their present positions appear to Captain Birch to be too much extended. He learns the force of the armies to be—Arragonese, 22,000; Valencians, 18,000; Andalusians, 10 or 12,000, including 1,000 cavalry; Castilians, the same number, with 12 pieces of artillery. He learned at Burgos that the army of Estremadura was on its march to Madrid. He has just heard that Castaños commands the Andalusian and Castilian armies.

General Leith again represents the disadvantages experienced by the Spanish armies for want of cavalry. He has made great exertions to collect for them supplies from all parts, adverting only to their real necessities, and not to the provinces to which they belonged. Before he has granted any succours to the provinces, he has stipulated for their sending Deputies to the General Junta; but no provision has yet been made by the Central Assembly for the army or provinces, nor does he at present know whether they have the means: until they have, the absolute wants of the armies must be supplied from the British purse and stores with economy and method.

He complains that Mr. Hunter, without his authority, has

offered to the Central Government the stores which arrived in the Fortuna transport. He does justice to Mr. Hunter's character and motives, but doubts the expediency of his acting in a diplomatic capacity, and represents that, in the present instance, his interference has kept back the stores from the army, by whom they were much wanted. He urges the expediency of his being immediately furnished with means to supply the smaller but scarcely less urgent wants of the provinces, especially Biscay. If the difficulty of finding Spanish specie be great, he has no doubt that letters of credit on Spain could be obtained, or money might be obtained there by bills on the Treasury. He again notices the want of small vessels for co-operation and despatch.

Major Roche, whom he had sent to ascertain the routes from Leon to Coruña, and thence back by Oviedo, has been diverted from this object by a journey to Oviedo, whence he has been despatched by Lord W. Bentinck, to conduct the British army on its route from Portugal.

Santander, October 19, 1808.

He recommends the sending of supplies in kind as far as possible, not only because the articles are extremely bad in Spain, but to encourage our own exports, and prevent a drain of specie. Suggests that large supplies of oak timber might be had from Asturias, Santander, and Biscay, for the supply of Great Britain. He has also communicated on this subject with the Procurador-General of Asturias, who has undertaken to export any quantity required. At the port of Riba de Sella, there is enough for three ships of the line, which he could send to England, if desired. He has been applied to for sending back the transports returning to England, freighted with Spanish wool. Suggests that a person might be confidentially sent to survey the ship-timber.

Santander, October 31, 1808.

He has been occupied since the 18th, by making arrangements for Sir John Moore's army, furnishing supplies for Blake

and the province of Biscay, and by the daily expectation of the arrival of the Marquess of Romana.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatches, two of the 25th and two of the 26th September, with the copy of one to Major-General Broderick, all received through Sir David Baird. He has been much embarrassed by the non-arrival of the Marquess of Romana, who, as he has been given to understand, will be appointed Commander-in-Chief. Not the slightest notice was taken by the Government of the arrival of Romana's army, no supplies sent, nor any instructions. General Leith supplied their wants, keeping them in good humour with their own Government; and the army, though without any regular authority, has been placed at Blake's disposal.

He learns from Sir John Moore that he is making every exertion to move 20,000 men forward to the north of Spain. The convoy of transports has just sailed from Santander, for Coruña; 200 mules had been collected, and ordered from Santander, for Sir D. Baird's army: he has also taken measures in Asturias. M. Assiotti is too ill for the fatigues of service.

He encloses a letter from Captain Lefebvre, dated Bilbao, 25th October, stating that the Lords of Biscay have applied for assistance, urging their want of provisions, both for the army and the people; that the province is making great exertions for supplying Blake's forces: that a General Junta is to assemble on the 28th, to select Deputies for the Central Government, and to make arrangements for arming the province; when money will be required, as well as arms and ammunition.

Another letter from Captain Lefebvre, also enclosed, dated Bilbao, 26th October, states that he had been at Blake's headquarters; that the General expected a happy result from the meeting of the Junta on the 28th; that he pressed for supplies, and approved of leaving the arms for the present at Castro; that the Asturians are on Blake's right, and in movement, sup-

posed to be covering Bilbao; that Blake considers the troops at Santander, from the North, were not a part of his army, and would therefore decline giving orders to them, conceiving the Bishop, the Count de San Roman, and General Leith, responsible for them.

General Leith also encloses a bulletin, dated Bilbao, the 25th of October, by which it appears that skirmishes had taken place at Zornosa, but nothing decisive. General Leith adds that, on the 26th, the French retreated from Zornosa, without making opposition to Blake, who established his head-quarters there, while the enemy concentrated himself towards Durango. Reinforcements have since arrived under Marshal Lefebvre, to the amount of 8 or 10,000.

Santander, November 7, 1808.

Encloses a letter from Captain Carroll, dated Valmaseda, 2nd November, describing an attack made on the 31st October by the enemy, who had received very considerable reinforcements, and, by means of their superior numbers, forced the Gallicians to retreat, which they did with great regularity. Captain Carroll speaks in high terms of the conduct of the Spaniards, whose numbers did not exceed 17,000, while he estimated those of the enemy at 28,000. The retreating army arrived at Bilbao on the night of the 31st. No return has been made of the killed and wounded, which must have been considerable on both sides. In a postscript to this letter, dated the night of the 2nd November, on the heights over Valmaseda, Captain Carroll fears the retreat of the Spaniards is cut off, and adds, they must cut their way through.

General Leith, having heard that 4,000 of the enemy's cavalry had entered Vallarcayo, has concerted with Brigadier Caro (Romana's brother) and Count Villa Nueva de la Baroa every measure of resistance and reconnaissance which their scanty means will afford. He learns from the Commandant of Reynosa that his communication with Blake's head-quarters

was open on the 6th. He has taken every measure to prevent Blake's army from starving.

The fleet of *chasse-marées*, which he had sent first to Castro, and subsequently to Bilbao, arrived at the latter on the day of Blake's retreat. General Blake sent Captain Lefebvre thither, to encourage the province to give the army and people the supplies of food, and prevent their premature expenditure for undefined purposes, while Blake's army stood in danger. The Biscayans have proved sensible of the exertions of the British Government; and the arms and provisions in vessels in the river have been all saved from the enemy. He is embarrassed in his endeavours to supply Blake's army by the secrecy which that General observes with regard to his movements. He was preparing to send 2 or 300 mules to the British army, when Blake's pressing wants made it necessary to change their destination. Unless Blake was in co-operation with the army on the side of Navarre, which must have been badly planned, ill executed, or defeated, General Leith knows not what could induce him to expose himself, without cannon, to famine and superior numbers: he suspects his position was too extended. He suggests that a British Commissariat and Medical staff should be established for the Spanish armies.

Encloses a letter from Captain Jones, who has in vain attempted to learn from Blake the position of the Asturians. He was in the action of the 31st, and extols the bravery of the Spanish troops.

The Semiramis had arrived with a million of dollars for the Spanish Government, and 50,000 for Romana's army. He has prevented their landing, and has acquainted Mr. Frere with what has passed.

He encloses, in a PS., a letter from Mr. Aguire, dated Santona, 6th November, who has learned from an aid-de-camp of General Blake that the army, 30,000 strong, is in high order at Valmaseda. The French attacked them in the valley of Mina, but were repulsed with great loss and pursued.

Santander, November 11, 1808.

The Marquess de la Romana is at last arrived, and the Jupiter has brought a convoy, with stores, &c.

Encloses a letter from Captain Carroll, dated Valmaseda, November 5th, detailing the particulars of the repulse of the enemy that day. The loss of the enemy must have been great; that of the Spaniards is comparatively trifling. One gun, two ammunition-waggons, and a quantity of baggage, were taken from the French, besides several cars loaded with provisions, which proved very acceptable, as the troops had been almost destitute of food during a march of five days. Their behaviour in the field was, nevertheless, gallant in the extreme: 8,000 Asturians and 2,300 of Romana's troops are with the army.

Encloses a duplicate of Colonel Doyle's letter to Lord Castlereagh, of the 21st October. The Marquess de la Romana is appointed Commander-in-Chief; and he agrees with General Leith in the necessity of concentrating the forces, and proceeding on an entirely different principle of attack.

Encloses a letter from Captain Birch, R.E., who has been wounded in the leg at Valmaseda. Captain Birch communicated at Calahorra, on the 15th October, with Castaños, who had just arrived from Madrid, and took Captain Birch with him to Zaragossa, where he had a conference with Palafox. The result of this was, that they should unite their armies near Sanguessa, and act against the enemy, at the same time with the army of Blake on the left. The enemy has received a reinforcement of 12,000 men. Captain Birch encloses a statement of the numbers of corps in that part of the country, as under:—

Blake's	44,100	at present.
Castaños	27,500	
Palafox	13,000	
Estremadurans	12,000	coming.
Andalusians	10,000	
	106,600	

Of these 63,000 are peasants, 41,000 regular troops, 2,600 cavalry. The Estramadurans are ordered to march to Burgos, and the Andalusians are yet at Madrid.

Head-Quarters, Army of the Left,
Cabexon, November 16, 1808.

It appears that Blake's army had a severe and unsuccessful action on the 7th, in the valley on the Bilbao side of Valmaseda. They retreated to Espinosa de los Monteros almost in a state of famine, but their wants were partially relieved by the supplies which General Leith had forwarded. Had they, after the affair of the 5th, retreated towards Burgos by Reynosa, these disasters would have been avoided, and their communication with the British army and the mass of the kingdom preserved.

On the 10th, they were again attacked at Espinosa: the action recommenced on the 11th, and the Asturians on the left gave way without resistance, which enabled the enemy to occupy the heights, and occasioned a panic, which led to the total defeat and dispersion of the army. The loss, which must have been great, is not yet known. The Division of the North, under the Count de San Roman, behaved most gallantly. The Count received a mortal wound.

On receiving this account on the 12th, General Leith reembarked the stores, and the transports sailed on the 13th for Coruña. He set off on the 12th, with the Marquess of Romana, towards Reynosa. Blake, on the 12th, without noticing the action, apprized Romana that, after a Council of War, the troops had been ordered towards the country of Leon, by Saldaña; but, on the 13th, hearing that the Estremadurans had been defeated at Burgos, he retreated from Reynosa by Soto, sending part of his artillery towards Santander. He had not with him more than 4 or 5,000 men, and those in utter confusion. The night march of the 13th completed their dissolution; and the naked, starved, and dispirited remnants of the army retired, in their own way, towards Asturias. Romana

sent for Blake, who came to the head-quarters at Renedo on the 15th. The Marquess has taken pains to re-establish order, making Oviedo and Leon the points of rendezvous for the fugitives.

General Leith states the force to be collected not less than 18,000: few, if any, have thrown away their arms. The disaster he attributes to the injudicious exposure of the army to difficulties and famine, and the misconduct of the officers of the new levies: the men were capable of every thing, under proper arrangement. He has acquainted Sir J. Moore and Sir D. Baird with what has occurred.

Head-Quarters, San Vincente de la Barquera,
November 17, 1808.

The Marquess of Romana removed to Barquera from a report that 4,000 French infantry, with some cavalry, occupied Cartes, intending to pursue the discomfited army. The *chasse-marées* are at Barquera with provisions. Every exertion is making to rally the broken army. He encloses a sketch of the route of the army.

Leon, November 25, 1808.

The Marquess of Romana, with the remains of Blake's army, had made a further retreat to Leon through the Asturias.

November 28, 1808.

In consequence of an order from Sir John Moore, he has joined the division of the British army under Sir D. Baird, acting as a Major-General and in the command of a brigade.

Lugo, December 10, 1808.

Reports the death of M. Assiotti, Deputy Commissary General, on the 27th November. Recommends Mr. White, one of M. Assiotti's clerks, to be appointed Assistant-Commissary, and fears that another of the clerks has fallen into the hands of the enemy at Santander, with $3,000, and letters for General Leith, some of them probably from Lord Castlereagh. He understands, also, that a packet has been cap-

tured, but that the letters were sunk. In conveying away the Bishop and his retinue from Santander, no vessel was left there to warn British vessels of the change, which precaution had before been observed. He is still in correspondence with Romana, and has received, for the use of his army, £60,000 in bills on the Treasury.

NO. X.

ABSTRACT OF DESPATCHES FROM SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO LORD CASTLEREAGH,

FROM THE TIME OF HIS TAKING THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY IN PORTUGAL.

Cintra, September 3, 1808.

Sir Hew Dalrymple landed in Portugal, and took the command of the army on the 22nd of August, the day after the battle of Vimiera, when the enemy sustained a signal defeat. A few hours after his arrival, General Kellermann came in with a flag of truce from the French Commander-in-Chief, to propose a cessation of hostilities, in order to conclude a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French.

He encloses the articles first agreed on and signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Kellermann; but, as one of those relating to the disposal of the Russian fleet in the Tagus was objected to by the British Admiral, it was finally agreed that Lieut.-Colonel Murray and General Kellermann should proceed to the discussion of the remaining Articles, and finally concluded a Convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French, subject to the ratification of the respective Commanders-in-Chief. After much discussion, a Convention was signed, and the ratifications exchanged on the 30th.

Orders were sent to the Buffs and 42nd to land and take possession of the forts on the Tagus, in order to gain anchorage for shipping without, exposed on a dangerous coast, and to secure a communication with the victuallers. Accordingly,

the forts of Cascaes, St. Julien's, St. Bugio, were yesterday evacuated by the French troops, and taken possession of by ours. His want of local information had great weight in deciding his opinion in favour of expelling the French by a Convention, which the late defeat had induced them to solicit in preference to continuing hostilities; in which case the enemy could have consumed much valuable time, by a protracted defence of the strong places they occupied.

When the suspension was agreed on, doubts were entertained whether Sir J. Moore's army could land, and, if landed, whether it could be supplied with provisions from the shipping in its present exposed situation. During the negociation, Sir J. Moore's force was landed; but the fear of the latter difficulty was confirmed. Sends his despatch by Captain Dalrymple, who can give further information.

Cintra, September 3, 1808.

Soon after the suspension of arms was agreed on, Sir Hew Dalrymple learnt that the Portuguese were offended that the Provisional Government of Oporto had not been adverted to in the transaction. He stated to General Freire that he conceived the Convention to be a military measure of the Commanders of adverse armies, without reference either to the British or French Government. He encloses correspondence on the subject, containing the alleged grounds of complaint.

Soon after his arrival, he received from Sir Arthur Wellesley a communication between Sir C. Cotton and the Junta of Oporto, respecting the re-establishment of the Regency at Lisbon. Encloses copy of correspondence with Brigadier-General Decken on the subject. In a letter to the Bishop of Oporto, he merely adverts to the re-establishment of the Regency, but waves any opinion of it. On a general view of the subject, he thinks no plan so good as restoring the Regency of the Prince Regent, with some improvements. The Bishop of Oporto seems a worthy man, but easily worked upon.

There exists a petty intrigue at Oporto, to make that the seat of Government, and to perpetuate the power of the Junta. It appears, from conversation with M. de Pinto, that the Junta of Oporto is as ready to relinquish the province of Algarve as the Junta of Seville is to adopt it. The latter would have no objection to Alentejo into the bargain.

Except one letter from Castaños, which he encloses, he has had no intelligence from Spain since he left Gibraltar. He intends to communicate with Castaños and the Andalusian army, and will arm and send off the Spaniards about to be released by the Convention.

Head-Quarters, Ocyras, September 11, 1808.

Encloses extract of a letter from Colonel Whittingham, containing intelligence and a request from Castaños for a body of British cavalry. He is surprised to find there is an idea that he has a sufficient force of cavalry to enable him to detach 2,000 to Madrid, when his whole force does not amount to that number, and is not sufficient for the services of his army in the field.

Encloses letters from Valencia, strongly painting the wants and distresses of the patriots in that part of Spain. By a deputy from Arragon, whom Lord Collingwood saw, it appears that this province, like almost every other, thinks of no wants but its own, without reference to the forming a Central Government for the Spanish nation. The Junta of Seville are employed in useless discussions, and betraying great jealousy at every measure likely to produce a Government for the nation, and to extinguish their own power. Their deputies to the General Junta are not men of respectability. Count Tilly is notoriously the contrary. Sir H. Dalrymple doubts whether the pecuniary advance made by Mr. Duff to the Junta of Seville was, under present circumstances, well applied.

The Council of Castille, soon after the exclusion of the French from Madrid, declared itself against them, and wrote

a letter, which he encloses. The Junta, from the misconduct of some of the individuals composing the Council of Castille, argue the dissolution of the body itself, from which, if properly constituted, the kingdom would find a resource against anarchy and the exorbitant pretensions of the Juntas.

By communciations he has received from Colonel Doyle, dated the 23rd and 24th of August, it appears that arms and money had been landed at Bilboa; that the insurrection in Bilboa was in great forwardness, 14,000 already enrolled, and a reinforcement expected from the Asturians; and that certain important passes had been occupied. He also mentions the evacuation of Burgos. By a later communication, however, from Colonel Doyle, it appears that the French had fallen heavily upon Burgos, putting many to the sword. Ney and Soult are to command in Spain. No doubt but that the French have received reinforcement.

Head-Quarters, Da Funda, September 12, 1808.

Since his last letters, he has been much occupied in enforcing the provisions of the Convention, (some of which the French seem inclined to infringe) and in making arrangements for the establishment of a Regency after the French are gone. The establishment of a Regency will be a matter of much delicacy. The Council of Regency left by the Prince is not so much connected with French interest as has been represented to his Majesty's Government. The patriotism of the Marquess d'Abrantes, the President, is questioned; two of the other four are respectable men; and the other two, although they acted in the French Government, are respectable men, and highly esteemed even now by their colleagues.

The Supreme Junta of Seville is to be believed in its solemn declaration to the Spanish nation of the 3rd of August. "The Portuguese provinces of Algarve and Alentejo have joined in placing themselves under our protection, and the Canary Isles have sent us a deputy for the same object." The

Junta of Oporto, which claims the superiority over every other part of Portugal, (not including Algarve) seems to act on the same principle as the other Juntas. Their formation was by the acclamation of the people, and their principles are revolutionary. He understands that the favourite plan is to establish this Junta at Oporto, to rule the kingdom, with the addition of some members from the former Regency, whom it is proposed to summon to Oporto. He does not know whether any of these parties will accept the Regency on the only footing he can, under his instructions, confer it. He has no means of acquiring information respecting the characters and political views of the several persons of weight in Portugal; yet very shortly some definitive resolution must be taken and acted upon. He disapproves of the conduct of the Junta of Oporto, and thinks their project of a form of Government is inadmissible, as derogatory to the honour of the Prince Regent, and subjecting the nominal Regency to the unconstitutional influence of a body, which, though withdrawn from view, avowedly continues to exist.

Da Funda, September 12, 1808.

Sir A. Wellesley, being indisposed to the mission proposed to him, General Leith and two able assistants have been sent to report on the local situation of the Asturias, and the advantages which might be derived from a British corps acting on that coast.

He is of opinion that the whole of the force under his command ought to be placed in cantonments during the approaching rains, in such situations as may enable them to assemble and march beyond the frontiers of Portugal into Spain, to co-operate with the Spanish armies against the enemy's front. The march of the army must, of course, depend on the disposition of the Spaniards, as to its appearance and their means of supplying such an army in the field. Whether the aid of a British force will be necessary to oppose the French army in front will depend, not only on the numbers, but on the union and dis-

cipline of the Spanish armies; and, according to these considerations, the Spaniards will manifest more or less desire to have a British force united to them, particularly if it is understood to be so considerable as to take a prominent part in the measures pursued. He thinks Castaños' request for a small corps of cavalry, though impracticable in the execution, was made from the best motives.

In making these suggestions, Sir Hew holds in view the very army he now commands: It will require some little time to settle in Portugal, and he thinks it would be inexpedient to make any considerable detachment from thence, whilst there remains any chance of the French moving forward, with effect; besides which, from the present disposition of the transports, it would take some time to make any considerable embarkation. To consider his a mere army of observation destined for the defence of the country would, he thinks, be an unfortunate necessity, which ought to be avoided.

He is not sufficiently acquainted with the northern provinces of Spain to give a decided opinion upon the operations which might be undertaken in that quarter. He thinks that 10,000 men and a proportion of cavalry might soon arrive there from England, and shortly after 10,000 from his army might join them; when the affairs in Portugal are settled, 10,000 more might follow, and the remainder might be left to maintain the internal tranquillity of that country. It is not to be supposed that the French will remain long at Burgos; and the fate of Bilboa and of Biscay proves that their officers will be sensible of any movement threatening that quarter.

He proposes sending Lord William Bentinck to Madrid, to communicate with Castaños and the Generals in command of the Spanish forces.

Prayeas, September 16, 1808.

Acknowledges Lord Castlereagh's despatch, enclosing General Freire's report to the Junta of Oporto, and the communications between the Secretary of State and the Portuguese

Minister. Now that he is more fully apprized of the enemy's strength and resources than he was on landing in Portugal, Sir Hew does not hesitate to state that, in his opinion, the advantages gained by the Convention greatly counterbalance those which would have been derived from a perseverance in hostilities.

Prayeas, September 16, 1808.

He has sent Lord William Bentinck to Madrid, to ascertain the feelings and views of the Spanish nation, their inclination and power to give the necessary aids to the advance of a British army into Spain, an accurate description of the country likely to become the seat of war, and other circumstances connected with the proposed employment of the force under his command.

In the present unsettled state of affairs, he cannot form a precise opinion as to the amount of the force it may be necessary to leave in Portugal, to support the Regency to be established in the name of the Prince Regent; and he conceives it to be a matter worthy the attention of his Majesty's Government whether that Regency is to be supported by a British force. If the Juntas are sincere in their professions of loyalty, no danger is to be apprehended whilst the French are checked in Spain. In the mean time, British influence and British interference seem to be objects of jealousy to all parties.

Prayeas, September 16, 1808.

Count Tilly proposed to march a division of Castaños' army to force the Government of Granada to acknowledge the supremacy of Seville. This violent measure was stopped by the firmness of Castaños, who said that no part of the *army of Spain* entrusted to his command should become the vile instrument of civil war. This Junta refused the application of the Catalans for artillery, which they could easily have spared. Sir Hew thinks it will be prudent to keep a watchful eye on their proceedings.

Prayeas, September 19, 1808.

The conduct of the Supreme Junta of Seville, in the application of the supplies from England, evidently proves that they have lost sight of the common cause in pursuing their individual interests: instead of directing their efforts to the restoration of their legitimate sovereign and established form of Government, they are endeavouring to fix the permanency of their own, and to separate its interests from those of other parts of Spain. They threaten to withhold from Castaños the means of subsisting his army if he advances beyond the limits prescribed by them. If other provinces follow this example, the cause of Spain is ruined, and the triumph of the enemy complete.

To remedy these evils, Sir Hew proposes that the money intended for the supply of the Spanish armies should be entrusted to some individual of consequence, in the confidence of his Majesty's Government, who might see that all pecuniary aids were applied to the right purpose, and not employed for the individual interest of any particular Junta.

Considerable connexion subsists between the Junta of Seville and that of Spanish Estremadura. The army of the latter still surrounds Elvas, notwithstanding the termination of hostilities in Portugal. The Spaniards were actually bombarding the French garrison in Fort La Lippe, when the British arrived to take possession of it. Sir Hew has expostulated on this subject with the General commanding at Badajoz, and hopes to bring him to reason, but fears it will be more difficult to persuade him to march upon Madrid.

September 20, 1808.

The Bishop of Oporto declines taking a distinguished place in the Regency, on the ground of feeling the necessity of remaining at Oporto, and endeavouring to support the authority of Government in the northern provinces. A deputy from the Junta held nearly the same moderate language as the

Bishop; and, finding that the Prince's Regency was likely to be restored, with the exception of those members who had forfeited the confidence of the nation, he signified his approbation of the measure; and, although Sir Hew thinks he was instructed to do so, he did not press that the Junta should participate with the British Government in the act of replacing the power of the Regency.

On the rumour of the Bishop's resigning the Government, commotions took place in Oporto, and were apprehended in other parts of the northern provinces, but these will soon subside, if the Junta is sincere in its declaration of attachment to the lawful sovereign.

Lieut.-General Hope's division has been ordered into Lisbon, to protect the embarkation of the French, and he has been directed to communicate with Don Francisco de Noronha and Don Francisco de Cunha, the only two members left by the Prince who were altogether unexceptionable.

The Count de Castro, Marin or Monteiro Mor, having been requested to repair to Lisbon, to explain certain doubtful parts of his conduct, at first excused himself, on *pretence* of ill health, but has since met Lieut.-General Hope and the other two noblemen, after which Sir Hew published a proclamation, calling to take upon themselves the functions of Government, till the will of the Prince Regent should be known, the following noblemen: The Count de Casto Marin, or Monteiro Mor, Don Francisco Xavier de Noronha, Francisco de Cunha e Menezes, João Antonio Salter de Mendoça, and Don Miguel Pereira Forjaz Coutinho. To this Government the inferior jurisdictions and tribunals, the constituted and legal authorities of the kingdom, and all persons of every description, were by the Proclamation required to pay all deference and submission. The Regency then met, and proceeded to complete the numbers by the election of the Bishop of Oporto and the Marquess de las Minas. Sir Hew does not know how far the Bishop and Junta will be pleased with what has been done; but, whatever

may be their professions, he suspects that the power which they have assumed will not be cheerfully relinquished.

Prayeas, September 16, 1808.

He has not yet been able to select a confidential officer, to send into Catalonia. Should one be found, he requests to be informed what pay and allowances are to be attached to the situation; also how Major Cox and Captain Whittingham are to be paid. By some mistake, Mr. Markland has not yet proceeded to Valencia as Consul: he speaks highly of his abilities, and expects much useful information from him.

Prayeas, September 20, 1808.

By letters from Lord William Bentinck at Seville, it appears that he has communicated with Governor Don Jonas Morla; whose conversation proves him to be a true Spaniard. He strongly represented the necessity of a Central Government, and of the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief. He feared these desirable objects would be retarded by private interests, and recommended the interference of British influence as most likely to produce union among the Spaniards, and represented the great advantages which would attend the march of a British army into Spain.

By a letter from Major Cox, it appears that he thinks the Junta have discovered that they were in a wrong course, and have resolved to change it. A conspiracy has been formed against the lives of some of the members. Cuesta had dissolved the Supreme Junta of Leon, and threatened that of Salamanca: he considers his authority as paramount within his command, having been appointed by the King.

The Junta of Seville have now declared that Doyle's bills shall be paid; that Castaños shall be supplied with money; and that he is at liberty to proceed upon his own judgment, and to act according to circumstances, without consulting their deputy at the Central Junta.

Sir Hew has heard from Mr. Stuart at Madrid, who states the necessity of a British force, to control the parties, and wishes that the Spaniards released at Lisbon may be sent to join Blake and a body of Portuguese to Rosas, and that General Galluzo may be ordered to march from Badajoz into Castille.

The French army has sailed, except the garrisons of Almeida and La Lippe: the latter General Galluzo has hitherto prevented from marching, to prove his disapprobation of the Convention. The French have been taught to know the meaning of the article relating to property, and much plunder has been restored.

The army is in high order. As the rains are setting in, Sir Hew proposes to canton it, but it will be ready to proceed when orders arrive. He has been attentive to supplies.

Benefico, September 29, 1808.

In obedience to the orders he has received, Sir Hew will return to England as soon as he can prepare the documents which will be indispensably necessary to enable him to fulfil, in a satisfactory manner, the object for which he is recalled. He has communicated to the Admiral the order for putting on shore the French troops, in the event of the third division not having sailed, or having put back.

Benefico, September 30, 1808.

In consequence of letters from Mr. Stuart and Captain Whittingham, and similar applications from Castaños and Galluzo, Sir Hew, after having communicated his intention to Sir Harry Burrard, has directed the Spaniards lately prisoners to be embarked for Rosas, with 10,000 stand of arms. He has taken no step with the Regency relating to detaching the Portuguese troops to Catalonia, as, in the present state of the army, no very effective corps could be spared for that purpose.

He learns from Colonel Graham, who had been sent to Badajoz, to endeavour to induce Galluzo to raise the siege of Elvas, that he has succeeded in the attempt; but that the fine

body of troops under his command, whom he wishes to lead to Catalonia, are destitute of many necessary equipments. Sir Hew has, therefore, under the pressure of the moment, ordered that the supply may be furnished to him from the supposed stores in Elvas.

Benefico, October 3, 1808.

By letters from Major Cox, at Seville, the violent conduct of Cuesta, in arresting the deputies from Castille and Gallicia, on their way to the Central Junta, appears to have excited great alarm, which is likely to produce very serious consequences. The Juntas of Castille, Leon, and Gallicia, have united. Cuesta is suspected of being a traitor, and it is thought the Council are in league with him.

London, November 2, 1808.

In answer to Lord Castlereagh's inquiries respecting the state and situation of the hostages for securing the execution of the Convention, states that Colonel Donkin, from the British army, and Colonel La Roche, from the French, were at the head-quarters of the respective armies, forming a part of the families of the Commanding Officers. On the embarkation of the French, General Loison sent back Colonel Donkin, when Colonel La Roche was permitted to depart. It never was understood that Colonel Donkin was to accompany the French army, or that Colonel La Roche was to remain with us after its departure.

London, November 3, 1808.

In reply to Lord Castlereagh's letter of yesterday, he states that, during the negociation of the Convention ratified at Torres Vedras, he wrote to Lieut.-Colonel Murray, observing that some of the Articles were so framed as to make him responsible for what it might not be in his power to fulfil: for instance, that respecting persons taken by the Spaniards; and that therefore his acquiescence must be understood to mean his using all the influence he possessed in their behalf. In consequence of this engagement, he took an early opportunity of

applying to Castaños, Galluzo, and the Junta of Gallicia, in favour of the persons alluded to. The Junta of Gallicia promised to release some persons of this description, and to restore them their property, provided the Spaniards detained by the French had been treated in the same manner. He cannot say whether these people were released or not; but he thinks the Junta would at once release the property of their prisoners, if desired.

He never heard that the French General knew of any persons such as are alluded to in this Article, except those in Gallicia, and does not know whether the non-combatants taken in Portugal were released, as he had not received any report on that subject when he left Lisbon.

London, November 4, 1808.

Requests Lord Castlereagh will allow him to have copies of some letters alluded to in the Morning Post, as having been addressed to his Majesty's Ministers. He considers that these documents may be of the greatest consequence in the elucidation of the business before the Court of Inquiry.

London, November 5, 1808.

Encloses a letter which Major-General Beresford had addressed to him, dated 5th October, stating that in an interview with Mr. Cipriano Robino Freire, very satisfactory explanations took place on the subject of intercourse with the Regency, and of their intentions and wishes. He expressed from their Excellencies the greatest readiness to attend to the representations of the British Commander-in-Chief. General Beresford attributes the cold and distant intercourse which has hitherto taken place to the person through whom that intercourse has till now been carried on.

London, November 7, 1808.

If there is no objection to his request, he wishes for a copy of the Despatch from the Junta of Oporto to the Chevalier de

Souza, referred to in the Note of that Minister to Mr. Canning, dated 3rd September.

London, November 10, 1808.

Encloses copy of a private letter from Lord Castlereagh, recommending to his particular attention the talents and experience of Sir A. Wellesley, and acknowledges with thanks the receipt of a copy of the French engineer Vincent's Report.

London, November 14, 1808.

The paper enclosed is a copy of a letter from General Spencer, dated off Lisbon, 24th June, stating that, on his arrival, he consulted with Sir C. Cotton on the advisability of an attack on Lisbon. It appearing from the report of some intelligent Hanoverian deserters that the French force (20,500) was fully capable of resisting a much larger force than could be brought against them, Major-General Spencer, with the advice of Sir C. Cotton, determined to return to the corps he had left under General Nightingale, which he expected to join next day, to the southward of Cape St. Vincent. He then proposes to return immediately, with the troops, to Ayamonte, and, on finding the frontiers secure, to proceed to Cadiz, there to act according to the instructions he may receive.

London, November 16, 1808.

[Addressed to Mr. Ryder, and by him enclosed to Lord Castlereagh.]

Specifies the papers which he requests Lord Castlereagh will cause to be laid before the Court of Inquiry.

London, November 18, 1808.

Acknowledges receipt of Lord Castlereagh's of the 17th, and perfectly coincides in the propriety of not producing before the Court some parts of the correspondence. He has found it necessary to mention in his Narrative the full powers and assurances of support contained in Lord Castlereagh's letter of 20th August, and wishes to know whether his letter of the

4th September, acknowledging it, ought not to be produced, as also his letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 12th September, containing his opinion on the further prosecution of the war. Upon these opinions he acted, and he considers it material to prove to the Court that he communicated his sentiments to Government at that early period.

London, November 2, 1808.

He has received from Mr. Cooke a copy of the draft of a Warrant for a Court of Inquiry. He fears that, according to the Warrant, the Court will not feel itself bound, or even authorized, to enter into the measures he pursued for establishing the Regency. This subject appears to him intimately connected with the *motives* which induced a party in Portugal to raise a clamour against him. He trusts it will be clearly understood that the steps he took to carry the provisions of the Convention into execution, and to avail himself of the advantages it was intended to produce, are, under the authority of the Warrant, fit subjects for inquiry.

London, December 23, 1808.

The extract from the letter from the Junta of Oporto to the Chevalier de Souza was not enclosed in Lord Castlereagh's letter of the 4th September. When this document was communicated to Sir Hew, on his arrival in England, it was his intention to produce it before the Court, and expose the fallacy of the statements it contains, at the same time explaining, by his correspondence with Brigadier-General Decken, the motives which possibly actuated the Junta of Oporto in the hostility of which he has experienced the effects. He now encloses a continuation of his correspondence with Brigadier-General Decken, in order to explain the real views of the Junta of Oporto, so entirely at variance with their public professions. The assertion contained in the letter above alluded to, that the Junta had thought fit to make similar observations on the armistice to the British General, is (as far as relates to him) unfounded.

He believes that Sir A. Wellesley is the English General alluded to, and he encloses a copy of a letter from the Bishop of Oporto to Sir A. Wellesley, dated 24th August, containing such observations as it was then thought fit to avow. When these observations are contrasted with those addressed two days before to the Chevalier de Souza, and when the views on the subject of the Regency, as stated by Brigadier-General Decken, are compared with the sentiments expressed to Brigadier-General Anstruther, as mentioned in a letter from him enclosed, Sir Hew thinks a just estimate may be made of the degree of credit which ought to be attached to representations from that quarter. Finding that these documents cannot, with propriety, be produced in Court, he requests Lord Castlereagh will lay them before the King.

Of all the mortifications he has experienced, none has given him so much concern as the impression his Majesty seems to have taken on the subject of the removal of the Portuguese property. He conceives the immediate matter of his recall, if considered separately from the share he had in the Convention, can only be attributed to his not having given earlier notice of the signature of the armistice. On this head he confesses his error; but each day held out so near a prospect of final arrangement, that he was insensibly betrayed into a delay, which he cannot altogether justify.

STATE OF THE SPANISH COLONIES IN AMERICA.

1779—1809.

Among the Papers in this Section will be found some which prove that the idea of withdrawing the Colonies of Spain from their dependence on the mother-country, and thus depriving her of the vast resources which they furnished when she was at war with Great Britain, had occurred to various intelligent minds, long before it was entertained by our Government. The communications on this subject from Mr. Hippisley, with which it opens, date so far back as the year 1779, during the administration of Lord North, and there is one from the pen of Sir Ralph Abercromby, which could scarcely have been written later than towards the conclusion of the last century.

The most zealous advocate, however, for the political emancipation of those Provinces was Don Francisco de Miranda, a native of Caracas, who, from intimate acquaintance with the grievous nature of the yoke imposed upon them, laboured with untiring perseverance to effect the liberation of his countrymen from the galling oppression in which they were held.

From his Letters, which are numerous, we learn that, prior to the discussions with Spain relative to Nootka Sound in 1789 and 1790, he had solicited aid

from Mr. Pitt towards the execution of plans for accomplishing the one grand purpose of his life: but having, at the commencement of the first war of the French Revolution, obtained high military rank—he was second in command in the army under Dumouriez—it appears not improbable that a distrust of his political principles may have deterred our Ministers from entering heartily into those schemes to which he so frequently called their attention. It is not surprising, indeed, that, after opposing with all their might that reckless spirit of democracy, which, in the Old World, had covered France with blood and ashes, and St. Domingo, in the New, with desolation and anarchy, they should hesitate about extending its influence to the Colonies of Spain. Accordingly, no sooner had the entire Spanish nation acknowledged Ferdinand VII. for its sovereign, than the efforts of the British Cabinet were exerted to preserve to the Spanish monarchy its vast American possessions, not to break them up into independent Republics.

The misguided policy of Ferdinand, and the execrable barbarities and perfidies practised by the commanders of the royal troops sent to quell the discontents of the Americans, thwarted the friendly intentions of our Ministers, and inflamed those discontents to such a degree, as to dissever the Colonies from Old Spain, and to induce the adoption of republican forms in them all.

Miranda himself ultimately became a victim to the faithlessness of his royalist antagonists. After several

attempts, the failure of which disappointed his too sanguine expectations of support from his countrymen of the Caracas, he at length, in 1810, succeeded in planting the banner of freedom in that province. In the following year, the congress of that and six adjoining provinces, assembled at Venezuela, set the example to all the rest of Spanish America, by proclaiming them a federative Republic.

Miranda was placed at the head of the army, with dictatorial authority; but, discouraged by the unpromising state of the affairs of the infant Republic, and the successes of the Royalists, he concluded a Convention with their General, Monteverde, with the approbation of the Executive Council, surrendering to him La Guayra, Caracas, Barcelona, and Cumana; while he was, on his part, promised a complete amnesty, free permission to emigrate, and the introduction at Caracas of the constitution given by the Spanish Cortes. This Convention Monteverde most treacherously violated, by seizing Miranda, and sending him a prisoner to Old Spain. There he was consigned to the most dismal of the dungeons of the Inquisition, at La Caraca, near Cadiz, where he died, after a rigorous confinement of four years.

In this Section will also be found various plans emanating from the fertile mind of General Dumouriez, among which will be particularly remarked those relating to his favourite project of founding with one of the Spanish provinces a kingdom for the Duke of Orleans (Louis Philippe); and, from a paper written by the Prince himself on Mexico, that country was

no doubt selected for constituting the proposed monarchy, under the protection of Great Britain. The information respecting Mexico, obtained from other sources, seems to indicate that this project was not deemed unworthy of consideration. Had it been carried into execution, how different might perhaps be at this day the condition of the American kingdom, as well as that of the European Republic!

Extracts of Letters addressed to Lord Loughborough, and communicated to the Secretary of State, 1779.

Rome, June 18, 1779.

* * * * Governor, or principal officer commanding at Arica, in Peru, in correspondence with his brother, an ex-Jesuit at Rome, informs him of a great insurrection at Mexico—"that, after forcing the Viceroy to retire, they had burned the King's warehouses of tobacco, to the amount of seven millions of piastres; that all the provinces of Peru also were in the highest degree disgusted with the Spanish Government; that at Arica they had paid the assessments of the present year with great discontent, openly protesting against any similar impositions in future."

This account is confirmed by several letters received from Old Spain, which mention the late arrival of a King's ship at Cadiz from the Spanish West Indies; and that all communication between the ship and shore is prohibited. It is well known this ship brings a confirmation of the above intelligence.

The King of Naples read, at his table, a letter he had received from his father, dated the 18th of May, complaining of "the *haughtiness* of Great Britain, which would compel him speedily to declare war against her."

Rome, July 7, 1779.

The number of ex-Jesuits now settled in the Papal territories is computed at near 2,000; they are in general subsist-

ing upon small pensions of six Roman crowns per month, which are paid to them by the Ministers of the different States where they originally professed: to a man, they bear implacable animosity to the Court of Spain. The most violent are the ex-Jesuits from Peru and Mexico. They are in general descended of old Spanish settlers, who have intermarried with the principal American families, and many are of great consideration. This class comprehends some hundreds, who are anxiously in expectation of a favourable period, which may facilitate their return to their native country. It may be presumed that such men might prove *essential instruments* in effecting a reduction of New Spain, having an entire influence on their countrymen, who universally, both in Peru and Mexico, are predisposed to revolt.

Every Jesuit with whom I have conversed on this subject concurs in this opinion, but my chief information is derived from * * *, in the earlier part of his life an officer in the Neapolitan service, but afterwards professed a Jesuit, and was Secretary to the General of the Order, who, on the abolition, was imprisoned, and died in the Castle of St. Angelo. He is a universal scholar, and perfect master of the system of Spanish policy in the government of their American colonies. His brother, whom I have mentioned in a former letter, is Governor of Arica, and commands the King's troops in the northern provinces of Peru, and is known here to be very ill affected to the Spanish Government. He intimates in his letters to his brother that, from the excessive imposts on the Spanish colonists, as well as on the native Peruvians, they were on the eve of a revolt—that by his influence they had been induced, within his districts, to pay the assessment of the last year, but they avow resistance to any future attempt to tax them in the same excess.

It formerly was the policy of Spain to send drafts from veteran regiments, to maintain the government of their colonies in America. The Duke de Grimaldi, (now Ambassador at

Rome) when Minister in Spain, first discontinued this usage, and embodied new regiments for the American service, consisting chiefly of Flemings and other foreigners, the greater part of whom, from time to time, have deserted to the interior of the country, where they have connected themselves with the natives, and are ready to co-operate in any attack on the Spanish Government. The Prince of Quito can command a considerable force, and is stated to be an implacable enemy to the Spanish Government.

*Memorandum of a Conversation with Don * * *.*

Rome, August 4, 1779.

His situation for many years, both in Old and New Spain, afforded great opportunities of being well informed on this subject. At the Havannah his advice was often solicited by the Government. Velasques, who so bravely defended the Moro, was his intimate friend, and died in his arms. He is much respected in Rome, and lives in habits of great intimacy with the chief prelates of the Government. He was several years an Inquisitor, both in Old and New Spain, chiefly at Mexico.

I have communicated with many other principal Mexican ex-Jesuits, who entirely concur with Don * * *. "He says that the Havannah is now much richer than when taken by the English—that the fortifications are strengthened, and, in his opinion, an attack from the same place as before must prove abortive—that the Spaniards were much surprised that the English had not made their attack on the south side, which, in that event, must have surrendered in a short time, and that, at present, if an attack was made in that quarter, the garrison must soon submit, as any number of troops the Spaniards can keep there will always be inferior to what the extent of the fortifications requires."

The inhabitants of the Havannah, he observed, were originally well inclined to submit to the British Government, but the conduct of Lord A——e had greatly disgusted them by

exacting from the clergy nearly £200,000 as a nominal *free gift*—that a similar measure, on any future attempt on the Spanish settlements, would prove to be highly impolitic—that, on the contrary, it would be wise on the part of the English, if any such attempt was to be in contemplation, to endeavour to efface the former impression, by having it well understood that no exaction from the clergy should be permitted.

The attack on the Havannah, he observed, was too late in the season: had it been six weeks earlier, the troops would not have been exposed to sickness, which all foreigners experience without the walls, in the summer months, though, within the town, they are exempt from it.

Speaking of the Continent of America, he says that, if Acapulco and La Vera Cruz were attacked, they must be soon reduced by a very inconsiderable force, and the entire American trade of Old Spain must consequently be destroyed. He knows La Vera Cruz at present to be extremely rich: if an attack should be made from the East Indies on the Spanish settlements, it would be advisable first to make a descent on the peninsula of California, which could be attended with little or no opposition, and would be highly detrimental to the trade of Spain. The possession of that peninsula, with the capture of Acapulco, on one side of the Isthmus, and of La Vera Cruz on the other, must necessarily force Mexico to submission, probably without offensively marching a single league into the country; but that manifestoes should be industriously circulated, to assure protection to the inhabitants.

The Jesuits had often remonstrated to the Court of Madrid against the impolicy of constructing fortresses in the interior parts of a country so notoriously disaffected to the Spanish Government; as such fortresses were always reducible by a small force, and would afterwards serve as strongholds to secure the independence of the disaffected. The Spanish Government paid no attention to these remonstrances, but constructed several fortresses, at distances from forty to eighty leagues

within land, from La Vera Cruz, which, on the first alarm, would probably be seized by the disaffected natives, as the Spaniards, even admitting them to be well affected to Government, cannot sufficiently garrison them.

In the event of any attack on the Spanish settlements, he thought it advisable that the English should declare in their manifestoes that their object was to retain possession of the ports of Acapulco and La Vera Cruz *only*, and that they would leave all the interior parts of the country to be governed by such regulations as were most agreeable to the inhabitants, particularly recommending the choice of governors and magistrates, *natives* of their Continent—a hint he *well knew* would operate with inconceivable energy, by contrasting their present state of oppression with the establishment of a system of government so congenial with their native principles!

The most powerful Caciques, he observed, might readily be excited to take arms against the Spaniards. In the northern provinces, many of their native princes still pride themselves on being of the race of Montezuma, and entertain an insuperable aversion to them. He is decided in his opinion, from his knowledge of this country and disposition of the natives, that a few well instructed emissaries would render more essential service than any military force unaided by such coadjutors. In every quarter the antipathy to the Spaniards is universal, and, *since the suppression of the Jesuits*, their Government is deprived of the only medium of influence on the minds of the natives. The conquest, he added, might be said to be already effected to our hands: nothing remained for us but to take possession.

The peninsula of California he represents as a barren soil, but the port of Loretto, which the Manilla ships always make in their passage to Acapulco, is of much consequence.

The Jesuits of Rome are now reduced to the habit of secular priests. The Duke de Grimaldi, Ambassador of Spain, has enjoined a very strict attention to be directed to the conduct of those from Peru and Mexico, ordering that they should

appear in person from time to time, at his palace in the Piazza di Spagna. The present Pope is known to be well-affected to the Jesuits, and supposed secretly to favour their general re-establishment; but the Court of Madrid maintains an ascendency in the Vatican, and even constrained the Pope to create the Spanish Nuncio, Palavicini, a Cardinal, and afterwards Secretary of State, much against the Pope's inclination.

Yesterday (September 10), the Duke de Grimaldi had an audience of the Pope, and delivered a sharp remonstrance against the permission lately granted by the Court of Rome to the Jesuits in Russia and Poland to found a Noviciate—a circumstance considered as a dawning of the general re-establishment of the Order.

Should it be deemed necessary to come to a more explicit communication with these Jesuits, it will appear but equitable to assure to them at least an equivalent to their little pensions, and an asylum, in the event of a discovery of any negociation with them. A few of them, such as Don * * *, &c., receive liberal allowances from their families and connexions in Spain, &c., and are enabled to support a respectable appearance in Rome. The multitude are, nevertheless, restricted to their narrow pensions of six Roman crowns per month, and their mass (only one paul per diem) in addition.

I am acquainted with a Mexican Spaniard, now living with Don * * *, who, within a few months of his professing himself a Jesuit, surrendered into the Treasury of the Order a property nearly equal to £40,000, which had devolved to him from his family. He is now reduced to a pittance in common with the lowest of his Order.

I am persuaded that many of these Jesuits, conversant with the Mexican and Peruvian languages, would very cheerfully expose themselves to any hazard in embarking for the Continent of America, under an assurance of a free exercise of their religion being secured to them. Possibly one or two of them might be found serviceable in England to be consulted with,

previous to the arrangement of any expedition that might be formed.

Rome, November 28, 1779.

In the apprehension of a probable rupture with Spain, it occurred to me that any authentic information relative to the state of the Spanish Colonies might prove of consequence; and, as no intelligence whatever could be so interesting as that derived from the Mexican and Peruvian Jesuits, I made such inquiry as seemed to throw most light on the subject. I knew that the Papal State was the only country in Europe where such information could be obtained, as, since the general abolition of the Order, it had afforded an asylum to the ex-Jesuits of every nation. I had long lived in habits of particular intimacy with those I have before named: I therefore reasonably flattered myself that I had the means of procuring the most satisfactory information more unsuspectedly than any person who had not antecedently lived in equal habits of communication with them. No person in a public character, or being less in their confidence, could, without great suspicion *at that period*, have commenced an intercourse with them.

During my long residence in Rome, I had been introduced to many other ex-Jesuits who had possessed considerable influence in the Spanish Colonies, and were violently incensed at their treatment. I was therefore led to believe that, should hostilities commence with Spain, they might be used as efficient instruments in rendering essential services to Great Britain. Some corps of Irish Catholics might be embodied with great advantage for such an expedition.

The Abbate B * * *, who has been lately appointed by the Pope to one of the Catholic Bishoprics in Ireland, has been many years resident here, as agent for the Irish Catholic Bishops and clergy. He is now on his route for London, and is well attached to the British Government. I have found him always extremely cordial in his communications, and have written to Brummell, desiring him to give him a private intro-

duction to Lord North. I profited here of his introduction to several Mexican Jesuits, who confirmed every thing I have hitherto communicated.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Corneille (late Governor of St. Helena) to Mr. Hippisley.

November , 1781.

I recollect Governor Johnston's conversation with me on the South American business, and perfectly remember his telling me of having despatched the Shark sloop, commanded by Captain Macdowall, somewhere near Madeira, in March last, to the Rio Janeiro, with a Jesuit, taken by a Glasgow privateer in a Spanish ship bound to Spain—that, in consequence of some intelligence in the hands of Lord Hillsborough of South America being in a state of revolt against the Spanish Government, it was thought this Jesuit might be a proper person for encouraging the same . . . . Mr. Johnston expressed great satisfaction on receiving Captain Macdowall's packet, wherein he mentioned the safe landing of the Jesuit, with further particulars—that several of the Spanish provinces were then in a state of revolt, and that a general dissatisfaction ran through the whole coasts of Chili and Peru, wishing to shake off the Spanish yoke. The name of a particular chief thus in arms was therein mentioned as the principal leader of the revolters, who was very formidable to the Spaniards.

Extract of a Letter to Warren Hastings, Esq., (then Governor-General of Bengal) from Mr. Hippisley.

Fort St. George, August 11, 1782.

Colonel Fullarton, on his departure for the command of Trincomalee, very anxiously expressed his wishes that the accompanying papers might be submitted to your perusal. In apology for the Colonel and myself, it is incumbent on me to say that I have been drawn into this communication from having mentioned to him that the extracts of my correspond-

ence with Lord Loughborough had the good fortune to have received some share of your notice. Colonel Fullarton, conscious of the magnitude and importance of the object, expressed a desire that his own ideas and specific propositions to Government on the same subject might at least have equal advantage with my little labours; and he has also requested me to say that, if the situation of India under your auspices should permit the revival of an enterprise against the Spanish settlements, he would then hope for the honour of paying his personal respects to you, and submitting to your judgment the detail of many incidental circumstances which had originally been arranged for the expedition.

In the memoranda which I gave Mr. S——, on his departure for Calcutta, I mentioned the conversations I had been honoured with by Lord North on this subject—the confirmation of the revolt in Peru, &c., received by the capture of the Corunna packet, and the intelligence brought by Captain Macdowall, who had been despatched by Commodore Johnston, with a Jesuit, to the Rio Janeiro.

This intelligence has been further confirmed by Sir Thomas Mills, whose information is derived immediately from the Viceroy of the Brazils, purporting that Peru was, at the last moment of advice, in a state of revolt that threatened the entire subversion of the Spanish Government. I need not suggest to you, sir, that the rebellion is of a nature that cannot be expected speedily to terminate, or, if crushed for the moment, the Spaniards can have any security against its revival, whenever the least encouragement is held out to the original revolters.

My first communication (June, 1779) to Lord Loughborough was previous to our rupture with Spain. Colonel Fullarton's overtures, in the beginning of the following year (January, 1780), preceded by some months my return from Italy. At that period we had no communication on the subject: our information was drawn from different sources, but

has received the most irrefragable confirmation from a variety of facts, supplying weight and credit to each other.

J. Cox Hippisley.

N.B. The preceding letter was accompanied by Colonel Fullarton's opinion (dated May, 1781), prepared for a Council of War between St. Jago and the equinoctial, and his Propositions for an Expedition to South America by India, dated June 3, 1780, laid before the Cabinet by Lord North, and approved.

On the Liberation of South America from the Dominion of Spain.

BY SIR R. ABERCROMBY.

The people of Great Britain in general take little share in the affairs of foreign nations. The balance of power is a subject they do not understand; and they are little interested in any thing that does not tend to the security and extension of commerce, and the dominion of the sea.

To keep up the spirits of the nation, and to engage it heartily in the further prosecution of the war, it seems necessary that every military enterprise we shall undertake shall be directed to such objects as shall tend to secure to us or to enlarge the sources of our commerce and wealth.

With this view it has occurred that the removal of the French from Egypt should be effected before a negociation for peace should take place: to allow it to remain in their possession would threaten the security of our dominions in the East; at any rate, were the cession of it to become an object of discussion at the peace, a considerable degree of weight would be given to it in the general scale, and concessions would be demanded of more consequence than we would be inclined to grant.[1]

But of all the objects that ought to claim our attention, the

[1] This paper, which is not dated, is shown by the above paragraph to have been written during the occupation of Egypt by the French, consequently, between 1798 and 1800. We shall, therefore, not err much in placing it under 1799.

liberation of South America from the dominion of Spain seems to stand first; it can only be accomplished while we are still at war with Spain, and if it should be happily effected, it would be beyond the reach of negociation at a peace.

It should be undertaken without any view to conquest, to exclusive commerce, or to plunder. Every port in South America, and the whole trade of that extensive Continent, should be declared free, and laid open to every nation in the world. Every country would feel interested in it, Spain and Portugal excepted: Great Britain, however, from her enterprise, from her capital, and from her industry, would in reality possess nine parts in ten of this great commerce. A market would be equally opened for British and for East India commodities. In a short time, the Brazils, which would follow the fate of the Spanish settlements in South America, and the other countries now under the dominion of Spain, would produce more sugar, cotton, and indigo, than all of our West India Islands, which we retain at a great expense, and which are frequently the source of wars.

Should Great Britain decline at this time to undertake this great enterprise, some other nation will attempt it, on principles less liberal and less advantageous to the happiness of South America and to the world at large.

The present state of that country gives us reason to believe that it would not be difficult to accomplish this object. The Creole Spaniards and Indians are oppressed beyond measure: no office can be held in that part of the world but by a native of Old Spain; and the restrictions on trade are severe in the extreme. Justice is venal, and extortion commonly practised by all in power. The clergy, who have great influence over an ignorant and superstitious people, are in general natives of New Spain, and consequently would favour a revolution. It seems only necessary that we should remove the Spanish force, declare to the people what our intentions are, and the Spanish Government would fall to the ground.

Two expeditions should be fitted out: one to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope, and from thence to the River Plate; the other should rendezvous at Barbadoes or the Gulf of Paria, and should act on the provinces of Caraccas and Venezuela.

Monte Video is the principal port and rendezvous for shipping in the River Plate, and is situated on the left bank of that great river: Buenos Ayres, the capital of the country, is situated on the right. One or two line-of-battle ships, and as many frigates, are commonly stationed at Monte Video, and two battalions of Spanish infantry at Buenos Ayres, for the defence of that country. Of the force at Monte Video little is known.

The approach to Buenos Ayres by water can only be made in vessels of a small draught, on account of the shoals. The climate is good, and the country abounds in provisions. Roads have been opened across the country to Chili and Peru, and European commodities are carried over land into those provinces, which are paid for in specie, and brought from Buenos Ayres to Europe.

The expedition against the Terra Firma should act in the rivers Oronoque and Guarapichi, and against La Guayra and Portocabello. The above mentioned rivers give an opening into the province of Cumana.

La Guayra is the port of St. Juan de Leon, of the Caraccas; it covers the approach to that great capital, and is strongly fortified to the sea: a landing, however, may probably be effected to the right or left of La Guayra, particularly at the small river Tuy; and, if the batteries to the sea can be turned, (which they probably may) this fortress would soon fall, and consequently the capital of the province.

Portocabello is said to be a place of considerable strength, but probably, like La Guayra, it is not equally strong on the land side as on the water. It may admit of a doubt whether, in carrying on these operations, we should do more than blockade these fortresses, taking it for granted that, as soon as the

revolution had taken effect, they would surrender: but it is to be apprehended that a people, who possess so little energy as the Creole Spaniards, would not venture to adopt so decided a measure as throwing off the Spanish yoke, until they have their enemies removed, and British garrisons in La Guayra and Portocabello.

If a revolution could be set fairly on foot in the principal settlements on the coast, it would spread with rapidity into the interior of the country. Emissaries would be sent to propagate the news of the joyful event, and to assure them that the British troops should not quit the country till relieved from the Spanish yoke, and until a new government of their own should be established. All that would be required on the part of Great Britain, in the first instance, would be to furnish them with arms and ammunition, and to assist them in framing a form of government, best suited to the genius and temper of the people.

Much information and many details will be necessary before these undertakings can be set on foot. Captain Mc Douall, of the Ganges, who was an Admiral in the Portuguese service when Portugal endeavoured to establish a colony at St. Sacrament, certainly knows the navigation of the River Plate, and among the Spanish prisoners now in England, with a little address, some of them may be found who can give pretty accurate knowledge of the River Plate and of the coasts of Terra Firma; and General Miranda is still in London. Lieutenant-Colonel Picton, the Commandant of Trinidad, was instructed, in July, 1797, to procure every possible information relative to the neighbouring provinces of Cumana, the Caraccas, and Venezuela: and Colonel Maitland might be directed to go to Trinidad to arrange with Lieutenant-Colonel Picton the plan of operations.

The province of Guyana is already nearly in our possession: there remains, however, in the possession of the French the small island of Cayenne, and some inconsiderable

plantations on the main land. It may be necessary to root out the French, by removing the garrison and the French settlers in this island, and by a total destruction of the fort and the adjacent town.

To ensure the success of this grand enterprise, a very considerable force (not less, probably, than 12,000 men) would be required: were it to fail, the unfortunate natives would be left to the merciless revenge of their cruel masters, and many of them would end their days on the scaffold, or in the mines. The difficulty seems to be to find a sufficient disposable force; this, however, may be procured, provided the general principles on which this enterprise is founded shall be approved of.

Nothing has been said of Mexico. Unless the Americans were to co-operate, we have not a sufficient force to favour a revolution in that part of the Spanish settlements; the probability, however, is that the same spirit would prevail through that great continent.

General Miranda to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

D. Francisco Miranda presents his respectful compliments to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas. He has the honour to send him copies and translations of the enclosed papers, which he received three days ago; and as the importance of the subject is perfectly obvious, he will only say a few words respecting the person who writes them.

D. Manuel Gual is the eldest son of D. Matheo Gual, who commanded at La Guaira when Admiral Knowles attacked that place in the year 1743. He is a native of Caracas, has served in the regular infantry of that province, and enjoys great popularity in the country, being descended from a noble and rich family at La Guaira. General de Miranda knew him intimately in his youth, and has been informed since that time that he has become a man of distinguished abilities and consequence in the country.

If the Right Honourable Minister should think proper to have a conference on the subject with General de Miranda, he will do himself the honour to wait on him at any time he may think convenient, and will communicate to him any information in his power relative to this important object.

He takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgments for the kind interference which Mr. Dundas (at the instance of a friend) was so good as to employ on his behalf, for the purpose of obtaining a passport for the United States of America. He will always remember it with gratitude and respect.

London, September 30, 1799.
Queen Charlotte Row, No. 9. Marylebone New Road.

[Translation, No. 1.]

Don Manuel Gual to General Miranda.

Puerto España, Island of Trinidad, July 12, 1799.

My dear Friend—I would not write to you, if it were possible for me to come and see you—Miranda, if the ingratitude which you have experienced from mankind, if a love of study and retirement (as I have seen related of you in a public paper), have not rendered you forgetful of these delightful regions, and if the pure glory of becoming the deliverer of your country—as the American people wish but for one—do you come and be that one. Miranda, I feel no other ambition than to see this noble enterprise accomplished, nor desire a greater honour than to serve under your orders.

I enjoy at this moment the distinction of being proscribed by the Spanish Government as the author of the revolution attempted at Caracas in the year 1797. Persecuted at Curaçoa, and reclaimed in all the islands neutral or friendly to the Spanish Government, I came to seek the protection which I found was offered to us in the Proclamations of the Governor-General of this place.

The paper annexed (No. 1) will convey to you an idea of the facility of an enterprise which would astonish all the world,

and prove the glory and honour of Americans, thanks to the hatred which the Spanish Government inspires. In the other (No. 2), you will see what are my wishes. I there speak to a people attached to their religion, and anxiously desiring their independence. Do you be, if not the chief, at least the agent, of your unfortunate country, in carrying into effect the majestic work of its deliverance; which, in order to be accomplished, only requires to be begun. You need not entertain a doubt of success. The smallest assistance at the outset would be sufficient, and it might be obtained in these islands by a simple order from the English Ministers.

The credit I enjoy among my countrymen, increased by the persecution I now experience from the tyrannical Government of Spain (which seeks to secure me dead or alive), may render my persecuted person of some utility. Whether it be as an agent or as chief that you may think proper to act, should you have an idea that I can be of service, you may communicate your wishes to me through the medium of Mr. Picton, Governor-General of this Island. You may send your answer to this letter through the same channel, as he will always be acquainted with the place of my residence.

Our enterprise failed only from this circumstance. In my absence from Caracas, the Government discovered our plan through the imprudence of a simpleton. Many persons were immediately arrested, and the most active measures were immediately taken both at La Guaira and at Caracas; so that, finding our combinations defeated, I was obliged to make my escape with the view of seeking succours in English colonies, for the hopes of my countrymen are still alive. This is, in a few words, an account of the miscarriage of our attempt, since which the desire of independence has only increased. That you may come, I again repeat it, and have the glory of establishing it, is the ardent wish of your most sincere and earliest friend and fellow-countryman,

MANUEL GUAL.

[Translation, No. 2.]

Memorial of Manuel Gual, presented to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Windward Islands, through the medium of General Picton, Governor of Trinidad.

Trinidad, May 2, 1799.

Sir—The Abbé Raynal, after having spoken of the unfortunate expedition of Admiral Anson against the empire of Peru, proceeds thus:—" Tant d'obstacles à l'envahissement de l'Amérique Espagnole avaient, dit-on, fait naître en Angleterre, durant les dernières hostilités, un système étonnant. Le projet de cette puissance, alors maîtresse de toutes les mers, étoit de s'emparer de La Vera Cruz, et de s'y fortifier d'une manière redoutable. On n'aurait proposé au Mexique un joug étranger, pour lequel on lui connaissait trop d'éloignement. Le plan était de le détacher de la métropole, de le rendre arbitre de son sort, et de le laisser maître de se choisir un Souverain, ou de se former en République. Comme il n'y avait point de troupes dans le pays, la révolution était assurée, et elle se serait également faite dans toutes les provinces de ce vaste Continent, qui avaient les mêmes motifs de la désirer, les mêmes facilités pour l'exécuter. Les efforts de la cour de Madrid pour recouvrir ses droits devaient être impuissants, parceque la Grande Bretagne se chargeait de les repousser, à condition que les nouveaux Etats lui accorderaient un commerce exclusif, mais infiniment moins défavorable que celui sous lequel ils avaient si long tems gémi."—Liv. 8.

If I were permitted to enter into a discussion of the interests of England, I should say that it would be infinitely more to her advantage to undertake this great work at the present moment than it would have been at any former period. Attached as the Court of Madrid is to the Executive Directory with chains which it cannot break, Spanish America can only be regarded as a colony of France; and, on this account, has the Directory guaranteed to the King of Spain his colonial

system; so that the question whether the independence of Spanish America would be advantageous to England is the same as to doubt whether it would be for her interests to liberate these immense colonies from the Directorial power—whether it would be for her advantage to deprive it of a source of riches on which it calculates for the continuation of the war against her—whether it would be for her interest to secure her own colonies, and to ensure the important harbour of Bahiaonda from all hostile attempts by exciting a war, founded in justice, on the territories of her enemies—whether it would be for her interest to be certain of the approvisonment of her Colonies, and of a supply of beasts of burden on the eve of harvest, and of which she may be deprived by a ferocious decree of the French Directory—whether it would be for her interest to give a favourable impulsion to a revolution which the American people are destined to experience, either from their own exertions, or by the intrigues of the Directory—whether it be for her advantage to open to her fleets the harbours of this vast portion of the globe, and to shut them against those of her enemies—in a word, it would be to question whether, in the present day, when the commerce and manufactures of Great Britain have been extended to a degree of which no example is to be found in the history of nations, it would be for her advantage to open to herself a thousand new channels for the sale of her commodities, by increasing to an incalculable amount the objects of consumption and of production in America, and by aiding her in overturning a Government founded in devastation, and enabling her to establish a Government which would conduce to her prosperity—or whether, on the contrary, it would be more to her advantage to sacrifice these great interests, in consideration of a Court which promoted the independence of North America—a Court which has deserted her Allies, and which has shamefully submitted itself to the power of the French Directory—finally, in consideration of a Court which may now be regarded as null, and which, by its impru-

dence, is equally without the power of breaking its chains, or of carrying on war.

And what sacrifices are required of England, in order to effect so great a work? Your Excellency knows as well as I do—thanks to the horror inspired by the Spanish Government throughout the whole Continent of America—thanks to the imprudent conduct of the Court of Madrid, which has completely succeeded in irritating the minds of the people by new impositions and new taxes—thanks to Fortune, who has placed nearly all the arms in the hands of Americans, and to the number of discontented who are known to be among the regular troops in the country—and thanks to the general confusion which would certainly prevail in all the measures which the Government might adopt for continuing the subjugation of America—that you may be confident that all that is necessary are four or six thousand stand of arms, as many uniforms (if they can conveniently be procured), a few pieces of field artillery, a small quantity of ammunition, about two hundred regular troops, in addition to the Spanish Americans who may be collected here from the Costa Firma, and two frigates for a few days only, to co-operate with the troops in the first attacks. The above alone would be sufficient to ensure the success of the expedition, and to overturn the colossal dominion of the Spanish Government, which is ready to fall from its own weakness.

This is the assistance which I ask in the name of my country, for such would be her wishes if it were possible for her to manifest them; and it may be proper for me to add, with the view of further promoting the success of this great undertaking, that, in such a case, I might immediately be authorized to enter into treaty with Great Britain, and that I should not fail to regard it as my first duty, as it would be the first interest of my country, to represent to America the necessity of being just and generous, and of continuing to deserve by an intimate alliance the protection of that great nation, if her object is to

avoid a long war, and to fix, at this moment, her destinies for ever. MANUEL GUAL.

EXTRACTS FROM PROCEEDINGS OF THE AUDIENCIA, OR SUPREME TRIBUNAL OF THE CARACAS.

Opinion of the Audiencia respecting a proposal for re-conquering the Island of Trinidad.

May 10, 1797.

A most secret letter has been laid before the Audiencia, dated the 9th instant, from the President, Governor, and Captain-General, enclosing two papers, signed on the 27th of March last, by the French Pardo (man of colour), John Basilio Constant, an inhabitant of the Island of Trinidad, and a secret letter from the Governor of Cumana, dated the 4th of April last, all proposing the re-conquest of that Island, upon the supposition of the English Government there being abhorred, and of the number of discontented Spaniards, French, and Germans in the Island being much superior to that of the garrison, upon which the President desires to hear the opinion of the Audiencia.

The latter, after stating a variety of reflections upon the difficulty and the uncertainty of the success of the enterprise, thinks that further information is necessary, before a decided opinion can be given on the subject; and therefore recommends that the Governor of Cumana should be directed to inquire particularly of Don Joseph Bosch, a resident on the coast of Paria, and of Don Miguel Alcala, who was at Curapano, what degree of confidence was to be placed in John Basilio Constant, and in M. Cadet Blanfet, an inhabitant of the Island, who, Constant says, would be the best channel for giving and receiving intelligence; and how far the Frenchmen, Serré, Bourdenaus, and Constant, possessed the influence they were stated to have at Trinidad, and if they were really as well disposed as they pretended to be.

Representation of the Audiencia to the King of Spain, in his Supreme Council of the Indies.

Caraccas, August 12, 1797.

Mr. Duff, who resided a long time ago at Cadiz, as British Consul, communicated to his Court a particular account of the Island of Trinidad; stating the quality of the soil, its productions, the trade of the Island with Spain, its advantageous situation; and that all the provinces within the jurisdiction of this Audiencia, in which provinces there is but a small military force, would very soon submit to the British Government, if they were either summoned or invited to it by a very small force to afford them protection; that the said provinces had, for a long series of years, been abandoned to the Guipuscoan Company of Caraccas, which carried on an exclusive trade, till it was dissolved in the year 1780, and the Philippine Company erected out of it, with considerable privileges; that, during the monopoly of the former Company, the trade consisted of but a few cargoes of cocoa, which were, for the most part, sent to Holland, whence they drew their principal supplies through the medium of the Island of Curaçoa, which trade is now become an object of great consequence; that the commerce of the said provinces is more flourishing than that of any other under the Spanish dominion in America; that their productions may still be increased, and sugar and tobacco cultivated to great extent; that the inhabitants all along the coast have always been inclined to smuggling, to form connexion with foreigners, and are very impatient of the restrictions they labour under; that the military establishment consists of four or five battalions of provisional troops, four of them of Militia, one of Veteran Artillery of 100 men, and many detached companies, some of which are of mulattoes; that an advantageous and useful intercourse with the whole coast may be kept up from Trinidad, which would lead to the most favourable consequences, such as great extent of trade and other matters, especially to the object

most to be attended to—the reduction of Cumana, Guyana, and Maracaybo, in none of which places would any resistance be found, but quite the reverse; and that the same would probably happen in regard to Caraccas, as appears by the document No. 2.[1]

Upon this, and perhaps some other information, the opinion No. 3[2] was formed in London on the 30th of March last, expressing that the principal advantages that the English would derive from the possession of Trinidad were the excluding Spain from a station which would have afforded her the means of destroying the English West India Islands and their trade; the unlimited liberty of carrying on trade with the provinces of Caraccas and Cumana, the most fertile of all the Spanish territory in America, especially having the advantage of possessing Demerara; whence it may be said with truth that there is not a point between the Isthmus of Panama and the mouth of the River of the Amazons, where British manufactures may not be imported; that the most important object is that the communication of the English with the Spanish provinces should be with a view to encourage their discontent against the Spanish Government, and to give every kind of assistance to the disaffected; that the province of Caraccas and all the additional territory included in the privilege of the Guipuscoan Company, between which and Trinidad a constant and direct communication was kept up, is said to be the most disaffected part of Spanish America; that the jealousy of Spain on this subject was so great, that the possession of Demerara by the English was one of the principal complaints against them, and taken up as a cause of the war; that this point is considered as affecting the existence of the Spanish Empire in America; that, at any rate, the English should endeavour to make them-

[1] This document is entitled "Mr. Duff's Communication respecting the Island of Trinidad."

[2] This document is entitled "Minute respecting Trinidad." In the margin it is called "Mr. Dundas's Instructions."

selves feared by their enemies, and bring them to a peace, by giving instructions immediately to the Governors of Demerara and Trinidad to use their utmost efforts to open commercial and political communication with the neighbouring provinces of Spanish America; and that it would be very useful, for the purpose of exciting an alarm at Madrid, to open the port of Trinidad to all nations, particularly to vessels from all parts of the Continent of America, both North and South; and to allow those from Spanish America to pass and repass freely from Trinidad, granting them passports without fee.

Five days after this opinion was given, a Proclamation was issued by the King of England, granting a free trade between all the Colonies and the Island of Trinidad, and permitting the produce of the latter to be imported into England on the same footing as that of the other British colonies, plantations, and islands, in the West Indies, as more fully appears by the document No. 4.[1]

On the 8th of April, the Minister Dundas wrote to Colonel Picton, Governor of the Island of Trinidad, the despatch No. 5,[2] with instructions as to the most proper system to be observed for drawing every possible advantage from that island in a political as well as a commercial way; informing him that he (the Minister) had been assured that the neighbouring Spanish provinces on the Continent of America were, in a great degree, disaffected towards the Spanish Government, and desirous of being relieved from an oppressive system of monopoly and forced restriction; in consequence of which, it would be very serviceable that he (Governor Picton) should encourage the inhabitants of Trinidad as much as possible to continue their intercourse with the Spanish settlements; that, notwithstanding it could only be kept up in a contraband and secret way, if the facilities afforded by the local situation were improved by the dispositions and wishes of the parties, it would

[1] This is a copy of the King's Order in Council.

[2] This is an exact translation of Mr. Dundas's despatch.

not be in the power of the Spanish Government to prevent its extension, so highly beneficial to the commercial interests of England, and advantageous to the inhabitants of New Spain, at present dependent upon an oppressive monopoly for their supplies from Europe; with which view the King of England had issued the above-mentioned Proclamation, which Governor Picton is ordered to publish at Trinidad; and to encourage the inhabitants of the Spanish settlements to resist the oppressive authority of the Spanish Government, by assuring them that measures have been taken to support them by means of the British naval force, and to supply them with arms and ammunition, merely to enable them to maintain their commercial independence, without any desire on the part of the King of England to acquire any right of Sovereignty over them, or to interfere in their civil, religious, or political rights, unless they themselves should, in any degree, solicit his protection.

The Minister Dundas transmitted these documents to the Governor of Trinidad, with another despatch of the 8th of April (No. 6[1]); and the latter, in consequence of these instructions, drew up and caused to be printed the paper No. 7,[2] which should be attended to, for he therein uses every means to excite your Majesty's faithful subjects in these provinces to an insurrection.

The Governor of Cumana, who has transmitted these papers, which, he says, were found on board a small vessel, captured on the coast of that province, in a despatch accompanying them (No. 8), expresses an opinion that they will not make the impression the English wish for; but the Audiencia think otherwise, especially since the discovery of the papers enclosed in the Representation (No. 233), which were found in the house of the conspirator Don Manuel Gual, and in which are to be observed all the spirit and force of those transmitted by the Minister Dundas, and of that printed by the Governor of

[1] This is an exact translation of Mr. Dundas's despatch.

[2] Governor Picton's Proclamation, dated June 26, 1797.

Trinidad, who has circulated them in different parts, without our being able to prevent it, or to discover where they are, notwithstanding all the measures taken for the purpose by the Audiencia.

Among the proceedings of the Audiencia of Caraccas relative to the matter of the intended Insurrection in that country, there is a copy of a secret letter, dated May 9, 1797, addressed to that tribunal, by the President and Captain-General, transmitting to them, for their consideration and opinion, a royal order (which is not copied) from the Court of Spain, which the letter states to be dated December 24, 1796, and to contain the plan of the Court of London for an expedition against New Spain, and the measures taken by the famous Spaniard Miranda; on which subject the Audiencia is of opinion that an exact description of Miranda's person should be transmitted to all officers, civil and military, with the strictest orders to arrest him whenever he should be discovered on any part of the coast, as well as every foreigner who should appear in the least suspicious.

N.B. These papers have been transmitted to me from the late Governor of Trinidad, General Picton, who vouches their authenticity.

Memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet.

Downing Street, October 3, 1799.

I wish his Majesty's servants seriously to consider the accompanying letter, with its enclosure. Nobody can wish at present to see any part of the habitable world set adrift on any revolutionizing system: but it is our duty to consider well how far that is entirely in our power to decide one way or other.

From what has passed with America, in the transactions which we have had with them relative to St. Domingo, I am afraid they don't look to future consequences with the same

caution as we do; and, if they can any where open to themselves a new market, they will overlook all other considerations. Indeed, from circumstances that have come under my observation, I have reason to apprehend they are not without such views in regard to South America.

Under these circumstances, I wish it to be considered by his Majesty's Ministers, whether it is best for us to do nothing, and let it take its course, or if we ought so far to interpose, and to be a party in the business, as to prevent, as far as we can, the whole mischief that may be done, if this immense empire is to be permitted to revolutionize itself without guidance or control, or any direction given to their endeavours for independence.

HENRY DUNDAS.[1]

I have a very strong opinion that we ought not by any means to engage in the projects of General Miranda, or in those of the Government of the United States of America, on this subject. It ought to be a very clear and certain prospect of good to be done by such measures, that should induce us to extend the spirit of revolutions, and to involve in that system the whole Continent of South America. G.

October 5, 1799.

Every one, I suppose, will have a great distrust of the projects of General M., and not any great confidence in those of the United States of America. It is, in fact, from the horror of a revolution conducted by either one or the other, and the apprehension that such an attempt will notwithstanding be made, that I cannot but join with Mr. D. in thinking the subject well worthy of consideration, however strong the objections to which every measure of the sort must be liable.

[1] On the same paper with Mr. Dundas's Memorandum are recorded the opinions of two of his colleagues in the Cabinet—Lord Grenville, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Mr. Windham, Secretary of State for the War Department, as inferred from the initials attached to them.

Might not some use be made of the danger which Spain is thus threatened with to prevent the evil, to detach Spain from France, and to give to those Colonies a constitution (under the Spanish Government) with which they should be better satisfied, and of which we might be the guarantee?

W. W.

Opinion of Lord Pelham on the same subject.

September 27, 1801.

It appears to me that the expedition against Spanish South America requires more consideration than I, at least, have been able to give to it. The information contained in this box is not so recent as could be wished. If the paper, with Sir Ralph Abercromby's name at the top of it, contains his opinion, it would seem that 12,000 men, instead of 3,000, are necessary for such an enterprise; and I most entirely agree with the great man in the opinion that no enterprise of the kind should be undertaken without a superior force. The example of Buonaparte in Egypt, in Italy, and now, in his preparations for invading England, is not to be disregarded.

The idea of liberating South America is certainly not a new one to me; but I think it one of those great measures, the consequences of which must have so very extensive an influence that I cannot venture to give my consent to making the attempt without a further discussion, and without knowing the principles and ulterior views of those with whom I am to embark in the enterprise. It might be the means of shutting us completely out of Europe—an extremity we may be driven to, and, therefore, it might be wise to look to it. But I am not prepared to say that we should engage in an enterprise that may accelerate it by throwing Spain still more into the hands of France. It is impossible to support the independence of Old Spain, and be admitted to a participation of the trade in New Spain?

PELHAM.

Note sent in circulation in September, 1801.

The measures which have been in contemplation with respect to South America having been postponed on account of the state of the negociation with France, it becomes necessary, under present circumstances, to call the attention of his Majesty's confidential servants to that subject; and more especially as the augmentation of the French forces in Spain, in opposition to the wishes of the Spanish Government, and after the object for which they were originally sent is declared to have been accomplished, cannot fail to create a suspicion that the Chief Consul is endeavouring to effect that which was in vain attempted by Louis XIV., viz., the consolidation of the power and resources of France and Spain under the same Government.

But, even if France should be disposed to suffer Spain to exist as a nominal kingdom, the cession of Louisana already obtained, and the demand made on Portugal of the country bordering on the Amazon River, sufficiently disclose the intentions of the French Government with respect to the intermediate provinces, if not the whole Continent of South America, to excite the most serious apprehensions on the part of this country.

With a view of counteracting projects, the operation of which might prove so prejudicial to the trade we have lately opened with South America, and which might ultimately tend to throw all those resources into the hands of France, it would appear advisable to advert to the information which has been received with regard to the provinces upon the coast, situated between the River Orenoco and the Gulf of Venezuela, and to consider whether it may not be expedient for the Government of this country rather to promote the disposition of the inhabitants of those provinces to assert their independence, than to hazard the consequences of their becoming subjects to the French Government.

General Miranda, during a period of four years, has solicited the assistance of his Majesty's Government towards effecting this object, asserting that the emissaries of the French were employed to encourage the people to look to the Republic of France for their liberation, and that there was reason to apprehend, if we did not speedily take measures to direct the revolutionary spirit that prevailed in those countries into a proper course, it would be perverted by the French to their own purposes, and would terminate in effectually excluding the manufactures of Great Britain from the markets of South America.

This information given by General Miranda has been confirmed by accounts collected through a variety of channels, and particularly by Brigadier-General Picton, Governor of Trinidad, all concurring in opinion that, from the disposition of the inhabitants to shake off their present Government, and the weakness of the Spanish force that could be brought in support of it, a plan of operations might be concerted and executed by a very small body of troops, by which a decisive blow might be struck at the resources of the enemies of this country, the views of the French Government counteracted, and the advantages of an extensive commerce secured to the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain and Ireland.

For this purpose, it is proposed to send General Miranda immediately to the West Indies, and to instruct General Trigge to consult with him upon the measures to be pursued, in order to effect the important objects that have been stated.

Secret Paper on South America, sent by Sir Home Popham to Mr. Secretary Yorke.

Copy. London, November 26, 1803.

The Continent of South America has naturally engaged the attention of this country in every probable rupture with Spain, and in the year 1790 it was so seriously taken up, that, if hostilities had commenced, I have little doubt but an armament

of considerable magnitude would have sailed to that country; for Sir Archibald Campbell, who expected the command, consulted me on the occasion, particularly with respect to the co-operation from India, and all the previous measures necessary to be adopted, that no time might be lost when the enterprise was actually decided on.

This subject has since been frequently agitated; and, as I officially knew that I was to have had the honour of directing one part of an expedition to that country during the late war, I, in course, lost no opportunity of informing myself on every point at all connected with an operation of such importance. It is a topic that has occasionally occupied the attention of the ablest statesmen for a series of years; and, from the result of the discussions which it must have undergone in the Cabinet, there can be no doubt of the policy and expedience of the measure.

The advantages which this country would derive from a successful issue are incalculable; nor is it possible to trace them in either a commercial or political point of view, though it may be fair to assert, that the annual export from that country to Spain, under all the disadvantages of a most arbitrary and oppressive Government, are fifty millions of dollars a year (the last Return from Cadiz made in 65); and if this was only to be diverted from its present channel, without calculating on the additional operation of bringing it to this country, I can scarce venture an opinion on the effect which such a circumstance would have in France as well as Spain, who can only be esteemed the intermediate agent to that Republic for her Colonies in South America.

It must be evident to every person who possesses a knowledge of the geographical situation of that great continent, its population and resources, that any permanent influence of Great Britain, whether fixed by absolute conquest, or conquest in the first instance, followed up by successful political intrigue, (which I contend is authorized by all usages of war) must offer

the greatest commercial advantages, not only to this country, but to our possessions in India, by opening a direct trade on each side of the Continent, and drawing all the wealth of Spanish America from our enemies, which has always been their principal support in every war with Great Britain.

Without entering into the very detailed advantages of emancipating that country, it may be proper, in addition to those stated, to calculate on its eventually annihilating the navy of Spain, by cutting off its greatest nursery for seamen and its principal sources for, foreign timber; for if Spain is once confined to its European navigation and commerce, she will not be long considered a maritime power. Her Colonies, also, both in the East and West Indies, are so particularly dependent on the intercourse they enjoy with the great Continent, that they must sensibly feel any alteration in that Government.

The points which offered the fairest promise for military establishments in the South Sea were Baldivia, Valparaiso, Lima, Panama, and Acapulco; and, at the time Sir Archibald Campbell consulted me, I was not fully competent to give an opinion beyond that of the navigation from both countries, and to which points the armaments from each ought to be directed; but, during the late war, when I had some slight knowledge of General Miranda's project, I certainly did press on Mr. Dundas's attention the very great importance of Rio de la Plata, from its particular situation, its immediate intercourse with Chili, from whose coast it is not 350 leagues, and its presenting the most probable point for the enemy—I mean, France—not only to take possession of, but to furnish supplies to counteract all our operations, and this certainly with great facility, if he once had possession of the Brazils; and I do think, if we could previously occupy Buenos Ayres, it would make any attempt of France on the Portuguese Settlements a serious consideration. Mr. Dundas appeared so fully convinced of the importance of this point, that he assured me he should adopt it as one in the enterprise, when it was undertaken, which he expected

would be immediately the case; and I should have instructions to go there from the Red Sea with an adequate military force for the purpose.

Taking up Buenos Ayres as a principal point very much removes, in my mind, the necessity of looking to any situation in the Pacific to the southward of Lima, if even it is absolutely necessary to go there; but Buenos Ayres must be considered on the earliest moment of a probable rupture with Spain, as the attention of the enemy will be called to that station in preference to any other.

The great object, however, of the expedition, and from which it is to derive its principal spring, is the possession of the Caraccas, which has already been given in military detail by General Miranda, who, from the advices and intercourse with that province and his family connexions, calculated on being able to collect an army of 15 to 20,000 men, increasing as he proceeds to the provinces of Santa Fé and Quito, and ultimately establishing a powerful and permanent post on the Isthmus of Panama, and opening an immediate communication with the Indian expeditions and Indian commerce which ought to accompany the armaments from that country to the Pacific Ocean.

The inhabitants may be considered under four heads: the positive Spaniard, the Creolian Spaniard, the Mulattoes, and the Indians. The Mulattoes are much connected with the Creolian Spaniards, who have ever been notoriously the most dissatisfied race in that country with the existing Government, even as much so as the Indians, who are its natural enemy.

General Miranda's intelligence and correspondence with that country is so well known to Government, that I need not quote any particular circumstance, to prove how natural it is that a desire of emancipation should generally obtain, particularly in the interior provinces. I have been long in the habit of strict and confidential intimacy with the General, and I have not seen any thing, either in his papers or the mode of

carrying his project into effect, but marks the strongest common sense, which never fails to carry with it the most pointed and satisfactory conviction.

The military force required by Miranda for the operation on the northern side of Terra Firma is a regiment complete: two companies of artillery, and two squadrons of dismounted cavalry. The list is already with Mr. Vansittart.

The naval force should probably be three forty-fours on two decks, *armé en flute*, one of the armed Indiamen, two smaller vessels, and a bomb; but if this interferes with the arrangement at the Admiralty, Mr. Davison has offered to furnish, at his own expense, three or four Indiamen; one large, to mount fifty guns; three smaller, to mount thirty-six; and two cutters, as tenders; the bomb to be supplied by Government, who is only required to secure Mr. Davison against the failure of the expedition, by capture or otherwise. He is satisfied, from his confidence in Miranda, and the view of success which he has held out to him, to take the advantages promised by the General as a remuneration for his advances, and he will engage to have everything ready in six months.

An equipment from the Admiralty is always to be preferred to any other; but, in the present case, it is proposed that the ships offered for this service shall be commanded by officers in the navy regularly appointed in each class by commissions from the Admiralty. It must, however, be a satisfaction to see that an individual merchant shall have sufficient zeal, enterprise, and resources, to furnish ships for such an expedition, and it will establish the possibility of recourse for an auxiliary marine on future occasions, probably of more necessity than the present instance.

I trust it will appear evident of how much importance to the success of this vast undertaking is even one day; for, if the enemy, either from France or Spain, is able to land a European force on the coast, and by any immediate sacrifices or concessions to the natives obtain their favour, the enterprise from

this country may have the greatest difficulties to encounter; but, taking it well concerted, promptly executed, and politically managed, I know of no project which presents, in all its different forms, such prospects as the one in question.

Take a review of the various channels of commerce which it opens to Great Britain—properly appreciate the ruin which it promises to entail on a great European maritime power—calculate on the universal popularity such an expedition is likely to be attended with—and then see what is required to carry it into execution.

A merchant, seeing the probability of success (and which is a good criterion to form a judgment of the impression it will have), offers to furnish all the ships to Government without any expense, only requiring a security against capture by the enemy, or failure by their superior means. The General asks for 1,500 men, which, I contend, is only a loan of men from the present establishment for a few months; for, the moment the expedition sails and that it can be made public, issue letters of service for a Mexican legion, and you will have 2,000 recruits in a few weeks.

If there still exists a doubt of a war with Spain, and which is not likely to be solved for some time, can any eventual service which would be likely to employ the ships in question authorize an order to Mr. Davison for their being prepared, that the service may be so much advanced when it is ripe for execution?

On the Attack of Mexico from the Eastern Side.

BY WILLIAM JACOB.

July 11, 1806.

In the Gulf of Mexico, the regular sea-breezes, or trade-winds, prevail from March to September, varying their direction from north-east to south-east: the north winds generally blow from September to March. In the latter end of October, the whole of November and December, and the beginning of

January, the north wind blows with great violence, so as to render an attempt to land a force on that coast extremely hazardous: in July, August, and September, the time of the periodical rains, it is very unhealthy on the coast; and, from these considerations, the best time obviously is for the fleet to rendezvous at Jamaica the beginning of January, from whence, in less than a month, they would arrive on the coast of Mexico, and be ready to commence their operations in the month of February, the most favourable period of the whole year, for the wind is then usually a fresh breeze in the morning, between north-east and south-east; and in the evening, the land wind from the west prevails, at which time there is little or no surf on the beach, and troops may be landed with ease and safety on any part that may be deemed most favourable.

To determine the number of troops which the conquest of Mexico would require, it will be proper to take a view of the force there, which can oppose an invading army; and, first, the only fortified place is Vera Cruz, with the fort of St. Juan de Ulloa opposite to it. This city is not calculated to stand a regular siege: the walls are not surrounded by a ditch; there are no casemates for the troops, no bomb-proof magazine, and, on the west and north sides, the houses of the suburbs are close to the glacis; besides which, as the merchants have their depôts here, a few shells would ensure the surrender.

The castle of St. Juan de Ulloa, opposite the town, has seventy cannon mounted on the walls, some 18, and others 24-pounders, but the carriages are in bad condition; a dry ditch surrounds the outwork, and on the north-east side the glacis is stockaded, but neither the magazine nor casemates are bomb-proof. There is no other fortified place on the eastern side of Mexico, except Perote, which is distant 120 miles, and to which we shall have occasion to attend more minutely in the review of the road to the capital.

In considering the military bodies in the kingdom of Mexico, I think it needless to take further notice of the Militia than to

state that, though the number on paper is upwards of 50,000, yet they cannot be assembled for want of arms, as there were not twenty thousand muskets in all the arsenals when the present war began; and, further, such was the discontent among the inhabitants when they were last attempted to be assembled, that it is fair to presume they would be more dangerous to the Government than to the invaders, were the same attempt to be made again. The Spanish printed account in the Guido de los Foresteros makes the establishment of the regular army for Mexico amount to 5,417 infantry, 1,160 cavalry, and 368 artillery, but this includes the garrison of the Havana, which takes at least one-third of the infantry, and one-fifth of the cavalry. This account, besides, professes to give not the actual number of effective men, but the establishment when complete, which is never the case with the Spanish Colonial regiments.

I had a return of troops in Mexico, which was in some intercepted letters, from which I made the following extracts; and, being corroborated by two Spanish officers who had passed many years in Mexico, and by other accounts which I have compared, I think its accuracy may be relied on.

INFANTRY.	Effective.	Deficient.	Sick.
Regiment of Orizava	1,042	335	40
——— Vera Cruz	1,227	150	135
1st Battalion, Cordova	567	122	30
2nd ———	542	146	57
	3,378	753	262
CAVALRY.			
Regiment of Mexico	480	109	54
——— los Angelos	410	102	33
	4,268	964	349

To these should be added the artillery and militia of Vera Cruz and St. Juan de Ulloa, which are two companies of 100 men each. The greater part of this force is on the eastern side

of the kingdom; but at least 1,000 men are scattered at such distances as to render it impossible they should be concentrated before the fate of the capital was decided. A part of this 1,000 men is at Acapulco, 300 miles distant to the south, a part at St. Blas, 600 miles to the north-west, and a part at Charcas and St Luis de Potosi, to the north.

Having thus taken a review of the means of resistance which could be offered, it is proper to state some circumstances which induce me to think a larger force would be necessary than may appear at first sight. It may be proper to have an army sufficiently numerous to besiege, or at least blockade, Vera Cruz and St. Juan de Ulloa, while another part pushes on by forced marches for Pueblo de Perote. It would be absolutely necessary to have the means of stationing a body of horse and foot at St. Luis de Potosi, which would keep the north part of Mexico in awe, while the main body of our army was stationed in the vicinity of the capital. Detachments might likewise be wanted at Terpeaca and Guadalaxara, and, although at a distance from the sea, where the operations of the army would be carried on, the country is very healthy; yet some allowance must be made for sickness and death, at the commencement of the campaign. Under the impression of these considerations, I should not think it judicious to attempt the conquest with an army of less than 8,000 men, exclusive of officers of the Staff, and of sailors and marines. Of these, at least 1,000 should be dismounted cavalry, who might soon be mounted on horses of the country. If, at the time of the attack, we had a force in the South Sea, a less number of men would be necessary to execute the plan we are now considering; but, if that should not be the case, a judicious commander would be able to circulate reports of the expectation of such a force; and the report would prevent the enemy from weakening the garrisons of St. Blas and Acapulco. Some time previous to the sailing of the expedition, or even before the force is assembled at Jamaica, the Havanah and Vera Cruz should be blockaded

with more than usual rigour, and a small squadron should be cruising between Cape Catoche and Cape Antonio, by which means all communication of our designs, as well as all succour, would be precluded.

It would be desirable that our own people at Jamaica should be misled with respect to the point of attack; and it would be easy to make an opinion prevail that the force was destined to occupy Carthagena, or to force a passage across the Isthmus of Panama; and, by engaging a few pilots for the first, or guides for the second place, we should favour the deception, and greatly facilitate the real design.

It will not be necessary to take a large supply of provisions, because, as soon as the army has reached Xalapa, it will be in a very abundant country, well stocked with cattle, and well supplied with vegetables. Wheaten flour is, however, by no means plentiful; and a supply for a month (after the landing) of that article should be sent with the expedition. If any circumstance should occur to prolong the stay of the army near Vera Cruz, or to prevent its reaching the fertile country, a good supply of cattle might be obtained, by means of the shipping, from the vicinity of Campeche, or the banks of the river Grijalva.

As there is no fortress but that of St. Juan de Ulloa which would require to be attacked with heavy artillery, and as the ships' guns could be used there, no other artillery but field-pieces would be necessary.

The common mode of travelling from Mexico to Vera Cruz is on horseback, or in litters resembling sedan-chairs, which are carried by two mules, one before and the other behind, and the long poles which support the chairs are fastened to their sides. By the same mode, merchandize of all kinds is carried over the mountains, and the same method must be adopted in transporting artillery.

If it should be deemed necessary to take Vera Cruz and St. Juan d'Ulloa before proceeding to the capital, the army

should be landed in the Bay of Pampanos, one mile to the southward of the town, where the beach is hard, and the water so deep, that the frigates might approach near enough to the shore to cover the landing. The force in Vera Cruz and St. Juan de Ulloa is usually two battalions of Veterans, each containing eight companies of fusileers and one of grenadiers: each company consists of 65 men, when complete; 4 companies of Militia, of 65 men each; 2 companies of Artillery, of 100 men each. The whole are commanded by Don Joseph Davila, who is Governor of Vera Cruz, who has seen little or no military service, and is deemed a man of no talents.

If the marines and seamen of the squadron were landed near Vera Cruz, and were enabled completely to blockade it, the army might very advantageously be landed on the north bank of the river Antigua, six leagues from Vera Cruz, and march immediately for Rincanada, by which two days' marching would be spared them, and the risk and danger of crossing a deep river, 150 yards wide, will be avoided, as well as the hindrance which may occur should the enemy remove all the craft to the north side of the river; and, even were that not the case, if all the craft were employed, it would be a tedious operation to convey a numerous army with so few boats as are to be found there.

At Rio de Antigua is plenty of provisions, both fish and beef, with vegetables, such as are usually found in the tropical climates. The water is abundant and good. The road to Rincanada, three leagues distant, is very rocky: it winds round the hills with a gentle ascent, is from 12 to 15 yards wide. To Casa di Posta, the road is very stony, and a continual gradual ascent; to Plazier, is a constant ascent, and through a country yielding only very good water. It continues the same to within one mile of Bonavista, when, having reached a high, level country, every production is most abundant.

Through this well cultivated country, the road gradually mounts to Xalapa, one of the most beautiful, healthy, and

plentiful spots in the New World. This city contains 40,000 inhabitants, who are well provided with all the necessaries of life from the surrounding country. It is the place where the merchants of Vera Cruz have the residences of their families, and it contains a considerable number of people of the first rank. It is two days' journey from Vera Cruz for those who travel in litters, and would be an excellent place to refresh an army after the fatigue of ascending the mountains. It has no fortifications, and consequently could make no resistance.

From Xalapa to Soldado and Jolla, though not the steepest, is the worst part of the road, being full of enormous rocks, which no carriage can pass. The country, however, is very fruitful, and the climate very healthy; and thus continues to Las Vigas, where all the difficulty of the march terminates; for from this place to the capital the road is excellent, which carriages of all kinds travel with great rapidity, and the road for two hundred miles is a gradual ascent.

Las Vigas is a large village, containing about 4,000 inhabitants, and the whole country from thence to Perote is well peopled and well cultivated. There is usually a battalion of the Veteran Infantry doing duty in the three towns of Xalapa, Las Vigas, and Perote. The castle of Perote is a quadrangular fort, has a narrow, double, dry ditch, a glacis, stockaded, but no bomb-proof casemates or outworks. It has 24 cannon, 18-pounders, but the carriages are very old. One company of artillery is stationed here. In this fortress the royal treasure is deposited, until vessels arrive at Vera Cruz to convey it to Old Spain; and sometimes, during a war, twenty millions of coined dollars have been kept within its walls. At present, there must be nearly that amount, which peace would convey to the treasury of France.

Nopolucan is a town containing 5 or 6,000 inhabitants, mostly Indians, and mixed breeds. The road passes by the Lake of Pinar; from thence to Amozoque it is level and rather sandy. Near Chachaparcingo is the last hill. Pueblo de los

Angelos is a large, open city, containing near 100,000 inhabitants: it is situated in a fine climate, and surrounded with a fertile country. One battalion of Veteran Infantry is usually quartered in this city. The Governor, Don Manuel de Floon, by birth a Fleming, is esteemed a good soldier, and an enlightened politician. Pueblo de St. Martin is a town containing 8,000 people. There is no other place of consequence on the road to the capital; but the whole country is covered with villages scattered over it, and abundantly provided with all the requisites to supply an army.

The city of Mexico is a large place, quite destitute of fortification. It contains a rich, luxurious, and enervated population of 200,000 souls; but, as it is described by all travellers, I have only to observe that there are in it generally two battalions of Veteran Infantry and one regiment of cavalry, who are considered as the household troops of the Viceroy during their being quartered in the city.

The whole kingdom of Mexico is under the viceroyship of Don Jossep de Yturrigarai, who has obtained it from favouritism with the Prince of the Peace, and who is generally considered to be a weak man; yet in him is centered the whole power, civil, military, fiscal, and judicial. He is accountable only to the Council of the Indies in Spain, and controlled only by his own will, or the suggestions of his Assessor.

There are no manufactories of arms in the kingdom of Mexico, nor are the inhabitants, except the nobility, allowed to keep any, so that the people are literally an unarmed rabble.

The Route from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico, with the Names of the Posts, and the Distances in Leagues.

	Leagues.
From the City of Vera Cruz to	
Pueblo y Rio de la Antigua . . .	6
Rinconada	3
Carried over	9

	Leagues.
Brought up . .	9
Casa de Posta	3
Plazier	4
Casa de Posta	3
Buenavista	4
Casa de Posta	3
City of Xalapa	2
Cuesta de Soldado	3
Jolla	3
Town de las Vigas	3
Town of Perote	3
Casa de Posta	4
Venta de Soto	3
Venta de ojo de aqua calienti . . .	6
Town of Nopolucan	2
Venta del Pina	2
Town of Acacete	3
Town of Amozoque	3
Town of Chachaparcingo . . .	2
City of Pueblo de los Angelos . .	2
Ventorrillo	4
Town of St. Martin	4
Venta del grand Puente nuebo . .	4
Casas Viejas	2
Venta del Rio Frio	3
Casas de las Barrancas de Juanes . .	3
Venta de Cordova	2
Chalco	2
Pueblo de Yndios	2
Venta de Penon	2
City of Mexico	2
	97

A new road was begun about nine years ago from Mexico

to Vera Cruz. It is finished, according to the above route, as far as the town of Amozoque, and thereby taking a different direction from the present road, will render the whole passable for wheel carriages; but the present war has suspended the work.

Private Annotations, addressed to his Excellency the Minister of War, on the first Arrival of the English, under Major-General Beresford, at Buenos Ayres.

Buenos Ayres, August 1, 1806.

His Excellency, M. Abascal, being appointed Viceroy of Lima, was obliged to take his passage through Portugal, and, having arrived at Rio Janeiro, gave notice from thence to the Marquess de Sobremonte, Viceroy of the province of the River Plata, that there was at that time an English convoy, whose destination was unknown, taking in fresh provisions in the Bay of All Saints. This news obliged the Viceroy to go to Monte Video, taking with him all the regular troops composing the garrison of Buenos Ayres, and leaving only one company of grenadiers and the invalids.

A few days afterwards, advice was received from Rio Janeiro, purporting that the English expedition had gone to take the Cape of Good Hope. Upon this notice, the Viceroy returned to this capital, leaving all his forces at Monte Video. The Viceroy never thought that the town could be attacked, and always neglected it. Not many days afterwards, it was known, through the same channel, that the English were masters of the Cape.

Acquainted with this success, four greedy merchants and not a few of the citizens, disgusted with the Government of the Marquess de Sobremonte, wrote to the English General, informing him of the defenceless state in which the Viceroy had left the town, and invited him to come, on the assurance that he would be very well received. The Generals Sir Home Popham and William Carr Beresford did not hesitate in coming.

They knew from the English merchants, who have been here under the name of Americans, that they had many friends here, and consequently made their appearance with their small army in the Bay of Barragan. There they received accurate information of the state of this town, and, various points where they might land being indicated to them, they chose that of Quisme.

The incautious Viceroy was persuaded that this squadron consisted of nothing but merchant-ships, which had come for the smuggling trade. Mr. Santiago Liniers, who commanded at that time the port of La Cressenada, made the Viceroy still more easy by writing to him that this little squadron was a trifling affair, unworthy of any concern. The Viceroy was perfectly quiet, till the English began to land on the 23rd of June of the last year, 1806; and they soon took possession of Buenos Ayres, with no more troops than 2,000 men, on the 27th of the same month, without loss, and without the least resistance. General Beresford, when in full possession of the place, said, "I never thought it to be true that there were not more regular troops in the town than one company of grenadiers; but I see that I was not deceived."

The English had been invited under the persuasion that they would declare the independence of Buenos Ayres; but those who had so calculated were mistaken. Beresford called himself conqueror, saying that the fort and the city were surrendered by capitulation. He was several times urged with energy on the subject of the independence, but obstinately refused it, and by a proclamation declared the King of Great Britain the sovereign of Buenos Ayres. After this proclamation, the very same persons who called him hither took the resolution to drive him out ignominiously with their house-brooms, and from that time they began to think of re-conquest. For this purpose, the Cabildo wrote to the Governor of Monte Video to send a corps of six or eight hundred men to protect it against the resentment of the English General, if its proceedings should come to his knowledge. The Governor would

have come himself, but was prevented by the Cabildo of Monte Video; in consequence of which circumstance, and various recommendations, he appointed Don Santiago Liniers commander of the expedition, composed of about 1,000 men, with whom he began his march.

Let us now turn to the Viceroy. His Excellency left the town, and went to Castros Hill, about three leagues distant, followed by Don Pedro de Arce, Sub-Inspector-General, Don Manuel de Gutierrez, and many others. The Viceroy went to the town of Cordova, 160 leagues from this, and ordered that place to be reckoned the capital of the Viceroyalty; adding, that it was his intention to send for troops, in order to the reconquest of Buenos Ayres.

The Viceroy, when in Cordova, had the imprudence to open the public correspondence between Peru and Lima, to learn what was the opinion of his person in Buenos Ayres. There was not a letter in which he was not considered as a traitor, a coward, and a man ignorant of all military principles. He was extremely irritated at this discovery, and his lady threatened with gallows and guillotine the citizens of Buenos Ayres, (naming many) which menaces were to be put in execution as soon as the Viceroy should be re-established in his authority, either by re-conquering the town, or by exchanging it at the general peace. All those threats and impertinent speeches came daily from Cordova to this town, (the correspondence was very expensive) where it was decided not to receive him in his former command, at any rate; and, knowing that he was coming with 5,000 inexperienced and raw troops, the citizens forwarded the re-conquest of the town, and called eagerly for Liniers, who soon passed the port of Los Conchas, where he received an order from the Viceroy to stop from the reconquest without his presence, for which purpose he was on march already. But Liniers did not obey this order.

The citizens of Buenos Ayres received every day precise intelligence of his marches: they called for Liniers with the

greatest earnestness; but he, doubtful of the success of the proceeding, wrote to the Cabildo that the expedition would miscarry, and that he thought it better to re-embark. This letter is in the possession of the Cabildo. That body replied that he might return if he pleased, but that he ought to understand that the re-conquest was unavoidable, and that, if he was deficient in troops, he could have them by thousands as soon as he should take possession of the suburbs of the town. At length, Liniers advanced and took possession of the Mataderos de Miserere, and a party of Catalanes that he brought, under the name of Mignones, without orders, and merely of their own motion, attacked the Retiro, garrisoned by 60 English, and defeated and killed them all. This success gave great courage to every man, and the mob began to show itself in arms. Liniers came to Retiro. Beresford was beaten, and obliged to surrender at discretion. After this, by dark means a capitulation was made, written with gold, which seduced Liniers by the brightness of the precious metal, (so it is said) and with the pretext of being for no other object but that of exculpating himself with his nation. When Beresford made use of this capitulation, Liniers perceived his incautious facility, and, being censured by the Cabildo, endeavoured to clear himself by means of a public paper.

When Beresford knew that it was difficult to defend the town, he offered independence; but, having been answered that it was too late, he resolved to sack the town and to embark; but he had no time, and only plundered the house of the Colonel of Militia, Asenenaga, in the great square near the fort.

The higher class of citizens incited the lower to oppose the entry of the Viceroy into Buenos Ayres; and, to succeed the better, they persuaded them to raise Liniers to the military command. This was done, and it was declared at a meeting of the Audiencia on the 14th of August, 1806, two days after conquest. By this all the blades of the guillotine were blunted, and all the ropes of the gallows broken.

The same higher class of the citizens, afraid of the re-establishment of the Viceroy by the Court of Madrid, roused Liniers, and, with a view to defending the town, showed him the way of raising troops. It would be foreign to these remarks to detail the operations: suffice it to say that it began about the middle of September.

The populace, once armed, were told that they had a right to oppose the tyrannical Government which they had endured under former Viceroys, and which was worse under the present. By this the mob was urged into a complete state of revolution; and, if the King had re-established the Viceroy, God was pleased that the King approved the resolution of the Audiencia, and this resolution was taken under the critical circumstance of the enemy being near the town.

The Viceroy was fortunate enough to be received within the walls of Monte Video, and his reception ruined that place. The English took the defenceless town of Maldonado. Monte Video demanded from Buenos Ayres troops to retake it. Here they thought that this application was a treachery instigated by the Viceroy, who, they were afraid, (such was the opinion of the public) in case the King should not approve of the resolution of the Audiencia, might have orders to deliver to the English the two towns of Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. The troops were refused, in consequence of which, the Cabildo of Monte Video, approved by the Viceroy, sent to Buenos Ayres to raise recruits. The flag was hoisted in the great square. The populace was against this step; and, if the recruiting officers had not hidden themselves, they would have been assassinated. This is one of the causes of the loss of Monte Video.

Two English brigs had cut off the navigation of the Uruguay. The officers of the navy, with their commander, Don Juan Gutierrez de la Concha, took no pains upon the subject. The Cabildo of this town, observing their indifference in regard to those small armed vessels, and their activity in

taking merchantmen coming from London, in the persuasion that Buenos Ayres was yet in the hands of their nation, wrote to Don Santiago Liniers, insisting on Mr. Concha and his officers coming to their station off Monte Video, adding, that Buenos Ayres had seamen of sufficient intelligence to fit out the men-of-war and act against the enemy, the Cabildo engaging to pay the King for them, in case of loss in any way whatever. Liniers answered, declining to comply with this order, because the blow was at his intimate friend Concha. The Cabildo insisting, Liniers answered roughly, saying that those officers were of his own corps, and that it was his duty to support them; and that, if the Cabildo insisted on its resolution, he would march with them. The reply to this was, that he might march if he pleased; and, as one word brings another, the Cabildo reproached him with the scantiness of his military knowledge and many other defects. This discussion became so warm, that, at last, Liniers took the prudent step of speaking to the Bishop, in order to have all the papers destroyed; and this prelate succeeded in leaving things as they were before. Liniers promised that the officers of the navy should act; and they really came out and fought with the brigs; and, though they could not take them, they frightened them at least, and one sunk soon after the action. Under these circumstances, the English decided to attack Monte Video, and landed there. The Governor gave notice of it to Liniers; but he was quite insensible to every thing; and it was observed that, in the most critical moments, when the correspondence was very frequent, this did not prevent him from going in the night out of the fort, where he was living at the time; and in one instance he kept the Cabildo and the Audiencia waiting, because he was not to be found to open the despatches of that Governor, and that he was in a kind of stupor. Hence the public began to doubt, and to be diffident of the advantages of the defence formed to his hands.

When the Governor was reduced to extremity, the enemy

having opened the trenches, he demanded some assistance. This gave rise to some meetings. At length, it was decided that Liniers should go, with 2,000 men, of the new militia, and all the regulars, who were no more than 700, to the succour of the place. Four days after this arrangement, Don Pedro Arce sailed with the regulars, and landed on the north side: he marched to Monte Video, and arrived there the day before the English took it by storm. Liniers agreed to go, on condition that his command should be independent of the Viceroy's. The Audiencia declined; but at last they gave him a despatch, closed and sealed, to his Excellency, telling Liniers that there was the royal resolution of his independent command, with which he embarked three days after the sailing of Arce. No sooner had he landed than he sent the despatch to the Viceroy, and his Excellency, copying a supplicatory letter from the Audiencia, answered that he would not consent to his being independent. He received this answer at his first station, after a march of eight leagues, and from thence he was about to return to Buenos Ayres, leaving behind him the 2,000 men, with the intention of remonstrating with the Audiencia upon the deception; but, before he embarked, he received a letter from the Viceroy, informing him that the enemy was in possession of Monte Video. This ambitious and haughty act is one of the principal causes of the loss of that town. Many others will be found when this loss shall become the subject of a trial by a court-martial.

These proceedings of Liniers induced the Audiencia and the Cabildo to send secretly for Don Bernardo Velasco, Governor and Intendant of Paraguay, in order to invest him with the command of the town and to get rid of Liniers: but shortly before his arrival, Colonel Don Xavier Elio presented himself in Buenos Ayres. This gentleman was commander of the fields [?] at Monte Video, and enjoyed some military reputation. The Audiencia and Cabildo decided to place him by the side of Liniers, and avoid the scandal of his separation. Accordingly,

he was made Major-General; but, on the arrival of Velasco, he was sent to the other side of the river, as commander of a corps of observation; and, being defeated by the English near Colonia del Sacramento, that corps was given up, and Elio returned to Buenos Ayres. As for Velasco, he had the sub-inspection and was made Major-General, so that every one had employment.

What with the loss of the Monte Video river, the disgrace of the Marquess de Sobremonte, and the populace who were armed, with the power in their hands, there soon arose an outcry for his deposition: the mob conceiving that the oidores did nothing but what the Viceroy desired. An open meeting of the Cabildo was summoned; but, an oidor opposing this proceeding, the mob shouted, "Down with the Audiencia! death to the oidores!" insomuch that the oidor was obliged to make his escape by a private door. It was impossible to avoid the suspension of the Viceroy, the Marquess de Sobremonte. The oidor Don Manuel de Velasco went to the other side of the river, accompanied by a sufficient force, to intimate the decree to the Viceroy; and, having brought him to this side, he confined him in a country-house near the town. Hence, all the authorities were left loose and without support, and the Viceroy without the superiority and high representation of his dignity. Bad example!

With a view to prevent thenceforward this scandalous disorder, the Audiencia ordered that no person should keep arms in his house, but that they should be deposited in the quarters. This produced another popular commotion; it was necessary to repeat the order; and this was another instance, as bad as the preceding.

Don Santiago Liniers has the misfortune of not having learned the science of choosing honest and capable people to be about his person; neither has he the strength of mind necessary to get rid of the bad people who surround him. Instead of taking for his secretary Don Jose Barrera, chief clerk in the

Secretary's office, an honest man, if ever there was one, and very conversant with the affairs of the viceroyalty, with the experience of thirty years in the said office, (the Regent of the Audiencia took him for himself) he chose Don Saturino Peña, a native of this town, who knows nothing else but to write a good hand, and is a consummate rogue. This man, associated with a certain Padillo, a native of Cochabamba, a person in similar circumstances, made himself chief of a conspiracy. Very good secretary had Liniers, on whom the defence of the town could depend!

A considerable number of rich people took it into their heads to make a revolution, in order to shake off the yoke of the Spanish Government, and to establish the independence of the country. They gained some officers of the new militia: they named General Beresford and Colonel Packe at the head of the conspirators. Peña spoke to the Alcalde, Don Martin Alzaga, to persuade the Cabildo to join in the plot. This Alcalde answered with caution, and let him go to Luxan to bring Beresford and Packe, with the intention of arresting them all on their arrival. This was not necessary, for a trifling event dissipated the conspiracy. This happened in the following manner.

A person came from Rio Grande (a Portuguese settlement) with despatches for the Marquess de Sobremonte, from one of his correspondents in Rio Janeiro; and one of the idle creatures of Buenos Ayres spread about the news that the French and Spanish fleets had arrived at Santa Cathalina, with 11,000 troops; and that the General of this army sent an officer with the King's orders and the public correspondence. This imposition went to the north side of the river, whence it returned in a very circumstantial letter from an officer of easy belief. This was enough to intimidate the conspirators. One of them discovered himself and discovered others, who were arrested immediately. Under these circumstances, Beresford, Packe, Peña, and Padilla, arrived in town, and, as the plot was known,

they ran away to Monte Video. Many declarations were taken on the subject, and the criminals were sent to Chili on the English approaching this town. The truth is, that many letters from people of this town have been intercepted, which were addressed to the English, and which will be preserved by the magistrates, to be made use of in better times.

Had I delivered these remarks verbally, I should perhaps have been asked from what cause arises this ardent desire of a change of Government. In order that the Court of Spain may take the best means for curing this evil, which spreads now more than ever to all the Colonies, for it is certain that the people of this town and all those of Peru know that they are not in want of any thing for defending the town and all its dependencies from the English, French, or Spaniards, and even from legions of devils, and that they alone know how to defend themselves, without chiefs or military officers to direct them, as they have just done, I shall say, in a few words, it arises from the despotic Government established in this capital.

It is publicly stated, and had been experienced, with grief and ruin to some persons, that the Assessor Don Juan de Almagro, and the Secretary Don Manuel Gallegos, both married here, have formed the plan of gaining the Viceroy (a thing very easy, from the authority of their employments), and act as persons not responsible, the Viceroy being the man who puts his signature. They behave themselves as if they were atheists. Their relations and those in their interest alone obtain favourable decisions; and they make game of the complaints preferred by the injured to the court of Madrid, and augment their persecutions. When this is the case, they refute the most just complaints by false informations, which, upon the word of a Chief, seduced by the hypocrisy of these men, produce their effect against the innocent or against the unjustly persecuted. This is the public opinion—I never approach either of them—and once only I went to the Secretary's office for a passport to go upon some commission for the King's

service. They thought themselves not very secure among the people, and took their precautions. The Assessor, soon after the meeting of the 14th of August, 1806, left the town, and went to shelter himself under the Viceroy; and, when he was told that his employment was suspended, he went to his country-house, about 100 leagues from this town. And the Secretary never came more to his office, and retired to a villa. Notwithstanding this, the populace once cried, "Death to Gallegos!"

I cannot imagine any other remedy for the cure of this evil than that of re-establishing the ancient mode in regard to those employments—that is to say, when every Viceroy and every Captain-General chose their assessors and secretaries, whose authority ended with that of the Viceroy or Captain-General, and those who are actually employed to be sent out of the capital, or to have a retiring pension assigned them.

Many other causes of discontent exist; but the shortness of these notes and the sailing of the packet prevent me from detailing them and pointing out their remedies. I shall, however, say that there is not a man of any judgment or prudence but considers the transactions which have occurred in this town, from the reconquest to this day, as previous dispositions to its independence. In order to arrange the Government, there is much danger, and it is necessary to proceed with great circumspection. The people know already that they want not a military Chief, as they once thought when they were threatened with this invasion. They have experienced that, for their defence, Liniers and the collection of regular Colonels were of no use. They look on them with contempt when any military question is in agitation; and really, they never did any thing but plunder; and they saw that Don Martin Alzaga, Alcalde of the first election, arranged the defence of the town under the circumstances of all the military chiefs having been beaten. I conclude these observations with the following remark: In order that the Government of Buenos Ayres may be settled, it is indispensable for his Majesty to send as Viceroy

a Lieutenant-General, skilful, prudent, sagacious, and of great integrity.

I shall add another proof of the desire of the rich people for a change of Government. There is no doubt that they were in intelligence with the enemy. The artillery of the batteries of the Residencia, Retiro, and Recoleta, was found nailed up; and there is no doubt that it was nailed up on the 2nd of July. The Alcalde Alzaga has charged with this fault Don N. Sampera, captain of artillery of the militia, to whose care the said batteries were consigned; and he acknowledged that he did nail the guns; but, being asked by whose orders, he said nothing more. Alzaga will not leave this matter so quiet. So Velasquez, to whose care the stores at the Retiro were entrusted, made his escape on the morning of the general attack of the town: he left the stores locked up, and not a tool to open the doors. Being asked why he left the ammunition shut up, he answered, that Don Francisco Agustini, commander of the artillery, ordered him to lock up the doors, and Agustini was not in the Retiro on the morning of the attack. He has been three days in prison, but is already free. In the fort were also found three guns nailed up, on the days of landing. This cannot be done without much gold.

An artillery officer of militia was made flag officer in the fort (I know not his name). Agustini ordered him, on the day of the attack, to be ready to strike the colours when he ordered it. The officer answered, that the orders he had received from the commander of the fort were not to strike unless the action was lost. Agustini said, that on the bulwark nobody had to command but himself. The officer replied that there was yet time to discuss this matter with the commander. I do not say that there was any malice in Agustini: it might be the effect of ignorance, but it would be very remarkable in an experienced officer.

Excepting a few persons, all detest the English Government, and are decided to perish fighting against it. But all,

all are inclined to independence, and the reason they give for it is the despotism under which they have suffered. They complain that the Court of Madrid rewards and punishes according to the information of the Viceroys, obtained by intrigues, and despises the complaints of the injured and the merits of the subjects; and that this evil cannot be cured but by independence, as the only recourse against the will of the man who holds the supreme authority at so great a distance: and since the 20th of last July they speak with freedom, in consequence of the statement of Liniers, in which he speaks of the Viceroy. This statement is in the hands of everybody, and they say that it is full of misrepresentations, and the public openly assert that there are many lies in it; and it is supposed that the relation sent to Spain is of the same tenour. The public had already shown its opinion by pasquinades on Liniers' having selected as deputies to the Court of Spain M.M. Perison and Altolaguirre, the former of whom is brother of a woman to whom he is paying his addresses, and the latter uncle of his deceased wife. They speak freely of the recommendations which they suppose to have been obtained by means of such a woman.

A Lieutenant-General as a Viceroy is the only one who can set to rights this great disorder, and restrain an armed populace with a prudent energy. With great grief of heart I see this country violently disturbed, and I think it is necessary to accelerate the arrival of a Viceroy by the way of Portugal.

Memorandum for the Cabinet, relative to South America.

[BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.]

Draft. Downing Street, May 1, 1807.

The late despatches from Monte Video having rendered it necessary to forward, with the least practicable delay, supplies of provisions and military stores to that quarter, Lord Castlereagh deems it of importance, before any instructions are transmitted to the officers in command for the future direction of

their conduct, that the Cabinet should review the principles upon which this service has been undertaken; in order that they may determine whether it should be hereafter prosecuted on the same, or with any, and what modification.

Upon a perusal of the correspondence in the office, it does not appear that any original purpose prevailed in the Councils of the late Government, to commence operations in South America; or that, when commenced by the expedition against Buenos Ayres, they ever came to any very precise determination with respect to the principles upon which they were to be carried on.

In Mr. Windham's letter of the [blank], any intention of countenancing an immediate change in the constitution of the Settlement is disclaimed; the purposes of the expedition are confined to a mere military occupation, and the assurances to be given to the inhabitants limited to a declaration that his Majesty would, upon a peace, be disposed to attend to their interests, as far as possible.

It appears that the late Ministers were so little intent upon this object, and so little prepared to embark in it upon any fixed system of permanent policy, that although, as early as the 10th of July, they ordered a detachment to be prepared for Buenos Ayres, yet they suffered above three months to elapse after they received, on the 24th of June, the notification of Sir Home Popham having proceeded against Buenos Ayres, before they despatched any reinforcements to support him, or sent him any instructions whatever for the direction of his conduct; and they, in like manner, suffered the officers in command in the West Indies, whilst Miranda's expedition against the Caraccas was in progress, to remain in total ignorance of their intentions; the consequence of which appears to have been that this operation, unsupported by any effective aid, proceeded from a British port, with just enough of co-operation on our part to mix us in the policy and failure of the effort, but without any adequate prospect of rendering it successful.

In this state things continued till the news of the capture of Buenos Ayres arrived in September. The popularity of this acquisition, and the disposition of the commercial interest to take advantage of it, appears first to have determined the Government to follow up this object. Brigadier-General Achmuty accordingly proceeded, on the 13th of October, with 2,900 men, to the River of Plate, but without instructions to hold out any particular hopes to the inhabitants, or to aim at more than a commercial intercourse, under the protection of a military occupation.

Early in November, Brigadier-General Craufurd proceeded, with about 4,000 men, to establish a similar military occupancy on the western coast of South America, in the province of Chili; but without any precise object of attack in view.

It also appears that subsequently some progress had been made in arranging, though not in executing, an operation against Mexico, in which a force of about 8,000 men (assembling at Jamaica), under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was to be landed in the vicinity of Vera Cruz, and to proceed, in co-operation with a corps of about 3,000, then to debark from India on the opposite coast, to establish a military occupancy, upon similar principles, in that rich and populous kingdom.

It appears that, when the British troops first landed at Buenos Ayres, they only met with a nominal resistance: they were feebly opposed for two days by the militia of the country; but, so soon as possession was taken of the town, the inhabitants submitted with apparent cheerfulness. The Governor having fled, the Cabildo, composed of the leading natives, being the chief local authority, concerted measures for preserving order, &c., with great apparent cordiality, with the British Commanders, and even took steps in concert with the latter for recovering by force a considerable treasure which the Spanish Governor had carried off with him.

It is stated by Sir Home Popham and other officers, that the people became early inquisitive whether the English troops

came there to aid them in throwing off the Spanish yoke. The smallness of our force persuaded them at first that our only purpose in coming there must be to support the views of the inhabitants, and not to attempt any conquest on our own part, with means apparently so inadequate. This point was pressed to a distinct explanation; but neither General Beresford nor Sir Home Popham felt themselves authorized to hold any other language than that of taking possession in the King's name, till his further pleasure should be known.

The principal officers of the Spanish Government, who had retired on the approach of the British force, having assembled troops from Monte Video and also a proportion of the militia of the country, found the population of Buenos Ayres, thus disappointed in their expectations, ready to co-operate in our expulsion; and the corps under General Beresford was, in the course of a month, after they had thought themselves securely established, compelled to surrender.

A reinforcement of about 1,900 men, very ill provided, soon arrived from the Cape, but not in time to support General Beresford: they were too weak to undertake any effectual operations to recover Buenos Ayres, or take Monte Video, and were obliged to establish themselves at Maldonado, a very defective port, there to await reinforcements from England. In this position they continued from the month of October till January; during which period the Spanish Government, having this unequivocal proof of our determination to renew the attack, was enabled to arrange their measures of defence.

Upon the reduction of Monte Video, General Achmuty, with a garrison of about 4,500 men, did not consider himself as competent to undertake, until reinforcements should arrive, any further operation for the reduction of the town or province of Buenos Ayres. Some disposition to desert, in consequence of the great temptation in money, &c., held out to the men, and the intrigues of the priests, had shown itself among the troops. About twenty men deserted from Maldonado, and were

found acting as soldiers among the Spanish garrison of Monte Video (several of whom, however, are stated to have been Protestants). The General further expresses considerable anxiety about his supplies, in consequence of the means which the enemy had, by their numerous cavalry, of confining his intercourse with the interior. He estimates the enemy's force outstanding in the field at about 8,000 men, the greater part of which, it is probable, would retire for the defence of Buenos Ayres.

Early in January, upon information being received that Buenos Ayres was retaken, the Fly sloop was despatched to St. Jago with orders to General Craufurd not to proceed to Chili, but to Rio Janeiro, there to join General Achmuty, and to co-operate with him in the recovery of Buenos Ayres, with its dependencies. Before the Fly arrived at St. Jago, Brigadier-General Craufurd, afraid of his supplies being exhausted by waiting any longer for Admiral Murray, had sailed on the 3rd or 4th of January for the Cape, there to refresh, and afterwards to proceed, touching at New South Wales, to Chili. Admiral Murray arrived at Porto Praya seven days after Brigadier-General Craufurd had sailed, and followed him to the Cape. The Fly arrived three days later than Admiral Murray, and proceeded to the same destination.

As General Craufurd was encumbered with transports, little doubt can remain that both Admiral Murray and the Fly would join him at the Cape, and consequently that his force would proceed to the Plata; but, allowing two months for the voyage from Porto Praya to the Cape, and from eight to ten weeks for his passage from the Cape to South America, it is not to be expected that he could arrive in the Plata before the middle of May, soon after which time about 1,600 men, sent out in March with General Whitelocke, may also be expected to have arrived. The force which will then be assembled under General Whitelocke may be estimated at nearly 10,000 men, exclusive of General Beresford's corps of 1,100 men, now prisoners, which may probably be recovered.

With a force so considerable, there can be little doubt that Buenos Ayres must again fall into our possession; and it is to be hoped, notwithstanding General Achmuty carries the amount of force which he deems requisite to occupy the country effectually to 15,000 men, that the enemy's militia may be dispersed, and tranquillity so far restored as to put us in possession of such advantages as may be derived from that country by a military occupancy to be maintained by force of arms.

The question for the Cabinet to decide, and to the general bearings of which Lord Castlereagh is solicitous to call their attention, is, whether the value of such an occupancy and such a connexion, either during war, or upon a peace, is such as to compensate for the drain and incumbrance it must prove upon our other military operations and on our population; and, if not, whether some principle of acting more consonant to the sentiments and interests of the people of South America cannot be taken up, which, whilst it shall not involve us in any system of measures, which, on grounds of political morality, ought to be avoided, may relieve us from the hopeless task of conquering this extensive country, against the temper of its population.

It is not wonderful that the people of all classes should look with great jealousy to the circumstances under which we come amongst them. Our force is not adequate to their reduction, or effectual protection: they see no disposition, on our part, to have recourse to any exertion of theirs in support of a common interest. We give them no assurance of not being surrendered upon a peace to their former masters—an assurance which could alone render it prudent for them to expose themselves to the vengeance of a severe Government, under whose superintendence they must expect to be soon replaced.

It is not meant to disguise the serious objections that may occur to charging ourselves with the protection of the independence of this part of Spanish America, upon a peace, against the parent State, even supposing all difficulties as to its internal system of government were removed: but, unless we are pre-

pared to encounter these difficulties upon some enlarged principle which shall be intelligible and captivating to the country, the progress of our arms cannot well be expected to lead to any permanent national advantage; and it may even be doubtful whether the silent and imperceptible operation of our illicit commercial intercourse with that portion of the world during war would not be more operative and beneficial, if we approached it only as traders, than when, by approaching it as enemies, a new energy is given to the local government, which may probably enable them the better to enforce the prohibitory regulations against our commerce.

Independent, however, of the effect of taking upon ourselves the duty of guaranteeing the independence of Spanish America, the most serious objections that have occurred to those who have considered the policy of countenancing separation, are the probability that any local government which might be established would become democratic and revolutionary, and that, in endeavouring to promote and combine the happiness of the people with the extension of our own commerce, we might, in destroying a bad government, leave them without any government at all.

To the two extreme propositions, namely, either that of conquest, with a view to a permanent possession in ourselves, or to an endeavour to dissolve the existing government, without any precaution as to the system which is to replace it, there seems to be the most insuperable objections. To any intermediate course of policy, a variety of objections must be expected to attach, which would be at once conclusive against the attempt, if the affairs of the world were proceeding in the ordinary course. But, while the territory of Old Spain is, in fact, a French province, and whilst not only the fleets and armies of Spain, but of France, are put in motion against us by the resources of Spanish America, we are *driven to consider* whether those resources may not be made the means of creating and supporting an amicable and local government, with which those

commercial relations may freely subsist which it is alone our interest to aim at, and which the people of South America must equally desire.

Under any favourable prospect of restoring Europe to something like its former system, the temptation to risk much in any attempt of this nature would be proportionably diminished; but, if we are to carve out a separate existence for ourselves, and to seek to replace those channels of commerce which may be interrupted or shut against us, by opening others less exposed to French power, new and greater efforts must be made.

In looking to any scheme for liberating South America, it seems indispensable that we should not present ourselves in any other light than as auxiliaries and protectors. In order to prove our sincerity in this respect, we should be prepared to pursue our object by a native force, to be created under our countenance; and the particular interest which we should be understood alone to propose to ourselves should be the depriving our enemy of one of his chief resources, and the opening to our manufactures the markets of that great Continent.

In pursuing two objects of such legitimate advantage, we are only bound to restrain our efforts so far as not unnecessarily to incur the responsibility of having involved that country in anarchy and confusion. The danger of such a result must be in proportion to the extent of the change which will be requisite to produce the object aimed at; namely, the separation of that Continent from its indirect subjugation to France, and the establishment within it of a local government, by which the interests of the inhabitants may be better consulted than they now are. If it were possible, without dissolving the frame of the Government, without destroying the monarchy which now exists, to commit the power and authority of the Sovereign to other hands, and that the Prince on the throne should live amongst his subjects, and have no longer any motive to sacrifice their interests to the supposed advantages of any other portion of his empire, so far as we can hope to effect any change

of Government, without destroying the elements of authority, such a transfer of power does not appear impracticable or objectionable, and it is not difficult to imagine a variety of indulgences which might be connected with such a change, and which would interest the people in its support.

The means of creating and supporting a military force would enable the Government, without taxation, to strengthen itself, and speedily to dispense with the presence of a British army.

If the change could be brought about on these principles, it ought to be our policy to support the pretensions of some member of the Bourbon family, as naturally connected with that Monarchy, rather than any Prince more immediately connected with our own Crown.

The similarity of religion would render him more acceptable to those of Spanish extraction. Not being too near in the succession to the Crown of France, if established in Spanish America, there would be little jealousy of the regal power being again merged in that of a distant State. The native Americans might perhaps incline rather to a frame of government more resembling that of North America, in which their numbers might have more influence; but between such a system and the present Spanish authority they could not hesitate.

The practicability of such an attempt must be extremely dubious; but, in searching for some middle measure, as a compromise between the extreme principles which have been above stated, it has occurred as worth considering, whether some attempt should not be made to sound the dispositions of the inhabitants, to state to them the principles upon which we should be alone disposed to co-operate with them in rendering them independent, and to try whether a concurrence might not be obtained, with a view to such a rational system of government as we might, without disgrace, profess our determination to protect.

The degree in which the resources of South America have operated in the last seventeen years, to exclude the Bourbons from the throne of France, would make it a natural object of

policy to the family to lend themselves to an arrangement which should effectually cut off that hostile supply; and were such an enterprising individual as the Duke of Orleans, with their concurrence, to undertake it, the object might perhaps be accomplished, and, in that case, *must* prove beneficial to us.

In the event of his being deemed a proper person to look to, he might, in the first instance, embark in it only as a military man, governing himself afterwards according to circumstances. A great number of French officers could be easily prevailed on to embark with him. It is probable Miranda might be induced to follow his fortunes; Dumouriez certainly would; and we might thus obtain the means of expeditiously creating a native force, which would render the operation comparatively easy to us.

As things formerly stood, one should hesitate much in planting any thing like French power in any part of the globe from which we could exclude it; but, looking at the mode, the degree, and the circumstances, under which it would in this case exist, the corrections and checks it would have on the spot, its separation from France, at least whilst France shall continue under its present frame of government, and the necessary dependence and intercourse which, for a great length of time, it must have with us, it seems an instrument which might be used at present with greater prospects of advantage than danger.

The determination whether we ought to prosecute the object of South America seriously and upon system may perhaps, in a considerable degree, depend on the turn things shall take in the next three months on the Continent. Lord Castlereagh has thought he ought not, however, to delay bringing something in sufficient detail before the Cabinet, to invite a general consideration of this delicate and important question. His own mind is by no means settled on this point, and he begs to be understood as not so much submitting opinions to his col-

leagues, as throwing out such ideas as may serve to provoke discussion.

He certainly does entertain a very *strong persuasion* that the policy upon which we are now acting will be productive of little commercial or political benefit, and must be felt as a great waste of our military means. He is, therefore, desirous that the Cabinet should come to a decision as early as possible of the views and plan on which (finding the scheme thus begun by their predecessors) they are disposed to recommend that it should be followed up. Till this is done, it is difficult to submit for their approbation any instructions for the conduct of the officers charged with that service.

MEMOIR OF THE MOSQUITO TERRITORY.

In the years 1805 and 1806, having the command of his Majesty's naval forces in the Bay of Honduras, extending from the province of Yucatan to the extent of the Mosquito Shore, I had many opportunities of remarking and reflecting on the importance of the latter country. In this pursuit I was very ably assisted by a reverend gentleman who resided there many years, when it was formerly in our possession, and who, as respects his general knowledge of men, manners, and things, is excelled by no one in the settlement of Honduras.

In the several conversations I had with this gentleman, he requested me, in conjunction with many others, to commit to writing my own observations and reflections, as well as their local knowledge of the importance of the acquisition of that extensive territory and traffic; all which was solemnly tendered to me by two of the Mosquito Princes, deputed for that purpose by the king of the country, whose crown is hereditary. They were willing, in the capacity of plenipotentiaries, to swear fealty to the Crown of Great Britain, and offered lands and possessions to all that were recommended by me, who

would come and settle among them, only requiring in return protection and friendship. On those conditions they were christened: one after the military, the other after the naval commandant. I gave them assurances that, on my return to England, I should lay their propositions and wishes before the King's Government and the merchants of Great Britain; and they then departed to their own country, much gratified with the hope of having the English again among them.

In commencing my memoir, I am not fearful that my zeal for this unhappy and neglected country can carry me beyond the bounds of rigid truth; knowing, as I do, that my description must fall very far short of the actual fact, both as to the produce of the country, and the good disposition and sincere affection of its inhabitants towards the British nation.

The Mosquito Shore extends from the Point of Castile, or Cape Honduras, being the south point of Truxillo Bay, to the northern branch of the river Nicaragua, called St. Juan's, on the southward, being 182 leagues of shore. A chain of lofty mountains runs diagonally from Point Castile to St. Juan's, and serves as a strong barrier between the Spanish and the Mosquito territories. The area of the latter, which is one-third larger than the kingdom of Portugal, forms an irregular triangle, of which Cape Gracias a Dios makes the apex.

No country enjoys more advantages from water-carriage; as, besides nineteen rivers navigable for small craft up to the very interior, a chain of lagoons line the coast, accessible at the mouths of the different rivers. The climate is mild for those latitudes; and, being continental, not near so warm as the islands in the same parallel. The soil is so rich, that, until three or four seasons of rattoon canes have in some degree impoverished the land, no sugar can be produced. The first growths rise to the great height of sixteen or eighteen feet, and several inches in diameter, which naturally impoverishes the saccharine juices. This fact must sufficiently prove the great fertility of the soil in producing maize, Indian corn,

cotton, indigo, coffee, and provisions, which far exceeds any thing known in the West India Islands.

Endless tracts of pine ridges would supply an inexhaustible fund of tar and turpentine, the trees being so redundant with those liquors that, when put into the deepest rivers, they instantly sink. The savannahs, or plains, afford the richest pasturage. The rivers and sea-coast are exceeded by no country for the great abundance of all sorts of fish, and which are caught with the greatest facility. Many of the rivers, by washing the sand in fine sieves, furnish the native globules of pure gold. Gold mines, and those very rich, have been here discovered. I shall particularly mention one at Alprapayer, which might have been of infinite benefit to those concerned, had honesty in the conducting it been as proportionably attended to as the mine was rich.

The woods have an inexhaustible variety and great quantities of game, and plenty of poultry is every where to be found: the former is delicious in its flavour, and the latter is easily to be obtained. Medicinal gums and drugs are plentifully dispersed all over the country; there are the tono, or elastic gum; gum copal, balsam of capivi; sarsaparilla, of the finest quality, &c. It abounds also with mahogany, cedar, zebra or palmarotta wood, with many other kinds useful for every purpose of husbandry, the erection of buildings, &c. There is also plenty of large, beautiful deer, antelopes, buffaloes, mountain cows, &c. The coast affords a superabundance of turtle from the middle of April to the end of September, both by nets and on the beach, of the very best quality, together with the hawksbill turtle, from whose back the tortoiseshell is produced. In short, take the Mosquito Shore in all points of view, it far surpasses every part of the West Indies.

Truxillo harbour, being the northernmost extreme of the Mosquito Shore, is a noble, large bay, where are the commodious harbours of little and big Puerto Novo, and where large vessels may lie in perfect safety. This bay abounds with fish,

game, wood, and excellent water. Luke's Key, or Island, lies at the entrance of Truxillo Bay; the islands of Bonacca, Helum, Morat, and Rattan, with Barbareith, lie off Truxillo. Rattan and Bonacca, on account of the goodness of the soil, the salubrity of the air, the pureness of the water, and the convenience of very fine harbours, and fish, wild hogs, cocoa-nuts, &c., with which they abound, are proverbially called in that country the garden of the West Indies, and the key to Spanish America and New Gibraltar.

Cape Gracias a Dios is a noble, extensive harbour, where Commodore Parry anchored, in the year 1782, with his squadron, consisting of a 50-gun ship and some heavy frigates. This bay is open to no winds but a south-east. The Cape Keys lies off this place, abounds with turtle all the year round. Distant from thence about fifteen leagues is Pearl Key Lagoon, which has small keys all round, and, lying off it, form good anchorage. Bluefields has a bar; at high water, there is sixteen feet over it. When inside, it forms a noble basin of water, capable of holding a thousand sail of shipping. It may be proper in this place to observe that, on account of the number of fresh water rivers emptying themselves into the harbours on the Mosquito Shore, none but copper-bottomed vessels ought to be employed in them, or even in navigating those seas. There is another river, which lies under False Cape northerly, called Crouch river, where there is from nine to eleven feet of water over its bar.

The soundings along the Mosquito Shore are very regular; you are to stand no nearer than five fathoms, nor more than ten to twelve off from Potock to the Cape. Off False Cape there is a dangerous shoal, called Cape Bank; and there is a chain of reefs and keys, with passages between, towards the Cape. The north extreme commences at Carratasco reef, nearly abreast of Potock, which reef makes in the form of a half circle towards the sea, and three keys a good distance further out. The best book of directions for the Bay and Mosquito

Shore is Earl's, which, if there is no error in the publisher, is from his own actual observations, and in most instances has been found sufficiently correct. As Bluefield's Bluff fully commands the entrance of the harbour, a small force stationed there would keep off a great and numerous enemy.

The pirates who anciently infested, in a peculiar manner, the American seas, appear to have been the first of our countrymen who were acquainted with the Mosquito Shore. The difficulty, or rather impossibility, at that time of large vessels pursuing them into the rivers, on account of the shifting bars, and sometimes the shallowness of the water, rendered them safe harbours; and, at the same time, the lagoons, running from twenty, thirty, and fifty leagues withinside the beach, afforded them proper retreats for victualling and refitting. Here arose the necessity of friendly intercourse with the Indians, which, in process of time, extended to a commercial communication, productive of benefit to both parties: and hence originated among the natives the first knowledge of arms.

After the pirates were extirpated from these parts, succeeded the unhappy English sufferers who escaped from Spanish cruelty in the Bay of Campeachy, seeking here an asylum; and, as they fled from an enemy to whom the Mosquito Indians have an unconquerable and hereditary aversion, added to their good opinion of the English, they were received as their brethren, lands assigned to them, and a colony established. From this small colony they took their first hints of establishing a police; and this era marks the first dawning of civilization. The warmest friendship subsisted between them. So fraught were they with the ideas of English honour, probity, and justice, and the dignity of a British king, that, in the year 1687, the then Mosquito king, with the full consent of his tribes, made a formal and voluntary cession of the Mosquito Shore to the King of England; and, although the Indian crown is hereditary, yet no public act of his was acknowledged valid

until his title was recognised and ratified by the Governor of Jamaica, or the Superintendent of the Shore, acting under the Governor of that island. The late King George, who was murdered by his own subjects at Black River, was crowned Chief of the Mosquito Shore, at the chief settlement, Black River, by Captain, afterwards Colonel, Laurie, in March, 1777, where a fort had been erected at the end of the war, in 1763; and, with a single company of the 49th Regiment, assisted by the Indians, the turbulent spirit of the Spaniards was so quelled, that the colony was in a state of perfect safety.

Lord Halifax, at that time, by letter declared that the Mosquito shore was a British settlement; and Lord Dartmouth, in the year 1775, ordered a legislative council to be chosen there. In consequence of the Governor of Jamaica's commission, a Court of Common Pleas was established in 1776; hence it was deemed a part of the British territories, and in commissions, &c., joined with Bonacca and Rattan, as depending on and annexed to the government of Jamaica. However matters may now be contradicted, it is certain that, in Lord Hillsborough's administration, a particular commission did actually pass through his office, erecting this Government independent of Jamaica, in the person of the Superintendent and Council. It was afterwards revoked; lest, as it was alleged, it might give umbrage to the Governor of that island, who afterwards, construing (it is supposed through error) the 17th Article of the Treaty of Versailles into an acknowledgment of a Spanish territorial right, directed the fort at Black River to be razed, caused the ordnance to be conveyed to Jamaica, and ordered off the detachment of British soldiers commanded by Colonel Laurie. Thus were the Mosquito Indians abandoned, and of course all control over the acts and proceedings of their Government resigned by England. From that time up to the present, the natives have themselves defended the coast, and successfully resisted the attacks of their hereditary and implacable enemies the Spaniards, resolved, to a man, to shed the

last drop of their blood, rather than subject themselves to their authority, or recognise them as friends.

On the Mosquito Shore were eleven tribes of Indians inhabiting different districts, viz., the Patooks, Ramas, Cocorracks, Woolways, Tonglaws, Uticaws, Towacaws, Parramacaws, Poyers, Mosquito Sambais, and Samboes. The Patook men were extirpated by Spanish perfidy, the particulars of which act of atrocity are too well known and notorious to render it necessary to detail them here. The Ramas inhabit the most southern part between St. Juan's and Bluefields, and, at various periods of the year, carry on a considerable traffic with the Spaniards. It would be very desirable to make friends of these people, as, through their country, a passage might easily be found to the rich cities of Leon and Grenada. The Cocorracks are denominated wild and tame, to distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized. The Woolways, aback of Pearl Key Lagoon and Brangman's Bluff, with the Tonglaws, Uticaws, Towacaws, Parramacaws, and Poyers, from Wankis River to the Great Rocks, are the inhabitants of the interior. These six nations form a barrier between the Spaniards and the whole of the Mosquito territory.

The Mosquito Samboes inhabit the coast from Bluefields to Tibuppy, under the orders of two of their own chiefs, called the Admiral and the Governor. They were ever considered the best tribes of Mosquito men, from their industry, good order, and quiet disposition; but they were not liked by the Samboes, who, some years ago, with their late murdered king at their head, extirpated nearly the whole of them, and hung their chiefs. The Samboe race of Mosquito men inhabit the country from Sandy Bay to Polock, tolerably numerous, rather indolent, most of their labour being performed by their wives. There is no mode of ascertaining their numbers; but, from many circumstances, it might be inferred that 500 men might be induced to follow an army without injury to their own country. They are particularly useful as woodsmen, and

skilful in hunting, striking fish, managing bateaux canoes, dories, pitpans, &c., either on rapid rivers, or in high surf-beaches. They entertain an idea that, in whatever services their relations or friends may lose their lives, or die, such must be paid for, and it has been regularly demanded, even in battle. When satisfactory answers have not been given, they have been known to retreat in the most dangerous and disorderly manner; as, on the contrary, if they had been promised payment, they might have materially assisted in defeating the Spanish dragoons in the plain of either Wutigulpha or Matigulpha. Those people worship evil spirits, giving, as a reason for doing so, that good ones will do them no harm, and they are afraid the evil ones will. Among the worst is the Woolsaw—the Devil. Immediately on any of their people dying, they desert the habitation, and build themselves a new settlement.

The difference of complexion, so observable between the Samboe and all the other tribes, I account for by the fate of a Guinea ship, wrecked on their coast, when all the males were murdered, and the females taken as wives, of whom they take as many as they are able to support, the first wife usually enjoying the pre-eminence, living together in much apparent harmony, taking it by turns to attend each other at the delivery of their children, whom, as soon as born, they take and throw themselves into the coldest rivers, and it is surprising no accidents or ill effects are ever produced by this practice, either on the mother or the new-born babe, to whom, as it grows up, they are extremely indulgent: it is very rarely that they chide, and they never beat them.

Innumerable other observations suggest themselves to me, as connected with this important subject. I will wave narrating them: first, because I am anxious to avoid spinning out my memoir to a tedious length; and, secondly, because I am confident the sketch I have given must bring home, with irresistible force, to the intelligent and reflecting mind, this positive and

incontrovertible fact, viz., that the Mosquito territory, on account of the excessive richness of its soil, the luxuriance of its woods, the great salubrity of its air, the most remarkable excellence of its provisions and water, with its almost unrivalled harbours for shipping, with which the shore abounds, would, under the polishing hand of British protection, soon shine forth one of the brightest jewels in the British diadem; and I do insist that Spain might suffer a mortal wound in her American interest, by accepting the Indian offer, and by a comparatively small force being stationed there.

J. WRIGHT, late Commander H.M.S. Swift.

Memoir on Spanish America, and the Viceroyalty of Mexico in particular.

BY THE DUKE OF ORLEANS.

The object of this Memoir is threefold: first, to prove that scarcely any combination of events whatever can prevent a revolution from taking place in Spanish America; for, if things are allowed to go on as they do at this moment, a formidable convulsion must take place in that country, and that nothing but the timely and well directed interference of Great Britain can rescue that important quarter of the globe from falling a prey to Jacobinism, and save the world from the dreadful consequences which would inevitably follow that lamentable event: secondly, to show the advantages which are to be expected from such interference on the part of Great Britain: and, lastly, to point out the means by which an enterprise at the same time the most brilliant and the most important can be carried into execution, together with the measures necessary to protect that immense country against the dreadful calamities of a revolution that would be equally injurious to the country and to the real interests, not only of Great Britain, but of all the Sovereigns of Europe.

The illiberal policy of Spain towards her transatlantic pos-

sessions is well known, but it is not equally understood that the system can now no longer be kept up, and that nothing whatever can protract the existence of Spanish America under its present Government. The power of Spain over America is decreasing every day; for that country is unable to furnish the means of supporting the trade; Spain cannot send the troops required both to keep the inhabitants in subjection, and to repel the invasion of a foreign enemy: in fact, she reigns over America only by the sufferance of other powers, and, above all, by that of Great Britain. The proprietors in Spanish America are all natives; and, with the exception of the Viceroys, Governors, and a few officers, the whole force of the country is in the hands of the inhabitants themselves. This is one of the principal causes that render it impossible for the King of Spain to go on with the system that he has hitherto pursued in the Government and administration of that country. At the same time, it is evident that, the moment he relinquishes that system, he must also relinquish the sovereignty of his American dominions; and the time is actually come when he can maintain that sovereignty no longer; it must be superseded—the thing is unavoidable; but it may be superseded in various ways; and, as I have said, the object of this Memoir is to prove that a due sense of her dignity and real interests must induce Great Britain to take the lead, and avert the great dangers that would attend an event of so much magnitude and political importance, were it to take a wrong turn, by adopting such measures as will direct this revolution—for such only can it be termed—into the channel that alone can conduct it to a fortunate termination, in a manner at once honourable, easy, and of incalculable advantage to her resources and power. Therefore, the question is, not whether the Continent of Spanish America and its appendages can remain any longer in that state of comparative nullity to which it has been confined till the present time, nor whether its separation from Spain can or ought to be prevented; but the real ques-

tion is this—What course shall the important event of the revolution of that country take?—what country shall next reap the immense harvest which it now offers?—and what country shall derive from it the means of striking a blow at their adversaries' power? Shall it be France, or shall it be Great Britain? Such is really the question, on the decision of which may rest the fate of the world.

The French may secure the disposal and command of Spanish America, at a much cheaper rate than is generally believed. A few important and well known garrisons on the Spanish shores would give them the command of the whole Continent and of its resources: indeed, the acquisition of Louisiana would have been sufficient to ensure them the conquest of the whole; but, be that as it may, the subjection of the coast of Spain to the French Government is too complete to allow one doubt that, whenever France chooses to put garrisons into the principal forts of Spanish America, the King of Spain will submit to her demands. It is well known, also, that small expeditions may at all times escape the vigilance even of British cruisers; and if once the French obtain possession either of Vera Cruz, of the Isthmus of Panama, or the Rio de la Plata, or the Brazils, they will soon revolutionize the whole country in their own way. The commanders of the French army of St. Domingo, should there be any part of it left, may likewise, and will probably, be employed to such purposes. The blockade of St. Domingo can never be depended upon, on account of the winds and currents of those seas; besides, the distance from St. Domingo to Vera Cruz is a very short one, since both wind and stream are constantly favourable, and the French would always have it in their power to take shelter in a friendly harbour, all along the coast of Cuba.

If a French force is once landed on the Spanish American Continent, the business is settled; and Moreau, Massena, Augereau, or any such person, will soon be Consul of Mexico or Peru, and assist the favourite system of upstarts, by direct-

ing the great strength and resources of those countries against the British Empire and the whole system of regular governments. Revolutionary governments can never be sufficiently secure at home to indulge their subjects in the encouragement of industry and trade, and in an increase of their wealth by fair means; they know no other way of acquiring wealth but that of conquest and devastation.

Jamaica and the other islands are objects neither remote nor difficult of access, in consequence of the constant regularity of the currents and winds, and of the numerous shoals that have rendered it utterly impracticable to destroy the French privateers in those seas. We have all read of Flibustiers and Buccaneers; but on what an enlarged scale would this buccaneering system be carried on, if the resources and population of Spanish America were allowed to be at the command and disposal of the modern freebooters, and to be combined under the influence of France, and, by her activity, with the seeds of revolution and disorganization now existing in the West Indies!

However strange the assertion may be, it is, nevertheless, a true one, that Mexico is nearer to India than Suez and Egypt; and, therefore, from the facility of navigating the South Sea, from the abundance of all sorts of stores adapted to the construction and armament of vessels, from the immense wealth and considerable population of that country, some dangerous blows may be aimed at the British power in India from Spanish America. These considerations acquire a still greater degree of weight, when we find the Cape of Good Hope and Manilla, the two central rendezvous between Europe, India, and America, in the hands of the French, or at least in those of their vassals, the Dutch and Spaniards: but I go still further, and assert that the establishment in America, at once regular and independent, and hostile to the modern system of Jacobinism, can alone prevent the thread of connexion between that country and Spain being cut by the inhabitants themselves, the con-

sequence of which would be the introduction of Jacobinism, whether the French have a footing in the country or not; and that alone would be sufficient to secure to France an intimate connexion with that country, if not the conquest of it.

Commercial considerations alone cannot prevent the establishment of a revolutionary, democratic, military Government, which will always be hostile to Great Britain. Another consequence very injurious to the interests of Great Britain would also take place, if things were allowed to go on in that manner; this is no less than the increase of democratic interest in the United States, and, consequently, the extension of French influence over them. This would probably produce the loss of Canada and the British continental possessions in America. It is, therefore, extremely probable that, unless Great Britain secures in due time the resources and power of Spanish America, she will not only lose the immense advantages which she might derive from them, but they will be most actively employed against her, and she will lose with them and by them the whole of her American empire. On the contrary, if Great Britain herself gives the impulse; if she establishes in Spanish America an independent and regular Government, upon the solid basis of an hereditary monarchy, she will secure for her own use all the resources of those countries; because governments of that description will ever look to her for that support and defence, and they will, consequently, maintain with her an alliance as close as circumstances will allow.

Besides, regular Governments are always found to act respecting alliances upon the real interests of the countries over which they preside; and these are, in our days, with regular Governments, stronger motives than the ties of blood or consanguinity; and no doubt the interest of America is an offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain.

The advantages which Britain will derive by rescuing America from the clutches of Jacobinism, and by establishing in those countries regular Governments on a solid basis, will be

easily perceived and briefly enumerated. In the first place, it would deprive the enemies of Britain of all means of attack against the British possessions in America. After the loss of his continental possessions in America, the King of Spain will be unable to preserve either Cuba or Porto Rico. He can neither garrison them, nor pay the expenses of their Government. These islands would fall under the dominion of Britain, and these acquisitions would secure to her the command of the whole archipelago of the West Indies, and render her empire in America as invulnerable as it is in India, and, perhaps, still more so.

It seems unnecessary to dwell upon the commercial advantages that Great Britain would derive from this important change in the Government of Spanish America; still I must be permitted to say that they appear to be such as to exceed all calculation. It would throw the whole of the West India trade into the hands of Britain; it would render the trade of the eastern coasts of the United States entirely subservient to that of Great Britain; and the supplies of corn, timber, &c., from the Spanish continent would establish such a competition in the market as to render their trade completely dependent on the will of Britain. This would compel them to sue for her alliance, and to purchase it at almost any price. I do not speak here of Louisiana, and the countries upon the banks of the Mississippi: there must be a rivalship between these and the eastern States, which will daily increase their dependence upon Great Britain. The trade of Spanish America would also fall upon Britain: whatever the Americans may do, no article of their produce can find a market in this country, as neither corn, timber, nor any article produced by the United States, is deficient in Spanish America. This country is even so well supplied with all these articles as to be able to furnish a large proportion of them for the West India consumption and at a cheaper rate. The inhabitants of that country require only for their own use dry goods and British produce. The nature

of things would, therefore, reduce the Americans to be mere carriers of goods for Great Britain, and consequently their trade would always be limited to the extent allowed by her. The trade of Spanish America thus possessed by Great Britain would also supply her with all sorts of timber for the construction of her ships, and chiefly with those valuable sorts of wood hitherto unemployed by any nation except the Spaniards themselves. It is to these sorts of wood that the durability of their ships of war is to be ascribed. Cedar, now so scarce, mahogany, and various other kinds of timber, equally valuable, although not equally well known, might then be procured in any quantity, at a cheap rate. This would be equally advantageous to trade, as these sorts of wood are the finest for articles of furniture.

Copper and hemp might also be procured, the former immediately, and in great abundance. The cultivation of the latter might be easily encouraged, and in a very short time be carried to any extent by Britain. These supplies from Spanish America would enable Britain to support, without any embarrassment, the interruption or loss of the Baltic trade, should that event ever take place hereafter. The produce of the gold and silver mines, which is now an article of trade, would then be at the disposal of Britain.

It is out of my power to calculate the consequences of such events. They must evidently be productive of prodigious advantages to Britain. She would then be placed almost beyond the reach of hostile projects in Europe; and, this becoming daily more and more evident, her importance would rise in proportion, and she would then be enabled to take in continental transactions that part which becomes her power and rank. Of what consequence would it then be to shut all the harbours of Europe, when she is possessed, for the consumption of her produce, of such an emporium as America! Who could ever cherish a hope of wresting from her the command of the seas, when her empire in Asia and America would

be placed beyond the possibility of attack; and, when the trade and resources of these countries would amply afford the means of supporting the burdens of her naval and military establishments? The security of the British Empire in America would also enable Great Britain to reduce her establishment in that part of the world, and this would afford the means of considerably increasing her disposable force in Europe, and diminishing greatly the loss of men she has hitherto suffered from the West India climate!

Besides, I have no doubt that great bodies of auxiliary troops might be procured in Spanish America, and might be advantageously employed to relieve, to a still greater extent, Britain from the burden of furnishing garrisons for America.

Great as these advantages may appear, there are others of less magnitude, but of no less importance, in the present crisis. The diminution of the importance of the Spanish empire is one of them. Spain is and will remain totally dependent on France; the loss of America will deprive her of the remains of her former greatness; and the consequences of this change, even within her own confines, must be very injurious to France, who has at present the command of her resources and power. When Spain loses America, the loss will be complete and irrecoverable: no negociation, no treaty, can restore that sovereignty to her. There is for Spain no chance of trade, no chance of commercial connexions with her former possessions, as there was for Great Britain after the loss of her Colonies, nor can there be any comparison between the two situations; since, in the one instance, colonies established by Britain herself were lost; whereas, in the other, Spain would only be deprived of a country she had formerly conquered. Spain, confined in her European dominions, would fall a prey to all kinds of embarrassments and difficulties: her sources of revenue being dried up, she will be unable to support her expensive court, her navy, and even her army.

If any event can give to Spain a due sense of her present

state of degradation, and restore her to her former energy, it is the loss of America. After that event, the interests of France and Spain will become daily more clashing. Spain will have no money to bribe French rulers, and they will find her a burdensome and useless ally.

The means of carrying this enterprise into execution are, first, to give a solemn pledge to the inhabitants of the Continent of Spanish America that it is not intended either to conquer their country, or to subject it to any European sovereign; that, on the contrary, it is from a due sense of the impossibility of any European sovereign governing their country, under the present circumstances, that Britain is induced to interfere in her affairs; that, on the one hand, the subjection of Spain to France, and, on the other, the ascendency of Britain over the seas, makes it impossible for the King of Spain, or any other European sovereign, to govern them, and to protect them against their natural enemies; that the command Britain has over the seas covers them against any attack from Europe; that the only object of her interference in their affairs is to preserve them from the impending danger of anarchy and French oppression, to which they must otherwise be abandoned, through the treachery, or at least the impotence, of the Spanish Government; that that would be equally injurious to themselves and to Britain, since they would be ransacked and plundered, whilst the wealth and resources wrested from them would be turned against herself, who is the only power that can assist them in carrying on their trade, either in time of war or time of peace; that, to attain the proposed object, it is the intention of the King of Great Britain to establish in their country regular monarchical Governments, in the person of a prince or princes to reside in their country, who should pledge themselves to the forfeiture of their American sovereignties, if they ceased to reside in America, or if they assumed any European sovereignty. It would be also necessary for such a prince to pledge himself that the interior government and administration of the

country should be altered as little as possible. He should promise freedom of cultivation of trade, and of intercourse with foreign nations indiscriminately; though under the usual restrictions of Custom-House duties, &c. Ample security should also be given on the score of religion.

Secondly, the prince intended to be the sovereign of Mexico should be sent there with a force comparatively small, but sufficient to take post on the coast, to protect his person, and to assist his operations in the manner that shall be hereinafter explained.

It is not for me to suggest what prince Great Britain ought to present to the Mexicans. This important investiture must rest with the King and his Government, to bestow as in old feudal times. There are many princes who might be thought of, and no doubt some might be found in his Majesty's family who are equal to this enterprise, and capable of rendering this great service to their Royal Father, to their country, and to the great cause of royalty now at stake, by opposing the propagation of republican principles, and by founding in America an hereditary monarchy, whose interests would ever be congenial to those of Great Britain.

The adoption of such measures, at a time when the inhabitants of South America are ready to grasp at any thing to obtain a change from their present situation, would probably meet with their unanimous concurrence. It is, however, certain that, should they be left to themselves, they would fall into Jacobinism, and a revolution would then take place on the basis of those principles; and this is, above all, what must be prevented by Great Britain. The proposal I have above suggested, coming from Britain, supported by her powerful resources, will open to them an easy road to the grand object they have at heart—namely, to become independent of Spain; to obtain a Government of their own; free trade, free cultivation, and a free disposal of their property. It is probable they will prefer what is certain, immediate, and easily attained,

(although it may not comprise all they wish for) to what is distant, difficult, and at least very uncertain, in the execution.

Besides, the bulk of the people will be aware that they can pass from their present state to the proposed one, without any convulsion, and without exposing themselves to the excesses of the lower classes, who are very numerous in Mexico, that city containing upwards of 200,000 inhabitants. The Nobles will be glad to have a Court, at which they can shine, and to have a sovereign interested in keeping up their rank and superiority over the other orders of society. They are too proud to acknowledge any one of themselves to be their sovereign, and therefore a foreign prince must be sent there, to allay their mutual jealousies and pretensions. The Clergy could be as easily reconciled to the new order of things; and, in fact, there can be no doubt that they would accept it with as much alacrity and as much unanimity as it is possible to expect from the passions prevalent among mankind.

It is proposed that the first enterprise should be directed against Mexico, in preference to any other place, for various reasons: first, because it is the most vulnerable point; it is the most populous country, and it is also that part where the strongest disposition will be found to that order of things which it is the interest, and no doubt the wish, of Great Britain to maintain and defend. The Mexican nobles are the most ancient in Spanish America; they went over under the reigns of Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second; whereas, those of Caracas and Santa Fé de Bogota and of the other provinces went over at a much later period, and at a time when many could pass for nobles without being really such. It seems, therefore, advisable to attempt the enterprise first at that place, where it appears easy to accomplish it, and also most easy to direct it into a proper channel. Let it not be forgotten that the first outset must determine the success of the whole. If the revolution commences upon the principles of democracy, the whole of the Continent will fall at once into that system of

delusion and disappointment; but if it commences upon the principles of monarchy, it is also more than probable that the other provinces will likewise follow that example; and, at all events, it will be much easier to compel them to do so.

2ndly. Mexico is the key-stone of the arch: when that is removed, all the other parts, being unconnected, must fall to pieces. It commands both seas, and facilitates every operation which it may be thought advisable to undertake afterwards. Besides, there is another consideration of great moment in favour of Mexico, which is that, Mexico once carried, the Havannah must fall, and perhaps even without firing a shot; since it is from Mexico alone that Cuba is and can be supplied with soldiers, money, and ammunition. Even supposing, what I do not admit, that the Havannah should resist after the fall of Mexico, it must be confessed that a prodigious assistance would be derived from that kingdom for the conquest of Cuba, which, I hope and trust, would ever after remain a British island.

3rdly. Should the Spaniards hear of an expedition against their possessions in America, Mexico is not the point which they would consider threatened, and it is not in Mexico they would prepare for defence. I can support this assertion by the most direct proof. I was in the Havannah in 1799, when the great expedition against Holland was fitting out in this country. The Court of Spain mistook the object, and immediately sent orders to Cuba, Porto Rico, and La Guayra, to prepare for an attack. The Governors of those places were then authorized to go to any expense they deemed necessary, and accordingly they did it to an immense amount, though not any where in the most judicious manner; and the Court of Spain was so far from apprehending an attack upon Mexico, at least in the first instance, that they gave orders to the Viceroy of Mexico to send to the Havannah all the troops, recruits, and ammunition, he could spare.[1] If the Court of Spain did

[1] There were not 500 Spanish soldiers in the island of Cuba in 1798 and 1799, and there were upwards of 2,000 Mexican soldiers.

not think Mexico threatened by the great armament of 1799, they will be still more led astray, when the armament intended against them is so inconsiderable as the one now proposed; and therefore it is of the utmost consequence that it should be kept here a profound secret.

Lastly, there is another consideration of great moment, which is the difficulty and danger the Spaniards have in assembling the Mexican militia. The population is too great. The militia was assembled in spring 1798 by the then Viceroy, Marquess de Brancforte, and they amounted to about 60,000 men; but such was the ferment and agitation, that he dared not collect them in large bodies, and was obliged to disband them in the greatest hurry. He then retired to a small *camp volant*, not trusting himself to reside as usual in the city of Mexico, where he never appeared without being surrounded by a numerous and well selected body of guards.

Should this plan be adopted, I most readily offer to his Majesty's Government, as well as to the Prince, who may be intended as the future sovereign of Mexico, my personal assistance and services. I shall rejoice if the knowledge I may possess of that country enables me to be useful upon this interesting occasion. Notwithstanding the relationship between the King of Spain and myself, on the one hand, his conduct towards my mother, my brothers, and myself, on the other, the line he has adopted towards all the Jacobin Governments, including the present usurper of the throne of France, make it not only lawful but honourable for me to engage in any hostility against his Government; and I own it would be a gratification to me to be employed actively against a sovereign of a country whose policy it has always been to show the greatest enmity to my family since the beginning of the eighteenth century, or, in other words, since the accession of the Duke of Anjou, Philip the Fifth, to the throne of Spain.

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL STATIONS,

AND SURVEY OF THE STATES OF AMERICA.

BY GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

PREMIÈRE SECTION.

STATIONS NAVALES.

Le système de guerre maritime d'une puissance navale aussi formidable que l'Angleterre, attaquée par la ligue de toute l'Europe, est d'interrompre la communication de ce Continent avec les trois autres, pour forcer ses ennemis par leur privations à sentir la nécessité de rouvrir leurs ports à notre commerce, à attribuer leur besoins et leurs calamités au Tyran qui les égare et qui les ruine, et à revenir à nous qui pouvons seuls les aider à sortir de leur esclavage.

Il existe dans l'Océan Atlantique, entre l'Europe et les autres parties du monde quatre stations intermédiaires de relâche pour la grande navigation, par conséquent de croisière fixe pour les escadres que nous devons établir pour resserrer le blocus de l'Europe, et couper sa communication, au moins en flottes, escadres, ou convois.

La guerre dont nous sommes menacés avec les Etats Unis de l'Amérique est un motif de plus et très pressant de nous hâter de nous établir dans ces quatre stations de manière à empêcher le mouillage et le ravitaillement des vaisseaux ennemis, qui, après une longue navigation, approchent des attérages d'Europe, trouvent dans ces quatre stations des ressources et de rafraichissements nécessaires pour achever leur voyage. Nos croiseurs établis dans ces stations seront a portée, 1°., de soumettre les neutres aux lois de visites préscrites par les Ordonnances—2°., de prendre tous les vaisseaux ennemis qui chercheront à s'échapper de ces stations, soit en partant de l'Europe, soit de retour—3°., de repousser les flottes ou escadres qui voudront forcer le passage, ou attaquer les mediocres garnisons que nous tiendrons dans ces stations, soit séparement, s'ils

sont égales en force à l'ennemi, soit en se réunissant ensemble et à d'autres de nos escadres parties des côtes de l'Europe, sur l'avis de la route de l'ennemi.

Trois de ces stations appartiennent aux Portugais, dont les malheurs ont resserré les liens de notre alliance, et qui ont un intérêt encore plus grand que nous à la défense de ces stations qui couvrent le Brésil, le seul asyle du Portugal qui n'a à craindre que de l'Europe une attaque qui pourrait le livrer au ressentiment de Buonaparte.

On ne peut pas se fier entièrement à l'ignorance et à la paresse des Portugais pour la défense de ces stations; mais on doit pouvoir compter sur leur cooperation, sur laquelle on doit faire expliquer le Prince Régent, pour qu'il donne les ordres les plus précis à ses sujets de cooperer de tous leurs moyens à cette défensive.

Dix mille hommes au plus, et peut-être un tiers de moins, doivent suffir pour prendre, garnisoner, et conserver, pendant toute la guerre, ces quatre stations qui sont

Madeire.

On vient déjà de s'emparer de cette Isle, du consentement du Prince Régent. Elle est essentielle pour nous assurer l'importation des vins qui nous sont si nécessaires, et pour nous ouvrir une communication avec le Portugal. C'est le pont par où pourra un jour entrer la maison de Braganze. Mille hommes de garnison suffisent dans cette Isle lorsqu'on aura mis en bon état les forts et batteries, et qu'on se sera assuré de la disposition des habitans.

Les Açores.

De ces Isles Portugaises la seule à occuper à cause de son port, est l'Isle de Terceira: elle est la résidence du Gouvernement, et la ville d'Angra est la capitale des neufs Isles qui forment le petit Archipel, qui n'est eloigné du Cap d'Espichel, à l'embouchure du Tage, que de 250 lieues. Une garnison de cinq cent hommes dans chacun des deux forts de St. Sebastien

et de St. Jean Baptiste suffit par assurer cette place, à l'aide des troupes Portugaises, en ayant soin de mettre en état de défense les forts et batteries de cette Isle, sans négliger celles de San Miguel et de Fayal.

Puisque nous avons établi une station navale et une garnison à Madeire, les Açores deviendraient la route pour les vaisseaux de guerre ou marchands des ennemis, soit seuls, soit en convois, si nous negligions de mettre cette garnison de mille hommes dans Terceira, et d'y établir une station navale. Cette station est donc une conséquence nécessaire de celle de Madeire.

Les Isles du Cap Verd.

Ces Isles sont surtout intéressantes pour la navigation aux Indes Orientales. Souvent on les reconnait; on y fait eau et on y prend quelques rafrachîssements. Ils forment un Archipel de 10 Isles: il existe une bonne rade et un port dans celle de St. Vincent, mais les étrangers ne la fréquentent pas; elle est sans habitans et sans ressources, cependant nos croiseurs de cette station doivent y veiller. Le seul port important est Porto Praya: c'est dans cette rade que le bailli de Suffren attaqua sans succès la flotte de l'Inde, commandée par l'Amiral Johnstone.

J'ignore s'il y a un fort ou une batterie sur l'Islet à l'Ouest de l'entrée de la Baye; mais c'est certainement le point à occuper pour la protection de la rade intérieure, en plaçant une batterie à la pointe du Sud qui y correspond, et une garnison dans la citadelle à l'Est de la ville. Mille hommes de nos troupes suffisent pour assurer cette station: on en détachera deux cens pour occuper le fort St. Philippe et veiller sur la rade de St. Yago conjointement avec les Portugais.

Le Gouvernement ne négligera pas d'envoyer à poste fixe dans chacune des 4 stations un ingénieur et des officiers et ouvriers d'artillerie, pour mettre en état de défense les forts et batteries, car on ne peut pas compter pour cet objet essentiel, ni sur le zèle, ni sur l'habilité des Portugais, ni même sur leur

bonne volonté, lorsqu'ils apprendront que l'armée Portugaise est incorporée dans les armées de Buonaparte.

Isles Canaries.

Le plus importante des quatre stations intermédiaires à occuper d'après notre système de guerre maritime, est celle de Canaries. Leur proximité de Cadix exige que l'escadre que nous y aurons soit toujours respectable. Quatre de ces Isles, Téneriffe, Canarie, Formentera, et Gomera, meriteraient d'être occupées par des garnisons, parcequ'elles présentent de bons mouillages; mais, pour diminuer l'emploi de troupes de terre, sur quoi il est nécessaire d'économiser, on peut reduire la défensive de ces Isles à une seule garnison, celle de Ste. Croix de Téneriffe, le principal port des Canaries.

L'occupation de Ste. Croix est une expédition assez forte, et qu'il ne faut pas manquer une seconde fois. On y trouvera les Espagnols préparés de longue main à la défense, et surtout animés par le mauvais succès de la tentative de L. Nelson, et par nos honteux revers de Buenos Ayres. On ne peut donc tenter cette attaque avec moins de six mille hommes bien commandés. Mais certainement ce nombre de nos braves soldats, secondés par une forte escadre, suffit pour cette importante conquête.

Après avoir désarmé les autres Isles, avoir assemblé dans Ste. Croix les ôtages nécessaires pour assurer la fidelité des habitans, le Gouverneur qu'on laissera dans Ste. Croix avec une garnison d'au moins trois mille hommes, cherchera à gagner les esprits, et a tourner l'affection des habitans de ces Isles vers leur incorporation à l'empire Britannique, qui maintiendra leur religion, leurs loix, leurs propriétés, avantages qu'ils ne peuvent plus attendre du Gouvernement Espagnol, plongé dans l'esclavage le plus honteux, et prêt a subir une révolution encore plus terrible. Sous le pavillon Anglais, le commerce et la culture fleuriront dans ces Isles *Fortunées*, aux quelles il ne manque qu'un bon gouvernement et de la liberté

pour meriter le nom; ils deviendront l'asyle des Grands d'Espagne, esclaves sur le Continent, et des vrais Espagnols attachés à l'honneur du nom Castillan. Dans des circonstances plus favorables c'est des Canaries que rentreront en Espagne, avec l'appuy de l'Angleterre, les vengeurs de la Monarchie.

Ainsi l'occupation des Canaries, nécessaire pour notre système de guerre maritime, puisqu'elle completera l'interception de la navigation entre les côtes d'Europe et les trois autres parties du monde, est tout aussi nécessaire en grande politique parcequ'elle conduira par la suite à l'affranchissement de l'Espagne, et à une paix glorieuse et utile, par laquelle, si nous ne conservons pas la propriété des quatre stations indiquées dans cette section, nous aurons au moins obtenu par les stipulations du traité de paix qu'on ne nous dictera, et que notre courage aura rendues égales et justes, la continuation d'un commerce libre dont les avantages seront accrus et assurés par le bonheur et les profits que les habitans, surtout les Canariens, auront retiré de leur soumission temporaire au gouvernement d'une nation active, industrieuse, qui continuera avec eux des relations d'amitié et de commerce fondées sur l'intérêt réciproque.

DEUXIÈME SECTION.

LES DEUX AMÉRIQUES.

C'est ici que s'ouvre le plus grand intérêt de l'Angleterre. Buonaparte, à la tête d'armées jusqu'à présent invincibles et innombrables, s'est débordé sur l'Europe comme un fleuve, dont la fureur renverse toutes les foibles digues qu'on luy oppose successivement. Il n'en reste qu'une—l'Empire Britannique: toutes les Puissances du Continent, plus par peur que par séduction, s'empressent à obéir à ses ordres, à se ranger sous ses drapeaux pour renverser cet Empire. Nous n'avons plus un allié en Europe, car le chancelant Roy de Suède ne peut pas être regardé comme tel: ou il se rangera avec les autres, ou il tombera bientôt, victime de la vengeance du Tyran de

l'Europe, chef de la ligue générale contre nous. Nous ne voyons plus en Europe que des ennemis.

C'est en Amérique que nous devons à l'avenir chercher des alliés, que nous devons même les créer, comme Buonaparte crée de nouvelles Puissances, de nouveaux peuples en Europe. Nous avons à cet égard par nos forces navales les mêmes facilités que luy par ses forces *terriennes*. Nous sommes exemptés d'employer comme le *Demiourgos* des moyens odieux et révoltans. Nous ne pouvons pas prétendre comme luy à la souveraineté universelle. Nous ne faisons que séconder la disposition des peuples, aider leur libre arbitre et leur émancipation, écarter les calamités que leur apporterait leur soumission à ce fléau de l'humanité, assurer leurs propriétés, leurs loix, leurs mœurs, vivifier leur territoire par un commerce solide et continu, qui en même tems assure notre empire naval, le débouché de nos manufactures et de nos denrées, et forcément ramenera un jour à nous l'Europe, par la nécessité de se procurer les précieux metaux et les autres productions des deux Amériques, qu'elle ne pourrait plus recevoir que par notre canal, au moins tant que durera cette guerre à mort, qui ne peut finir que par notre déstruction, ou par celle de la tyrannie qui n'a plus que nous à dévorer.

AMÉRIQUE DU SUD.

Cinq parties principales dans l'Amérique du Sud exigent l'entière application de nos ressources politiques et navales, non pas pour en acquérir la souveraineté, comme Buonaparte l'exerce sur tous les Etats de sa création—Dieu nous garde d'une injustice aussi absurde !— mais pour nous y donner l'influence de la bienfaisance par l'appuy de notre marine contre le tyran universel, et par un commerce également lucratif et nécessaire aux Amériquains qu'a nous-mêmes. Ces cinq parties sont :—1°., le Brésil ; 2°., le Rio de la Plata ; 3°., le Pérou ; 4°., la Terre Ferme, ou *the Main ;* 5°., la Guyanne Française.

Le Brésil.

La timide hardiesse qui a déterminé le Régent de Portugal à abandonner ses états d'Europe et a établir le siège de son gouvernement au Brésil, a fait de cette colonie une terre sacrée, que notre honneur et notre intérêt nous obligent également à protéger et a défendre de toutes nos forces. Nous ne pouvons empêcher le total anéantissement de notre commerce et conserver notre supériorité navale qu'en soutenant le seul allié qui nous reste, et en élevant le Brésil au degré d'importance et de dignité dont est suceptible une contrée aussi étendue, et aussi douée des dons de la Nature, qui ne demande que des bras que lui fournira l'émigration continuelle des Portugais d'Europe, et de l'activité et de l'industrie que nous devons leurs inspirer par tous les moyens qui tiennent à l'amour propre et à l'intérêt.

La cause du Brésil est si bien identifié avec la notre même, que nous ne pouvons nous livrer à aucune négociation de paix avec l'Europe avant d'avoir assuré le sort du Brésil et de la maison de Bragance: si nous nous rendions coupables ou de la lâcheté ou de l'imprévoyance, dans un traité de paix, d'abandonner le seul allié qui nous reste, ou de stipuler pour luy de manière à le laisser par ce traité dans l'état de faiblesse et nullité où est à présent le Brésil, nous signerions notre déshonneur et notre propre ruine.

Mon assertion ne tend point à perpétuer la guerre, mais à en assurer le succès, et à la terminer par une paix solide et glorieuse. C'est là l'avantage que le gouvernement éclairé d'une nation puissante, noble, et généreuse peut retirer de la translation de la Maison de Bragance au Brésil. Que l'Angleterre annonce qu'elle ne fait pas la guerre pour la cause de la Maison de Bourbon—à la bonne heure: quoiqu'il y ait eu des époques, que les inconstances peuvent encore ramener, où la declaration contraire eut été conforme à la saine politique; mais, pour la Maison de Bragance, nous ne pouvons jamais nous départir de sa cause, ni sacrifier ses intérêts sans immoler

notre honneur, notre commerce, notre supériorité navale, par conséquent notre existence.

Hâtons nous donc de mettre le Brésil en état non seulement de ne rien craindre, mais encore de nous aider. Une année bien employée suffit pour produire cette régénération de la nation Portugaise. Si nous la livrons à elle-même, elle deviendra plus dangereuse qu'utile, et elle finira par se joindre contre nous. Si nous ne changeons pas la face de l'Amérique du Sud cette année, nous l'aurons ensuite toute entière contre nous. Que de secours et d'avantages, au contraire, nous en retirerions si nous réussissons !

I. Il faut commencer par engager, forçer même, le Régent à mettre les côtes du Brésil en état de défense—par le rassemblement d'une armée bien payée, bien disciplinée, commandée par de bons officiers étrangers ou Portugais, organisée en divisions et en brigades, placée dans les Capitaineries frontières du Rio de la Plata et de la Guyanne, soutenue par des milices régulières des diverses capitaineries, bien commandées, bien exercées, soldées pendant le mois de leur rassemblement en tems de paix, et pendant leur service en tems de guerre, quand la nécessité l'exigera.

Cet état militaire, modifié de manière à ne pas contrarier les travaux des cultivateurs et des artisans, comme dans les Colonies, relevera l'amour propre national, et donnera une subsistance honorable à quantité de pauvre noblesse, attirera beaucoup de Portugais et même d'Espagnols d'Europe, et assurera l'existence d'une foule d'individus à charge à la société, faute des métiers ou de moyens. Cette armée ainsi réglée fournira les garnisons des côtes, et aura, outre l'artillerie des places, une artillerie de campagne à pied et à cheval.

II. Mettre en état de défense les principales places susceptibles d'attaque par mer, ou par conséquent des garnisons sont nécessaires, en ayant soin d'assigner à chacune de ces places un nombre suffisant de milices des capitaineries correspondantes, pour diminuer la dissémination des troupes de ligne sur une

aussi grande étendue de côtes, et pouvoir, en cas de besoin, les rassembler en trois corps d'armée à Rio Janeiro, à la Bahia, et au Para, pour se porter en force sur le côté attaqué. Les points à mettre en état de défense sont, du Sud au Nord—

1°. St. Vincent, place frontière du côté du gouvernement de Buenos Ayres.

2°. L'Isle Ste. Catherine, importante parce que le Gouvernement Portugais en a fait l'entrepôt exclusif du commerce. Cette précaution fiscale, qui tient à beaucoup de préjugés, qu'il faut espérer que la résidence de la cour à Rio Janeiro et l'intérêt bien entendu du commerce feront abolir, est très-nuisible à l'activité du commerce et à la prosperité du Brésil, qui ne fleurira que lorsque l'entrée libre aux vaisseaux, au moins Anglais, sera accordée dans tous les ports de cette immense contrée, qui a besoin d'une vivification rapide dans toutes ses parties.

3°. Rio Janeiro est très-fort: il l'était déjà lorsque du Guay-Trouin s'en empara. Comme il est, au moins à présent, la résidence de la Cour et le principal dépôt de la marine, il convient de le rendre inattaquable.

4°. Spiritu Santo, assez bon port, qui couvre au Nord la résidence royale de Janeiro.

5°. Porto Seguro, très-bon port.

6°. St. Jorge, ou Camanu, bon port dans la capitainie de los Ilheos.

7°. La Bahia, ou San Salvador, la capitale de tout le Brésil, la seconde résidence royale et la plus naturelle, puisqu'elle est centrale.

8°. Fernambouc, ou Olinde, que les Hollandais ont évacuée la dernière, place très-importante.

9°. Rio Grande.

10°. Marañon, ou l'Isle St. Louis, autrefois possédée par les Français, qui ne manqueraient pas de réclamer un jour leurs vieux droits, si on les laissait se renforcer dans la Guyane.

11°. Para, qui doit être un grand département militaire,

d'où doit partir la grande expédition, tant par terre que par mer, pour chasser les Français de la Guyane et de Cayenne.

12°. L'Isle de Joannes vis-à-vis de Cayenne, qu'il faut craindre de voir occupée par les Français, qu'on en chasserait difficilement.

III. Le Prince Régent a emmené au Brésil un fonds de marine, qu'il faut qu'il augmente dans la proportion qu'exige la grande étendue de ses côtes. Elle doit être naturellement divisée en trois départements, d'au moins cinq ou six vaisseaux chacun, outre les frégates et autres bâtiments armés: au sud, celui de Rio Janeiro; au centre, celui de la Bahia; au nord, du Fenambouc, ou Marañon, ou Para, selon le plus ou moins de facilités qu'on trouvera à établir ce département.

Le Brésil vivifié par la présence d'un Gouvernement paternel, avec une bonne œconomie, est en état de supporter dès à présent cette dépense, puisque son revenu ne sera plus détourné et enfoui en Europe. L'Angleterre doit inspirer à cette Cour cet esprit de vigueur et d'ordre nécessaire pour son existence, et qui intéresse aussi la nôtre. Loin de nous cet égoïsme mal calculé, qui entretient l'apathie et la faiblesse dans ses alliés pour les rendre plus dépendants! Nous n'avons rien à risquer du Brésil dans l'état le plus prospère, et nous avons les plus grands avantages à en tirer, si nous contribuons par nos conseils et nos secours à en faire une grande puissance en Amérique.

Le seul moyen qui reste à la famille de Bragance pour rentrer en Portugal est de gouverner et vivifier le Brésil avec autant d'activité que si elle avait entièrement renoncé à l'espoir de retourner en Europe. Je viens d'esquisser les arrangements qu'elle a à y faire. Ils suffisent avec l'alliance Anglaise, contre toute attaque partant de l'Europe; mais elle a autour d'elle deux voisins très-dangereux. Voicy ce que j'ay écrit dans un ouvrage intitulé *Etat présent du Portugal*, imprimé a Hambourg, éd. in 4to., p. 80.

"Si le Brésil était attaqué à la fois avec vigueur par les

Français du côté du Para, du Marañon, et du Rio Negro, et par les Espagnols du côté du Rio San Pedro, en se portant sur St. Paul et sur la capitainerie de St. Vincent, la défense serait fort difficile, et d'autant plus embarrassante que cette colonie serait attaquée par ses endroits les plus importans, qui sont les Mines: le secours des Anglais n'y serait pas fort utile, n'employant que des flottes, et il serait également dangereux pour les Portugais d'y introduire des troupes Anglaises de débarquement; c'est certainement ce à quoi ils ne se résoudraient qu'à la dernière extrémité. Mais les Portugais n'ont pas ce danger à craindre tant que les Colonies Françaises et Espagnoles ne seront pas plus garnies de troupes et en meilleur état qu'elles ne le sont actuellement."

Depuis 1797 tout est changé. Le Brésil est devenu un but d'attaque pour les deux nations réunies sous le joug de Buonaparte. Le Vice-roi du Perou recevra les ordres de Madrid pour attaquer le Brésil sur toute sa frontière occidentale; le Vice-roi de Buenos Ayres aura ordre d'attaquer toute la frontière méridionale; et les Français recevront des renforts a Cayenne pour envahir les provinces du Nord. Peut-être l'escadre sortie de Rochefort est-elle déjà chargée de ce renfort. Pour prévenir cette attaque environnante, il est nécessaire, 1°. de changer l'état politique des provinces méridionales Espagnoles, et de les diviser de la Métropole, ce qui amènera nécessairement par la suite la même révolution au Pérou.— 2°. chasser pour jamais les Français de la Guyane et de Cayenne. C'est ce que nous allons examiner dans les Paragraphes suivants.

Rio de la Plata.

C'est l'Angleterre seule qui peut produire cette révolution salutaire, en fomentant et soutenant l'émancipation que désirent les indigènes. L'expérience du passé prouve que la force est inutile, insuffisante et imprudente pour opérer ce grand projet. Quand même, par un armement, qui dérangerait partout ailleurs le système de guerre maritime, qui seule convient à

l'Angleterre, on parviendrait pour la troisième fois, à occuper Monte Video, on ne ferait que rendre implacables les indigènes, les aguerrir, et s'attirer une guerre continentale à deux mille lieues de nous, qui, quel que fût son succès, épuiserait nos forces de terre, et détournerait nos forces navales de leur véritable destination. Je prie le Gouvernement de relire plusieurs mémoires très-détaillés, que je lui ai donnés à ce sujet.

L'établissement de la Cour de Portugal à Rio Janeiro peut avoir une influence favorable, en cas qu'il ne paraisse pas que cette Cour travaille pour elle-même. Le parti de la liberté est encore fort dans les Colonies du Sud ; mais il a déjà été ébranlé par nos maladresses ; il s'est déjà franchement réuni au parti Espagnol pour nous chasser de son territoire, lorsque nous nous y sommes présentés comme ennemis, comme conquérans.

Il existe une haine nationale encore plus forte entre les Espagnols et les Portugais qu'entre les Français et les Anglais. Les indigènes s'opposeraient avec autant de violence aux Portugais, s'ils s'imaginaient qu'en s'immisçant dans leurs affaires ils ont la prétention ou l'arrière-pensée de les soumettre un jour à leur Gouvernement, que les Français s'opposeraient aux Anglais s'ils tentaient d'envahir quelqu'une de leurs Provinces.

Qu'on n'imagine pas non plus arrêter cette antipathie en présentant aux indigènes le fantôme d'Infant Don Pedro, qui, indépendamment de la faiblesse de ses facultés morales, tient de trop près aux deux maisons royales d'Espagne et de Portugal pour contenter ce peuple nouveau, qui a besoin d'un Roy HOMME et indépendant.

La proposition de ce simulacre de Roy serait une fausse démarche, qui serait rejetée par les indigènes, romprait toute négociation en les aliénant, les réunirait tous à leur métropole, et tournerait leur activité et leurs passions vers une guerre dangereuse pour le Brésil.

On ne peut réussir à accomplir le grand œuvre de l'émancipation de cette Colonie, et de la jonction de ses intérêts à ceux de l'Angleterre et du Portugal, que par une négociation

de l'Angleterre seule, franche, simple, conforme aux idées de liberté de ces peuples et aux intérêts mutuels du commerce entr'eux et l'Angleterre. Cet intérêt, sous plusieurs rapports, sera en contradiction avec celui des Portugais : ainsi ce serait une grande maladresse de le faire entrer dans cette négociation.

Elle doit être tout militaire et très-courte. Il faut proposer aux indigènes un prince qui leur convienne encore plus par ses qualités personnelles que par son illustration, qui soit en état de leur inspirer de la confiance, et d'étendre le bienfait de l'émancipation sur le Chili, le Pérou, et la Terrafirma. J'ai dit tout ce que je pense à cet égard : j'ajoute seulement que pour la sureté du Brésil et pour celle de notre commerce dans tout le Continent méridional de l'Amérique, il faut dès cette année et le plus tôt possible entreprendre cette négociation et la pousser avec franchise, adresse, et vivacité.

Le Pérou.

L'émancipation du Pérou suivra naturellement un jour celle des Provinces du Sud ; mais elle ne peut avoir lieu que lorsque le Prince, digne du choix des indigènes, réunissant les esprits par une grande capacité et une grande activité, se montrera à la tête des indigènes libres aux peuples du Chili et du Pérou, et leur ouvrira la porte à l'affranchissement et au bonheur. Cette révolution sera rapide parceque la volonté générale comprimée aura toute la force de l'explosion.

Mais ce ne peut être ni par conquête ni par la violence qu'on peut faire réussir ce grand projet. Il ne faut pas non plus compter sur les Portugais pour l'appuyer. Outre la haine nationale qui rendrait leur intervention nuisible, le Brésil pourra bien, avec beaucoup d'activité de la part de son Gouvernement, en deux ou trois ans, se mettre en état de résister à une attaque : mais de très long tems il ne sera pas assez fortement organisé pour envahir ses voisins ; et une année de guerre, ou le moindre désastre au commencement de son établissement, luy

ferait perdre tout le fruit de son travail, et le plongerait dans un état de faiblesse qui nuirait à sa propre défense.

C'est donc uniquement par la négociation Anglaise avec les indigènes de Buenos Ayres, par l'appuy de nos escadres, par le bénéfice mutuel de notre commerce, que l'émancipation peut passer du Rio de la Plata au Chili, au Pérou, et à Terra Firme, qui par leur arrangement naturel, doivent former une souveraineté, alliée de l'Angleterre et du Portugal. Il n'y a pas un autre canal.

Dans cet état de choses, et avec ce plan digne des vues sages, prudentes, et prévoyantes d'un Gouvernement qui veut travailler en grand, il serait téméraire et inconséquent de projeter des expéditions contre les côtes du Chili et du Pérou par la mer du Sud. Quel en serait le résultat? Nous n'avons aucune Colonie à portée de soutenir des opérations hostiles. Et contre qui cette opération hostile? contre des riverains tranquilles, qui ne nous ont jamais fait aucun mal. Faire révolter les Indos bravos de Chili? à quoi bon, puisque nous ne pourrions pas appuyer leur révolte? Brûler et piller des ports et des bâtimens de commerce? quel profit retirerait la nation de ces expéditions de corsaires, qui ne pourraient enrichir que quelques avanturiers en flétrissant notre pavillon?

Prenons le contre-pied de la conduite de Buonaparte: il est le fléau de l'Europe; montrons-nous les bienfaiteurs de l'Amérique. Détruisons ses calomnies par une conduite noble et sage. Voilà ce que nous prescrit notre véritable intérêt. Ainsi point d'expéditions hostiles sur les côtes de la mer du Sud, contre une nation que nous devons regarder d'avance comme notre alliée future.

La Tierre Firme, ou The Main.

Cette grande partie de côte, qui s'étend de l'Orenoque jusqu'à l'Isthme de Panama, doit être ménagée avec la même douceur et la même prudence que le Chili et le Pérou, par le même principe. Heureusement les projets révolutionnaires,

concus avec tant d'audace, exécutés avec tant de faiblesse par le Général Miranda, ont échoué. S'il eut eu du succès, cette révolution contre laquelle tous les honnêtes gens, tous les propriétaires, se sont révoltés, quels que fussent leurs opinions et leur désir de liberté, fût devenue un chaos aussi effrayant que celle de St. Domingue. Ce chef n'avait ni la consistance, ni les talents propres à la régulariser. Nous connaissons les résultats des systèmes spéculatifs de liberté. La révolution Française et celle d'Hayti sont un grand livre ouvert sous nos yeux: écrit avec du sang, il doit nous faire trembler.

Le Général Miranda vient d'arriver à Londres; qu'on se garde de ses sophismes et de ses propositions, et qu'on juge de sa conduite avant de l'écouter. Veuton établir une république sur ce Continent? En supposant qu'on puisse soumettre à cette opinion les quatre castes de ses habitans, et qu'elles ne se détruisent pas entr'elles comme celles d'Hayti; ou elle sera faible; alors, par la conformité d'opinion, elle se jettera entre les bras des Etats Unis; ou elle sera forte, alors, qui garantira nos Antilles?

Laissons dormir tout projet sur la Tierra Firme, comme un Appendice successif à l'émancipation du midy de l'Amérique. Travaillons sur les mêmes principes partout. Ne cherchons point à établir la monarchie d'un côté, la république de l'autre. En agissant aussi contradictoirement, nous perdrions la confiance partout, et nous ne réussions nulle part. Le sort de la Tierra Firme doit être le même que celui de Buenos Ayres, du Chili, et du Pérou, et doit en être la conséquence.

La Guyane Française.

La sureté du Brésil exige nécessairement que dès cette année les Portugais fassent tous leurs efforts pour chasser entièrement les Français de cette Colonie, et ne leur laisser aucun établissement sur le Continent de l'Amérique du Sud. Si on retardait cette expédition, on donnerait le tems à Buonaparte d'y faire passer les renforts que certainement il y destine, de-

puis que le Régent a pris le parti de transférer son Gouvernement au Brésil. Si une fois ces secours étaient arrivés, non seulement cette expédition deviendrait plus dangereuse et plus meurtrière, mais Cayenne deviendrait le foyer de fréquentes hostilités contre les capitainies septentrionales et contre les mines de Rio Negro. Les Français pourraient faire des établissements sur l'Amazone et l'Orénoque, communiquer par derrière les établissements Anglais et Portugais avec les Espagnols, et prendre ces établissements à revers. Il ne faut donc pas leur donner le tems de s'y fortifier et d'y préparer des coups de main imprévus. On doit tout craindre de leur génie audacieux, de leurs inclinations avanturières, et des longues vues de leur Empereur.

L'Angleterre a le même intérêt que le Prince Régent à cette prompte expédition, pour détruire ce repaire de corsaires placé à la porte de Surinam et de la Trinité, qui en sont continuellement inquiétées. En outre, ce serait la ruine de son allié, qui tient à la sienne propre.

La Guyane Française n'est d'aucune conséquence: tous les établissements, qu'on a faits avec beaucoup d'éclat et de dépense, en differents tems, ont manqué de succès, parce-que les Français n'ont jamais eu ni le génie ni le caractère propres à former des Colonies. La destination qu'on a donnée depuis la Révolution à ces établissements de terre ferme, dont on a fait des prisons d'Etat, suffirait pour en éteindre toute vivification. Cette Colonie ne consiste donc que dans l'isle et la ville de Cayenne.

Cayenne.[1]

Cette ville est plus peuplée qu'à l'époque de la monarchie. Le port en est assez bon. La ville est forte. Les approches

[1] Le Comte de Behague, Lieutenant Général Français, plein d'honneur, de probité, de zèle, et de talents, a d'excellents plans et de très-bons mémoires sur Cayenne et la Guyanne, où il a commandé. Le Gouvernement ne peut que tirer un parti très-utile de ses lumières, s'il le consulte sur cette Colonie, ainsi que sur Brest, Bellisle, et la Martinique, où il a pareillement commandé.

sont difficiles, parce-que l'intérieur du pays est bas, inondé, malsain, sans eau douce, et couvert de mangliers. Les habitans sont tous soldats, marins, corsaires. La piraterie qui les enrichit, leur donne en même tems une obstination, une audace, qui doivent faire attendre une défense opiniâtre: ainsi il faut préparer l'expédition en conséquence. Elle doit être composée d'une assez forte escadre Anglo-Portugaise, et d'au moins huit mille hommes de troupes de terre des deux nations. Des bâtimens armés doivent s'emparer et rester stationnés dans les deux rivières Cayenne et Mahuri, qui forment l'isle, et la renfermement. Une division de l'armée doit s'emparer de St. Joseph, à la pointe de la Liberté, s'y retrancher, et établir des batteries pour brûler les vaisseaux dans le port. Peut-être peut-on aussi établir des batteries, soutenues par l'escadre, sur les Islots de Maret, pour achever de fermer l'entrée et la sortie. Ces islots ne sont pas à plus de 1,200 toises de la ville. Le reste de l'armée combinée doit descendre, ou par l'intérieur de la rivière Cayenne sous Maringoin et la Montagne des Tigres à une lieue au Sud-Est de la ville, ou sous la Pointe Mercière, à l'embouchure du Mahuri, sous la montagne du même nom, ou dans l'anse de Montjoli, au Sud-Est à deux lieues de la ville, ou sous la montagne de Rodomontabo, ou sous la montagne du Pont à l'Est et à une lieue et demie de la ville. La descente peut se faire en un seul point ou en plusieurs à la fois, selon la disposition de l'ennemi, sa force, et son plus ou moins d'obstination à défendre les approches de la place. Aussitôt descendue, l'armée doit se placer sur les deux monts Baduel et Dupont, pour resserrer la place et commencer le siége. Les vivres et munitions seront apportées par eau du quartier de St. Joseph, qui servira de place d'armes dans la petite crique au Sud du mont Baduel et de l'escadre dans l'Anse de la montagne du Pont.

L'enceinte de la place est faible entre le Bastion royal au Nord-Est, et le Bastion Dauphin au Sud-Est. A la vérité, tout ce front est commandé par la citadelle; mais, une fois

forcé, l'armée se logera fort à son aise dans la ville, sous la citadelle même, à l'abri de son feu par sa propre élévation. Je doute que les assiégés puissent risquer de défendre la citadelle, lorsqu'ils auront perdu les magazins, l'Hôpital, les Casernes, et surtout l'eau : car il ne leur restera plus alors qu'une citerne. Alors vraisemblablement les habitans qui se seront retirés avec la garnison dans la citadelle la forceront de se rendre, pour ne pas être entièrement ruinés ou passés au fil de l'épée.

Dès que la ville sera prise, il sera nécessaire d'en évacuer tous les habitans Français, car c'est une détestable population, composée de toute la canaille de la France et des Antilles. Il faudra y établir des familles Portugaises émigrées d'Europe, y faire une station navale, ou Portugaise ou mi-partie, et y laisser une garnison d'au moins deux mille hommes, après avoir remis les fortifications en bon état.

Cette Isle ne doit dans aucun cas, ni par aucun traité, être rendue aux Français ; elle fait la sureté du Brésil et de la Guyane Anglaise. Les deux Rois alliés s'arrangeront sur sa propriété à l'aimable. St. Joseph doit être fortifié avec le plus grand soin, parce qu'il domine la navigation du port. Peut-être aussi jugera-t-on convenable de fortifier un des Islots de Maret pour défendre les approches à l'avenir.

Lorsqu'on a réussi à émanciper les indigènes de Buenos Ayres, et par suite ceux du Pérou, et qu'on a pris pour toujours la Colonie Française de Cayenne, le Brésil jouira d'une paix profonde ; le Prince Régent pourra tourner ses vues vers l'Europe ; et c'est dans le Brésil qu'il préparera une flotte et une armée, pour retourner un jour délivrer sa patrie avec le secours de son puissant allié.

TROISIÈME SECTION.

AMÉRIQUE DU NORD.

Si l'on a démontré qu'il est indispensablement nécessaire que le Gouvernement entame et suive, sans perdre de tems, la négo-

ciation la plus active avec les Colons Espagnols de l'Amérique du Sud, pour produire sur ce continent une révolution politique qui, en les affranchissant du joug de leur Métropole opére la sureté du Brésil, et nous ouvre un grand commerce qui nous dédommagerait largement de notre interdiction des ports de l'Europe ; il est encore plus aisé de prouver que notre intérêt est encore plus grand de tenter les mêmes moyens auprès des Colons de l'Amérique Espagnole du Nord, parce que la souveraineté qui s'établirait au Mexique assurerait le sort de nos Colonies des Antilles ; parce que notre commerce doublerait d'étendue ; parce que le Mexique est plus à portée de nous ; puisque surtout cette puissance *terrienne*, tenant à nous pour la sureté de sa propre existence, confinant les parties méridionales des Etats-Unis, ayant sur pied une armée de terre qu'elle peut armer et entretenir sur les frontières du Nord pour couvrir le Nouveau Mexique, tiendrait en respect les Américains, qui, se livrant aux suggestions de la politique Française, nous menacent d'une guerre embarrassante dans notre position critique, pendant que nous avons déjà toute l'Europe contre nous.

Dans l'Amérique du Sud, si nous réussissons à y opérer une révolution salutaire et raisonnable, nous serons parvenus à pacifier cet immense Continent, à nous y assurer un commerce qui nous laissera peu de regrets sur la suspension de celui de l'Europe, à lier par un intérêt commun entr'eux et avec nous les deux grandes puissances de ces deux Continents, à donner une grande existence à notre fidéle alliée la maison de Bragance, et a luy faciliter les moyens de former une marine et une armée avec lesquelles elle puisse un jour rentrer en Portugal, et nous aider a briser la tyrannie de l'Europe.

Mais nous n'aurions rempli que la moitié de notre but si nous ne travaillons pas avec la même prudence, la même bienfaisance, et le même succès, dans l'Amérique du Nord, en affranchissant le Mexique et contenant au moins les Etats Unis, soit en les forçant à une paix encore plus salutaire pour eux que pour nous, soit en les divisant et opérant chez eux

une révolution intérieure, qui ne peut que tourner à notre avantage, si c'est nous qui la dirigeons et si nous sommes assez modérés pour nous abstenir de toute idée de conquête, nous contentant de notre suprématie navale, seul but raisonnable d'une grande nation commerçante et insulaire.

Le Mexique.

Cette partie de l'Amérique Espagnole est encore mieux disposée à une révolution politique que celle du Sud. Il y a plus de fréquentation avec les étrangers, plus de lumières, des idées plus libérales. Son état militaire et civil est mieux composé, et c'est précisément ce qui facilitera son insurrection et hâtera son émancipation quand l'impulsion sera donnée. Les Espagnols d'Europe y sont en petit nombre, détestés comme des insectes devorants, et le vœu général est de s'en débarrasser. Le Gouvernement a continuellement à lutter contre l'esprit d'inquiétude et de mutinerie des indigènes. Son palais est une citadelle assez forte, mais serait un faible asyle contre une population de plus de 200 mille âmes. Il n'y a pas plus de quatre à cinq mille soldats Espagnols naturels répandus dans le Mexique. Les indigènes forment une armée régulière de trente mille hommes, et le sort du pays est dans leurs mains. Il faut aussi mettre en ligne de compte une seconde armée aussi forte, de commis, gardes, employés aux fermes et aux Douanes, que l'activité continue de leur service accoutume aux armes, et qui formeraient un secours très utile dans une insurrection parce qu'ils l'étendraient partout.[1]

Une autre troupe auxiliaire ce sont les prêtres et les moines indigènes, qui détestent le haut clergé composé d'Espagnols naturels, les hommes de loy, et les riches proprietaires, qui voyent avec indignation toutes les places honorifiques, lucratives, et de confiance, remplis par des avanturiers d'Europe, qu'ils mé-

[1] Don Joseph de Pavia, que je ne peux trop recommander au Gouvernement pour ses qualités morales, son esprit, ses talents, et 22 ans d'expérience, fonde sur cette seconde armée l'espoir d'un succès immanquable.

prisent, et qui, à leur tour, les traitent avec dédain, les pillent, et les vexent.

Les rapports que le Gouvernement a reçus par plusieurs voyageurs sont très-contradictoires, et n'ont pu jusqu'à présent fixer ses irrésolutions et le déterminer à former ou adopter aucun plan. Le tems est venu où il faut prendre un parti très-décidé; j'en ai développé plusieurs motifs dans les mémoires que j'ai donné en différents tems sur cette matière, qui sont tous entre les mains de mylord Castlereagh. Notre position critique avec l'Amérique Unie est un motif de plus pour entreprendre l'émancipation du Mexique. Il faut nécessairement nous en faire un allié et créer dans cette nouvelle souveraineté un frein ou un ennemi contre les Etats-Unis.

C'est en monarchie que nous devons opérer partout. Si des Miranda ou autres avanturiers nous faisaient adopter le système républicain ou celui de conquête, c'est contre nous-mêmes que nous travaillerions si nous réussissions, ce que le mauvais succès de Miranda a Cumana rend au moins très douteux.

Nous aurions produit un chaos de crimes et de sang comme la révolution d'Haïti, ou un Etat allié naturellement aux Etats Unis, pour lesquels nous aurions travaillé; nous aurions crée de nouveaux alliés aux Français, qui par la cession que Buonaparte vient de se faire faire des Florides, deviendraient leurs voisins et leurs agitateurs, ce que nous avons intérêt d'empêcher.

Pour chef de cette monarchie, le choix du Prince qu'il faut y présenter n'est pas indifférent. Il faut qu'il soit du sang des Bourbons, tant pour flatter la vanité des descendants des anciens conquérants du Mexique, que pour contenter leur amour pour cette auguste maison. Il faut qu'il ne soit pas étranger à leur idiome et à leurs mœurs: il faut qu'il soit déjà connu d'eux, et que luy-même les connaisse; il faut que ce soit un homme fait, qu'il ait de grandes connaissances, pour pouvoir suppléer par son génie à tout ce qui manque au premier mo-

ment de la création d'une nouvelle souveraineté, qui ne doit pas, s'il est possible, paraître une révolution turbulente, mais une translation volontaire du pouvoir souverain dans une branche de la même maison, avec la condition de la résidence ; il faut surtout que par son caractère et ses habitudes, autant que par intérêt et par reconnaissance, il soit naturellement notre allié et que nous puissions compter sur luy. Toutes ces conditions se trouvent dans le Prince que j'ai indiqué, et dans luy seul, en Europe : ainsi le choix n'est pas douteux, et convient également aux indigènes et à l'Angleterre.

Pour réussir à placer de gré à gré ce nouveau souverain sur ce nouveau trône, nous n'avons ni le tems ni les moyens d'entamer une négociation préliminaire. Notre conduite dans le Rio de la Plata nous a fermé toute correspondance amicale avec l'Amérique Espagnole ; nous nous y sommes fait haïr sans nous faire craindre : nous n'avons donc qu'un moyen ouvert, tant pour réparer notre honneur que pour ramener à nous ces peuples aliénés—c'est de brusquer la négociation en la rendant imposante par une force armée, qui puisse faire craindre nos hostilités, en nous abstenant cependant d'en commettre, à moins que la négociation ne soit entièrement rompue.

Si nous avions eu une conduite et un succès différent dans le Rio de la Plata, quatre frégates et une simple garde d'honneur de deux ou trois mille hommes auraient suffi pour présenter ce Prince aux Mexicains. Le Vice-roi et les Espagnols naturels n'auraient pu rien opposer à un mouvement universel et spontané. Ils n'ont pas acquis plus de force depuis ; la disposition générale est la même : mais nos disgrâces leur ont procuré les moyens d'écarter toute communication amicale, et nous ne pouvons plus parvenir jusqu'au peuple Mexicain, ni luy jusqu'à nous.

Pour rétablir la communication, il faut qu'il nous voye en force sur ses côtes. Pour relever la confiance il faut qu'il connaisse que ce n'est point comme ennemis que nous venons, mais pour le soutenir dans son noble dessein d'affranchissement.

Ce peuple, une fois persuadé, redoublera de courage et de volonté; notre force lui paraîtra la sienne propre, et n'envisagera plus ni obstacle, ni opposition, ni danger à l'exécution de son plan d'émancipation.

La menace d'une guerre prochaine contre l'Amérique nous oblige dès cette année d'expédier des forces considérables de terre et de mer aux Indes Occidentales, tant pour protéger notre commerce que pour mettre en état de grande défense nos Colonies des Antilles, la Canada, la Nouvelle Ecosse, et pour menacer les ports et les côtes des Etats-Unis. Ce supplément de forces, qui ne peut pas être de moins de vingt-cinq mille hommes de troupes de terre, se divise naturellement en deux portions, l'une de dix mille hommes pour Hallifax et Quebec, l'autre de quinze mille pour les Antilles.

Cette disposition nous donne le moyen de faire très-promptement l'expédition du Mexique, et le différents points d'attaque et de défense dont les quinze mille hommes expédiés aux Antilles seront chargés nous donnent occasion à des rassemblements et des mouvements, qui en couvriront le secret jusqu' à son exécution. Il y a les Florides à occuper pour empêcher les Français de s'y établir, la Louisiane à attaquer si la guerre éclate contre les Etats-Unis, des expéditions à faire contre l'Isle de Cuba, la Martinique, la Guadeloupe, même les faux projets de Miranda contre la Terra-firme peuvent servir de prétexte à nos mouvements.

La Jamaïque est le point naturel de rassemblement et de départ pour toutes ces expéditions. C'est le plus favorable pour l'opération du Mexique. Douze mille hommes et le nombre correspondant de bâtiments de guerre propres pour la navigation de ces parages forment une force suffisante pour cette entreprise.

Le Prince doit être embarqué sur cette flotte, et pendant le séjour à la Jamaïque, nécessaire pour y compléter les préparatifs, il y attirera de l'Isle de Cuba, de la Terra-firme, et du Mexique, toutes ses anciennes relations, pour grossir son cortége, et il

enverra d'avance des émissaires pour préparer les voyes par des proclamations, qui garantiront les indigènes coutre la crainte de tout projet de conquête et hostilité de la part de la force Anglaise qui paraîtra sur leurs côtes, laquelle, au contraire n'est envoyée que pour cooperer avec eux à leur affranchissement.

Le Prince doit être pourvu en partant d'Europe de moyens pécuniaires suffisants pour tenir à la Jamaïque et sur le Continent Mexiquain un état convenable à sa grande destination, et pour les dépenses nécessaires pour soutenir ses adhérents, et en acquérir de nouveaux. Il doit porter avec luy des armes, des munitions, quelques canons de campagne, obusiers, mortiers de petit calibre, &c., pour pouvoir organiser sa force armée en mettant pied à terre. Cette dépense n'est qu'un prêt ou une avance que lui fera le Gouvernement, et cette dépense peut servir autre part si l'entreprise échoue.

Le Prince doit avoir auprès de lui un agent diplomatique Anglais, pour garantir dans l'opinion des indigènes Mexiquains tous les arrangements et transactions qu'il jugera nécessaires de passer pour le succès de son entreprise. Cet agent sera pourvu d'avance d'un caractère diplomatique pour résider auprès du nouveau souverain, qu'il ne [quittera ?] qu'à Mexico, lorsque le Prince y sera entré, que le gouvernement Espagnol sera renversé, et que la majorité de la nation aura accepté et reconnu sa souveraineté. Les bases du traité seront très-faciles entre deux nations de bonne foy, qui ont besoin l'une de l'autre, et qne l'intérêt politique et commercial invite mutuellement à une alliance offensive et défensive. Ces bases seront arrêtées d'avance, avant le départ du Prince, entre le Gouvernement et lui. On les modifiera sur les lieux selon les circonstances.

Dès que l'expédition sera entièrement prête, elle se rendra directement à la Vera Cruz comme le port le plus près, et la route la plus directe et la plus commode pour la capitale, qu'il faut atteindre le plus tôt possible. Je sçais par les rapports le plus récents qu'à reçu le Gouvernement, que c'est le

point où les Espagnols ont préparé la plus grande défense; que vingt-cinq mille hommes, de très-belles troupes en apparence, très-bien organisées, sont disposées par échelons entre ce port et Mexico; que si on voulait pénétrer de vive force de la Vera Cruz à la capitale *en conquérants*, cette distance de plus de deux cent quarante milles, et cet obstacle, seraient des empêchements trop forts pour être surmontés, même par une force double de celle de l'expédition proposée.

Mais je sçais aussi qu'excepté les officiers généraux et supérieurs et peut-être deux ou trois mille Espagnols naturels, cette armée est composée d'indigènes, de ces mêmes hommes qui ont le plus grand intérêt personnel à l'affranchissement de leur patrie, et qui en retireront le plus grand bénéfice, puisqu'il les portera à tous les emplois civils, militaires, honorifiques, et lucratifs, qu'occupent à présent les Européens à leur grand regret.

C'est donc à la Vera Cruz que l'armée Anglaise doit descendre.[1] S'il y a résistance, elle s'en emparera de vive force; mais en protestant par une proclamation du Général à l'appuy de celles du Prince qu'il n'est pas venu dans l'intention de garder pour l'Angleterre cette place ni aucune autre sur le Continent Mexicain; qu'il a ordre de n'y séjourner que le tems nécessaire pour aider les indigènes à fonder leur gouvernement avec solidité et à compléter leur affranchissement.

Des que le Prince sera descendu, il rassemblera sous la protection de l'armée Anglaise ses partisans, en grossira le nombre, les organisera en troupes régulières, appellera auprès de sa per-

[1] Il y a sur cette côte plusieurs autres points de descente, tels que Panuco, Rio San Pedro, Villarica, la rivière de Grijalva, Tabasco, Truxillo, &c.; mais j'ai suivi l'opinion du Capitaine Don Joseph de Pavia, qui a longtems commandé une frégate dans ces parages. Il m'a assuré que le vrai point de descente, pour faire une grande sensation sur les indigènes, et pour les déterminer, est la Vera Cruz, que cette place, même en cas de mauvaise volonté de leur part, ne peut pas résister à une attaque sérieuse, et qu'il répond sur sa tête du succès et des suites. Il faut entendre et consulter ce bon officier.

sonne tous les officiers civils et ecclésiastiques qui voudront se joindre à lui, ou qui luy seront proposés par les indigènes de son parti, et se disposera à marcher le plus rapidement possible sur Mexico, pour ne pas laisser refroidir le zèle de ses adhérents, et pour augmenter la confusion et le discrédit du Gouvernement Espagnol. Sa prudence, son audace, sa popularité, et ses talents, feront le reste.

Le Général Anglais aura ordre de lui fournir sur sa réquisition le nombre de troupes qu'avec son conseil et le vœu de ses partisans il jugera nécessaire pour son escorte, sa sureté, et sa dignité. Il est à présumer qu'il n'aura besoin que de quelque cavalerie, quelque infanterie légère, et quelques canoniers. Ce Général restera à la Vera Cruz, ou à portée de l'escadre, avec le reste de l'armée, observant de la maintenir dans la plus exacte discipline, traitant les habitans comme des alliés, dont il cherchera à gagner la confiance.

Tel est le plan d'après lequel je crois que doit être conduite la révolution du Mexique: j'ose ne pas douter du succès. Elle n'occasionnera ni emploi de troupes, ni dépenses extraordinaires, puisque dans tous les cas il faut nécessairement envoyer une force dans les Antilles; elle ne coûtera que très-peu d'hommes, puisqu'il ne s'agit pas de conquérir, et que tout au plus la prise de la Vera Cruz coûtera un peu de sang si on s'y trouve forcé. Elle ne retiendra pas longtems dans ces parages l'armée et l'escadre quel qu'en soit le succès, car, en trois semaines au plus la révolution sera faite ou manquée; ainsi elle ne suspendra pas de plus d'un mois les autres opérations auxquelles ces forces auront été destinées.

Si elle réussit, le nouveau Souverain fera passer une partie de son armée au Nouveau Mexique pour tenir en bride les Amériquains, et il préparera à la Havane une expédition pour aller se remettre en possession de la Louisiane, et sauver les Florides des griffes de Buonaparte. Par là il paralysera toutes les Provinces méridionales des Etats Unis, qui sont les seules qui désirent la guerre, les seules qui méritent notre vengeance.

Si la révolution n'a pas lieu en entier, elle pourra devenir partielle, et s'étendre en deçà ou au delà du Yucatan; ou, si elle manque en entier, toutes les côtes du Mexique et du Golphe seront ouvertes à notre ressentiment et deviendront la proye de nos expéditions partielles. Peut-être même, dans le cas absolu de guerre, pourra-t-on établir dans l'Isle des Sacrifices une garnison et une station fixe d'une escadrille, pour couper toute communication entre le Mexique et l'Europe, et par là ramener par force les indigènes au projet d'émancipation, qu'ils auront eu l'imprudence de rejeter, lorsqu'elle leur aura été offerte de bonne foy.

En cas que le Prince soit obligé de renoncer à ce glorieux projet, il se trouvera, dans le cours de la guerre, des moyens de l'indemniser, soit par la cession de la Louisiane et des Florides, soit par un établissement sur la Tierra Firme. L'une ou l'autre le mettrait à même de reprendre un jour ce projet, qu'il ne faut jamais abandonner. Ce Prince resterait donc attaché à l'armée des Antilles, car notre Roy et notre Gouvernement pensent trop noblement, et notre nation est trop généreuse pour sacrifier un Prince intéressant après l'avoir mis en avant.

Il est d'autant plus important de se presser d'envoyer aux Antilles des troupes et une forte escadre et de commencer les opérations par l'expédition du Mexique, qu'on doit être très-convaincu que Buonaparte s'en occupe très-sérieusement, et qu'il est même à craindre que la destination de l'escadre de Rochefort ne soit de jeter une forte garnison dans la Vera Cruz, et d'en tirer le très gros numéraire, qui, sans ce secours ne peut pas passer en Europe.

Rt. Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Great George Street, June 2, 1807.

My dear Lord—I take the liberty of sending you a letter I have just received from General Miranda. I have not seen

that to De Rouvray which he refers to; but I have no doubt, if it contains any thing material, De Rouvray will communicate it to your Lordship.

I am, my dear Lord, yours sincerely, N. VANSITTART.

I presume you must have letters from Trinidad of a much later date.

General Miranda to the Rt. Hon. Nicholas Vansittart.

Trinidad, ce 9 Mars, 1807.

Mon très-cher Ami—Ayez la bonté de remettre la lettre cijointe à de Rouvray, et de lire son contenu, qui vous mettra au fait de l'état actuel des choses dans cette partie du monde.

Envoyez-nous, je vous en prie, au plustôt possible, une résolution définitive quelconque. Le Nouveau Monde se perdra aussi bien que le Continent Européen, si on persiste à se conduire comme on l'a fait jusques ici. On se décourage ici; on croit que l'Angleterre n'a pas de moyens pour soutenir cette grande lutte; et on finit par se persuader qu'il faut absolument se soumettre aux volontés de la France, pour y pouvoir exister. C'est la doctrine la plus pernicieuse et la plus détestable qu'on puisse adopter; mais elle se propage malheureusement ici par l'insouciance que l'Angleterre montre à l'égard du Nouveau Monde, qui depuis longtemps lui tend les bras, lui offre son commerce et ses richesses, et qu'elle semble dédaigner et mépriser absolument; tandis qu'elle donne des secours et cherche avec empressement l'alliance des Russes, des Tartares, et des Turcs, pour qu'ils viennent à son secours, &c. Je vous assure que ce sont des raisonnements que j'ai entendu faire ici à des habitans de la Province de Caracas, qui aiment leur indépendance, qui abhorrent les Français et le système actuel de Bonaparte, et qui désirent sincèrement de s'allier avec l'Angleterre pour se soustraire absolument au Gouvernement Espagnol et Français.

Adieu—à vous très-sincèrement,

MIRANDA.

Ce 7 Avril, 1807.

PS. Les Depéches que je viens de recevoir du Comte de Rouvray et de Mr. Turnbull me laissent encore dans l'affreuse incertitude où je me trouve depuis longtems: ayez la bonté donc, mon cher ami, de m'en tirer au plus tôt, et de m'annoncer enfin l'envoy des secours qui doivent produire l'indépendance et la liberté de mon pays, ainsi que la prospérité et la gloire du votre.

Par les renseignements que j'ai reçus dernièrement de la Côte Firme, ainsi que de la Province de Caracas, il paroît que tous les esprits sont encore bien disposés en notre faveur, mais que le retard des secours promis par l'Angleterre les font vaciller dans ce moment, et les jeteront bientôt (je crains) dans le désespoir. Je vous laisse à penser le reste, et les conséquences fatales qu'un délai pareil pourroit nous amener pour le malheur de tous.

La catastrophe récente de Buenos Ayres doit ouvrir les yeux du Ministère sur les idées absurdes de conquête que quelques gens ont toujours eues en vue sur l'Amérique méridionale. Je ne me suis pas plus trompé sur ce point-là que sur la facilité qu'il y auroit de pénétrer dans le pays, toutefois que l'indépendance et la liberté des habitants soient la base de cette entreprise, devenue cependant plus et plus difficile qu'elle l'étoit il y a un ou deux ans. Ne perdons pas plus de tems, je vous en prie.

À vous toujours, M——A.

General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.

11, Leicester Square, le 4 Juin, 1807.

Mylord—Je crois vous prouver mon attachement particulier pour vous, et mon zèle pour votre patrie, devenue la mienne depuis quatre ans, en vous exposant tous les motifs à l'appui de l'importante proposition que je vous ai faite. Je sçais que vous avez été content de ma première note: je vous prie de lire cette seconde avec la même indulgente attention.

J'aurai l'honneur de me rendre demain matin à 2 h. à votre office.

Je suis avec tout le respect possible votre très-sincère serviteur, DUMOURIEZ.

Note.

4 Juin, 1807.

Toutes les nouvelles apportées par le Diomède sont en faveur de la proposition du voyage du Duc d'Orléans. Il n'existe en troupes réglées qu'environ deux mille hommes, encore ce ne sont que de troupes coloniales. Le Vice-roi est arrêté, et c'est déjà une espèce de révolte contre les agents de la Métropole. Le reste de l'armée est un ramassis de colons sans ordre et sans union. Liniers, qui parait s'être emparé de toute l'autorité, est un avanturier Français *royaliste*, que le Duc d'Orléans peut gagner ou abattre facilement. Vous tenez déjà la colonie du St. Sacrement, où ce Prince sera à portée de pratiquer avec les habitants de la Capitale. Si Buenos Ayres est en votre possession à son arrivée, je regarde la révolution comme très-facile, très-prompte, et très-assurée, parce qu'elle fixera toutes les irrésolutions.

Cette Révolution devient plus nécessaire que jamais pour votre sûreté et votre commerce, car vous voilà déjà avec deux places à garder, Montevidio et le Sacrement. Il faudra encore occuper St. Gabriel et même Maldonado, sans compter la garnison nombreuse qu'exigera Buenos Ayres. Par la paix avec les habitans, vous vous reduirez à votre seule garnison de Monte Video. Cette paix ne peut être solide que par l'émancipation du pays, et cette émancipation ne peut avoir lieu que par un Prince de la Maison de Bourbon, substitué aux droits de Charles Quint, par la descendance directe d'Anne d'Autriche. Ce droit a une force très réelle sur les déscendants des guerriers qui ont conquis cet immense pays au nom de cet Empereur. Tous ces titres sont réunis dans le Duc d'Orléans et dans lui seul, puisque la bonne politique exclut nécessairement la branche ainée.

L'intérêt de l'Angleterre pour déterminer ce voyage n'est pas douteux sous les trois points de vue politique, commercial, et militaire. La délibération ne peut être suspendue que par des circonstances étrangères à cet intérêt décisif. Elles ne peuvent être que relatives à l'Europe.

Serait-on arrêté par le désir de ménager l'Espagne ? à quoi bon cette condescendance ? n'est-elle pas totalement asservie à Buonaparte, au point d'envoyer 30,000 hommes à 600 lieues de ses frontières malgré sa pénurie en troupes et en argent, et malgré son véritable intérêt, qui exigerait qu'elle réunît toutes ses forces de terre et de mer pour aller sauver ses colonies, dans lesquelles ses bons amis les Français eux-mêmes augmentent continuellement un germe de rébellion, qui finira toujours par les détacher de la Métropole, en votre faveur si vous protégez cette révolution, à votre détriment si elle se fait sans vous ?

Cette Révolution est déjà écrite dans le livre des destins ; elle sera ou Anglaise, ou Française, ou Amériquaine. Ces deux derniers modes sont contre vous, et vous tenez les premiers dans vos mains. La condescendance pour l'Espagne ne peut donc plus vous arrêter. Buonaparte en aurait seul le profit ; il rirait de cette faiblesse, dont personne ne vous sçaurait gré.

Votre résolution peut-elle être suspendue par l'incertitude des grands évènements qui doivent décider dans le Nord de l'Europe le sort du Continent et du monde entier ? bien loin d'être arrêtée par cette crise, c'est un motif de plus de hâter la révolution de l'Amérique du Sud. Vous n'êtes entravé par personne ; vous n'avez pas besoin d'un bataillon ni d'un vaisseau de plus pour l'effectuer : au contraire, vos dépenses diminuent et son succès vous rend la disposition de vos troupes.

Si une bataille générale décide sur la Vistule le sort de l'Europe en faveur de Bonaparte, ou si la crainte de cet évènement force l'Empereur de Russie à faire la paix avec ce conquérant, alors, livrés à vous-mêmes (car vous ne serez point com-

pris dans la paix du Continent) ne serez-vous pas trop heureux de vous être approprié, avant la défection de vos alliés, par la Révolution Amériquaine, le débouché de votre commerce et de vos manufactures, au moment où l'Europe vous sera fermée, et le numéraire de ces contrées avec lequel Buonaparte vous fait la guerre ?

Supposons qu'il vous fasse la grâce de vous admettre à une paix universelle — supposons qu'en conséquence vous soyez alors obligés d'abandonner les indigènes à leurs propres forces, comme Louis XIV. fut forcé d'abandonner son petit-fils Philippe V., la chose sera faite ; et certainement toutes les Puissances de l'Europe, vous exceptés, ne sont pas en état de faire rentrer l'Amérique sous la domination de l'Espagne, dès qu'elle s'en sera affranchie.

D'ailleurs, que la Russie fasse sa paix particulière, ou que vous soyiez compris dans une paix générale, vous ne pouvez regarder tous les arrangements pacifiques de Bonaparte à votre égard que comme une suspension d'armes qu'il employera contre vous. Il profitera de tous ses avantages, profitez donc de tous les votres.

Au reste, en admettant l'hypothèse de la paix et du triomphe complet de ce Conquérant, on n'y croit pas ; et si les ministres veulent lire avec attention le *Jugement sur Bonaparte* qui n'est point un pamphlet des invectives et de colère mais une suite de raisonnements conséquents, ils verront qu'il y a des ressources immenses pour abattre le Géant, si on employe bien les diversions. L'émancipation de l'Amérique du Sud en est une très-importante. Elle est facile à éprouver ; tous les moyens sont sur les lieux ; et il ne faut de plus que l'envoi d'un seul homme que la Providence a placé dans les mains du Gouvernement Anglais.

Note sur le Mexique.

Juin 12, 1807.

Dans la Note du 22 Avril, sur la continuation de la guerre de terre et de mer, voicy le paragraphe intitulé *Mexique.*

" Le coup le plus terrible que l'Angleterre puisse porter à Buonaparte est de séparer les possessions Espagnoles de leur métropole, non pas en tentant follement de les asservir, mais en y plaçant une Dynastie qui les garantisse également et de l'indépendance Américaine et de l'influence et du joug de la France. Toutes les pertes, toutes les gênes que Buonaparte parviendra à faire supporter au commerce et aux manufactures Anglaises en Europe seront réparées au centuple par la création d'une nouvelle puissance, alliée nécessaire de l'Angleterre, et qui par ses consommations, dépendra de son commerce et de ses manufactures.

" Le projet d'arracher le Mexique à la Monarchie Espagnole ne doit point être envisagé comme une conception dévastatrice et de haine contre cette Monarchie. C'est un acte de prévoyance digne du gouvernement d'une nation prudente et réflechie. Les progrès de la population et de la culture de la Louisiane depuis son union avec les Etats-Unis annoncent l'invasion prochaine du Mexique, dès que les nouveaux établissements qui s'étendent déjà à la droite du Mississippi, dans les riches plaines des Cenis, se répandront jusqu'au Rio del Norte. Alors les frontières du Mexique seront bientôt franchies par les avanturiers Amériquains, à moins que le Mexique n'ait un Souverain résidant sur les lieux, qui puisse rassembler sur les mêmes frontières des forces indigènes bien conduites. Toutes les nations de l'Europe seront alors intéressées à borner les conquêtes des Amériquains sur le golphe de Mexique, l'Angleterre surtout. La révolution du Mexique est inévitable un jour; il est donc important d'empêcher qu'elle ne devienne Américaine ou démocratique, de la prévenir, de la préparer à l'avantage de l'Angleterre, pendant qu'elle est en guerre avec l'Espagne subjuguée par la France.

" L'avantage d'une pareille révolution est incalculable; son exécution est très-facile, sa dépense n'est qu'une mise en dehors, un prêt à la nouvelle Dynastie, dont on serait bientôt remboursé; le succès est infaillible. C'est ce que je m'offre à dé-

montrer, si le projet est adopté par le Gouvernement. Manille, Cuba, Porto Rico, suivront le sort du Continent, et auront une autre destination suivant les circonstances."

Pendant que j'envoyais cette note de Stralsund, on apprenait en Angleterre l'armement du Général Miranda à New York ; on sçait à présent qu'il est arrivé à l'Isle de la Marguerite, sur la côte de Cumana, et qu'il est débarqué à Barcelona, dans la Province de Caracas. Miranda est né dans cette Province, de parents obscurs ; il a reçu une éducation distinguée. Etant entré dans le Régiment de la Princesa, en garnison à la Havane, il en a été chassé pour contrebande, et s'est sauvé en Europe. Après plusieurs voyages en Russie et en Angleterre, il a été attiré en France par le fameux Petion, et l'exaltation de ses sentiments républicains l'a fait nommer en 1792 Maréchal de camp. Devenu par la rapidité des changements qui avaient lieu dans les armées Commandant de celle de Flandre en 1793, il a occasionné par une trahison la perte de la bataille de Nerwinde. Chassé ensuite de France, pendant les différentes phases de la révolution, il s'est réfugié en Angleterre, où son esprit et ses intrigues lui ont donné un libre accès près du Gouvernement, auprès duquel il a sollicité depuis trois ans les moyens d'aller révolutionner les Indes Espagnoles, en débutant par Caracas, sa patrie. Tel est l'homme dans lequel on paraît avoir mis trop de confiance, en protégeant sous main et aidant d'argent son projet, sans en examiner les conséquences.

Depuis trois ans on ménageait l'Espagne, et on rejetait toute proposition de tenter quelque entreprise contre les Indes Espagnoles, d'abord dans l'espoir d'amener par ces égards la Cour de Madrid à une exacte neutralité, peut-être aussi faute de plans, enfin par égard pour la Russie, qui exigeait, dit-on, que l'Angleterre respectat les possessions de l'Amérique Espagnole, vraisemblablement par jalousie sur la navigation de la Mer du Sud. Cette condescendance pour la politique Russe est une faiblesse qui n'aurait pu être excusable que dans le cas

où on eût eu lieu d'espérer de ramener par l'influence de la Russie la Cour de Madrid non-seulement à une neutralité exacte, mais à une jonction de ses forces avec celles du Portugal, de la Russie, et de l'Angleterre, pour fermer les Pyrénées aux Français, et s'affranchir du joug de Buonaparte.

Comme cet espoir, s'il a eu lieu, a été totalement illusoire, la condescendance pour la protection accordée à l'Espagne par la Russie est déplacée, surtout à l'époque où cette Cour parait abandonner les plans vigoureux qu'elle avait adoptés, se rapprocher de la France par la Prusse, ne présenter à l'avenir qu'une médiation dangereuse, et ne respirer que la paix. Une pareille politique ne mérite pas des ménagements désavantageux, et l'Angleterre rentre dans tous ses droits de nuire à Buonaparte en arrachant à l'Espagne ses possessions d'où il tire tout l'or qu'il employe contre l'Angleterre.

Mais si le Gouvernement a commis l'erreur de se laisser lier les bras sur cet article par la cour de Russie, quelle inconséquence n'a-t-il pas commise en protégeant les projets révolutionnaires d'un avanturier ! La Russie jetera les hauts cris sur cette expédition, et il n'y a pas d'excuse à donner de la part de l'Angleterre ; car Miranda a fait ses propositions au Gouvernement Anglais: c'est de Londres qu'il est parti; c'est de Londres qu'il a emporté au moins 60,000 lb. st. pour faire son armement. On aura beau nier cette mission qu'on croit très-secrète, la Cour de Russie doit la regarder comme un grief, et en portera des plaintes auxquelles on n'aura rien à répondre.

Mais cette expédition en elle-même est nuisible : elle est la seule manière de révolutionner les Indes Espagnoles qu'on ne devait pas tenter. Miranda, parti d'Angleterre avec de l'argent, est allé faire à New York un armement d'Américains. Son plan est fondé sur des principes démocratiques ; c'est pour les Etats-Unis de l'Amérique qu'il travaille : s'il réussit non seulement cette révolution sera démocratique, mais elle sera Américaine. Parité de principes, liaisons de commerce, secours prompts, tout l'attache à l'Amérique, tout le rend dé-

pendant des Etats-Unis, et c'est au moment où on est en contestation avec ces Etats, où peut-être on est menacé d'une rupture par rapport aux violences commises contre l'Etat de New York,[1] qu'on se suscite ce nouveau sujet de querelle, qu'on ouvre cette nouvelle carrière à l'ambition des Américains !

Dans quelle partie se fait cette expédition ? Dans le point le plus rapproché de la Grenade, de Tabago, de la Trinidad. Si elle réussit, l'amélioration de ces Colonies, la liberté de leur commerce, seront dans la dépendance d'un avanturier, dont l'intérêt sera d'attirer les Amériquains, et qui aura sur son flanc gauche l'appuy de Curaçao, d'où il recevra les secours des Hollandais et des Français, qui l'exciteront et le soutiendront contre l'Angleterre. D'après la connaissance des principes personnels de cet avanturier, et du lieu de son départ, du choix du point de débarquement, des dangereux résultats de sa réussite, le Gouvernement aurait tort de laisser opérer cette révolution, que pour l'intérêt il doit étouffer dans sa naissance.

En même temps qu'il doit par ses escadres fermer à Miranda toute communication avec les Etats-Unis, et intercepter tous les convois du Congrès et de Curaçao, en lui enlevant l'Isle de la Marguerite et l'enfermant dans la Province de Caracas ; en même tems il doit opposer le plus promptement possible, dans un autre point de ce Continent, aux principes révolutionnaires démocratiques, qu'il y aura déjà répandus, d'autres principes révolutionnaires royalistes qui remplissent le même but, de séparer ces Colonies de la Métropole—séparation qui est inévitable, qui est commencée depuis l'expédition de Miranda, et qu'il faut diriger puisqu'elle est entamée.

Les habitans des Indes Espagnoles n'ont point du tout un caractère analogue à une révolution démocratique : attachés à leur religion, à leurs usages, ils ont un dévouement particulier pour le gouvernement monarchique, qui seul leur convient, qui seul peut rallier ensemble les quatre castes qui composent leur

[1] Ces violences ne sont pas injustes ; elles sont conformes au droit de la mer, mais elles sont envenimées par l'inimitié du Président Jefferson.

population, Espagnols naturels, Créoles, Indiens, et Noirs ou sang mêlé. Aveuglés par leur haine contre le gouvernement de la Métropole, il est possible qu'ils embrassent avec fureur les moyens qu'un avanturier démocrate peut leur présenter: mais ils tomberaient dans tous les malheurs de l'anarchie. Si on leur présente un Prince de la maison de Bourbon, qui a des droits à les gouverner, que ce Prince, s'engageant à résider parmi eux, leur offre l'image d'un royaume indigène, et d'une existence nationale: alors leur amour-propre naturel, qui anime également les quatre castes, les ramenera sur-le-champ à leur caractère, à leurs principes, leur fera abhorrer l'anarchie démocratique et l'avanturier qui leur apporte ce funeste présent, et les raillera sous les étendards d'un roy légitime d'un sang qu'ils chérissent, et autour d'un trône dont la splendeur flattera leur vanité.

C'est dans le Mexique même qu'il faut présenter un Prince de la maison de Bourbon, qui ne soit ni de la branche Espagnole, ni de la branche Française, ayant un droit direct à la couronne de France. Ce Prince doit être connu d'avance par sa bravoure et ses talents; il doit sçavoir la langue Espagnole; il doit avoir déjà passé les mers, être acclimaté, dans la force de l'age, n'être pas étranger aux Américains Espagnols. Toutes ces qualités se trouvent réunies dans le Duc d'Orléans, qui a en outre, aux yeux de la nation Anglaise, le mérite de s'être accoutumé depuis cinq ans aux mœurs, aux usages, à la langue du pays qui lui a fourni un généreux asyle, qui est aimé et estimé du Roy, des Princes de la famille Royale, et de toute la Nation. Son caractère moral, sa probité délicate, ses connaissances étendues, la valeur brillante qu'il a déployée à la guerre, sa constance dans l'adversité, toutes ses qualités naturelles et acquises, lui donnent un droit incontestable au choix du Gouvernement, pour aller fonder un Royaume en Amérique, qui assure à l'Angleterre un allié solide et nécessaire et un débouché certain pour son commerce et ses manufactures. Mon amitié pour ce Prince respectable, qui a fait avec moi son brillant

apprentissage de guerre, ne m'aveugle pas, et si j'en connaissais un plus propre à remplir ce but, je le proposerais sans balancer.

Aucun Prince n'est plus en état de réunir les esprits des différents habitans de l'Amérique Espagnole sous une royauté sage, indépendante de l'Espagne, de détruire les projets démocratiques de l'avanturier Miranda, d'anéantir son parti, de former une armée indigène pour s'opposer aux progrès des Américains dans le golphe de Mexique, d'aider les Anglais à chasser les Hollandais et les Français des Antilles. L'Angleterre peut compter sur la solidité de son alliance, parce que ses liens politiques seront encore plus forts que sa reconnaissance.

Ses droits à occuper le nouveau Royaume des Indes sont aussi réels que ceux de la branche Espagnole de Bourbon. Dès que la politique nouvelle occasionnée par la révolution Française oblige à démembrer ces Etats d'outre-mer de la Monarchie Espagnole, comme on a séparé par la guerre de la Succession l'hérédité de la France de celle de l'Espagne, il est plus proche héritier par Anne d'Autriche de cette partie de la succession de Charles Quint, dont cette même politique exclut nécessairement la branche aînée des Bourbons, à cause de son droit direct à la couronne de France.

On ne peut pas craindre l'éventualité de l'extinction de cette branche aînée soutenue par quatre Princes, dont l'aîné, Louis XVIII. a une femme hors d'âge d'avoir des enfans, dont le second, Monsieur, est veuf; le troisième le Duc d'Angoulême a une jeune épouse, le quatrième, le Duc de Berry, n'a que 29 ans et peut être marié.

Cependant, pour tout prévoir en une affaire de cette importance on peut prendre d'avance des mesures sur le cas de cette éventualité comme on l'a fait dans le traité d'Utrecht, en stipulant que dans le cas où la couronne de France reviendrait par droit d'hérédité au Duc d'Orléans devenu roy du Mexique, il serait obligé à remettre cette dernière couronne à un de ses frères ou de ses collatéraux, de manière à ce que dans aucun tems ces deux couronnes ne puissent être réunies sur la même tête.

Quant à l'exécution de cette entreprise, le Duc D'Orléans est le plus propre de tous les Princes à en diriger toutes les parties et tous les mouvements dans le plus grand détail si le Gouvernement faisait d'avance un traité éventuel avec luy, et mettait à sa disposition une somme de 500,000 lb. st. avec la facilité de rassembler une force de 6,000 hommes parmi les Ecossais et le Irlandais Catholiques, et parmi les Italiens, Portugais, Espagnols, &c., qu'il pourrait attacher à sa fortune. Son point de rassemblement, d'entrepôt, de départ, serait une des Antilles à son choix. Le prétexte de l'armement pourrait être l'attaque de Martinique, de Cuba, ou de Porto Rico, pour masquer le plus longtems possible le vrai but de l'expédition.

Ce Prince, ayant passé dix-huit mois à la Havane, a certainement combiné d'avance tous les moyens de pénétrer dans le Mexique, connait le fort et le faible de cet empire, ainsi que les dispositions de ses habitans. On peut s'en rapporter avec confiance au plan qu'il tracera, et que lui seul en Europe est en état d'exécuter par ses talens, sa naissance, sa vigueur personnelle, et par le secours de ses deux frères, leur liaison avec l'Angleterre, leur habitude de braver les dangers, et surtout leur union qui de trois têtes n'en fait qu'une et présente trois successeurs pour achever l'entreprise en cas qu'il arrivât malheur à l'un d'eux dans son exécution.

En adoptant ce plan, l'Angleterre *aussi* aura fait un Roy, aura révolutionné le globe d'une manière plus glorieuse et plus utile que Bonaparte, auquel elle aura porté un coup terrible en lui enlevant les trésors du Nouveau Monde, et laissant à sa charge la Nation Espagnole, dont une partie émigrera pour aller retrouver la liberté dans une nouvelle patrie. Quant à la Cour de Madrid, on pourra la ramener à une politique saine et vigoureuse par l'espoir qu'on lui fera entrevoir de lui reserver ses possessions de l'Amérique du Sud, à condition qu'elle secouera avec énergie le joug de Buonaparte et s'alliera solidement avec l'Angleterre et le Portugal.

La Russie, par la mollesse de sa politique, a perdu le droit d'intervenir dans la disposition du sort de l'Amérique Espa-

gnole: le Gouvernement n'est nullement obligé de lui annoncer ses projets à cet égard, puisque les liens qui étaient le prétexte de sa condescendance se relâchent de jour en jour, et changent la nature des obligations mutuelles. Cependant, pour guérir sa jalousie et diminuer l'ombrage qu'elle pourrait prendre de la création d'un nouvel Etat dans la Mer du Sud, il sera possible, lorsque l'expédition sera en train, et pas plus tôt, d'entrer en négociation avec le cabinet de Pétersbourg, pour luy démontrer que son intérêt sur cette mer est purement commercial, et vu la nature ingrate de ses ports au Nord-Est de son Empire, ne pouvant fournir qu'une navigation bornée, son plus grand avantage est que toutes les côtes de l'Ouest du Continent Américain Espagnol seroient vivifiées par un gouvernement solide et par un Souverain résidant sur ce Continent.

L'étendue naturelle du nouvel Empire que l'Angleterre peut fonder en Amérique sous le nom de Royaume de Mexique doit comprendre toutes les bandes des côtes du golphe de ce nom depuis le Rio del Norte au nord jusqu'a la Guyane, jadis Hollandaise, au sud, ainsi que toutes les Isles de ce golphe appartenantes à l'Espagne excepté Cuba, qui serait cédée à l'Angleterre, et Porto Rico, pour en faire le prix d'une alliance étroite avec le Dannemark, en cas qu'on réussisse à ramener la Russie à des principes énergiques, et à former la Ligue du Nord. C'est ainsi que l'Angleterre peut lier les intérêts des deux Hémisphères, et réunir à son avantage contre l'ennemi commun les Puissances les plus séparées par leur position géographique.

Extrait d'une Lettre à M. Windham.

Le 21 Juin, 1806.

. . . . faire un Roy du Mexique; par cette création acquérir un allié puissant, qui par la suite contienne les Amériquains, vous aide à chasser les Français et les Hollandais des Antilles, vous ouvre un Débouché pour vos manufactures, et vous dédommage au centuple des gênes qu'elles souffrent en Europe. Par cette expédition, aussi brillante que solide, aussi facile que lucrative, vous acquerrez, sans tirer un coup de fusil, la domi-

nation du Golphe du Mexique par la possession de la Havane, celle des Philippines et de la Mer du Sud par l'occupation de Manille, que le nouveau Roy vous cédera pour prix de son exaltation. Vous ne pouvez les acquérir par ce moyen, en profitant des circonstances qui ne se représenteront jamais, ou qui tourneront contre vous si on les laisse échapper. Le commerce de ces deux mers sera dans vos mains; les richesses métalliques de l'Amérique Espagnole arriveront en Angleterre; vous en priverez l'Espagne et Buonaparte. Cette révolution numéraire changera la politique de l'Europe. . . . .

Memorandum relative to Spanish America.

BY LORD CASTLEREAGH.

[No date.]

The liberation of South America must be accomplished through the wishes and exertions of the inhabitants; but the change can only be operated, in the first instance, either speedily or with safety to those who may be disposed to concur in it, under the protection and with the support of an auxiliary British force; the principles upon which it is sent being, however, from the first, distinctly declared.

This force, with a view to Mexico, should not be less than 10,000 men. It should assemble at Jamaica in October, so as to be prepared to land on the Spanish Main by the 1st of December. A small force at Trinidad, to give the impulse at the same time to the Caraccas, might be advantageous. The officer who is to command, or some other confidential person, should precede the troops. His early departure may be material to superintend preparations, communications with the interior, &c. The corps to be composed two-thirds of British, and one-third of the Black West India Regiment: the British troops to be selected from those corps that have been seasoned to a tropical climate, replacing them by others. The following arrangement is suggested for assembling the force required.

The four regiments in reserve at Gibraltar, under Major-General Spencer, to be ordered on this service—one regiment from Madeira, replacing it by the 4th Veteran Battalion from Ireland, 1,061 strong. A battalion of the 60th is now on passage from the Cape to the West Indies, where we have, at this moment, (exclusive of 5,000 men at Jamaica, and the battalion of the 60th on passage from the Cape) 19,422 men—the usual force in that quarter not exceeding 15 or 16,000 men. If 3,000 men are sent out from hence in the autumn to the West Indies, four Black and three European regiments may be drawn from thence. The numbers will then stand thus:

Four regiments from Gibraltar . .	4,000
One ditto, from Madeira . . .	1,000
Four Black regiments . . .	4,000
Three European	3,000
	12,000
Cavalry dismounted	1,200
Artillery	
	13,200

If war with America should cease to be apprehended, three regiments more, or 3,000 men, may be drawn from thence. The 4,000 men to be sent from home will be replaced by the usual annual draft of fifteen men per company from the Irish Militia, the vacancies in which will again be filled up, as heretofore, without ballot, and at a low bounty. The force for home defence will then stand as at present. Should reinforcements be required for North America or the East Indies, they can be furnished. It will in that case only remain to be determined, according to the circumstances of the moment, whether Sir John Moore's corps (which cannot be considered as separated from our system of home defence) shall be recalled.

Much facility would be given to the above arrangements, and the composition of the Irish army improved, were some fencible regiments raised in Scotland, for service in Ireland,

which would enable us to bring over a proportion of the Irish Militia to Great Britain.

[The following calculations, in the handwriting of Lord Castlereagh, likewise without date and without title, appear to be closely connected with the subject of the preceding memorandum.]

No. 1.

Now at Gibraltar.

6th	1 Battalion	.	982
29th	1 do.	.	825
32nd	1 do.	.	943
42nd	1 do.	.	983
48th	1 do.	.	1,004
50th	1 do.	.	973
57th	1 do.	.	975
61st	1 do.	.	1,061
82nd	1 do.	.	953
1 Royal Vet. Bat.			476
Artillery	.	.	800
			9,975

Of this force Spencer would probably carry from 4 to 5,000 men to Cadiz.

Now under orders at Cork.

9th	1 Battalion	.	1,196
40th	1 do.	.	1,048
60th	5th do.	.	971
91st	1st do.	.	1,001
4th Vet.	do.	.	1,069
2 Companies, 95th			200
2 do. of Artillery		.	200
			5,685

Were the whole of this force sent, it might perhaps afford the means of striking a blow against the Russian fleet in the Tagus, on its way.

If not, it would assemble 12,000 men upon Cadiz.

May be added from Cork.

5th	1 Battalion	.	1,000
38th	1 do.	.	1,020
71st	1 do.	.	968
			2,988

Total Force.

At Gibraltar . .	9,975
Under orders . .	5,685
	15,660
May go . . .	2,988
	18,648

This arrangement withdraws 8,000 men from Ireland. There are, however, three 2nd Battalions on passage to Ireland, consisting of 2,000 men.

The reduction in Ireland is therefore only 6,000, leaving an army there of 53,000 men.

No. 2.

Supposing the force in No. 1 detached to Spain, and they should find on their arrival that no opening for service there presented itself—South America might be approached on the side of Monte Video, and the Caraccas or Mexico by independent corps, according to the following arrangement: the former, as early as the troops could reach their destination, that is, by the middle of September; the latter, as soon as the season would admit of operations, that is, in the month of November or December.

Corps for Monte Video.

5th	1	Battalion .	1,000
6th	1	do. .	982
29th	1	do. .	825
32nd	1	do. .	943
40th	1	do. .	1,048
42nd	1	do. .	983
48th	1	do. .	1,004
50th	1	do. .	973
2 Companies, 95th			200
1 Reg. dismounted Cavalry . .			700
3 Comps. Artillery			300
			8,958

This Corps, with the exception of the Cavalry, would be taken from the force assembled at Gibraltar, and on the Spanish coast.

After the occupation of Monte Video, 4 or 5,000 men might be withdrawn to support the operations on the Spanish Main, and might arrive in the course of December or January.

Corps for the Caraccas or Mexico.

60th	5th	Battalion	971	From Gibraltar and Spain.
61st	1	do.	1,061	
3rd	1	do.	971	From Madeira, replaced by 4th Veteran Battalion.
7th	1	do.	1,025	Corps under General Prevost may safely be ordered on this service, if no change for the worse takes place in our relations with America.
8th	1	do.	985	
13th	1	do.	916	
23rd	1	do.	983	
1st West India Reg.			907	From the Garrisons in the West Indies.
4th		do.	979	
6th		do.	914	
8th		do.	997	
60th, 3 Battalions			989	
2 Reg. dismounted Cavalry			1,400	From home.
3 Comps. Artillery			300	From North America.
			13,398	

No. 3.

According to disposition proposed in No. 1 and 2, the Garrison of Gibraltar will remain as follows:

9th	1	Battalion	1,196	This arrangement supposes the 1st Veteran Battalion to come home, and the 4th ditto to proceed to Madeira, to relieve the 3rd Regiment at Madeira.
38th	1	do.	1,020	
57th	1	do.	975	
71st	1	do.	968	
82nd	1	do.	953	
91st	1	do.	1,001	
Artillery			700	
			6,813	

The force actually at home will then stand nearly as follows:

Great Britain	128,000
Ireland	53,000
Islands	8,000
	189,000

of which

Regulars . . .	99,000	
Militia . . .	90,000	
		189,000

General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.

11, Leicester Place, le 26 Juin, 1807.

Mylord—Je respecte vos occupations et je ne sollicite plus une entrevue inutile. Je vais passer un mois à l'Isle de Wight, pour prendre les bains de mer, et pendant cette absence je vous demande la permission de vous adresser de tems en tems mes réflexions relatives aux circonstances.

Deux affaires, sur lesquelles j'ai pris la liberté de vous donner mon opinion, tournent d'une manière bien contraire à ce que m'a dicté mon expérience; et je crains bien que le résultat n'en soit fâcheux pour les intérêts de l'Angleterre et n'occasionne des regrets et de l'embarras à un ministère que je respecte et que je voudrais voir repousser par des succès glorieux les attaques de ses ennemis.

La première est l'évacuation d'Alexandrie, pour laquelle, à la vérité, il fallait un plus grand courage que pour s'obstiner à soutenir cette place, qui coûtera bien du sang et de l'argent, non-seulement sans utilité, mais au détriment de ce qu'il était plus essentiel de faire ailleurs de vos braves troupes sacrifiées mal-à-propos en Egypte.

La seconde est la tentative que j'ai proposée de l'émancipation de l'Amérique Espagnole par le moyen le plus simple et le moins hazardeux. Je n'ai rien à ajouter aux motifs que j'ai détaillés pour cette entreprise, et je ne peux pas répondre aux objections, puisqu'elles ne m'ont pas été communiquées. Mais j'ai appris depuis ma dernière note que je ne suis pas le seul qui ait attaché un grand prix à ce projet; et je suis glorieux de sçavoir qu'un grand homme, l'immortel Pitt, s'en était profondément occupé il y a trois ans, et qu'il avait même destiné le Capitaine Doyle et une autre personne à aller sur les lieux,

pour constater les dispositions des habitans et les moyens de réussir. Sir Sidney Smith et Mr. Huskisson ont connaissance de ce qui a été agité alors sur cette affaire.

Je regrette infiniment que cette proposition ait été rejetée, parce que j'y ai vu la gloire du Gouvernement, le salut des troupes, la sureté et l'augmentation de votre commerce, et de vos manufactures, et surtout l'épuisement des ressources pécuniaires de votre mortel ennemi. Mon âge me met à l'abri d'être soupçonné d'aucun intérêt personnel; ainsi mon zèle à cet égard est aussi pur que l'entreprise m'a paru grande et utile.

Je compte partir du 4 au 6 Juillet pour l'Isle de Wight, et partout je conserverai pour vous la plus respectueuse amitié, la plus sensible reconnaissance, et le plus vif intérêt. C'est avec ces sentiments sincères que j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

Le Genl. DUMOURIEZ.

On the Declaration of Independence by the Provinces of Rio de la Plata.

BY GENERAL DUMOURIEZ.

30 Juin, 1807.

On assure que les provinces du Rio de la Plata se sont déclarées indépendantes: il paraîtrait inexcusable, dans les circonstances présentes, de ne pas tirer parti de ce grand évènement, pour le bien de l'Angleterre, de l'Europe, et du monde.

Cette rébellion a dû être prévue. Le Gouvernement actuel, les Gouvernemens qui l'ont précédé, ont dû s'y attendre. L'état de l'Amérique Espagnole, les dispositions de ses habitans, leur étaient connues. Ils ont su que ces vastes pays étaient mûrs pour des révolutions; qu'ils voulaient à tout prix se séparer de leur métropole; que l'influence des Puissances Européennes pourrait modifier les conséquences de cette séparation, mais non la prévenir; qu'il dépendait de l'Angleterre de la faire tourner au profit de son commerce, de sa puissance, de la civilisation générale; mais que si le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne

demeurait passif durant ces commotions, il en résulterait de nouveaux essais de Démocratie, le bouleversement des propriétés, le règne des barbares en Amérique, et l'établissement du pouvoir de Buonaparte dans cette partie du monde.

Ces considérations et les avis non suspects qui lui parvenaient avaient frappé le Ministère à jamais regrettable, qui sauva l'Angleterre des attaques de la Démagogie, qui en eut sauvé l'Europe, si cela eût été au pouvoir des hommes; et il voulait en préserver ces belles et riches contrées de l'Amérique. On assure que Mr. Pitt ne différa de contribuer à leur affranchissement que pour se ménager le tems d'en faire comprendre la nécessité aux Ministres d'une grande Puissance alliée de l'Angleterre, et qui croyait faussement avoir un intérêt opposé. Une partie des vues salutaires de Mr. Pitt fut alors communiquée à quelques personnes: des Agens furent désignés et sur le point de partir (dans l'été de 1805), pour vérifier les dispositions des habitans, et s'assurer du concours de ceux qui désiraient l'établissement d'une monarchie indépendante. Ce fut, dit-on, l'influence du Ministre de cette Puissance alliée qui fit différer leur départ. La maladie de Mr. Pitt, sa mort, doublement lamentable dans les circonstances où le monde était placé, les vues de ses successeurs immédiats (si différentes des siennes), arrêtèrent la marche de ce grand projet. Il n'y eut d'exécuté sous les successeurs de cet Homme d'Etat que l'entreprise sur Buenos Ayres par Sir Home Popham et le Général Beresford.

Une vérité que l'histoire conservera, et qui ne fait sûrement aucun tort ni à la bravoure du petit nombre des troupes employées à cette entreprise, ni aux talens des officiers qui la dirigèrent, c'est que le succès de ce coup de main avec une poignée d'hommes, qui n'éprouva, pour ainsi dire, aucune résistance, démontra que les habitans voulaient s'affranchir, et que, croyant les Anglais venus pour les y aider, ils ne voulurent pas se défendre. Dès que le Général eut pris possession de la ville, on lui proposa de favoriser l'affranchissement; il rejeta

cette demande faute d'instructions. Les Chefs qui la lui avaient faite s'éloignèrent ; on se souleva, et, après un bien petit nombre de jours, Buenos Ayres fut reprise.

S'il était vrai qu'on eût encore attaqué cette place depuis, et que les forces de sa Majesté Britannique, parties de Monte Video, s'en fussent emparées de nouveau, après un bombardement, ce serait une grande faute, une faute d'autant plus grande que l'expérience d'un soulèvement aussi récent contre elles aurait dû avertir de ne la pas commettre.

Les Provinces du Rio de la Plata contiennent un million d'habitans, sans compter les Indiens non civilisés. Comment imaginer qu'on pourra les conquérir avec le peu de troupes Anglaises dont il serait possible de disposer pour cette guerre étrange, impolitique, meurtrière, et, pour le moins, inutile aux intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne !

A quoi cette conquête servirait-elle ? On ne pourrait garder ce pays parce que on ne garde point *malgré lui* un pays éloigné, qui peut mettre sur pied quatre-vingt mille soldats, chasseurs par habitude, braves, et susceptibles de s'aguerrir.

On le rendrait donc à la paix ! C'est tout ce que Buonaparte désire, pour s'y faire céder des places sous prétexte d'éteindre la rébellion, et d'en empêcher d'autres ; pour y établir ses Agens, et y mûrir une révolution dans le sens du Jacobinisme, dont il est (suivant l'expression du Grand Homme qu'il faut toujours citer), *the child and champion.*

Il y réussirait d'autant mieux que l'Angleterre serait devenue plus odieuse aux habitans. Ils n'ont pas encore oublié le sac de leurs villes par Drake et Morgan. La guerre actuelle fait de nouveau saigner ces plaies. Les Moines déclament en chaire contre les Anglais, qu'ils appellent hérétiques, et qui leur donnent beau jeu, s'ils ne s'occupent que de lever des contributions et de faire des conquêtes. Un cri s'est élevé dans le parti très puissant qui veut l'affranchissement ; car ses Chefs n'avaient pas ignoré le plan de Mr. Pitt, et lorsque le Général à qui Buenos Ayres venait de se rendre à rejeté leurs propositions,

ils se sont cru trahi par l'Angleterre. Enfin, si la guerre continue entre les troupes de sa Majesté Britannique et les habitans, l'Angleterre n'aura bientôt plus un seul partisan dans toute l'Amérique Espagnole.

Le précédent Gouvernement s'est bien abusé quand il a cru gagner l'affection des habitans en diminuant les droits payés aux Douanes, et en offrant à ce pays la perspective d'un grand commerce—1mo. La contrebande des Anglais et des Anglo-Américains était si active et tellement secondée par les Agens même du Fisc, que ces droits ne pésaient presque pas sur le pays, 2do. Les Espagnols de l'Amérique ont encore moins d'idées de commerce que ceux d'Europe.

Ce qu'on peut appeller le *Parti Anglais* sur le Rio de la Plata, se réduit à quelques négocians *étrangers* au pays, et qui le verraient volontiers se soumettre à la nation la plus commerçante du monde, dans l'espoir de partager ses bénéfices. Un autre *parti* très faible (si l'on voulait s'entendre) serait celui qui tienne pour la *metropole*. Il ne serait composé que du petit nombre d'Espagnols envoyés d'Europe pour occuper les grandes places dans l'Administration, la Magistrature, et l'Eglise. Déjà Liniers en a fait arrêter quelques-uns: on se débarrasserait de tous en les renvoyant en Espagne. Mais la division entretenue dans les esprits par l'indécision que les Généraux Anglais ont fait paraître donne actuellement de la force à ce parti. Les Moines et les gens timides sont pour lui, parcequ'ils craignent de retomber sous la domination de l'Espagne, et ils seraient patriotes demain, s'ils avaient une preuve aujourd'hui que l'Angleterre favorisât l'émancipation.

Les *Patriotes*, au Rio de la Plata, et dans toute l'Amérique Espagnole, se divisent en deux classes; ceux qui veulent une *monarchie* et un Roi résidant parmi eux, et ceux qui voudraient un Gouvernement populaire et *l'anarchie*. Les Patriotes de la première classe comprennent au Rio de la Plata tous les hommes considérables par leur naissance, leurs propriétés, leur éducation, les déscendans de Mendoce, d'Ayolas, de Salazar, &c.

Ce sont eux dont les Chefs firent des propositions, pendant l'occupation de Buenos Ayres. Ils ont depuis long-tems des Agens en Angleterre; et ils croient aujourd'hui avoir été trompés par eux ou par elle.

Les Patriotes de la seconde classe n'ont pas besoin d'être décrits: il suffit de dire que les émissaires de Buonaparte en augmentent incessamment le nombre, et que si l'Angleterre eût été secrètement leur alliée (ce qu'il serait absurde de supposer) elle n'aurait pu suivre un plan qui favorisât leurs projets sinistres mieux que le plan de conquérir qu'elle a suivi.

Le grand objet pour tous les Patriotes est l'émancipation. Si, dans l'état de rébellion où sont les provinces du Rio de la Plata, on ne leur laisse d'autre route pour y arriver que l'anarchie, ils s'y précipiteront; les uns de projet formé, les autres par désespoir, et parcequ'ils ne pourront demeurer neutres au milieu d'une multitude en armes.

Il est donc tems, il est plus que tems, de venir au secours des Patriotes qui veulent la monarchie: il faut leur donner un Roi. La possession de Monte Video sera d'un grand avantage pour y parvenir. C'est là qu'il pourra être envoyé d'abord—c'est de là qu'il répandra ses proclamations—là qu'il formera son armée—et c'est sous les murs de Monte Video qu'on accourra se soumettre à sa bienfaisante autorité.

Que ce monarque puisse jamais avoir un intérêt qui sépare sa cause de celle de l'Angleterre est impossible à supposer. Il sera son allié le plus fidèle, par la meilleure des raisons, qui est qu'il ne pourra subsister que par son alliance.

C'est de cette alliance étroite et nécessaire que découlera pour la Grande-Bretagne un immense accroissement de commerce, de ressources, et de puissance. L'émancipation gagnera, de proche en proche, toutes les provinces de l'Amérique Espagnole, et tout ce vaste empire demeurera ouvert aux Anglais. Ils l'auront fondé, et il sera aussi utile à leur indépendance politique et à leur grandeur, que les Etats fondés par Buonaparte le sont au soutien de sa tyrannie.

Mais si des considérations telles que celle de la distance des lieux et du défaut de nouvelles récentes empêchaient de risquer à présent l'embarquement d'un Prince pour Monte Video, est-il possible qu'il y en ait une seule qui détourne d'y envoyer un Agent, ou plusieurs Agens, comme Mr. Pitt avait projeté dès 1805, qui soient chargés de paroles pour Liniers et les Chefs du parti monarchique, qui fassent connaître avec prudence les intentions du Gouvernement et celles du Prince qu'il aura désigné, et dont le Général qui commande à Monte Video soit chargé de protéger les démarches? On ne le croit pas, et comme cette mesure peut avoir un très-heureux résultat, sans qu'elle paraisse présenter d'inconveniens possibles, c'est surtout pour obtenir qu'elle soit prise, qu'on a rédigé ces Mémoire.

Account of the Second Attack of Buenos Ayres.

BY DON BERNARDO VELASQUEZ, INTENDANT OF PARAGUAY.[1]

Buenos Ayres, July 12, 1807.

My dear Buonaventura—I do not know if a letter will reach your hands which I wrote to you about a month ago, and which was delivered to a naval officer, who went disguised by land to embark for Europe in one of the ports of Brazil. Since war was declared against the English, this river has been continually blockaded by their vessels; and if we have rarely any opportunity to write to Europe, I have not been able to avail myself of it, because I have been 500 leagues from this capital.

In the letter entrusted to the naval officer, I gave you notice

[1] From Lord Castlereagh's Memorandum on Cabinet Measures respecting South America (see vol. viii., p. 98), it appears that this Narrative was one among other letters from Spanish officers then recently intercepted, and that the writer was second in command under General Liniers at Buenos Ayres. The paper, by the same writer, giving details of the occupation of that city by General Beresford (introduced at p. 302), no doubt formed part of the same capture; and these communications were probably translated by some Spaniard in this country, so imperfectly acquainted with English, that it has been necessary to take great liberties with his language before it could be presented to the public.

that the English took possession of Monte Video on the 3rd of February, and that, in consequence of this loss, the people of Buenos Ayres, who ascribe to Sobremonte all their misfortunes, cried against him and against the Audiencia, and the latter, being intimidated, decreed the suspension of Sobremonte from all kind of command. The 10th of March, I received at the Assumption the official declaration of the said suspension, and an order from the Royal Audiencia, in which they stated that the defence of the capital was depending on my coming here. This order, I think, was not communicated to Liniers at the time, and, it seems, was not very agreeable to him, when he knew of it afterwards.

By the same Audiencia I was made Sub-Inspector and Major-General of all the troops, an employment which gave me very unpleasant moments, because the military regimen is entirely abandoned here, because it is impossible to enforce it in corps without chief officers, and consequently without subordination. Luckily, they have undertaken with emulation the management of the arms, evolutions, and continual exercise in firing.

The English in Monte Video received succours as well from the Cape as from Europe. On the 28th ultimo, more than seventy sail appeared before this capital, and on the 29th they made good their landing about twelve or thirteen leagues to the south of this capital. On the 1st we went to meet them with our battalions of Volunteers, whose strength was not 5,000 men, infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, and a competent corps of artillerymen, for the service of 40 pieces of light artillery.

We drew up our troops in order of battle, at the distance of three quarters of a league from here, and the following day we saw the enemy passing in front of us, and turning in search of an easy passage over the Riachuelo, a small river, which was behind us, with the intention of coming directly to the capital. Knowing his idea, we changed our position, and, repassing the bridge, which was behind us, we marched quick to receive them at the entrance of the town.

I arrived there with only a battalion of Vizcaynos, one of Arribeños, and a squadron of hussars, with six pieces of the light artillery. At the same time, Liniers arrived there. Hardly were those pieces established on a small hill, called the yard of the Matadero, or del Miserere, when at a short distance a column of the enemy was observed coming towards that point through the hedges of prickly pear, from a wood all about the capital. The artillery for some time made a very good fire of grape-shot, near the enemy; but he, having gained by the protection of the hedges of prickly pear an advantageous post, directed upon us, without being observed, a good many volleys of musketry, which obliged our troops to abandon that point — after having succeeded, however, by this manœuvre in stopping the enemy, who would undoubtedly have taken possession of the town that very evening, if our arrival at the Matadero had been delayed by half an hour. All that you shall hear different in a comma from this simple statement, do not believe.—Let me go on.

The nights of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, were employed in putting in each of the entrances of the streets leading from the Great Square towards the fields, two heavy guns, the troops on the terraces of the same streets, and in opening ditches at 150 yards from the Square. Another part of the troops was destined to skirmish in the cross-lanes.

The 5th, the enemy attacked the town in three columns, by the north, south, and west, dividing themselves between the eight streets which lead to the Square. At 6 o'clock began an infernal fire, as well from the artillery as from the musketry of the terraces. This produced all the effect which ought to be expected from so advantageous a situation, where the soldier could load his musket undiscovered, and was to be seen only at the moment of charging. The last terraces garrisoned with musketry were distant not more than 400 paces from the Square, and at this distance every Englishman was killed in the streets. After a few hours' firing, there began to come

into the town a good many prisoners, in crowds of 40, 50, 100, and more, carried by our skirmishing parties. In short, at 3 o'clock, p.m., or a little after, the firing ceased, for want of enemies. At this moment, we numbered 1,800 prisoners, 155 officers, among them one General and some Colonels.

At sunset on the 6th, an English officer came to speak to Liniers. He made some propositions, of which some were accepted, some were modified or refused, and some dictated to him. The amount of them is, that the hostilities will be stopped from that moment in the river Plata; that, on both sides, there should be a mutual restitution of prisoners, and those to be embarked in the space of ten days, carrying with them the arms they had actually—that, in two months, the town of Monte Video was to be restored in the same state it was in at the time it was taken. This last proposition was very hard to the enemy: however, he was obliged to accede to it after a defeat so astonishing, which cost him 1,080 odd men killed, a great number of wounded, little less than 2,000 prisoners; 155 officers, and a great many missing. In short, in nine hours, an English army of from 9 to 10,000 men, according to the statement of all the prisoners, was destroyed by 5,000 citizens. I assure you that I cannot find in the natural order of things a sufficient cause of so unexpected and happy an event, which cannot be ascribed but to a decided favour of Heaven.

In the very few meetings in which the defence of the capital was discussed, my opinion was always (considering the troops we had) not to expose them in the open field, and that we could not receive any benefit from them but in the ditches and clefts which surround the town, and in the streets. Many proofs we have of the advantages resulting from such positions, though taken in indispensable cases. It is a point of faith, that if the English had attacked us in the plain, on the 1st, when we came to give them battle, we should have clothed in mourning all this America; we should have been destroyed, without

being able to preserve a single man, because we had on our back an impenetrable river. I never thought that we should pass to the other side of this river; and when we marched towards it, I thought it was with the idea of having it as a bulwark on our front. I say that I take as a point of faith that we should have been destroyed completely; and I repeat it again, because it is also a point of faith that these troops, without being sheltered, cannot stand a second volley of shot.

On the side of the English there has been very little skill, and no combination whatever. They did not attack us, when they could have destroyed us in the field, and after that they attempted the rash undertaking of forcing the town when its entrances were garrisoned as I have said. If their three columns had maintained and fortified themselves in the points they took on the entrance of the town, without firing a musket, in less than four days we should have been obliged to deliver to them our arms, because we had no provisions in the town to feed the troops and inhabitants, and it was very easy for the enemy to prevent the entering of 500 bullocks which were slaughtered every day to feed the people. But, fortunately, they came persuaded that here there was not any resistance to meet with, and in this persuasion they began to plunder, without any discipline, and in the most atrocious and barbarous manner killing several citizens of both sexes and of all ages. By these means, spreading themselves about in small parties, they were taken by our soldiers. Our people—that is to say, the country people—have also resorted to plunder, and the soldiers profit by the robberies of the prisoners.

Many are the mournings worn by the inhabitants of this capital, in consequence of the action of the 5th instant. But its memory will rest for ever, on account of the complete defeat of a strong expedition, composed of select troops, of which their own officers said that they were not only the best of England, but of all the world. They are mistaken.

The number of vessels richly laden, which were waiting for the surrender of this capital, is very great. They did expect to land their merchandize, whose value, it is stated, amounts to more than twelve or fourteen millions of dollars. It is not a little disappointment to go back to London with their cargoes.

I have not yet made any question about my return to Paraguay, notwithstanding that I think I shall do it in a very short time. My stay here during the present Government cannot produce to me but disgust, because I cannot see with indifference the disorganization of this capital in all its branches. This is the 25th.

Since ten or twelve days, I feel myself almost good for nothing, and unable to take the pen. Thank God that the vessel destined to carry the correspondence had been detained more than I thought, and what deservedly interesting news! All my disease seems to be no more than a cold; but I have suffered a painful illness, and even at this day I feel myself very much incommoded, owing to so many cold and damp nights I have to pass in the open air.

Let us come back again to the defence of the capital, whose news will be very much celebrated in Spain, and will make noise in all the provinces of the world, as one of the most memorable military achievements of these times. We cannot form any other idea of it, if we consider ten thousand Englishmen, well armed, and commanded by Generals and a great number of officers, in whose countenances, at least, there appears a martial spirit, have been defeated by five thousand citizens (the number of muskets in Buenos Ayres at that time was not above that) in such a manner that they were obliged to restore so important a town as Monte Video. I cannot know in what expressions the King will be informed of this transaction. In such cases as this, there are sometimes injurious exaggerations. If they relate of heroism, of courage from the town-militia, besides that they are very credible by the result, the Govern-

ment will be deceived, and may disregard the security of these provinces, trusting to the valour and the patriotism of the citizens. If it was my province to give my opinion on the subject, I would say that they have shown their patriotism and their love for their sovereign, and that they have shaken off with courage the yoke which the English were to impose upon them: but that, notwithstanding this behaviour, I am of the opinion that half the number of troops which attacked this capital would make themselves masters of it, supposing the same defenders, equally armed and disciplined—a thing which cannot subsist long, because it is necessary that all the people give up their arms, in order to attend to their own private business. I never can consider as an instance, which can give any rules of defence, this which we have made so complete of this capital. I will rather say that ten thousand English sheep came to present their throats to the knife; and, in a word, I could say that the River Plata, the key to so vast and rich dominions, is defenceless, incapable of resisting a small force, and that in all its provinces there is not to be found a military man. This is the state of the Viceroyalty, and Peru is the same, and miracles are not to be found every day. If the war continues, if the English undertake another trial against Buenos Ayres, and if from Spain cannot come troops to defend it, we must give it up.

Nothing have I told you about my Paraguay, and now I have not time nor head to explain the motives of satisfaction I have in that country; being the foremost, the blind obedience, particular esteem and respect, shown to me by every class of that people. Nothing is wanting there for the service of a regular table. There are many and well assorted shops. The Government House is very good; the salary is $4,600, enough to satisfy a person who, like me, only wishes for a commodious existence. The climate is excellent: it is true that, in the months of December, January, and February, we feel strong heats, though I fancy not so great as in some days in Madrid.

The rest of the year is delicious. In the winter, after dinner, I ride: I alight about a league from the town; I take the musket, and in a short time I kill no less than half a dozen partridges. Some of my companions make good game of pigeons, ducks, and several other kinds of birds. The river is prodigiously abundant in fish. Commonly, some vessel is at anchor at about 200 paces, in sight of my house. I order to carry a chair there in the afternoon, when I do not ride. From thence, with the greatest easiness, I throw the line, and catch monstrous fishes. These are the amusements of the afternoons; the mornings are occupied more seriously.

Already my head is fatigued. Tell whatever you please to your amiable partner and my respected friend, without forgetting the little Charles, whom I consider as a little man of courage. I do not know what I can say to Pepe—you shall see him—A Dieu. Yours always, BERNARDO.

General Miranda to Lord Castlereagh.

27, Grafton Street, Fitzroy Square, January 3, 1808.

My Lord—After a boisterous passage of forty-four days from Tortola, I arrived at Portsmouth in the frigate Alexandria; and having obtained the necessary passports and passes of the Custom-House for my equipage and suite, I proceeded to London, where I arrived on Friday evening.

I had the honour to call on your Lordship this morning, to deliver the enclosed despatches from Governor Hislop, of Trinidad, and from Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, M.P. Having some important communications besides to submit to his Majesty's Ministers, I should be very glad to know when it will be convenient for your Lordship to receive me.

I have the honour to be, &c., FRAN. DE MIRANDA.

General Hislop (Governor of Trinidad) to Lord Castlereagh.

Trinidad, October 20, 1807.

My Lord—The important object which General Miranda's

visit to this island originally had in view, and from a consideration of the knowledge which his Majesty's Ministers have thereof, I have deemed it proper to apprize your Lordship of the resolution which he has, in the present situation of public affairs, adopted of departing from hence for England without further delay, he having done me the honour of consulting with me on the expediency thereof, and my opinion on that measure perfectly coinciding with his, however earnestly it were to have been wished that he had previously received his letters which the second August packet ought to have brought him. It is, notwithstanding, to be feared that he will have to leave them; as the packet has been arrived at Barbadoes these seventeen days past, we fear there is no boat there to bring down our mail; and, it being intended that the convoy with with which he goes shall leave this on the 23rd instant for Tortola, he has taken a passage in a ship bound to Bristol, and is anxious that he may not be detained there under the Alien regulations, conceiving that his earliest presence in London may be of consequence.

During General Miranda's residence here, I have enjoyed much of his private society, and I have received occasionally confidential communications from him, touching the important enterprise he has so long had in contemplation. I should by no means do justice to him, did I let pass the present opportunity of mentioning to your Lordship the undeviating proofs of zeal and anxiety he has evinced for the honour and success of his Majesty's arms, as well as for the welfare, prosperity, and glory, of the British Empire, towards which both his heart and mind are as strongly bent as those of the most loyal and faithful of his Majesty's subjects.

I trust that the many months of uncomfortable state of suspense that he passed here will, in some degree, find a compensation by the information he has thereby been enabled to acquire of the precise situation of matters on the neighbouring Continent, and of which he may hereafter avail

himself with advantage to the general object of his ultimate wishes.

I have the honour to be, &c., T. HISLOP.

The Honourable A. Cochrane Johnstone to Lord Castlereagh.

Tortola, November 15, 1807.

My Lord— I cannot avoid taking the liberty of introducing to your Lordship the bearer of this—General Miranda; because I am confident that the adoption of his plan for giving freedom to South America would be the means of producing such a commercial intercourse with our country as would enable us to view with indifference any attempt on the part of France against England. No peace should be made with that country till this great national object was accomplished.

I have the honour to remain, with much respect, &c.,

A. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE.

General Miranda to Lord Castlereagh.

London, January 10, 1808.

My Lord—The emancipation of South America has been a subject introduced by me, and received by the English Ministers as far back as the year 1790, under the promise of granting their independence on the same conditions that France and Spain did with the English Colonies in North America; when the Convention with Spain about Nootka Sound put an end to the measures adopted at that period, for putting this plan into execution. (See Note A.)

France undertook it soon after, in the year 1793, with the view of giving them an absolute independence in the same manner; but the exaggerated doctrines propagated at that moment by the anarchical party in France put a stop to it, through my own persuasion and efforts: demanding further explanations about the real state of St. Domingo, that I apprehended would have contaminated the South American Continent, and, instead of bringing liberty, would have introduced anarchy

and confusion. The retreat of the French armies from the Low Countries, that followed soon after, put an absolute stop to it.

As soon as Spain abandoned the Coalition and renewed her connexion with France, I turned my views again towards England, and soon after quitted the army of the Republic. At my arrival in London, in 1798, the British Government, under the same Ministry of Mr. Pitt, renewed the negociations, with the intention of putting the same plans in execution, assisted by the co-operation of the United States of North America, that were invited to furnish a land force of 10,000 men; while Great Britain would have found the money and ships necessary for carrying into execution this grand operation. The President Adams disappointed us, however, on this occasion, and the subject was postponed.

In the beginning of 1801, during Mr. Addington's administration, the same negociations were renewed; the projects of Government to be recommended to the people of South America and the military operations were combined and agreed; and the expedition was on the point of sailing, when the preliminaries of the Peace of Amiens put a stop to it. The operation, of course, was again suspended, until an opportunity should occur to put them in execution at a future period.

On the declaration of war against France in 1803, the same plans were resumed, and preparations made by the Administration for the purpose of carrying them into execution, the moment that a declaration of war against Spain should take place. This event occurred in 1804, during Mr. Pitt's third [second] Administration; when preparations were immediately resumed, and an extensive and detailed plan was arranged with Lord Melville and Sir Home Popham for the same purpose. (See Note B.)

These measures, however, were suspended by the manœuvres of France and by Russian intrigue, when the pressure of the South American exiles from the provinces of Caraccas and Santa Fé, residing in the United States of America and in

the Island of Trinidad, forced me to quit this place, and to attend to their call, with the view of obtaining some assistance from the United States of America (which were at that time expected to be involved in a war with Spain, on account of the differences respecting Louisiana), having, previous to my departure, obtained permission and assurances from Great Britain of being supported, in case of success, in our independence, agreeably to our primitive stipulations.

The failure of this attempt was owing not only to the bad faith of the agents of the American Government, who betrayed the secret to our enemies, but to the infamous and treacherous conduct of the American officers, entrusted with the direction of the ships composing the expedition. (See Note C.)

The subsequent attempt upon the coast of Caraccas in the districts of Coro, in August, 1806, supported by some ships belonging to a squadron of the Windward Islands, under Sir Alexander Cochrane, with whom a formal stipulation in favour of Great Britain was agreed and signed, would have succeeded, if the Commanders of the navy had not peremptorily refused to continue any operations whatever on that coast, and forced us to retire (see Note D), under the apprehension that the preliminaries of peace with France must have been signed by Lord Lauderdale at Paris by that period. By the evidence of those that were on the spot at that time, and by the intercepted correspondence from the principal agents of the Spanish Government in the province, it appears that the point of the coast was judiciously chosen; their own evidence says: "The situation is the most advantageous of any that he could possibly have chosen on all these coasts, on account of the Peninsula of Paraguana, where they may form a second Gibraltar, as long as they are masters of the sea; so that this spark of fire, which appeared nothing, may ultimately devour the Continent, if the English give him any assistance;"—and that the distress of the Captain-General and Intendant, for want of money, was so great, that it forced them to adopt the odious and violent measure of

seizing some of the sacred property of the Church, with all the deposited money belonging to the poor, the dead, &c.

So that, if Great Britain had given us a decided support of any kind, not only those provinces, but the rest of the Continent of South America, would have been now totally emancipated from the dominion of Spain, as appears particularly by the letters of Don Dionisio Franco, Administrator of the Province, and Lieutenant Murray, R.N.

By those documents, as well as by the information I have been collecting at the Island of Trinidad during the last twelve months, it appears that the dispositions of the people of the provinces of the Caraccas and Sante Fé in favour of independence is the same, but their anxiety very much increased with the rumours transmitted both from Spain and France, that the Island of Puerto Rico and the province of Caraccas, by secret stipulations with Spain, are already ceded to France. And as long ago as the time I was at Coro, I found there a letter from the Secretary of Government at Caraccas, mentioning that "France was to conquer Portugal and cede it to Spain, in exchange for that province."

These apprehensions are greatly increased by seeing 180 French troops already established at the capital of Caraccas, while Old Spain appears to be in the hands and possession of France. In this alarming situation for that country, I have come here to claim from his Majesty's Ministers that assistance so long ago and so repeatedly promised, of supporting their independence; as it is natural for them to suppose that orders from Spain will soon arrive calculated to promote the Gallic interest, and the submission of the whole province to their new masters, if measures are not soon adopted in the country for an effectual and successful opposition.

This step, in my opinion, would be absurd in the highest degree, were the inhabitants of those provinces to venture, unsupported and unprepared, to contend with France and Spain united, without an efficient maritime and land support. In which

case, I should imagine it more prudent on their part to make the best terms and arrangements with France, rather than to make themselves the victims of French rapine and conquest.

This very same distressing circumstance I conceive to be in favour of the independence now; as dangers and difficulties must always unite men; and I do not perceive, by what I know of the province at the time I quitted Trinidad, that there is any difference in opinion for emancipation, if independence is fairly and openly offered to them, and the delicate point of their religion respectfully attended to. The late events at Buenos Ayres are certainly unfavourable, as they encourage the agents of Government to oppose resistance, and the strangers in the country to aspire to those high and supreme situations that Liniers and his followers have obtained in another quarter; for which purpose I should think that the force to be employed now to ensure this operation ought to be greater than any we have mentioned yet.

The population of the Colombian Continent is considered by the best authorities not to exceed twenty millions, nor to be less than fifteen, disseminated over four grand divisions.

1, Mexico and Guatimala, as far as the Isthmus of Panama, seven millions; 2, Santa Fé, Caraccas, and Quito, four millions; 3, Peru and Chili, four millions; 4, Buenos Ayres and Tucumen, three millions. The total mass of this mixed population appears to be chiefly composed of native Indians, free people of colour, slaves, and whites. The Indians and slaves, it is supposed, compose two thirds; the people of colour and the whites the other third part. By this statement, that appears to me the most probable, it is evident that each of these departments or divisions is susceptible of having a separate Government on a substantial basis in point of territory and population.

I don't perceive, from the information I have been able to collect these twenty years past, that the people of the country have shown a predilection for any particular form of Government. All their wishes have tended to obtain an independence

from Europe, and to preserve in the change the solid and essential principles of civil liberty, such as the Swiss and Dutch people have enjoyed for many centuries, with universal happiness and respectability.

I do not believe that this point would be difficult to settle by *persuasion*, as the people are mild and uncorrupt yet; but, if *compulsion* was to be employed, in any manner whatever, the result would be opposition and intestine divisions. When we consider the great advantage that they possess, in having a uniform and general code of good laws, one and the same language, one and the same religion, one and the same form of administration, the difficulty of changing without convulsions is greatly diminished and little to be apprehended. Depons, in his judicious and accurate observations on Terra Firma, remarks that the *Cabildos*, or municipal organization of the civil Government of South America, are the most popular and best calculated to administer and govern the country. (See Depons, tom. 2, art. Cabildos. Paris, 1806.)

The department of Caraccas, Santa Fé, and Quito, may be called, from the similarity of its position and physical structure, the Switzerland of South America—totally separated from Mexico by the Isthmus of Panama; from Peru by the Cordillera of the Andes; and from the Brazils by the immense rivers Amazons and Orinoco: a circumstance that will remove any apprehensions about interfering in the arrangements that may now take place at the Brazils.

If we meet with success in this province, and the regulations immediately introduced are wise and acceptable to the people, we may expect to see, in a very short time, the imitation in Mexico, through the Isthmus of Panama and Guatimala; in Peru, through Quito; and ultimately at Buenos Ayres, through Peru and Chili.

The land and naval force that I conceive sufficient to carry into execution this plan, beginning with the province of Caraccas, is 10,000 men of all arms, and a competent naval force to co-

operate with it—leaving the military details of this operation for another Memoir, which I shall be immediately in readiness to submit to your lordship.

The greatest danger I at this moment apprehend is the arrival of some French Chief in this province, with a military force and a set of intriguers well calculated to delude the simple South Americans, as they probably have done by this time at Buenos Ayres. To avoid such peril and dangers, *celerity* in the execution of the plan is, I should conceive, the most essential and material point; as that country is in the utmost danger at this moment.

Let me be permitted to say a few words about the actual state of the trade between South America and the mother-country, carried on under the American flag, through the exclusive interest of the Intendants and Governors of those provinces. It appears, by a voluminous correspondence lately intercepted in a packet from Europe, and in my possession, that the productions of South America are now cheaper in Spain than they ever were in times of peace; and that the people of South America, as well as the European Spanish merchants, complain very highly about it.

The specie and money transactions also, between Mexico, the Havanna, Carthagena, &c., are chiefly carried on by the American merchants, which immense profits have turned them from friends to be enemies of our independence. They will not be brought back, I presume, to our friendship and interest, till they shall see themselves deprived of that immense trade that they now almost exclusively enjoy.

In times when crime, usurpation, and vice are upon the throne, and virtue is seen oppressed almost everywhere on the Continent, let me be allowed to say a few words, in answer to some illiberal insinuations that, I find, have been thrown to the public. My personal views and interest will be highly gratified, and my labours perfectly rewarded, when I shall see the people of those provinces enjoying a sufficient portion of

rational civil liberty, and a solid, permanent form of Government that will preserve it and promise them happiness. The situation of a private citizen then will be to me not only a congenial and eligible one, but of a good example, I hope, to others, by showing that the true character of a patriot consists in being submissive to the laws of his country, and a useful member of the society to which he belongs.

I have gone rapidly and with brevity through the narration and statement, presuming that the annexed documents (particularly the plan presented to Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville in 1804) will supply the deficiencies; and I have to apologize to your lordship for the unavoidable delay, my papers not having come to hand till Thursday last.

The documents I have now by me are numerous and interesting; but the apprehension of being diffuse and tedious has made me select a few only, leaving the others for the inspection of any confidential person that your lordship shall think proper to appoint for their examination. For the sake of brevity and despatch I have also transmitted some originals, whose preservation being absolutely necessary to me, I request your lordship will have the goodness of returning, after the inspection of his Majesty's Ministers.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration and respect, &c., FRAN. DE MIRANDA.

Note A.

Note delivered to Mr. Pitt, at his request, desiring to know what were Don Francisco de Miranda's views, soon after the Convention with Spain, about Nootka Sound.

London, January 28, 1791.

Sir—My only views now are, as they always were, to promote the happiness and liberty of my own country—South America—excessively oppressed; and, in so doing, to offer also great commercial advantages to England, as stated in the proposal presented on the 5th of March, 1790.

Upon these principles, I should be very happy to offer and continue my services to England; that, in pursuing the advantages already obtained by the last Convention, some judicious arrangements may be made, so as to forward and bring to maturity, at some future period, the same generous and benevolent plan above-mentioned, for the happiness and prosperity of South America, and for the grandeur and opulence of this nation.

Very few individuals of the ex-Jesuits, natives of Chili and Mexico, now exiled and ill used in Italy, might be of very great service, both for the purpose of directing the new settlements and commercial intercourse to be formed between the English and the natives upon the granted coasts of South America, and for establishing some communications with the great Spanish towns on that Continent, by means of their own relations and friends.

My intention being purely patriotic, with the view only of offering services to my country, and promoting the interests and advantages of Great Britain, as perfectly compatible, services should not be requested from me against Spain with any other motive; it being a point of delicacy with me, though authorized by the rights of nations and the example of great and virtuous men, in modern and ancient times.

FRANCISCO DE MIRANDA.

Note B.

General Miranda to the Right Hon. William Pitt.

Grafton Street, ce 13 Juin, 1805.

Monsieur—La demande que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous soumettre par Sir Evan Nepean, tendante à vous demander la permission de partir incessamment pour la Trinidad, n'a pour objet que de me réunir à des compatriotes qui se trouvent actuellement dans cette isle, et qui attendent avec la plus vive impatience mon arrivée, pour donner la main à l'œuvre importante de leur émancipation qu'ils sont tout-prêt de commencer par eux-mêmes; voyant que les secours promis par l'Angle-

terre souffrent un délai trop long, tandis que le moment actuel est à leur avis le plus propice qu'on sauroit en sauhaiter.

La même personne qui m'a transmise votre réponse sur cet objet m'a fait sentir que ce n'etoit pas en réalité la faute de bonne volonté de votre part qui causoit ce rétard, mais les démarches inconsiderées de quelquesuns de nos compatriotes qui faisoient hésiter le Gouvernement dans ce moment sur la décision de cette affaire.

Je ne doute pas, Monsieur, que dans la nature des évènemens humains, et dans le cours de l'affaire qui nous occupe depuis un si grand nombre d'années, la méchanceté ou même la calomnie ne soient pas venues troubler la marche et empêcher une conclusion heureuse; mais ce qui m'afflige réellement c'est la magnitude de l'objet et l'intérêt immédiat d'une grande portion de l'espèce humaine qui doivent en être la victime. Ainsi, permettez donc (je vous un supplie), que je lève toutes les doutes et toutes les difficultés *à cet égard*, en offrant les preuves les plus évidentes, et en me soumettant à un examen quelconque pour détruire ces perfides insinuations. Je les appele ainsi, puisque n'ayant jamais departi un instant des principes politiques et moraux, qui formerent notre première liaison politique en 1790, je n'aurai pas la moindre difficulté à détruire l'ombre même du soupçon ou de l'inconséquence dans une inculpation quelconque. Quand on a passé 25 ans de sa vie occupé constamment d'un seul et même objet, et que cet objet est l'étude des principes sages qui conduisent les hommes au bonheur, pour les appliquer au bien de sa patrie, on ne doit pas, ce me semble, douter de ses propres principes: ni rougir d'avoir passé la vie dans des honteuses occupations. A cet effet j'ai l'honneur de vous proposer la mesure suivante.

Qu'on nomme deux ou trois personnes de votre confiance, à qui on transmettra toutes les charges qu'on puisse trouver sur mon compte ou celle de mes compatriotes, et qui portent incompatibilité aux propositions et aux renseignemens que j'ai eu l'honneur de présenter au Gouvernement de S.M.B. sur l'indé-

pendance et l'émancipation des Colonies H. Americaines, à differentes époques—et si on trouve après cet examen que ces inculpations sont destituées de fondement, l'obstacle sera certainement aplani et la confiance mutuelle rétablie, pour le bien d'une partie considérable du monde civilisé.

Je n'ignore pas qu'un jeune Allemand, nommé Duperou, et que je fis venir ici de Paris, ayant été corrompu par des émigrés dans ce pays, il y a sept ans, fut conseillé d'enlever quelques MSS. relativement à la population de l'Amérique meridionale; ainsi que quelques extraits d'autres papiers, qui tombaient par hazard entre les mains d'une personne honnête, qui les fit bruler après; qu'il fit en outre des fausses dénonciations à la police de Londres contre moi, se voyant arrêté ici par les intrigues de ces mêmes émigrés qui l'avoient seduit auparavant; et, qu'à la fin, se precipitant d'un crime dans un autre, il parvint jusqu'à faire des vols dans les chemins publics de la France, &c.—mais cet accident ne doit pas affecter la probité de mes compatriotes, qui le connurent par un pur hazard, ni de moi, qui l'ayant cru reconnoissant, lui ai confié quelques papiers pour les copier chez moi.

Deux autres faits portant des allusions peu favorables à ma moralité sont aussi arrivés à ma connaissance, mais qui ne m'ont paru mériter pour lors une réfutation publique. Dans l'année 1801 (le 13 du mois Juillet), l'Attorney-General Law, dans un procès qui ne me regardoit directe ni indirectement, s'est permis de dire que "le Général Miranda serviroit contre son pays la France, l'Angleterre, ou la Russie, selon qu'on les payeroit mieux." S'il l'a dit comme une vague conjecture, c'est une reflexion illiberale et déplacée—si, au contraire, on la prend dans un sens affirmatif, l'une et l'autre supposition seroient évidemment fausses, et l'auteur un lâche calomniateur.

Milord Bute encore, prétendant connoître ce qui se passe dans l'Espagne et dans ses Colonies mieux que personne, fut très occupé, il y a six ans, à propager l'idée que j'étois un avanturier, puisque j'avais fait la contrebande dans l'Amérique

meridionale. On pourroit, avec une meilleure logique, prouver à sa Seigneurie qu'une décision judiciaire du Conseil Suprême des Indes déclaroit tout le contraire dans l'année 1799, me justifiant de toutes ces charges ainsi que mes associés dans la propre cause, le Gouverneur de la Havanne Cagigal, et le Viceroi de Santa Fé, Espeleta; qui n'étoient pas des *avanturiers* pour cela. Un homme de l'âge et du rang du Marquis de Bute, parlant et raisonnant de la sorte, fait réellement pitié, et mérite plutôt le mépris.

L'importance de l'objet, ainsi que ma delicatesse envers les personnes respectables qui, m'ont honoré de leur amitié, et secondé avec leurs efforts pendant cette longue et pénible négociation, exigent encore cette démarche de ma part. C'est une justification enfin que j'offre et que je dois à ma patrie, à mes compatriotes, à mes amis, et au Gouvernement même qui m'a donné asile et un honorable support. Sous tous ces rapports je ne peux pas douter, Monsieur, que vous ne m'accordiez cette juste et honorable demande, comme unique moyen de satisfaire une inculpation fondée, avec les preuves justificatives nécessaires, ou de condamner à un infame mépris des obscurs et vils calomniateurs, s'il y en a.

Je suis avec profond respect et la plus haute considération, &c. Exact copy. M———A.

Note C.

Extracts of two letters from Mr. S. G. Ogden to General Miranda.

New York, July 28, 1806.

My dear General—It is with the greatest pleasure I now address you, and am happy to have it in my power to inform you that your friend Colonel Smith and myself have at length triumphed over our enemies and the oppression of the Government. After a trial which lasted twelve days, two independent juries of our country last week rendered a verdict of *Not Guilty* in both cases. We thus both stand free and *honourably acquitted*, and our persecutors, the President Madi-

son, &c., remain covered with the disapprobation of the independent people of America, and the disgrace brought on them by their unjust proceedings.

I have heard, with great regret, my dear friend, the great disappointments and disasters you have met with, in consequence of the unjustifiable and highly reprehensible conduct of the two Lewises. I can easily conceive all you must have suffered in consequence of those two men, and no one more heartily reprobates their conduct, as represented to me, than myself. I trust, however, notwithstanding those transient disappointments, there is an all-wise Providence, that will guide your footsteps to the wished-for point, and, as your cause is that of liberty and patriotism, that you may arrive at the climax of your wishes.

New York, September 6, 1806.

A few days since, the former commander of the Leander (Captain Thomas Lewis) returned here a perfect vagabond and outcast from society. His brother, J. Lewis, also returned here from St. Domingo, in the ship Emperor, making a very bad voyage from St. Domingo about a month since. I have now heard from themselves all that could be offered in their defence, for their extremely unjustifiable and improper conduct in regard to you. It is impossible it can be more entirely disapproved of by you than it is by me.

When I think how much you must have suffered from the ignorance and villany of Thomas Lewis, it really makes my blood boil with indignation. I could scarcely have believed any man capable of conduct so base and infamous. His brother, Jacob Lewis, is also unpardonable for having deceived you, and not joining you in the Emperor, after having solemnly promised you to do so; and even starting from Port au Prince with that intention, when, lo! a newspaper, saying the Colonel and myself were prosecuted by the Government, induces him to turn back and abandon one of the most laudable enterprises ever undertaken by man. The very reasons which caused him to

return would have induced me to persevere. Suffice it to say my confidence has been completely destroyed in those men. I consider the conduct of Thomas Lewis of the most infamous kind, and that of Jacob Lewis arising from pusillanimity and want of judgment.

I have, in my own mind, my dear General, little doubt, notwithstanding all these past provocations and disappointments, but that your heroic perseverance in the cause of liberty will lead to the wished-for goal of success. The people of this country will rejoice, and are almost unanimously in your favour. Even the President himself, although a low and petty policy induced him to prosecute Smith and myself, in his heart, I am sure, wishes your success; and I am not without hopes may yet, seeing their past errors, be induced to act a dignified part in regard to your views, and shake off the fetters continually bound round them by the French and Spanish Ministers.

It was always my intention to give to you the sole and complete control of the Leander and all the property in her, to cut and do with them as you might think proper to ensure your success. I have taken on myself the chance of the expedition. Should it fail, I engaged to take no compensation. Should you be successful, our contract is not on paper, but more deeply engraven in the breasts and honour of both parties.

Depend upon it, I will never forsake the cause I have once espoused, and think honourable and just. All the little energy I possess shall be devoted to you, and I have it in my power to interest such strong friends as will enable me completely to fulfil your views. I shall be governed, in a great measure, in my future conduct by the accounts I am now waiting, with the greatest anxiety, to receive from you.

Your sincere friend, SAMUEL G. OGDEN.

Colonel Smith to General Miranda.

New York, August 15, 1806.

My dear Friend—By the enclosed letter, you will notice the solicitude of Mr. Barker to be with you: his family are

respectable, and his appearance and manners much in his favour.

We have been severely persecuted since your departure. The Administration, under the influence of the French Minister, absolutely were determined to sacrifice me, deprived me of an office worth $6,000 a-year, and instituted a suit which, after putting me to immense expense, and themselves to a much greater, they were foiled in, by the unanimous verdict of a jury, as you will observe in the enclosed paper. When the verdict of *Not Guilty* was given, the whole Court burst into loud applause, and the country at large rejoice and wish you prosperity. God bless you! Yours truly, W. S. SMITH.

Note D.

Rear-Admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander Cochrane[1] *to General Miranda.*

Northumberland, Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, June 9, 1806.

Sir—Whereas you have represented to me that, in carrying into effect the expedition under your command, you have met with some difficulties from the defection of the force you expected to join you at St. Domingo; and, conceiving it may be mutually advantageous to Great Britain and the provinces of South America, which you are about to attempt to liberate from the dominion of Spain; and having received your statement of the various plans that have from time to time been in agitation between you and the British Ministry, in all which the same object has been kept in view; but, from particular circumstances incident to the moment, they have not been carried into effect—in consideration thereof, and judging that I may thereby promote what seems to have commanded the attention of the British Government, I agree to support your landing in any part of America between Trinidad and the coast opposite to the Island of Aruba, with such a naval force as I can afford, which will be at least a sloop of war and two brigs,

[1] Commander-in-Chief on the Islands Station.

and probably a frigate, if one can be spared from the attention which I must necessarily give to the convoys and protection of the Colonies within the district of my command. I do, moreover, assure you of such support as it may be in my power occasionally to give; and, should a Spanish naval force arrive in those seas, I will use my best endeavours to prevent their doing any injury.

At the same time, I am free to confess that, while I grant you such essential support, and the permission you have received to recruit your force here, as well as at Trinidad, I do expect that, in the event of your being successful, and any of the provinces on the Main become independent of Spain, you engage, in their name, to grant to Great Britain positively, and to no other power (the United States of America excepted, if you shall so incline), the same privileges of trade as the inhabitants of the said provinces—that is to say, that the vessels belonging or subject to any other power or State, who are not now giving aid to the expedition, shall not enjoy the same immunities with Great Britain; and that they shall be subject to an additional duty of 10 per cent. on all goods they either import or export, over and above that to be paid by Great Britain; and that none of the coalesced powers acting against Great Britain, or that may hereafter become so during the war, shall be permitted to enter or trade with any of the ports of the said provinces. That this agreement shall subsist and be in force until a Treaty of Commerce shall be concluded between Great Britain and the provinces so liberated from the Spanish Government; for which purpose Commissioners shall be nominated by each party, within twelve months after the Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the Powers now at war with her shall be signed.

It is farther agreed that British subjects shall, in every instance, be assisted by the Government of the said provinces in the recovery of their legal and just debts; and that, in security thereof, they may hold lands, houses, or estates, under

the same privileges with the natives of the said provinces; and that they shall be suffered to sell and dispose of the said property, both real and personal, in like manner with them; and that, in so doing, they shall not be subject to any tax, duty, or imposition, whatever.

It is also to be understood that Consuls or Vice-Consuls may be appointed to such provinces, cities, towns, &c., as the British Government may think proper, enjoying every privilege or immunity now granted to Consuls belonging to Great Britain by the most favoured nations of Europe.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALEXANDER COCHRANE.

General Miranda to Rear-Admiral the Hon. Sir Alexander Cochrane.

Barbadoes, June 9, 1806.

Sir—Having deliberately perused the foregoing proposals, I hereby bind and oblige myself, as far as my authority can extend, to see the same carried into execution, and that, to all intents and purposes, the same shall be ratified and made binding on those provinces that may become independent of Spain. I have the honour to be, &c.,

FRAN. DE MIRANDA.

Captain George Dundas, R.N., to General Miranda.

Elephant, off Aruba, September 22, 1806.

Sir—I am honoured with your note delivered to me by Colonel Smith, and am sorry that your dispositions in regard to returning to Trinidad should in any respect have altered since I had the honour of conferring with you on the subject yesterday. From what at that time passed, I naturally concluded your Excellency had seen in a proper point of view the necessity of *immediately* quitting this place, and returning with the expedition to Trinidad. In consequence, I have wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and also to Sir Alexander Cochrane, informing them of such your resolution.

I am sorry to add farther that, should your Excellency not be willing speedily to quit this place, the British naval force must be altogether withdrawn; and that it will not be in my power to issue any farther supply of provisions than what are now granted for merely carrying the expedition to some port of safety. That port appeared in your opinion of yesterday to be best found in Trinidad.

The vessel for England might remain till to-morrow; but I am truly anxious to despatch the schooner to Admiral Cochrane this evening.

I have the honour to remain, with much regard, your Excellency's, &c., GEORGE DUNDAS.

RIVER DE LA PLATA.[1]

The excellent maps which have been published in Spain and copied in this country leave nothing to be said as to the breadth, shape, soundings, &c., of the River de la Plata.

The city of Monte Video is situated on the north side of the river, at the distance of about 35 leagues from the Cape of Santa Maria, at the foot of a very gentle declivity, which falls from the interior towards the coast. Its population consists of 7 or 8000 souls. It is the only port for ships of the line in the river, but the entrance is difficult, and requires a very experienced pilot. The fortifications consist in an irregular wall, two bastions on the side of the river, and a citadel with four bastions on the land side towards the north. At the entrance of the port there are some exterior batteries, which used to be mounted with forty or fifty pieces of cannon, but they have always been considered as much too low.

The coast above and below Monte Video is very low, flat, and of easy access for a disembarkation in boats or small vessels. The garrison consists of one battalion of the fixed regi-

[1] This paper, without date or name, is evidently by a foreigner well acquainted with the subjects of which it treats.

ment of infantry of Buenos Ayres, of a regular regiment of dragoons, and of a regiment of disciplined militia, called volunteers, composed of cavalry and infantry. This force is in part distributed in detachments in the environs.

MALDONADO.

More to the eastward, on the same side of the river, about twenty leagues before you come to Monte Video, is situated Maldonado. It contains about 3 or 4,000 souls; and in the port, which only admits of small vessels, is the island of Gorriti. The garrison consists of 360 men of the militia of the country. All along this coast a disembarkation in small vessels could be made without danger.

BUENOS AYRES.

Buenos Ayres, the capital of the vice-kingdom of its name, is situated on the south coast of the River de la Plata, at about 60 leagues' distance from the Cape of San Antonio, and about 40 leagues from Monte Video. In front of Buenos Ayres, the river is nearly 12 leagues broad; but the water is so shallow as only to admit of small vessels, at least without great danger. The city is about three miles broad, and nearly the same in length. The ground upon which it stands is flat, and elevated above the bed of the river 20 or 25 feet, to which you descend by a variety of issues, formed by a continuation of the streets to the water's edge.

Upon the side fronting the river is the only fortification, and which is called "Il Fuerte;" being a sort of small citadel, the usual residence of the vice-king, and the depository of the royal treasure. This fortification, which is very ancient, and formed of brick, is a regular square, with four bastions and curtains, and, from the salient angle of one bastion to another, about 40 toises. The artillery consists of 40 or 50 pieces of 24lb. The population of Buenos Ayres is not less than 60,000 souls, including nearly 10,000 blacks.

The forces are as follows :—

		Horse.	Foot.	Total.
Buenos Ayres	The fixed regiments, called Veterans, but in fact composed mostly of natives, and, consequently, unused to real service	1,527	1,800	3,327
	Disciplined Militia .	720	1,010	1,730
Monte Video	A regiment of dragoons	800		800
	A body of disciplined volunteers . . .	720	690	1,410
Frontera, Colonia, Maldonado	Cavalry and infantry .			1,924
		3,767	3,500	9,191

Total of forces in or near Buenos Ayres . . . 9,191

Force of the horse militia of the provinces adjacent and under the Government of Buenos Ayres, but at great distances from each other, principally belonging to the Paraguay and Tucuman—most excellent horsemen, but without discipline 9,000

18,191

THE ATTACK ON BUENOS AYRES.

The force destined to the attack on Buenos Ayres should consist of 12 to 14,000 men, and be composed as follows :—

Battalion Infantry	10,000
Light Infantry and flying Artillery . . .	2,000
Dismounted Light do.	2,000
Total,	14,000

A stand of arms for 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, so that a native force might be immediately and properly organized. The fleet supporting the attacking army should have a larger proportion than usual of frigates and small vessels.

The first disembarkation and attack might certainly take place at Monte Video, as is evident from what has been already said; but, in case of any tolerable resistance, time would be lost, and the vice-king of Buenos Ayres completely on his guard: it might, therefore, be more advisable to direct the first operations against the capital.

The shallowness of the water opposite to Buenos Ayres not permitting the approach even of small vessels, the nearest point where vessels of 14 or 16 guns might cover the disembarkation of the troops in boats is about a mile and a half from the city, at a sort of bay called La Recoleta, where the shore is of easy access, and the country forms part of the before mentioned plain upon which Buenos Ayres stands.

About eight leagues before you arrive at the city, you have the Bay of Barragan, where frigates can anchor, and which would undoubtedly be an excellent place of disembarkation, if the ground over which you must advance were not at times, after great rains, so boggy as to be absolutely impassable. The best place of disembarkation would, however, indubitably be about 26 leagues from the city, in the Bay of Barrombon, *if the navigation of the south channel of the river can be reconnoitred and fully understood.*

In the dry season, which begins in the month of December and ends with the month of February, there is no obstacle of consequence to impede the march of the army to Buenos Ayres, as the rivers which cross this part of the country and enter into la Plata are either dry or fordable without difficulty. The peculiar advantage of this disembarkation is that it would take place in the flat country, occupied by the Indians, called Pampas, the constant enemies of the Spaniards, whether they

should be in open warfare at that particular time, or should have concluded a peace they never meant to keep longer than might suit their convenience. The character of these Indians is bad, and they must never be trusted but with great caution; but their detestation of the Spaniards would naturally lead them to favour the English; and, in return for the most trifling articles of English manufacture, particularly of glass and steel, they would furnish the camp with a superabundance of cattle, and with horses sufficient to mount any body of cavalry.

The march to the city, through an open country, offers no difficulty: nor is it possible the Spaniards should collect any force capable of impeding the progress of the English army. The expedition should sail for the River of Plata in the month of September, so as to arrive there about the month of December, the beginning of the dry season.

The same detail is entered into with regard to the second part of the expedition destined against the kingdom of Chili, and also with regard to the third part, intended to land on the coast of Atacama, or at the ports of Ica or Arica, and to act against the centre of Peru, so as to attack nearly at the same time the two extremities of the Government of the vice-king of Buenos Ayres. The attack, however, upon the kingdom of Chili is not considered as absolutely necessary to the success of the other expeditions.

Mr. J. D. R. Gordon to Lord Castlereagh.

3, Beaufort Buildings, Strand, January 26, 1808.

My Lord—In compliance with your Lordship's request, stated in your letter of the 17th December ultimo, I have enclosed for your perusal a description of the country between New Vera Cruz and Mexico, in New Spain, with an account of several of the principal towns, military force, points of defence, manners and customs of the inhabitants, &c., accom-

panied with plans of the country as high up as the city of Puebla, together with a plan of the city and harbour of New Vera Cruz. These, with the description I have mentioned, I was enabled to obtain during a residence of six years in Mexico and the adjacent country, where I was sent for the purpose of instructing myself in the language, and receiving the principal part of my education: for which purpose I was thirteen months in an Apostolic College, under the care of the principal guardian, recommended by the Count de la Cortina (a private correspondent of the late ever to be lamented Mr. Pitt). This guardian particularly instructed me in the nature of their religion, and in the art of pleasing and gaining the friendship of the inhabitants; and, when I travelled up the country, he and the Count de la Cortina were my protectors, and furnished me with presents to give to the Indians.

In the year 1805 I intended leaving this country for England, and was completely furnished with every information in writing requisite for the Government of my own country to be acquainted with; but, unfortunately, by receiving a letter from England, I was taken into custody, and, for self-preservation, was under the painful necessity of committing my journals to the flames. I was two months confined in a dungeon, and seven months under an arrest in the Artillery Barracks of New Vera Cruz, but was released at last through the interference of the vice-queen, with whom I was acquainted, and their not being able to substantiate any charge against me.

At last, on the 28th day of April, 1807, I was permitted to take my passage to Europe, under the character of a naval officer, with the hopes of being regularly exchanged at Cadiz, where I arrived on the 12th day of August ultimo; and immediately el Señor Marquess del Socorro delivered me up to H. Archdeckin, Esq., his Britannic Majesty's agent for prisoners of war; but the Naval General Moreno (Commander-in-Chief of his Catholic Majesty's fleet in that port) objected to my being exchanged, and through his means a consultation was

held relative to the business, when it was determined that, on account of my having been so long in Peru and Mexico, el Señor Marquess del Socorro should acquaint the Court of Madrid of the circumstance; and the Court determined that I should be kept in confinement during the war. When I was made acquainted with this determination, I immediately wrote to John Hunter, Esq., his Britannic Majesty's Commissary General for prisoners of war at Madrid, whose answers and the determination of his Catholic Majesty I have taken the liberty of enclosing for your lordship's perusal. This harsh determination induced me to attempt making my escape to our fleet off Cadiz, which I effectuated in an open boat on the 12th day of October ultimo, and furnished Admiral Purvis with the state of the French and Spanish fleet in that harbour; and, after remaining on board the Atlas six days, I took my passage to England in his Majesty's ship Prevoyante.

Your lordship will see, by the following information, of what service I can be to my country, in whose cause I am anxious to exert the best of my abilities.

I hope your lordship will excuse any defect that may appear in the enclosed information: as I left England when a child, I am not acquainted with the due forms and etiquette in addressing your lordship.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

J. D. R. GORDON.

STATE OF MEXICO.

New Vera Cruz is the principal sea-port in the Gulph of Mexico. The number of its inhabitants is computed to be between 11 and 12,000, one third of which are Spanish Creoles and Europeans; the remainder are of all the various castes between blacks and whites. They are considered to be the most wealthy people in the world in times of peace, as Vera Cruz is the key of all the commerce of Mexico and Europe; but in time of war this wealthy population labours under the

greatest distress, as they have at that time very little communication with Europe; and, being so contiguous to our possessions in the West Indies, are greatly annoyed by our cruisers on that station. They are also heavily oppressed by the tyranny of their civil government, which authorizes the troops to have so much power over them that they treat them with the greatest contempt, and insult them on every occasion. The lower class of people in particular are frequently subject to their attacks in the streets, and have forcibly taken from them such articles as they may be carrying to and from the market. The battalion of troops, called el Batallon fixo de Vera Cruz, is composed of 1,020 pardoned convicts. Their officers give them a good example; for, when Mr. Edward Watson, of his Majesty's ship Fortune, was a prisoner among them, they robbed him of $45. These *brave* officers are not admitted into any genteel society, but are looked upon with horror. They have likewise 200 regular artillerymen, and 100 militia. The former are continually employed in the artillery services of the city, and in keeping in order and packing up the artillery stores that are conveyed to Acapulco and San Blas, where great part of them are embarked for Monterey, the capital of the Spanish settlements on the coast of California, to defend them against the wild Indians. The latter are employed in the small garrisons along the coast. They have also 300 black soldiers, who guard the city jail. They have between eleven and twelve hundred cavalry, called the Provincial Dragoons of Vera Cruz, who are composed of the labourers and farmers within 20 or 25 miles of the city: there are only 200 of them on duty at a time, the remainder being engaged in their own family concerns.

Vera Cruz is one mile in length, and three quarters of a mile in breadth: it has a slight stone wall round it full of small embrasures for musketry, and seven round towers from 12 to 15 feet high, containing each five embrasures for ordnance. The fort of Santiago, on the south-east angle of the wall, is

the only fort of the seven that is mounted with cannon. It has four gates, one of which towards the sea goes out to the pier, and has a strong guard to prevent contraband trade.

On the south-west angle of the city are the cavalry and infantry barracks, which can contain 7,000 troops. On the south-east angle, between fort Santiago and fort St. Catherine, lies the Artillery Ground, with the artillery storehouses, and opposite to them the Artillery Barracks, with accommodation for 500 men. Adjoining the wall towards the sea are the Treasury Offices, and the Arsenal, or Naval Storehouse, which is well supplied.

The city has a cathedral and seven convents, the riches of which were conveyed up the country to Xalapa, on the 12th of March, 1807, as it was reported that there was a small expedition fitting out at Jamaica, for the purpose of attacking Vera Cruz. At the same time, the Viceroy gave very strict orders to the merchants to take the same precaution with all their effects; but, as their removal would have been attended with much expense, his orders were not complied with. His Excellency therefore declared in the royal Audiencia that no blame could be attached to him, should they be totally ruined.

The city is abundantly supplied with all sorts of provisions from the adjacent country; it produces nothing of itself, being situated on a sandy beach. It is bounded on three sides by high banks of sand, which would afford great shelter to a besieged army. The place is scantily supplied with good water, which has induced the inhabitants to have large cisterns constructed in their houses to receive the rain-water in the rainy season, which supplies them in the dry season.

The city is defended principally by the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa, which is situated on a small island, one mile distant, close by which a first-rate ship of war can be moored, as the Spaniards have fixed very strong brass rings in the rock under the castle for that purpose. This famous fortress contains 213 pieces of artillery, of various calibres, from nine to thirty-six pounders;

but their carriages are in a very rotten and decayed state. It is garrisoned by only 400 men, and is abundantly supplied with artillery stores of every kind, independently of brass and copper bars to the value of three millions of dollars. Three seventy-fours would be a sufficient force to make it surrender in a very short time. The south, the west, and north-west batteries are 50 feet in height; the west and north north-west 14 feet from the surface of the water; but I could not obtain the height of the east, east south-east, and south-east batteries. These batteries are constructed on arches, and their basements are formed for store-houses, barracks for troops, accommodations for the officers, and likewise dungeons for prisoners. These basements are not very strong; and when there is any artillery exercises, the whole Castle is materially affected. It is supplied every morning with fresh provisions from Vera Cruz, excepting when the heavy north-west gales prevail and prevent all intercourse with the city; consequently, the garrison at that time experiences much inconvenience. It is supplied with water, by means of a very large cistern, which fills during the rainy season, that begins from the middle of June to the middle of July, and ends in September. Some of the most distinguished families of the city are likewise supplied with water from this cistern.

The harbour is not more than half a mile in width at the entrance, with sufficient depth of water, eleven to twelve fathoms, but gradually decreasing as you approach the castle, close to which it is eight and nine fathoms in depth. No ship can lie nearer to the town than half a mile, as the water rapidly decreases in depth from that distance, and at low water there is little more than one fathom close to the wharf or quay. It is sheltered from the north-west winds by the point of Delgado, which forms with the city the Bay of Bergara, where the water is so shallow, that none but vessels of small draught can enter it. Point Homos, about three quarters of a mile south-east of the city, forms another bay, having a narrow

and intricate passage from the harbour, and being interspersed with shoals, which render the navigation dangerous. In entering the harbour, it is necessary to have the assistance of pilots belonging to the city.

Old Vera Cruz is situated fifteen miles north-west of New Vera Cruz, close to the north bank of the river Antigua, four miles from its junction with the sea. It contains between 2 and 3,000 inhabitants, consisting chiefly of mulattoes, with a few European families and some Creoles. Those of the lower class are chiefly employed in the business of agriculture in the neighbourhood, and in the making of bricks, which are mostly sent down the river Antigua, and along the coast of New Vera Cruz, in flat-bottomed boats (which the Spaniards call *piraguas*) during the summer months, when the weather is serene. In winter, the intercourse between the two cities by water is entirely interrupted, owing to the great surf along the coast. No other vessels but these flat-bottomed boats can navigate this passage, as the water at the mouth of the river Antigua is not more than four feet in depth. All the traffic carried on by New Vera Cruz with Mexico and other inland towns passes through the city, and is conveyed across the river Antigua in large canoes; it is carried forward to and from Mexico on mules, which are chiefly used here as beasts of burden. This part of the country abounds also in horses, but they are of a small breed, yet capable of enduring much fatigue, and are chiefly employed for agricultural purposes.

In this city are very commodious barracks, which are occupied by some artillerymen and a detachment of provincial cavalry from New Vera Cruz: these barracks are capable of containing 3,000 men and 900 horses.

The river Antigua, on the bank of which this city is seated, derives its source from Mount Orisaval, a considerable distance up the country; it is not more than half a mile in width at its junction with the sea, and is navigable no higher than Old Vera Cruz; about a quarter of a mile below which is situated

on the river a small fort, mounted with three pieces of cannon only.

Between Antigua river and New Vera Cruz, is a fine, firm, sandy beach, well calculated, with the assistance of flat-bottomed boats, for the disembarkation of an army of 15 or 20,000 men, with the greatest facility, provided the wind was moderate; but, when it blows fresh from the north-west, (which is the only strong wind that prevails in this country) it would prevent boats from approaching the shore.

The lower class of the inhabitants of this country have not the smallest idea of patriotism, but are entirely guided by motives of interest; and, were Europeans wishing to gain their affections, no better mode could be adopted than that of making them presents of such articles as ribbons, silk stuffs, small crucifixes, silk stockings, linens, and such-like European manufactures; and, if these things are offered them for what they conceive to be a cheap rate, they are almost as well pleased as by getting them without purchase.

In case of an army having once made good a landing in this country, it may be necessary to say something on the important subject of the religion of the people; as a knowledge of that subject, and an acquiescence in the forms of their devotion, are the principal objects to be attended to for gaining their esteem and affection.

They are of the Roman Catholic persuasion, but have no idea of the principles of their religion, and are entirely guided by enthusiasm and attachment to the outward signs of their faith, such as hearing mass, crossing themselves, counting their beads, and attending their processions through the streets; and it is to be remarked that the greater the art displayed in giving beauty and gracefulness to the image of the saint used in the procession, the warmer is their enthusiasm; yet, without the least reverence for the virtues of the saint whom they are worshipping, they are entirely engrossed by the attractions of his representation. Their priests are men, whose good offices

should be particularly courted by the leaders of a Europ army, as they have such an ascendency over the laity, t were their affections once gained, those of the latter wo immediately follow. The means that I should recommend preference for gaining the good-will of the priests would first, to be very attentive to their conversations on religi and by no means to interrupt them at that time, but to lis with the utmost patience, and even to give them hopes that some future period you may become a convert; secondly, be much in their society, riding out with them, and at th houses, and inviting them to come to you in return, maki them presents, and also receiving theirs, with seeming ma of esteem and affection, as, in this country, they have not t least idea of being averse to lay themselves under an oblig tion; and, were they even loaded with presents of the great value, they would accept of them all, and consider them merely so many marks of attention and kindness; thirdly, attend as often as possible their religious ceremonies, and show great outward devotion at that time, and, while in th cathedrals and convents, to be always silent and uncovere as nothing tends to alienate their affections so much the smallest disrespect or contempt for the forms of their r ligion.

The education and studies of the generality of the pries are entirely confined to theology, and show that they have idea of political subjects, but conceive them to be far beneat their notice; nor have they any knowledge of commercial any other subjects unconnected with their religion. The who of their time is devoted to their ecclesiastical ceremonies, an acts of gambling and lasciviousness; and it may be remarke that the priests have so screened themselves from the obloqu that might be thrown against them by the laity, for bein guilty of acts of debauchery, that they have established a ne doctrine among themselves, when they assert from the pulpi that it is a mortal sin to censure in any way the conduct o

their pastors; and they have impressed them with a belief that when they leave the vestry, invested with the alb and chasuble, they are free from all guilt while performing mass or any other ecclesiastical ceremony.

From this it may be deduced that, as these priests are of such corrupt habits, and lost to all sense of honour and virtue, they may be very easily seduced from their allegiance, as interest speaks all languages, and acts all parts, even that of disinterestedness itself.

Notwithstanding the generality of the priests are men of such dissolute habits, yet there are some among them of a very different description, men of virtue and piety, many of whom are branches of the first families for birth and consequence in the country; but, being Creoles, they are incapacitated for holding any military or civil employment of distinction in the State, as, by the laws of this country, no Creole can hold any thing above a subordinate situation in the military and civil departments; but, in the ecclesiastical and judicial, there exists no law to prevent them from attaining the rank of Bishop, and that of a Regent in any of the three Royal Audiences of Mexico, Guadalaxara, and Guatimala.

The nobles and others of high rank, who are Creoles by birth, bear a rooted antipathy to those Spaniards who are sent from Old Spain, to act as governors of towns and chief commanders of their armies. As these Creoles are for the most part men of great learning and knowledge, they consider it a degradation to be governed by men, many of whom are not so well informed as themselves, and who assume over them a degree of arrogance but ill suited to their nature and disposition.

It may be inferred from this, that the natives would be inclined to throw off the yoke of the Spaniards, but they are so fettered by their religion, which has taught them to believe that the least disobedience to their Government and supreme commanders would immediately be followed by excommunica-

tion from the Pope, the bare mention of which is to them more terrible than the idea of any torture that could be inflicted upon them. Besides, they have no sense whatever of independence, but consider themselves bound to submit to whatever is imposed upon them by their rulers. This, added to a stupidity inherent in their nature, renders them the most subservient and time-serving people on the face of the globe.

Much of this stupor and extreme indifference, which governs all their actions, arises in a great degree from the terror they are held in by the Inquisition, which keeps a strict watch over them; but, were they released from that abject slavery in which they are kept by this tribunal, and were suffered to have a free intercourse with civilized nations, they would show themselves to be a people not void of those qualifications which would render their services acceptable and very useful.

The system which the Spaniards have adopted to extract their revenue from this country has also been very offensive to the nobility and the enlightened classes of the people; for instance, no Mexican nobleman or gentleman of independent fortune is suffered to travel into any foreign country, not even to Old Spain itself, without the permission of his Catholic Majesty, in order that no money may be spent out of his own dominions.

The King holds also an exclusive right in the sale of tobacco, colours for paint, gunpowder, sulphur, saltpetre, and stamped paper; and if an individual is detected in the sale of any of these articles, he is liable to suffer death for the offence, if the quantity he has sold is great, and, if it is trivial, he will be compelled to undergo ten years' slavery in chains.

These articles, which are manufactured by the King alone, are kept for sale in Mexico, in warehouses which the Spaniards call *estancos*, or places of monopoly. The royal manufactory of tobacco is a very extensive fabric, wherein are employed 900 men and women. There is also in the capital of each province one of these *estancos* for the same purpose, which are

supplied from those at Mexico; but in every small town throughout the different provinces are to be found various *estanquillos*, or small shops, for the sale of tobacco and snuff, all belonging to the King, and they are supplied monthly with a certain quantity from the royal manufactory at Mexico; the money arising from the sale of which they must also return monthly to the same place; and the persons employed by the King to sell the tobacco in these shops are paid only one dollar for every hundred they receive for the sale of the tobacco. The amount of the profits arising to the King annually from the sale of tobacco and the other articles is computed to be not less than five millions of dollars.

One of the most remarkable plants which this country produces is called *maguey*, from the root of which is extracted a liquor called *pulque*, which is used throughout this country as much as malt liquor is in England. It intoxicates those who drink to excess; it is mild in its nature, though somewhat acid. There is brought into the city of Mexico every morning as much of this *pulque* as is worth $10,000, and the revenue thence arising to the King is immense; for instance, a nobleman, the Marquess de Valle Ameno, with whom I was in habits of friendship, sent from his estate every morning as much of this beverage as was sold for $100, out of which the King received $84 for duty, of which extortion he bitterly complained.

When the root of this plant is not disturbed by extracting the *pulque*, but is suffered to grow to maturity, it becomes a soft tree, about ten feet high, the substance of which is manufactured by the Indians into a kind of hemp, of which they make cordage, sewing thread, &c. This is the most predominant plant in the country, and produces the greatest revenue of any, except tobacco. The revenue arising to the King from the mines and the commerce with Old Spain I apprehend is already known in England.

The native inhabitants of Mexico differ greatly in disposi-

tion and manner from those of Peru and Chili. Those of Mexico are of a mild, soft, innocent disposition, bordering on extreme indifference; and the great dread they are held in by those Spaniards who are their governors renders them exceeding cowardly. They bear a rooted hatred towards the Spaniards, which arises from the severity of their treatment; and the Spaniards do not fail to take advantage of the mildness of their disposition, to exercise with greater severity that tyrannical authority which they hold over them. Were they freed from this tyranny and treated with kindness, they might become useful mechanics and excellent soldiers, possessing, as they do, considerable natural abilities.

The natives of Peru and Chili are of a more bold and fierce disposition than those of Mexico, which makes them far less submissive to their governors; consequently, they are treated by them with less severity, as the nature of the Spaniards is to use that authority which they hold over inferiors in a greater or less degree, according as they find their dispositions.

Leaving Old Vera Cruz, the next place on the road to Mexico that engages our attention is Paso de Varas. This place, twelve miles distant from the former city, is one of the four points of defence which the Viceroy has established in this country: it is a small village, situated in the middle of a fine plain, spacious enough for the review of a large army, and the fittest position for a European army, after it has made good a landing. It is sixteen miles from the coast, but an invading army will easily reach this station before that of the Mexicans could be brought to oppose it; as the news of the approach of an enemy's fleet could not reach the Viceroy at Mexico in less than two days, and four more would elapse before he could arrive with the army at this point. The Spanish army always lies at Xalapa, which is only forty-eight miles from the coast, and under the command of a Major-General, who receives intelligence of an enemy's approach by the same messenger who passes through that town on his way

to Mexico; but, in the absence of the Viceroy, this officer is not authorized to take the field with the army, or to act with it in any other way than in its own defence. The main body of the army, stationed at Xalapa, amounts to about 10,000 men.

The four principal points of defence established by the Viceroy are Paso de Varas; La Rinconada, situated on a rising ground, seventeen miles from Paso; Lanceros, twelve miles further; and the castle and plain of Perote, sixteen miles from Lanceros. In this castle are deposited 45 millions of dollars, and all the spare arms in the country: it is mounted with 72 pieces of cannon. These four places are situated on the road between Old Vera Cruz and Mexico. There is no such thing as a fixed battery or other obstruction on the whole way between those two cities.

The town of Xalapa, situated close to the foot of Mount Perote, is computed to contain between 12 and 14,000 inhabitants. Here are barracks for cavalry and infantry, capable of accommodating 11,000 men: they were constructed during my residence in the country. The climate is between temperate and frigid; and the town is abundantly supplied with excellent water from Mount Perote. The wealthy class of the inhabitants derive their support from agriculture and commerce, and the lower class are employed chiefly as mechanics and in husbandry; they are the cleanliest and most civilized people in the whole country; as, in former times, the fleet that annually arrived from Europe sent its merchandize to this town, where a fair was held for the disposal of it, where all the inhabitants of the adjacent country assembled to make purchases, and consequently had an opportunity of observing and imitating the manners of the Europeans. Xalapa has a large cathedral, in which are deposited the plate and gold of all the churches along the coast, several other small churches, and a convent.

Seven miles beyond Xalapa, going round the foot of the

mountain to Perote, is situated the village of Burras, where the climate in winter is extremely cold; and seven miles from Burras, at the foot of the north-west side of the mountain, is the small town of Perote, in which there is nothing worthy of remark but the castle, a place of no considerable strength, though mounted, as I have said, with 72 pieces of cannon. It is surrounded by a ditch, in which I never saw any water, crossed by a drawbridge close to the gate, which, when drawn up, unites itself with the gate, and doubles its strength.

This fortress is famous for the immense sums of money that have been deposited in it in times of war, but at present it is rendered still more so, as there has been less money exported from the country during this war than at any former period. It contained, when I left Mexico, the sum of 45 millions of dollars, besides some silver and a few gold bars. To give an idea of the strength of this castle, I need only mention that the Viceroy satirically said of it, that "he could take it with the domestics of his own family alone" All the spare arms of the country, which amount to a considerable number, are also deposited here, and contribute to render the possession of this castle a most important object to a European army, for, that being taken, the whole country would immediately submit, as there is no other obstruction to prevent an invading force from advancing to Puebla and Mexico; and I can assert with the greatest confidence, my lord, that an English army of 15,000 men, having a due proportion of cavalry, commanded by an able general, whose humanity and good address are not inferior to his skill in the field, would conquer this country with the greatest ease.

I repeat this, my lord, as my firm belief; and, were my services required as an aide-de-camp, I would engage, from my local knowledge of the country and the nature of its inhabitants, and also possessing a thorough knowledge of the language, to give the Commander such assistance as would render him competent to overcome every obstacle and difficulty. I do

not mean that 15,000 men would be required to conquer the Mexican army; one half of that number would be sufficient for the purpose; but the respect or awe which an army of 15,000 men would produce in the native inhabitants would make them cling to the English; and, having once experienced their friendship and good treatment, they would readily form an attachment which would continue and increase, as they became mutually acquainted with each other.

The road from New Vera Cruz to Mexico is inferior to none in the universe; it is wide enough for six carriages to go abreast, and the materials of which it is made are hard and durable; consequently, the baggage and other appurtenances of an army can be conveyed with great facility. That part of the road between New Vera Cruz and Perote was constructed under the orders of the present Viceroy, and was begun in the year 1803. The road from Old Vera Cruz to La Ventilla, where it joins the other, is very bad in the rainy season; yet it is passable enough for carriages.

General Miranda to Lord Castlereagh.

Grafton Street, May 16, 1808.

My Lord—Give me leave to trouble your lordship once more upon a subject so interesting to our countries, and so near my own heart, that I should consider it a blameful neglect on my part if I was to conceal from you, at this critical moment, the smallest thought or apprehension that might lead to the preservation of South America, or to the success of the plans, the execution of which we have now in hand.

The late eventful occurrences in Spain, by which that country is not only taken possession of by the armies of France, but the whole monarchy absolutely delivered to the ruler of Europe, are so materially interesting, and connected with the execution of our plans for the emancipation of South America, that, if we do not avail ourselves of this grand and pro-

vidential opportunity, we may have hereafter to lament it for ever.

We have now, in fact, every circumstance in our favour, if, with *celerity* and magnanimity, we appear before the South American provinces, offering them assistance for emancipation, rational liberty, and independence: but if, through the activity of our enemies and unforeseen accidents, they arrive there before us, with some plausible scheme and intrigues suitable to their interest and private views, then the best digested and most judicious plans may be defeated, or in a great measure checked and spoiled.

Nothing but delay, I conceive, my lord, may ruin, at this moment, our preconcerted plans; therefore, I should take the liberty of submitting to you, if the measure of leaving behind us some part of the intended co-operating force (to join soon after) would not be even a preferable thing, for the sake of anticipating the pernicious views and schemes of our enemies, than to expose the whole of our operations to be defeated by a fatal delay.

I have no doubt that your lordship's penetration, as well as Sir Arthur Wellesley's great experience and judgment, must have foreseen these circumstances and difficulties; but, as I said before, I do present them to your lordship, at this eventful crisis, feeling anxious for the safety of the New World, as well as for the happiness of Great Britain and mankind in general.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

FRAN. DE MIRANDA.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Dunira, June 8, 1808.

My dear Lord—Agreeably to your desire, I return you the papers which came in your packet of yesterday; and, agreeably to my promise of yesterday, shall send you what occurs to me on the re-perusal of your letter. I cannot undertake to send you any thing methodical, and you must be contented to

receive the loose and floating ideas which have passed through my mind in the course of a restless night.

I wish Parliament had been up before you had begun the execution of projects so deeply important; for the preparations of necessity give rise to speculations, all of which are used by factious men as instruments of mischief to their country, and as the means of obstructing its operations being attended with success.

As your lordship has not distinctly explained the grounds or information on which his Majesty has been induced to send the force from Gibraltar and Ireland to the coast of Spain, any suggestions I offer on that subject must, of course, be very vague and inconclusive.

My general impression is that, if you proceed on any such information or communication with Spain, as induces us to confide in a co-operation to get into our possession the fleets of Spain, Russia, or France, now in the ports of Spain, the plan is a meritorious one, and the success would be attended not only with great *éclat*, but with very beneficial consequences; but if, without any such specific object, you have been tempted by any general speculations of a disaffection in the minds of the Spaniards, against either their own Government or the Government of France erected there, it is impossible for me not to entertain the most serious apprehensions, if, with a view to any such co-operation, a considerable body of British troops should be landed and carried into the interior of Spain. If it turns upon a question of numbers, the population of Spain, animated by a proper spirit, is adequate to work its own deliverance. If they cannot rouse themselves to a spirit sufficiently vigorous, and adequate to the circumstances of their situation, I cannot conceive any substantial good or any decisive effects that can be accomplished by a body of British troops comparatively small, when we consider the magnitude of the object to be accomplished. And, in addition to this, you will never forget the facility with which any numbers of French

troops may be poured into the provinces of Spain; and we all know enough of the temper and animosity of Bonaparte to Great Britain, not to feel that there is no sacrifice he would not risk of his own troops, if he saw a reasonable prospect of bringing any serious disaster upon a considerable body of British force. Indeed, independent of the gratification of his own rancour, he would judge wisely in acting so; for, if such a disaster was to befal any considerable body of British troops engaged in such an enterprise, it would have the worst effects on the feelings of this country, and bring complete discredit on the councils of his Majesty.

As to the question more immediately under consideration, I own I am very sanguine in my expectations of success in effecting a separation of Spanish America from the mother country, if the measure is planned with wisdom, and the execution is attempted with a due attention to the feelings and prejudices of the people with whom we have to deal. And, in this view, it is certainly a point of radical importance to discharge from our thoughts and to disclaim every idea of establishing in our persons another European sovereignty in the Spanish Colonies in America. One of the great topics we must endeavour to enforce on their minds, is the oppression they have suffered under the yoke of Old Spain; and we should urge any such topics with a very bad grace, if we did not convince them that we had no such plan in our own contemplation, when we come forward professing ourselves as their deliverers from the yoke under which they had so grievously groaned. Above all, it will require the utmost caution to persuade them that we have no plans against their religion. If we are not credited in this respect, we shall have the whole strength of the country against us. The great body of the people are bigoted and in the hands of their clergy, and any thing like a meditated attack against their religious prejudices would operate as a watchword of union against us.

When I was in your office, I had occasion, in official in-

structions to Governor Picton, as Governor of Trinidad, to inculcate those sentiments. The document is probably in your Office. The subject was brought to my recollection last spring, when I was in London, by a communication made to me by General Miranda. A despatch of mine to Governor Picton appears to have been captured, and, as I learned, indirectly through him, he found the terms of my despatch translated into the Spanish language, and dispersed throughout the Spanish provinces as an incitement to revolt against the Spanish yoke. This is, at least, a proof that the manner in which I instructed Colonel Picton to address them was congenial to their own feelings and prejudices. I have no other copy of it; and therefore you will be so good as return it to me; but perhaps it may be desirable for you to read the communication made to me by Miranda, and with that view I send it to you under a separate cover.

The force you have appropriated for the emancipation of Spanish America seems respectable; and I should flatter myself that, with the aids we are naturally entitled to expect, it may be adequate to its object. If I was necessarily called upon to decide finally on the alternative you put, where the most beneficial exertions could be made on the Spanish possessions in America, I should be obliged to decide in favour of an attack on the province of Mexico, or, to speak more accurately, as preparatory thereto, on Mobile, Pensacola, New Orleans, or such other positions as would give us the undoubted command of the Mississippi. By having those positions, you would secure, in the most efficient way, your conquest of Mexico; and, that secured, it appears to me that the means of diffusing through the whole of Spanish America a spirit of revolt are almost certain, and, in doing so, we are, at the same time, administering most substantially to the commercial, and, of course, to the maritime interests of Great Britain.

There is another view, in which securing the positions I have stated at the mouths of the Mississippi appears to me to

be of deep importance, not only for the conquest of Mexico, but as connected with the establishment of a permanent and solid connexion with the United States of North America. I can never, in my contemplation of this subject of Spanish America, lay out of my consideration the ultimate state of North America. If he is not already known at your Office, which I think he probably is, let me entreat you to desire Alexander Hope to bring about a communication between you and Mr. Charles Williamson, with whom Mr. Pitt and myself have been in almost unremitted confidential communication, since our first connexion with him began, at the time of our threatened war with Russia, on the subject of Oczakow, down to the present moment. If I have any solid knowledge of the interests of Great Britain in relation to the United States of America, and the means of securing a paramount influence in those States, either jointly or separately, I am bound to confess that I am indebted for that knowledge to the information and instruction I have received from Mr. Williamson. I have long had confidential communication with him; and, in the course of a visit he paid me at this place, during my residence here last winter, I had occasion to discuss this topic with him in every point of view, and the result of the whole is a perfect conviction that it will be owing to our own mismanagement and want of wisdom, if we do not derive substantial aid from North America for the emancipation of Spanish America; and, our influence over Spanish America once firmly established, it will serve as an instrument in our hands to obtain, consolidate, and preserve, a paramount authority and control over the councils and politics of North America. Indeed, so sanguine am I on this subject, I have not a doubt it would lead to Great Britain obtaining and preserving the commercial market of both Americas; and it would be the interest of both to cling to the pre-eminence of the British flag, as the only effectual guardian of all their substantial interests; and, that being established as their general feeling and the ruling principle of their system

and conduct, Great Britain would be rendered independent of the casualty of every European combination against her; and the whole both of North and South America, in place of being jealous of, or cavilling at, the maritime power and interests of Great Britain, would feel that on that power rested all their hopes of security against any such revolutionary barbarity as that which now enthrals the whole of the European quarter of the globe.

With such impressions on my mind, animating and enlivening the future prospects of my country, I must urge you to give at least a candid and patient hearing and consideration to all that Mr. Williamson shall lay before you. I know that he has had much communication with Mr. Canning, and the confidential men in his Office. I know not whether the clearness of his head, the accuracy of his information, and the acuteness of his understanding, have made the same impression on them they have on me, and, to my knowledge, made on Mr. Pitt; but it is my earnest wish that you should not form your opinion at second hand. Converse with him; hear all he has to communicate; and then form your own opinion.

I have said, if I was obliged to decide on the alternative you put, I should give the preference to the establishment of our power in Mexico over an expedition directed to an establishment at Monte Video; but it will be with much reluctance if I am obliged to abandon this last. I have, ever since I read the fatal despatch of Whitelocke, after his disaster at Buenos Ayres, mourned over the wanton loss of Monte Video and the command of the River Plata; and ever since the fortunate emigration of the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils, and our consequent influence in that part of the world took place, I have flattered myself that the naval and military force to be kept at the Brazils would almost necessarily lead to the re-establishment of our power at the mouth of the Plata. I cannot bring myself to abandon that expectation. I know not whether we have any, and to what extent of military force at

the Janeiro to aid the Portuguese. If we have not, we certainly should; and the largeness of the destined force for the coast of Spain, I should think, would admit of a detachment of it to the Brazils. It is equally the interest of the Portuguese, as our interest, to prevent the River Plata falling into the hands of France; and I should think such an effort perfectly within our joint exertion, under the protection of a British squadron.

You say nothing in your letter of a naval force being destined for the purposes of Spanish America, in addition to what may be necessary for the protection of the Brazils; but I should certainly consider that a very inadequate provision was made for the purposes of Spanish America, if there was not a squadron appropriated both for the mouths of the Mississippi and the River Plata.

Many other topics crowd in upon me in the contemplation of this subject, on which I would wish to enlarge. Indeed, the discussion is endless; but I feel myself exhausted, and my head oppressed, so that I am under the necessity of stopping.

I remain, &c., MELVILLE.

PS. Of course, if there is any thing in the idea, it must have occurred to yourself; but, as it strikes me, I may as well mention it. I suppose that no persons can be more horrified at what is now passing in Spain than their clergy. Will it not be possible to get hold of some of them, and send them out as emissaries to Spanish America, to persuade the inhabitants of those provinces that we have no plans against their religion? On the same errand, would it be impossible to avail ourselves of a few well-affected Roman Catholic Clergy from Ireland? M.

General Miranda to Lord Castlereagh.

Grafton Street, August 19, 1808.

My Lord—Since Sir Arthur Wellesley's departure from this capital in June last, I have had no communication with

your lordship upon the political affairs of South America, nor, indeed, did I wish to call your lordship's attention, absorbed, as I conceived, in the affairs of Portugal and Spain.

In the mean time, however, I have received various letters and verbal communications relative to the province of Caraccas, through Trinidad and the West India islands, that I thought sufficiently important to communicate to your lordship; but, unfortunately, upon calling on General Charles Stewart [1] for this purpose, I found him so much pressed and engaged at the moment of his departure for Spain, that I could not fulfil my wishes.

This I the more regretted, as your lordship must be aware that, after the communications which, with your lordship's and Sir Arthur's approbation, I have made since January last to my correspondents in Trinidad and Caraccas, they would be extremely anxious for further advice from me, on the subject of which I was desirous of consulting General Stewart. Not having been so fortunate as to have an opportunity of doing so, and feeling the necessity of writing before the sailing of the packet, it appeared to me the best advice I could give them, in the present most critical state of affairs, both with respect to the uncertainty of events in Spain, and to the various sentiments and interests prevailing in America, would be to open a direct communication by authorized persons with the British Government, in order to concert with it such measures as circumstances might require, without listening to the Juntas of Madrid, Oviedo, &c., whose interests were opposite; but the Cabildos to assume the Government of the country themselves, having present, among other official papers, his Majesty's Speech to both Houses of Parliament, and the late Order in Council relative to the Spanish nation; which documents regarded also our American interests, and gave an idea of the views of the British Government towards their mutual commercial interests with our opulent establishments in South

[1] Then Under-Secretary of State.

America, recommending to them, above all, to act with *unanimity*, wisdom, &c.

The most material intelligence which my information conveys is that the French detachment of troops which was at Caraccas had returned to Guadeloupe, and that there is at present no French force remaining in that province. 2ndly, that the intercourse between the same province and the island of Trinidad, since the late calamity happened to the town of Port of Spain by fire, has materially increased, and a friendly communication been so far established, that a great number of the Spanish inhabitants, sufferers at Trinidad, had been received and settled on the opposite part of the Continent, in a place called Guiria, with the consent and approbation of the present Governor of Cumana, who had permitted every assistance to be given to the Island, and received Governor Hislop's confidential agents in a most friendly manner. 3rdly, that, as to the dispositions of the inhabitants of these provinces, on hearing the information transmitted by me from this country, they were excessively willing to accede to it, and as well inclined to embrace the opportunity for emancipation as they ever were.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, at the moment of quitting this for Ireland, (General Stewart present) communicated to me a message from your lordship, purporting that the requests in my Memorandum of the 6th of June were agreed to, so far as it related to the re-establishment of my pension, and providing for my Secretary, Mr. Molini; which matter was to be referred to Mr. Vansittart's statement; that the other subjects would be decided after knowing the results from Spain; and that the original papers that I had transmitted to Government would be returned to me through General Stewart, with whom I was to continue in future my communications to Government, as I had previously done with Sir Arthur.

General Stewart, on the point of his departure, informed me that your lordship had agreed to the above pension, and the

support of my Secretary as given in by Mr. Vansittart's Memorandum, and that I was to apply to Mr. Cooke for payment of the same, on which account I beg your lordship will accept my most grateful acknowledgments and thanks.

Mr. Vansittart will have the goodness to inform you of the circumstance of two officers, Messrs. Downie and Roorbach, who, having, with the approbation of Sir Arthur Wellesley, been induced to wait for some time in this town, with the view of being usefully employed with me, may be entitled to receive some assistance or support from Government, if your lordship may deem it proper.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

FRAN. DE MIRANDA.

Memorandum.

Produce of the Mines of Spanish America, in 1806.

MEXICO, 1,352,348 dollars, in gold.
23,383,672 ,, in silver.

24,736,020

N.B. This is less than the usual produce, the average of several preceding years being about twenty-seven millions of dollars. The port of Vera Cruz is that from which shipments to Old Spain are made, a distance from the city of Mexico of 220 English miles.

PERU. Produce of Gold and Silver Mines of Peru, for ten years, from 80 to 89, both included:

Silver, made into plate . .	602,130 dollars.
Silver, made into ingots .	29,126,024 ,,
Gold	4,424,035 ,,
Annual[1] produce, about .	34,152,189

N.B. Lima is the city where the dollars are coined, and it is also the principal shipping port.

[1] So in MS.

Carthagena is the shipping port of Santa Fé, from which it is distant upwards of 200 miles; but the quantity of treasure collected or produced in this district is not great, perhaps not much exceeding a million of dollars per annum.

Rio de la Plata has hitherto been an important *débouchure* for the mines of Potosi, the place of deposit of the Royal Treasury, as well as the residence of the wealthiest of the trading companies of Spain.

General Miranda to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Grafton Street, ce 7 Fevrier, 1809.

Mon cher Général—J'ai reçu hier une lettre dont copie est ci-jointe ainsi que la traduction; et, comme c'est un sujet de la plus haute importance pour ce pays-ci ainsi que pour le mien, je vous la transmets sans délai, afin qu'étant communiquée aux Ministres de sa Majesté, on puisse prendre des mesures convenables et à tems.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous faire observer que si, le 20 Septembre, quand on avoit les prospects les plus favorables sur la Révolution de l'Espagne, le problème (comme dit l'auteur de cette lettre) n'etoit pas encore résolu en faveur des Patriotes à la Havane, quel sera le résultat aujourd'hui quand on apprendra le manque total du succès, et la soumission aux vues du prétendu nouveau Roi de las Indias, Joseph Bonaparte?

La personne à qui cette lettre est adressée est Don Josef de Toledo, Lieutenant de vaisseau dans la marine Espagnole, et ayant servi comme Adjutant-Général dans l'armée de Galice, commandée par Blake. Il est natif de la Havane, dont la famille m'a été connue dans le tems de mon séjour dans le pays. Son père commande actuellement *la Matricula* ou rôle d'equipages dans toute l'île, étant Créole lui-même, et d'une famille respectable dans le pays.

Il m'a communiqué bien d'autres choses, relativement à la situation actuelle des colonies Espagnoles dans le Nouveau Monde; mais comme c'est un sujet sur lequel les Ministres de

sa Majesté ne veulent pas tourner la vue dans ce moment-ci jusqu'à ce que les affaires de l'Espagne ne soient entièrement terminées, comme vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me dire l'autre jour, je m'en défends de vous en parler davantage—attendant avec impatience cette remarquable époque.

J'ai ajouté sur la copie ci-jointe la liste des escadres qui étoient au Ferrol, quand il quitta la Corogne le 17 du mois passé, en compagnie du Duc de Veraguas.

Etant toujours avec dévouement et considération, votre très humble et obéissant serviteur,

FRAN. DE MIRANDA.

Literal Translation.

Havana, September 20, 1808.

My dear Joe—for a long time have I experienced with regret the want of news from you; but, thank God, the political events in Spain have opened the door of the seas, and consequently to me that of communication with you.

I do not doubt, my dear son, that you have embraced the just cause, and that you would sacrifice yourself for it, without ever forgetting those principles of which you have so often given me proofs: and I repeat to you, what I have often told you, that I would rather lose you for ever than have the regret to learn that you do not rank among the honourable men. I have said enough to my beloved son.

You know that the infamous O'Farrel has many relations here, and is greatly allied by various other causes, as well as Casa-Calvo: these keep and foment a secret party, which may be very prejudicial to us; because the problem of the French politicians is not yet resolved. I wish you would minutely detail to me what has passed, and give me your opinion, with reflection, about the future, that I may with reserve do all that is in my power in behalf of my beloved country.

God make you as happy as is the wish of your father,

LEWIS.

Lord Castlereagh to the Rt. Hon. N. Vansittart.

Downing Street, August 2, 1809.

My Dear Sir—As you are much better acquainted with Miranda than I am, I venture to trouble you with the confidential perusal of the enclosed; and perhaps you will take the trouble to ascertain how far there is any truth in the representation received from Admiral Apodaca. I should very reluctantly adopt any measure of unkindness to Miranda; but, connected as we are with Spain, the honour of the country and of the Government must not be compromised; and I think you will be enabled to obtain assurances from Miranda, so distinct with respect to his conduct, as to justify me in continuing to him the protection which he now receives.

I beg you will excuse the liberty I have taken of availing myself of your good offices on the present occasion, and that you will believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Rt. Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Great Malvern, August 7, 1809.

My dear Lord—I should have felt considerable uneasiness from your lordship's letter of the 2nd instant, sensible as I am of the delicate situation in which Government is placed, if I did not feel confident that, in some way or other, Apodaca has been misinformed; and I can have no objection to state distinctly, for your lordship's and Mr. Canning's information only, my reasons for thinking so.

First, I am satisfied that Miranda has heard nothing through Brazil, since he received the letters which I showed to you, and to which he did not return any answer: but I think he mentioned something to me of a duplicate of an old letter of his, which he supposed to have been intercepted, and of which it is possible Apodaca may have heard.

Secondly, because I have strong reason to believe that, at present, he only wishes to be quiet and to wait for events; and

this not only from his declaration, but from his conduct on a very critical occasion, which lately happened, and which I should certainly have mentioned to your lordship, if I had not found you wished, as far as possible, to keep clear of all communications on the subject.

About six months ago, Miranda received a communication from Caraccas, his native place, pressing him, in the strongest manner, to go there immediately, stating that those who opposed him, when he appeared off the coast, in 1806, were now among the most eager for his return, offering him any money he might want, and even mentioning that a ship was ready for his accommodation. He consulted me immediately, and offered to take your directions as to the answer he should give, but I thought it best (considering what you had said to me) to advise him to decline the offer entirely with civility, without involving you in any way in the business. He accordingly answered that he did not, at present, think it advisable to go out, and referred the person who wrote to him to the public accounts and to his correspondence with your lordship, of which he sent a copy, for the state of affairs.

I think this transaction very material, not only to show his present disposition, but to prove how essential it is, even to Spanish interests, that he should remain, as at present, under the protection of this Government. If he was to leave this country, where could he go with personal safety but to the United States of America? And if he had received such a proposition there, I cannot doubt he would have accepted it; and that the consequence would have been an explosion, which could not fail of being very mischievous, whatever the event of it might have been.

I certainly do not attribute this disposition to be quiet to any change in his principles, but to his conviction that what he wishes must take place speedily, in the natural course of events; *i.e.*, either that Spain will be overrun by the French, (which is his decided opinion) and that, in that event, a sepa-

ration of the Colonies under British protection will take place of itself; or that, if Spain should be able to maintain the contest, she will be obliged to adopt a more liberal policy towards the Colonies, and admit them to a full participation of liberty and civil rights.

Of this there has very lately, for the first time, been some appearance, though Bonaparte was wise enough to assume the mask of it at first, by calling the pretended deputies of Mexico, Peru, &c., in common with those of Spain, to the assembly at Bayonne. But what has particularly pleased Miranda is, that the Marquess del Toro and some other persons, whom he considers as friends, at Caraccas, and who had been arrested, and were even said to have been executed by the Jamaica papers, have been set at liberty by the new Governor of Caraccas, Emparan.

I certainly shall not fail to use all my influence (which I believe is considerable) with him to confirm this disposition to be quiet, and I think I can answer for his doing nothing without consulting me. If you wish me to make any communication to him as from your lordship, in addition to my own advice, I shall be happy to do it.

I remain, my dear Lord, very sincèrely yours,

N. VANSITTART.

END OF VOL. VII.

F Shoberl, Jun., Rupert Street, Haymarket.


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